

SHÁH TAHMÁSB AND THE ÚZBEKS

(The Duel for Khurásán with 'Ubayd Khán: 930-940/1524-1540)

By

Martin B. Dickson

A DISSERTATION

Presented to the
Faculty of Princeton University
in Candidacy for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

Recommended for Acceptance by the
Department of Oriental Studies

May 1958

7685-
1958
.34

cop.1

(The Duel for Khurásán with 'Ubayd Khán: 1524-1540)

Section I: The Safavids and the Úzbeks at Sháh Tahmásb's Accession

in 930/1524 (pp.5-50): The necessary background is provided here: On the Safavid side, the basic terms Safaví, Shí'eh, Qizilbásh, úymáq and Tájik are defined with special emphasis on the úymáq system and the relationship of Dynasty and Qizilbásh--particularly in Khurásán. In turning to the Úzbeks, the focus is on the political system of "neo-eponymous appanage-states", with particular reference to the functions of the Dynastic House (Abū l-Ash'arid and Yādgárid), the "Grand Khán", the rule by "peers" and the seniority factor; theory and practice are examined as are the elements leading to a more conventional type of dynastic system. Safavid-Úzbek relations are then outlined for the previous period of Sháh Ismá'il and Shí'bání Khán which culminated in the Safavid occupation of Khurásán. The Sunni-Shí'eh issue is introduced as is the role of the Tímúrid-Mughals.

Section II: The Duel for Khurásán: Chapter 1. Period of the First

Úzbek Invasion:930-2/1524-0 (pp.51-84): The first Úzbek attempt on Herát is described as an "adventure" and as differing from the subsequent invasions in which 'Ubayd Khán was aiming at permanent conquest. The inability of the Qizilbásh to cope with the foreign danger is seen in the troubled accession of the Sháh and the First Ustájlú War in which the Rúmlú, Dív Sultán subverted an army intended for Khurásán, and used it to seize control of the regency despite the armed opposition of the Ustájlú. This úymáq seizure of control at Court is parallel with the Shámlú seizure of control in Khurásán and the elimination of the Tájik-bureaucratic opposition there. The Úzbek conquest of eastern Khurásán (Balkh) from the Mughals at this time is also noted.

Chapter 2: Period of the Second Uzbek Invasion: 933-5/1526-8 (pp. 85-141):

The lack of a "national" (i.e. Safavid-Qizilbāsh) policy is seen in the Second Ustājlu war which encouraged 'Ubayd Khān to attempt the conquest of Khurāsān. He first took the area from Mashhad to Astarābād and then held Harāt under a seven month siege of attrition. The Qizilbāsh atrocities on the Harātīs are described and seen to differ little from the similar acts of the Ūzbeks. The Court was finally able to organize its first liberation army after the Ūzbeks had raided Fīrūz-kūh. The result was the Battle of Jām, the one occasion when Shāh faced Khān in open battle and in which both sides were totally committed. The Qizilbāsh victory was due to the use of "modernized" Ottoman methods of warfare involving the use of heavy firepower unavailable to the Ūzbeks. The Qizilbāsh did not however follow through on their victory but turned westward instead to suppress a revolt in Baghdād in which the Ottomans were peripherally involved. The real victory of Jām lay in the fact that the Ūzbeks could not again be united to oppose the Qizilbāsh in the field.

Chapter 3: Period of the Third Uzbek Invasion: 935-7/1529-31 (pp. 142-190)

With the Qizilbāsh army in the west, and the sabotage due to factionalism at Court, 'Ubayd easily took Mashhad and Harāt by negotiated surrender. The alleged sectarian atrocities are refuted and it is seen that wealthy Sunnī and Shī'eh suffered alike despite the sectarian pretext. (The example of the execution of Hilālī is cited.) The new liberation army (a reflection of the Shāh's growing political stature) forced 'Ubayd to abandon Harāt; his efforts to raise a new all-Ūzbek army were vetoed by his "peers". This is the time of the exchange of correspondence between Shāh and Khān, the propagandistic content of which is analyzed. The Ūzbek-Mughal War is then cited as an example of the non-cohesiveness of Ūzbek policy; the Qizilbāsh equivalent is

noted, i.e. the suspicious acts of the Shāmlú which drew the royal army from Khurásán to Isfahán.

Chapter 4: Period of the Fourth Uzbek Invasion: 937-41/1531-4 (pp. 197-252)

On the domestic scene, the Qizilbāsh were effected by the "Takkalú Disaster" and the new Shāmlú hegemony at Court, and the Úzbeks by the election of Abú Sa'íd as Grand Khán. 'Ubayd then launched his new invasion and again took the area from Mashhad to Astarābād; however Harát resisted for a year and a half (the "long siege") during which time the Qizilbāsh garrison was again guilty of atrocities on the civilians. The Court, after two military seasons on the western front against an Ottoman threat, finally launched a new liberation drive at the approach of which 'Ubayd again fled, for he was faced with the disorders following Abú Sa'íd's death and the difficulties of securing his election as Grand Khán. The Sháh, in Harát, planned an offensive against the Úzbeks but this had to be abandoned at the surprise Ottoman invasion.

Chapter 5: The Ottoman Invasion and the "Grand Sedition": 940-2/1535-6

(pp. 253-295). Uzbek-Ottoman relations are briefly traced and the possibility of joint anti-Qizilbāsh action discussed. More than the military events, the emphasis is on the "Grand Sedition" of the úymáq who with Ottoman aid and possible Uzbek collusion attempted to unseat the Sháh in favor of the royal brother, Sám Mírzá, the rebellious governor of Khurásán. Inter-úymáq factionalism and its background are discussed and the Sedition given unity by connecting the Takkalú aspect in the west with the Shāmlú aspect in Khurásán. The Sháh's victory on both the foreign and domestic fronts is seen to have restored Sháh Ismá'il's dynasty-úymáq balance which resulted in the emergence of the Sháh as de facto ruler and the possibility of a "national" policy against the Uzbek attempts to annex Khurásán.

Chapter 6: Period of the Fifth and Final Uzbek Invasion: 941-4/1535-8
(pp. 290-300). The situation in Khurásán is traced through Qizilbásh localism and atrocities, the anti-Qizilbásh "Herát Revolution" and the second Uzbek occupation. 'Ubayd's evacuation and the mutiny raised against him are cited as evidence for a decline in his power and prestige. The final liberation of Khurásán is then described, which included an advance into Turkmenistan against the Khwárizmian Úzbeks and the temporary conquest of Candahár from the Mughals. The victory is seen as stemming from the new Qizilbásh unity arising after the suppression of the Grand Sedition, as opposed to 'Ubayd's loss of prestige among the Úzbeks and the resultant eclipse of his vision of a unified and expansionist Uzbek state.

Chapter 7: Concluding Events: 944-0/1538-40 (pp. 307-391). The revolts in Kháf and Astarábád and their Uzbek connections are then considered. This entails a discussion of the mixed Turkí-Hijrí dating system and the "chronological tangle" in the sources. The death of 'Ubayd Khán after the fiasco of his Khwárizmian invasion and a brief notice of subsequent Uzbek relations with Sháh Tahmásb conclude the study.

Appendix I (pp. I-XLIV) is devoted to a special study of the Khwárizmian Úzbeks during this period in which the emphasis is on political theory and the relations with the Qizilbásh. Abú'l-Gházi's Shajarah-yi Turk has been collated with the Safavid sources for these purposes.

Appendix II (pp. XLV-LXIV) is devoted to the sources, which are primary and near-contemporary. Safavid and Uzbek manuscripts and printed histories as well as standard Ottoman and Mughal sources have been consulted. Appendix III is a table of the Turkí-Hijrí correspondences and includes a list of the cishlács made during this period.

x.....Transliteration Note

1.....Preface

5.....Section I: The Safavids and the ʔzbeks at Shāh Tahmāsb's Accession in 930/1524

5.....Chapter 1: The Situation in Iran

5.....A: The Basic Terms: "Safavid", "Shī'eh", "ʔizilbāsh", "ʔymāq"

11.....B: The ʔizilbāsh-ʔymāq System at Court and in the Provinces

10.....C: The Administration of Khurāsān

20.....Chapter 2: The Political Situation among the ʔzbeks

20.....A: The Origins of the Two ʔzbek States

24.....B: The ʔzbek Political System

38.....Chapter 3: Safavid-ʔzbek Relations

38.....A: Shāh Ismā'il's Conquest of Khurāsān

42.....B: The Sectarian Factor

47.....Chapter 4: Bābur and the Tīmūrids

51.....Section II: The Duel for Khurāsān

51.....Chapter 1: The Period of the First ʔzbek Invasion (Pīchi-Takhācūy-It/930-932/1524-1526)

51.....A: The Troubled Accession of Shāh Tahmāsb

54.....B: The ʔzbek Siege of Harāt

64.....C: The First Ustājlu War

71.....D: Anarchy in Khurāsān

78.....E: The ʔzbeks Vis-à-vis the Chaghatāy and Tīmūrids

78.....i. The Chaghatāy Invasion of Māvarā'al-nahr

80.....ii. The ʔzbek Conquest of Balkh

85....Chapter 2: The Period of the Second Uzbek Invasion
(It-Tūngūz-Sichqān/933-935/1526-1528)

Part 1: The Uzbek Conquest of Mashhad and Astarābād

- 85.....A: The Favorable Situation for the Uzbeks
- 88.....B: The Uzbek Advance from Marv to Mashhad
- 88.....i. Marv
- 89.....ii. Sarakhs
- 90.....iii. Mashhad
- 91.....iv. The Question of Atrocities in Mashhad
- 93.....C: The Second Postponement of a Royal Khurāsān Campaign
- 93.....i. The Second Ustājlu war
- 95.....ii. The Tekkalū Hegemony
- 98.....D: The Uzbek Conquest of Astarābād
- 98.....i. The Clash at Isfarāīn
- 101.....ii. The First Conquest of Astarābād
- 104.....iii. The Retaking of Astarābād by the Qizilbāsh
- 106.....iv. The Second Uzbek Conquest of Astarābād and
the Battle of Bistām
- 109.....v. The Uzbek Qishlāq near Harāt

Part 2: The Siege of Harāt and the Battle of Jām

- 110.....A: The Second Uzbek Siege of Harāt
- 110.....i. The Qizilbāsh Resistance
- 112.....ii. The Qizilbāsh Expulsion of the "Civilians"
- 114.....iii. The Uzbek Retirement
- 116.....B: The Uzbek Victory at Fīrūzkūh
- 119.....C: The First Royal Liberation Campaign
- 119.....i. The Situation at Court and the Baghdād Usurpation
- 122.....ii. The Qizilbāsh Victory at Dāmghān
- 124.....iii. The Securing of the Khwārizmian Frontier and
the First Pilgrimage to Mashhad
- 127.....D: The Battle of Jām
- 127.....i. Introduction
- 131.....ii. The "All-Uzbek Army"
- 133.....iii. The Qizilbāsh Order of Battle
- 134.....iv. The First Phase of the Battle: The Qizilbāsh Rout
- 137.....v. The Second Phase of the Battle: The Qizilbāsh Victory
- 139.....vi. The Aftermath

142....Chapter 3: The Period of the Third Uzbek Invasion
(Ud-dars/935-937/1529-1531)

Part 1: The Uzbek Occupation of Khurásán

- 142.....A: Sháh Tahmásb's Baghdád Campaign: The Beginning of
the Ottoman Factor in Safavid-Uzbek Relations
- 145.....B: The Uzbek Occupation of Mashhad
- 145.....i. The Beginnings of the Third Invasion and the Fall
of Mashhad
- 147.....ii. 'Ubayd Khán's Pilgrimage: Aside on Inter-Sectar-
ian Relations on the Court Level
- 152.....C: The Uzbek Occupation of Harát
- 152.....i. The Fall of Harát and Factionalism at the Safa-
vid Court
- 155.....ii. The Uzbek Oppression: A Refutation of the Alleg-
ed Sectarian Motivation
- 161.....iii. 'Ubayd Khán's Intentions in Khurásán
- 160.....D: The Marv Qurultáy and the Internal Uzbek Situation
- 170.....E: The Uzbek-Mughal war of 935/1529
- 170.....i. General Considerations
- 170.....ii. Bábur's Planned Invasion of Mávará'al-nahr and
the Attempt on Balkh
- 174.....iii. The Uzbek-Mughal-Chaghatáy Convergence on Badakh-
shán
- 175.....iv. Conclusion of Uzbek-Mughal Affairs

Part 2: The Second Liberation of Khurásán

- 176.....A: The Liberation Campaign
- 176.....i. Factionalism at Court and the Khurásán Campaign
- 177.....ii. From Qazvín to Harát
- 180.....B: The Correspondence between Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán
- 180.....i. Sháh Tahmásb to 'Ubayd Khán
- 182.....ii. 'Ubayd Khán's Reply
- 186.....iii. Sháh Tahmásb's Reply
- 188.....C: Sháh Tahmásb in Harát
- 188.....i. The New Khurásán Administration (the Third)
- 190.....ii. Aside on the Poet Jámí, the "Grand Vazír" Qází
Jahán and Crypto-Sunnis
- 193.....iii. The Return of the Qizilbásh Army to the West
- 195.....D: The wanderings of the Shamlú fugitives from Khurásán

197....Chapter 4: The Period of the Fourth Uzbek Invasion
(Tūshqān-Lūy-Yīlān-Yūnt/937-941/1531-1534)

Part 1: The Domination of Domestic Concerns

- 197.....A: "The Takkalū Disaster" ✓
202.....B: The Ottoman Threat
204.....C: The New "Grand Khān": Abū Sa'īd
204.....i. The Dating Problem
206.....ii. The Accession and the Question of Seniority
210.....D: The Preliminary Uzbek Raid on Mashhad

Part 2: The Fourth Uzbek Invasion of Khurāsān

- 212.....A: The "Long Siege" of Harāt
212.....i. The Uzbek Position during the Siege
213.....ii. The Qizilbāsh Position during the Siege
215.....iii. Starvation, Desertions and Atrocities in Harāt
217.....iv. Attempted Peace Negotiations and Inner Uzbek
Tensions
219.....v. ILCHĪ's Rivāyat of an Uzbek-Qizilbāsh Rapproche-
ment
224.....B: The Uzbek Conquests from Mashhad to Astarābād
224.....i. The Northwestern Campaign of the Uzbeks
226.....ii. The Daring Uzbek Raid to Ray
228.....C: 'Ubayd Khān's Evacuation of Khurāsān and his Election
as "Grand Khān"

Part 3: The Third Royal Liberation of Khurāsān

- 238.....A: The Liberation of Northwestern Khurāsān
238.....i. The Beginning of the Campaign and the Liberation
of Astarābād
240.....ii. The Liberation of Sabzivār, Nishāpūr and Mashhad
241.....iii. The Martyrdom of an Uzbek Sunni "For the Love
of Imām Rizā"
243.....B: The Royal Entry into Harāt and the Appointment of
the Fourth Khurāsān Administration
246.....C: The Planned Qizilbāsh Offensive against the Uzbeks
246.....i. General Considerations
248.....ii. The Probing Qizilbāsh Missions against Marv
and Gharjistān
250.....iii. The Beginning and End of the Planned Offensive

253....Chapter 5: The Ottoman Invasion and the "Grand Sedition"
(Yunt--uy/940-942/1534-1536)

Part 1: The Ottoman "Campaign of the Two 'Iraqs'"

- 253.....A: General Considerations
255.....B: Uzbek-Ottoman Relations
260.....C: The Course of Action

Part 2: The "Grand Sedition"

- 265.....A: Background on Inter-Üymaq Factionalism ✓
265.....i. Introduction
265.....ii. The Sub-Stratum of Inter-Üymaq Relationships
268.....iii. The Üymaq Factions at the Time of the "Grand
Sedition"
272.....B: Background on the Khurásán or Shámlú Aspect of the
"Grand Sedition" ✓
276.....C: The Poison Plot
279.....D: Desertions and waverings: The Takkalú Aspect of the
"Grand Sedition" ✓
286.....E: Another hint of Uzbek Involvement in the "Grand Sed-
ition": The Sedition of Muẓaffar Khán of Gílán
289.....F: The Revolt of Sâm Mirzá and the Shámlú in Khurásán
289.....i. The beginning of the Revolt
292.....ii. The Afshár, the Action at Qandahár, and the End
of the Revolt

296....Chapter 6: The Period of the Fifth and Final Uzbek Invasion
(Üy-Pichi-Takhacuy/941-944/1535-1538)

Part 1: The Uzbek Invasion and Occupation of Khurásán

- 296.....A: The Raids Preceding the Main Invasion
296.....i. Khabúshán and Kalát
298.....ii. Rúhistán
300.....B: The Balkh-Uzbek Raid and the Beginnings of the
"Harát Revolution"
300.....i. Bayrám Üghlán and the Situation in Gharjistán
302.....ii. The Deteriorating Situation in Harát after Sâm
Mirzá's Departure
304.....iii. The "Popular Army" versus the Üzbeks

- 306.....C: The Interlude of Súfýán Khalífah Rúmlú in Harát
 306.....i. The Joint Qizilbásh-A'yán Invitation to Súfýán
 307.....ii. The New Qizilbásh Atrocities
- 310.....D: The Launching of 'Ubayd Khán's Fifth Invasion
 310.....i. The Beginnings of the Invasion and the Siege of
 Mashhad
 311.....ii. The Battle of 'Abdulábád and the Execution of Súfýán
 Khalífah
- 315.....E: The "Harát Revolution"
 315.....i. The Lynching of the Vazír of Harát
 318.....ii. The Anti-Qizilbásh Plot of the A'yán and Bulúkátí
 320.....iii. The Bulúkátí Siege of Harát and the Background
 for the Úzbek Alliance
- 325.....F: The Úzbek Conquest of Harát
 325.....i. The Siege of Harát
 327.....ii. The Úzbek-Bulúkátí Entry and the Short Sack of
 Harát
- 330.....G: The Second Úzbek Occupation of Harát
 330.....i. 'Ubayd Khán's Deteriorating Position (A Postulation)
 332.....ii. The Alleged Sectarian Atrocities
- 334.....H: The Úzbek Abandonment of Khurásán
 334.....i. The Úzbek Advance on Mashhad and the News of the
 Royal Liberation Campaign
 335.....ii. The Mutiny against 'Ubayd Khán and the Departure
 from Harát

Part 2: The Final Royal Campaign for the Liberation of Khurásán

- 338.....A: The Beginning of the Campaign: From Tabríz to Bistám
 338.....i. The Delayed Beginning of the Campaign
 339.....ii. The March to Bistám and the Emergence of Tahmásb
 as De Facto "Sháh"
- 344.....B: The Winter Campaign to Turkmenistan
 344.....i. The Northern Campaign
 347.....ii. The Khwárizmian-Qizilbásh Entente
- 348.....C: The Sháh in Harát
 348.....i. The Appointment of the New Governors to Khurásán
 352.....ii. The General Amnesty in Harát
- 356.....D: The Royal Conquest of Qandahár
- 359.....E: The Úzbek Embassies to Harát: The Effect of the Qizil-
 básh Resurgence on the Internal Úzbek Situation
- 363.....F: The Royal Withdrawal from Khurásán
 363.....i. Economic Chaos in Khurásán
 364.....ii. The Return to Tabríz

367....Chapter 7: Concluding Events
(It-Tunġuz, Sichān/944-946/1538-1540)

- 367.....A: The Revolt in Kháf
367.....i. General Narration of the Events
369.....ii. Further Details Mainly of a Chronological Nature

373.....B: The Revolt in Astarábád
373.....i. Establishing the Chronology: A Brief Statement
on the "Chronological Tangle" of the Mixed Turkí-
Hijrī Calendar System
379.....ii. The Background of the Revolt
380.....iii. The Revolt and the Khwárizmian Intervention
383.....iv. The Suppression of the Revolt and Concluding
Remarks on Astarábád and the Khwárizmian Úzbeks

385.....C: The Loss of Candahár and Concluding Remarks on the
Mughals

387.....D: The Death of 'Ubayd Khán and Concluding Remarks on
the Úzbeks
387.....i. The Political Status of 'Ubayd Khán at the Time
of his Death
389.....ii. The Cultural Attainments of 'Ubayd Khán
390.....iii. The Úzbeks after 'Ubayd Khán and their Relations
with Sháh Tahmásb

Section III: APPENDICES

- Appendix I: The Khwárizmian Úzbeks (930-946/1524-1540)
I.....Genealogical Tables: The Yádgárids from Neo-Eponymous
Clans to Dynasty
II.....Chapter 1: The Political Situation in Khwárizm in 930/1524
II.....A: The Founding of the Yádgárid Úzbek State
III.....B: The Use of GHAZI as a Historical Document
V.....C: The Succession of Ílbárs Khán
VIII.....D: The First Khwárizmian Civil War
X.....Chapter 2: The Khwárizmian-Úzbek Expansion to the Frontiers
of Khurásan
XVI.....Chapter 3: Khwárizmian Foreign Relations
XVI.....A: The Inter-Úzbek Anti-Gizilbásh Axis
XVIII.....B: Dín Muhammad and the Gizilbásh-Khwárizmian Accord
XXII.....C: Dín Muhammad's Relations with Sháh Tahmásb
According to JANG and GHAZI
XXV.....Chapter 4: The Second Khwárizmian Civil War
XXV.....A: The Origins of the Civil War
XXVII.....B: The First Results and the Attempted Súfyánid
usurpation
XXI.....Chapter 5: 'Ubayd Khán's Invasion of Khwárizm
XXI.....A: The Sources
XXII.....B: The Background
XXIV.....C: The First Phase: The Abú'l-Khayrid Occupation
of Urganch

XXXVII.....	<u>D</u> :	The Second Phase: The Khwārizmian Liberation
XLI.....	<u>Chapter 6</u> :	The Aftermath
XLI.....	<u>A</u> :	The Succession and Ūzbek Political Theory
XLIII.....	<u>B</u> :	Khwārizmian Relations with the Qizilbāsh

Appendix II: Sources and Bibliography

XLV.....	<u>A</u> :	Primary Sources and Key to Abbreviations
LXIV.....	<u>B</u> :	Secondary Sources

LXV.....	<u>Appendix III</u> :	<u>Table of Turkī-Hijrī-Milādī Correspondences and the Safavid-Ūzbek ʿishlāqs</u>
----------	-----------------------	---

Transliteration Note

The transliteration is based on the fact that the bulk of the sources used are in Persian. Thus both Arabic and Turkish words are transliterated in the Persian manner (e.g. Arabic Dhú'l-Qa'dah becomes Zú'l-Qa'deh, and Turkish oymak becomes úymaq). In the case of the few specific citations from the Ottoman sources, however, the new Turkish letters have been used (e.g. Lüneccimbaşı for Munajjimbáshí).

Note the following: s s̄ z z̄ ž t h for س ش ذ ظ ت ه.

The other consonants are as in English (note the use of ch, gh, kh, sh, zh, j, v).

The vowels are limited to the written a (as in bad), i, u, á, í, ú plus eh for (e.g. kháneh, mahrúseh). The diphthongs are ou and ay (e.g. doulat, shaykh).

Initial hamzeh is not indicated; in medial or final position it is noted as ʾ or ʔ (e.g. umará, Mávará'al-nahr). Also note the use of ʾ for the elision of the Arabic article (e.g. Abú'l-Khayrid).

'ayn is written ʿ except in the following frequently recurring proper nouns: 'Abbás, 'Abd, 'Alí, 'Irác-i 'Ajam, 'Irác-i 'Arab, 'Ismá'il, 'Sa'id, 'Shí'eh, 'Ubayd.

PREFACE

Within the broad field of Turco-Iranian interrelations the range of this dissertation has been narrowed down to a political study of the sixteen year period covering the duel for Khurásán waged by the forces of 'Ubayd Khán of the Ūzbeks and those of Sháh Tahmásb of the Safavids. While this sixteen year period may be considered moderately critical in the history of Ūzbek-Safavid relations as a whole, no claim can be made to its decisive importance per se. Certainly when viewed against the background of the total field it is a very minor affair indeed. Nonetheless it has been thought that by examining as exhaustively as possible one of the climactic periods of Turco-Iranian relations the knowledge thus gained could be used for understanding many of the broader issues involved.

A further limitation set has been the emphasis on the political aspect of these relations. It is hoped that the necessary background will emerge here to make subsequent cultural, economic and institutional studies more meaningful.

It may be thought that a detailed study of the Safavids and Ūzbeks in the preceding generation, when their relations began, would have served a more useful purpose. It must be candidly confessed however that the many problems involved in tracing the origins and the formative period of both the Safavid and Ūzbek states could not be coped with at this time. As against this, in the period of Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán the situation is already set and the lines already drawn; the problems involved in their relations can accordingly be viewed apart from the extraneous factors of a situation in being.

Nonetheless it is obvious that certain of these "extraneous factors" must be dealt with if the situation upon Sháh Tahmásb's accession in 930 A.H./1524 A.D. is to be understood. That is the purpose of the First Section which it is hoped will provide some of the necessary background for following Safavid-Úzbek relations in the "second generation".

The sixteen year period dealt with here may be called the "First Phase" of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks. It forms a very convenient unit for periodization from both the Safavid and Úzbek points of view in regard to domestic as well as to foreign affairs. The essential unity of this period will become apparent in the course of the narration which follows.

On the Safavid side it may be said that by the time of Sháh Ismá'il's death in 930/1524 the major themes of subsequent Safavid history had already been set, both on the foreign front where the Ottomans and the Úzbeks had been engaged, and on the domestic front where the basic institutions had been established. This does not however imply that stability had been achieved on these two fronts, for the foreign and domestic problems bequeathed by Sháh Ismá'il to his successors were only gradually and intermittently solved.

This dissertation is concerned with one of the unsolved problems inherited by Sháh Tahmásb: the feud with the Úzbeks over Khurásán. The analysis however will necessarily include some discussion of another foreign problem, that of the Ottomans; and on the domestic scene it will be essential to deal with the unresolved role of the Qizilbásh úymáq (oymak) in the Safavid state. The Ottomans affect our study when they threaten to or actually do

establish a western front which minimizes the Safavid effort in Khurásán; the Qizilbásh problem affects our study when it serves as a source of internal weakness encouraging the Úzbek designs, and when it directly affects the local situation in Khurásán.

A third subsidiary discussion will also be attempted on another unresolved problem inherited by the new Sháh, a problem which straddles both the foreign and domestic fronts; i.e. the sectarian factor. The Sunni-Shí'eh differentiation will be viewed as it relates to Úzbek-Safavid diplomacy and to the question of the alleged sectarian massacres and atrocities in Khurásán.

On the Úzbek side it must be admitted that the year 930/1524 is not wholly relevant to the periodization. By sheer coincidence, however, it is the probable date of the First Civil War in the Úzbek state of Khwárizm which did change the internal course of events and prepared the way for raiding into Iranian held Khurásán. For the more important Úzbek state of Mávará'al-nahr (Transoxania) the accession year of Sháh Tahmásb is relevant in the periodization only as it affected the possibilities of a sustained attempt to conquer Khurásán.

To follow Úzbek-Safavid relations and the attempted expansionism of 'Ubayd Khán from the Úzbek point of view, it becomes essential to understand the Úzbek internal political system. The lack of unity and stability provided by the system, or perhaps merely the fact that the system was in a state of flux, was to play a decisive role in relations with Iran quite independently of the deterrent capacity of Sháh Tahmásb's Qizilbásh army. Since the Úzbek political institutions are distinctive, they are described in Section I as providing essential background material,

and further attention is paid to this matter in the main course of the narrative.

The description of the sources used for this dissertation has been relegated to the Appendix on Sources and Bibliography. It should be noted here that on the Safavid side the history of the sixteen year period under discussion has been recorded in several chronicles and that the documentation is reasonably ample. This statement cannot however be made for the Úzbek side, for although the preceding period of Shíbaní Khán (d.916/1510) and the succeeding period of 'Abdulláh Khán (occupation of Bukhárá: 904/1557) are documented by contemporary sources, the period of 'Ubayd Khán himself is almost a total blank. There are a few details to be gleaned from the later Úzbek chronicles, and the attempt has been made to use these to maximum advantage. However it must be kept in mind that the absence of sufficient Úzbek documentation places a severe limitation upon this study. A certain amount of conjecture has become necessary, and it should be noted that the conclusions reached are frequently tentative.

Section I. The Safavids and the Ūzbeks at Sháh Tahmásb's

Accession in 930/1524

Chapter 1. The Situation in Iran

A. The Basic Terms: "Safavid", "Shí'eh", "Qizilbásh" and "Ūymáq"

The dynastic house established over Iran by Sháh Ismá'il at the beginning of the tenth Muslim or sixteenth Christian century was descended from Shaykh Safí al-Dín (d.1334): hence the family name "Safavid".

This Shaykh had begun a religious movement in Ardabíl in Āzar-báyjān which became increasingly political in its orientation with the succeeding generations. By the time Sháh Ismá'il made his bid for the control of Iran the original religious movement had become militantly "Shí'eh" in its approach to Islám; i.e. the minority theological view had been accepted in such matters as the succession to the Holy Prophet Muhammad (the Caliphs), the belief in the extension of Divine Grace to the Holy Prophet's lineal descendants (the twelve Imáms) and the special reverence for Hazrat-1 'Alí (St. 'Alí) as both first Caliph and first Imám. As opposed to the Shí'eh Safavids, their two major political rivals, the Ūzbeks and the Ottomans, had accepted the majority or "orthodox" view of the Sunní on these and other theological issues.

It is however not sufficient to describe the Safavid cause in terms of its Shí'eh inspiration alone. It represented a highly specialized variety of the Shí'eh theological views which was made distinctive by the special loyalty of its devotees to the Safavid family and by its organization, which was geared to a military as well as to a spiritual conquest.

The distinctive variety of Shí'eh Islám represented by the

Safavid cause may be conveniently termed "Qizilbâsh" (Kizilbaş). The literal translation of this Turkish word is "red-head"; it refers to the special red turban (the tâj or "crown") worn as a distinguishing insignia by the followers of the Safavid cause.

The term is used by extension to apply loosely to the Safavid ideology as a whole, to its specific institutions and to groups and individuals formally linked to the Safavid cause. Even more loose and wholly unwarranted is the use of the term, particularly in the contemporary foreign sources, to apply to Iran and Iranian during the period of the Safavid rule (1500-1722).

The use of the word "Red" today to apply to Communism, Communist or Communistic and then by extension to Russia and Russian would be a precise parallel. In fact the translation "Red" for "Qizilbâsh" would be ideal were it not for the modern connotations. The telling comparison made by Prof. V. Minorsky (Tadhkirat al-Mulúk, London 1943, p.125) of the Safavid system with the monoparty states of today lends to the semantic comparison of "Red" and "Qizilbâsh" made here.

The military basis of the Safavid-Qizilbâsh variety of Shí'eh Islâm was provided by the organization of the converts to the movement into the "úymâq" (pronunciation: oymak), a term generally and quite loosely translated as "tribe".

There is much that is perplexing about the origins of these Qizilbâsh úymâq and the history of their association with the Safavid House. Some of the úymâq may well have been nomadizing tribes or segments of tribes which had joined the Safavid cause en masse. The Turkmán and the Zú'l-Qadar úymâq, consisting of the remnants of preceding semi-urbanized dynasties in Anatolia or Western Iran (the Turkmán úymâq is to be associated with the Aqquyúnlu

dynasty) cannot however be considered entirely as nomadizing tribes. Nor in all likelihood can the Rúmlú (i.e. those from Rúm or Anatolia) be so considered for they are traditionally said to have been descended from a group of prisoners bequeathed to the Safavids during Tímúr's (d.1405) passage through Ážarbáyján.

The only generalization that can properly be made is that the origins of the Qizilbásh úymáq and the circumstances attending their adhesion to the Safavid House are varied. Furthermore, despite the fact that the úymáq form a key element, much of their internal organization and their interrelationships remain equally vague. It can only be said that the problems involved are yet to be definitively investigated.

In the main narrative of this dissertation some attention will be paid to the úymáq system and to the political role of the major úymáq such as the Shámlú, Ustájlú, Rúmlú, Zú'l-Qadar, Afshár, Turkmán and Qájár. (For a full listing of the Qizilbásh úymáq see TAAA/104-106, 762-763.)¹ The basic domestic fact in the period of Sháh Tahmásb discussed here is the inter-úymáq rivalry, and since the úymáq role can be better understood in that context, this discussion will be resumed at the pertinent points.

It is important to note that these Qizilbásh úymáq, or rather the individuals in these úymáq, formed a closed class group with special privileges and duties revolving mainly about their military functions and their special proximity to the Safavid House. Whatever the explanation of the origin of the

1. For the abbreviations used to designate the sources, see the Appendix on Sources and Bibliography. TAAA stands for the Tá-ríkh-i 'Álam-ará-yi 'Abbási.

úymáq or of how an individual convert to the Safavid cause was fitted into the úymáq structure during the early history of the movement, it seems quite clear that by the time of Sháh Ismá'il an individual no longer became a Qizilbásh by simply becoming a convert to the cause of the Safavid House. An individual became a Qizilbásh only by being born into one of the úymáq associated with the Safavid House. This meant that the conquered population^{of} Iran, even when accepting the Shí'eh sect and the Safavid dynasty did not, and could not become Qizilbásh, for they were outside the úymáq organization.

Thus after Sháh Ismá'il's conquest the population of Iran was divided broadly into two closed classes: the Qizilbásh and all others. The "all others" are vaguely referred to in the sources as the "Tájik" in contradistinction to the Qizilbásh who are referred to as "Turk". (The use of these terms in the sources is independent of ethnic considerations.) The "all others" are also referred to, but even more vaguely, as the ra'ayat or "the protected community".

However this dichotomy far from explains the class system of the time. Within the úymáq themselves were the "chiefs", the umará, who with their gradated titles of Bek (Bik), Sultán and Khán occupied high positions at Court and the governorships of the provinces. To the umará would be contrasted the bulk of the úymáq who provided the main manpower in the Safavid armies. Since the internal structure of the úymáq is not sufficiently known, one cannot judge how open movement upward was within the ranks.

Similarly among the ra'ayat or the "Tájik" there was naturally enough a great deal of differentiation among the "villager" (da-háti), the "peasant" (rustáyi), the locally established landed

families (a'yán or arbáb), and the prestigious religious and intellectual groups (sádát and ulamá). The "Tájík" were also the bureaucrats and the administrators of the Safavid-Qizilbásh-Úymáq state, and as such frequently held key positions at both the Court and in the provincial administrations.

No attempt can be made here to trace the social stratification; but it can be broadly stated that the new Safavid state simply provided a new power superstructure superseding the previous Accuyúnú dynasty in western Iran and the Tímúrid dynasty in eastern Iran. Exactly how much of the existing social system had been changed by the Qizilbásh innovation could only be determined by an intensive study of the subject.

Although the Qizilbásh formed a closed class group with specific military functions, their social and political role in the new Safavid state was never defined with any great precision; the differentiation between "Turk" and "Tájík" was not as sharp in practice as it was in theory. There are examples which will be cited of non-Qizilbásh (i.e. individuals not belonging to one of the úymáq) who occupied military posts and governorships which were theoretically reserved for the Qizilbásh. There are also examples of Qizilbásh (i.e. úymáq members) who acted in the capacity of Court administrators, a function that should have been reserved for the "Tájík".

This lack of "functional specificity" in the Qizilbásh role, to use sociological jargon, was to be a major source of weakness for the úymáq themselves, and eventually prepared the way for their gradual elimination as the basic power structure underlying the Safavid state. But more important for the immediate purposes

of this dissertation was the lack of a clearly defined relationship between the úymáq and the Safavid House once the basic purpose of the original military arrangement had been achieved, i.e. after the consolidation of the conquest of Iran --and the accession of Sháh Tahmásb.

B. The Qizilbāsh-Ūymāq System at Court and in the Provinces

Although, as stated above, the origins and inter-relations of the Qizilbāsh ūymāq and their adherence to the early Safavid house and to Shāh Ismā'il are yet to be fully investigated, certain facts are reasonably clear by the time of Shāh Tahmāsb's coronation.¹ By then they formed the major ruling element of the state in their military capacity for the most part, but also to a lesser degree in their administrative capacity² (particularly the Qizilbāsh governors in the provinces).

Their influence at Court was maintained through the post of the amīr al-umarā ("head of the Qizilbāsh 'chiefs'"), known also

1. Prof. V. Minorsky has already initiated the study of these problems and indicated the main lines of the approach to be followed in his penetrating notes and additions to the Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, particularly pp. 14-19, 189-195.

2. The most important administrative post regularly held by the Qizilbāsh (outside of the vakālat, or position of vakīl) was that of muhrdār ("Keeper of the Seal"). As early as 907/1501-2 AHSAN/59 mentions Sārū 'Alī Takkalū as muhrdār. After his death in 912/1506-7 (AHSAN/90) we find that Amīr Bek Mūsillū (Turkman) was appointed to this post (LUBB/249, AHSAN/93). The practice was continued under Shāh Tahmāsb, when the most notable example was Shāh Qulī Khalīfeh Zū'l-Qadar who was muhrdār from about 941 to 965/ca. 1534-58 (for his death notice see AHSAN/403).

Other examples of Qizilbāsh in administrative posts at the Court of Shāh Ismā'il are:

a) Mahtar Shāh Qulī Rikābdār ("Keeper of the Stables") to whose name NUSAKH/211a adds the nisbeh ("name of origin") of 'Arabgīrlū. Since it is known from TAAA/702 that the 'Arabgīrlū "merged with the Shāmlū at this time" (i.e. at the time of Shāh 'Abbās) it can be assumed that they formed a minor Qizilbāsh group at the time of Shāh Ismā'il as well.

b) Chāyān Sultān Ustājilū, previous to his appointment as vakīl in 915/1509-10, is called in LUBB/250 and AHSAN/110 "Muhammad Bek Sufrehchī" (i.e. "Keeper of the Table").

There was probably not always a clear-cut division of the roles of the Qizilbāsh and non-Qizilbāsh in the period of Shāh Ismā'il's early activity. Thus Qāzī Muhammad Kāshānī, the sadr, is said in LUBB/250 and AHSAN/110 to have also held the governorships of Yazd, Kāshān, much of 'Irāq-i 'Ajam and of Shīrāz by the time of his execution in 915/1509-10. There is however some doubt here since none of these secular posts are mentioned in HABIB's/474-5, 499-500 account of the sadr. (Note: AHSAN has merely copied LUBB here verbatim and cannot therefore be considered as an independent source in evaluating the LUBB-HABIB discrepancy.)

as the vakíl ("deputy"). However the Qizilbásh role at Court was not formally regularized, and seems to have been exerted mainly on the basis of informal advice to the Sháh by the most prestigious Qizilbásh.

The post of vakíl, while evidently not of major importance in the time of Sháh Ismá'il's firm control of the Qizilbásh (Cháyán Sultán Ustájlú, the incumbent from ca.915-930/ca.1509-1524, does not play a particularly prominent role in the chronicles), was to be the focal point in the inter-úymáq wars for the regency which broke out at the accession of Sháh Tahmásb. The deaths of Cháyán Sultán and of his son Báyzíd, who had been appointed as vakíl in his father's place, occurred just prior to Sháh Ismá'il's own death, and although Dív Sultán Rúmlú seems to have been appointed to the post a bit before Sháh Tahmásb's accession, there was considerable confusion on this score at the beginning of the new reign.¹

1. NUSAKH/211a, AHSAN/118, SHARAF/548 and LUBB/258-9 have certain discrepancies in their descriptions of these events which will be further examined in the main narrative. The events are not mentioned in HABIB.

The date of the death of the Ustájlú vakíl--a rather important matter since very dramatic consequences were to follow at the very beginning of Sháh Tahmásb's reign -- is not given with any precision in the sources. Nonetheless it can be placed reasonably accurately as having occurred between Rabí'I and the Nou Rúz (5 JumádíI) of 930, i.e. between 8 January and 11 March, 1524. The event is thus placed at no more than two and a half to four and a half months before the death of Sháh Ismá'il and the accession of Sháh Tahmásb.

The establishment of the date is as follows: a) NUSAKH, which carefully follows the "Turkí year" based on a Nou Rúz of 11 March, places the event under the year called "Qúy/929" which began 29 Rabí'II in 929 and extended to 5 JumádíI in 930. b) HABIB, completed in Rabí'I of 930 (i.e. still within the Turkí year of "Qúy/929") makes no mention of the event; presumably it occurred after the completion date. c) To go beyond Rabí'I 930 and still remain in the year of "Qúy" leaves an unknown portion of the month of Rabí'I itself, all of Rabí'II, and the first four days of JumádíI.

The date of "930" given in LUBB and AHSAN for this event is thus seen to be referring to the actual Hijrí year. There is no discrepancy with NUSAKH's so-called "929" (i.e. Turkí style) which actually did include a portion of Hijrí 930. (See discussion on the "Chronological Tangle" pp. 373-378 .)

The governorships of most of the provinces directly controlled by the Safavid House were held by the Qizilbāsh umará. With each governor ¹ was a military contingent mainly derived from his own personal úymáq. The various úymáq accordingly came to be distributed throughout Iran with each new provincial appointment. The local Qizilbāsh armies were used for policing the provinces and were also subject to mobilization into the royal armies in times of national emergency.

Under Shāh Ismā'īl the governors were completely dependent upon the Court and were frequently changed as either punishment or reward. Since Shāh Tahmāsb was at the mercy of the Qizilbāsh at his accession, there were at first no changes in the governorships.

The most important Qizilbāsh governors (outside of Khurāsān) in 930 were probably² as follows: Jūheh Sultān Takkalú at Isfahān; Cerājeḥ Sultān Takkalú at Hamadān; 'Alī Sultān Zū'l-Qadar at Shirāz; Bādinjān Sultān Rūmlú at Ardabīl; Ibrāhīm Khān Mūsillú (Turkmān) at Baghdād; Ahmad Sultān Sūfī-ūghlī (Sufioğlu) Ustājlu at Kirmān; and either Akhī Sultān Takkalú or 'Abdullāh Khān Ustājlu at Qazvin.

The Qizilbāsh-Úymáq system seems to have worked reasonably well in the period of Shāh Ismā'īl. However its inherent weaknesses (e.g. the lack of clearly defined roles and the resultant complete dependence on the personality of the head of the Safavid House; the inter-úymáq rivalries for prize positions) immediately became

1. The sources generally use the term hákim for "governor"; the words válí, dārúgheh, bíklarbík (beylerbey) and tuyuldár are sometimes used and would seem to be quite synonymous for the period of Shāh Tahmāsb investigated here.

2. It is difficult to establish a list of the governorships for the period. The above list has been derived from random references scattered in the sources for the period of about 930-933/1524-27.

apparent upon the accession of Sháh Tahmásb. Khwándamír's closing statements to his history of Sháh Ismá'il (HABIB/002), written less than five months before the Sháh's death and summarizing his views on the situation at the time, demonstrate the apparent stability of the Qizilbásh system at the time. For example: "The governors of the inhabited quarter and the sultáns of the universe [i.e. the Qizilbásh umará of Iran] dutifully obey the writ of his [Sháh Ismá'il] commands; no one of any eminence entertains the slightest thought of opposition." ¹ The events which were to begin a few months later completely belie the statement.

There was a second ruling element in Sháh Ismá'il's Iran which handled most of the administrative facet of the state--both at Court and in the provinces. The bureaucracy seems to have been recruited mostly from the staffs of the superseded Aqquyúnlú and Timúrid dynasties,² and were, as has been noted above, not of the Qizilbásh úymáq.

The two most important administrative posts at Court were those of the vazír and the sadr, handling secular and religious affairs respectively. At the time of Sháh Ismá'il's death, the post of vazír was held by Khwájeh Jalál al-Dín Khwándamír Tabrizi;

1. "Hukkám-i rub'-i maskún va salátn-i 'alam-i kun fa yakún sar bar khatt-i fármán-i vájib al-iẓ'ánash nihádeh hích sáhib-i shouqatí khiyál-i mukhálafat b-payráman-i zamír namíguzárad."

2. E.g. LUBB/241-2 and AHSAN/54,130 note the coming to Sháh Ismá'il's Court in 906/1500-1 of Amír Shams al-Dín Zakariyá (Zakaryá) who had formerly been the vazír to the Aqquyúnlú, and his appointment as the Safavid vazír. A good example on the Timúrid side is Amír Ghiyás al-Dín Muhammad whose detailed biography is given in HABIB/581-4. He had been in the service of the Timúrids at Harát, then entered the Úzbek service at Shibání Khán's conquest, and was finally appointed as ráz of Harát and then sadr of Khurásan by Sháh Ismá'il.

he had replaced the assassinated mīrzā Shāh Husayn Isfahānī just one year before (HABIB/595-99, AHSAN/177-80). Shāh Tahmāsb attempted to retain him, but he was killed by the Qizilbāsh at the very beginning of the inter-ūymāq wars. Shāh Ismā'il's last sadr had been Amīr Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad Astarābādī; he was retained by the new Shāh but died a natural death one year later (AHSAN/189-91).

The provincial administrators were either sent directly by the Court (e.g. Khwājeh Muẓaffar Tabakchī, originally of the Astarābād area was sent to join the Khurāsān administration at Harāt¹); or they were of local origin in their appointed province (e.g. Amīr Ghiyās al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Amīr Yūsuf, of whom NUSAKH/209a says: his family was originally of the sayyids [descendants of the Holy Prophet] of Ray [Rey], but he himself was brought up in Harāt).

This group constituted a stable bureaucratic tradition which, despite corruption and frequent identification with Qizilbāsh extortions and atrocities², was a reasonably positive element in Shāh Tahmāsb's inheritance. They became the associates of the Qizilbāsh in much the same manner as they had been the associates of the ruling elements of the preceding dynasties which had conquered Iran.

1. For his coming to enter Shāh Ismā'il's service, see HABIB/507 and AHSAN/115; for his appointment to the Third Khurāsān Administration, see HABIB/590.

2. A notorious example of corruption and extortion took place in the khurāsān administration of "Prince" Tahmāsb and Amīr Khān Turkmán. The entire administration was finally dismissed by Shāh Ismā'il and the individuals involved--both Qizilbāsh and non-Qizilbāsh-- were brought to a royal trial held in Tabrīz in 928/1522. The guilty were required to make restitution, their property was then expropriated and they were temporarily imprisoned. The Qizilbāsh governor himself, Amīr Khān, died before he could be brought to trial. For the details, see HABIB/593-4. LUBB/258 openly states that the physicians treating Amīr Khān's final illness caused his death "amḍān" ("intentionally").

C. The Administration of Khurásán

In modern geographical terms the boundaries of the area loosely referred to as Khurásán in the sources may be approximately described as follows: north -- the Qara Qum Desert of Turkmenistan and the Amu Derya (the Oxus River) of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan; east -- the Pamir-Karakorum mountain wall of Sinkiang, India and Pakistan; south -- the Hindukush Mountains of Afghanistan and the Baluchistan desert of Pakistan and Iran; west -- the Dasht-i Kabir Desert of Iran. It is the area of Afghanistan, eastern Iran and southern Turkmenistan.

In 930/1524 the main centers in khurásán were Harát (the capital), Mashhad (the site of the particularly revered shrine of the eighth Imám, Rizá), and Balkh. To these, the peripheral areas of Astarábád, Qandahár and Kábul should be added, for while perhaps not technically part of Khurásán, their history at this time is inseparably linked with events in Khurásán proper.

Possession of the province at this time was divided between the Safavids who held Harát, Mashhad and Astarábád, and the last of the Tímúrids, Bábur, at Kábul, Qandahár and Balkh. There was however nothing permanent about this political partition, for it was of recent origin and, as will be seen shortly, the situation in Khurásán was in flux. As a matter of fact the two Úzbek states of Khwárizm and mávárá'al-nahr (Transoxania) were already reviving their stake in the area and were sending raiders and armies southward across the Qará Qum Desert and the Ámú River respectively, in the very year of Sháh Tahmásb's accession.

The Safavid controlled portion of khurásán had been integrated into the Qizilbásh system by Sháh Ismá'íl at the end of the

916-919/1510-13 series of wars with the Úzbeks from whom the area was wrested. The First Administration¹ then appointed (919-921/1513-15) was under Zaynal Khán Shámlú at Harát and Div Sultán Rúmlú at Balkh. The period was marked by an acute famine in Khurásán, Úzbek raids across the Ámú, and the loss of Balkh to the Tímúrids.

A Second Administration (921-927/1515-21) was then appointed by the Sháh to counteract these disasters. The custom, which was to continue until the time of Sháh 'Abbás (reigned: 996-1038/1588-1629) was then inaugurated whereby a royal prince was appointed as titular governor to Khurásán with a Qizilbásh laleh ("guardian") who actually governed the province in his name. The local army or garrisons were recruited for the most part from the laleh's own úymáq. The residence of the governors was established at Harát. Interestingly enough, the first "royal governor" of Khurásán was the future Sháh Tahmásb himself, a two-year old infant at the time of his appointment. His laleh was Amír Khán Turkmán.²

1. HABIB is an excellent source for the internal events in Khurásán during the period of the Three Administrations, for the author's patrons, Amír Ghiyás al-Dín Muhammad and Khwájah Habibulláh (after whom the Habib al-Siyar is named) were active administrators in Khurásán at the time. NUSAKH/209a-211a also gives an account of Khurásán during this period and has a few details not found in HABIB. LUBB and AHSAN have very little information on the subject.

The references from HABIB are as follows: First Administration, pp.552-3; Second Administration, pp.553-4, 572-3, 575-81, 585-593; Third Administration, pp.586-593.

2. For his career as Aqquyúnlu governor of Diyárbakr and his entering Sháh Ismá'il's service as muhrdár, see LUBB/249, AHSAN/90 and HABIB/575.

"Turkmán" is one of the Qizilbásh úymáq and is listed as such in TAAA/105, 702. It is derived from the Aqquyúnlu or "Turkman" who joined the Safavid cause (e.g. see TAAA/105 and AHSAN/170. "Músillú" (i.e. from Músil or Mosul), the other nisbeh by which Amír Khán is known, similarly indicates Aqquyúnlu-Turkmán origins. This Qizilbásh úymáq of Turkmán is of course quite dis-

This Administration was finally dismissed by Sháh Ismá'il for corruption, for the political murder of the sadr of Khurásán, and for ineptitude in handling the Úzbek siege of Harát in 927/1521 and Bábur's threat to Qandahár. Among the Qizilbásh in Harát at this time was Súfyán Khalífah Rúmlú, who was to play an important role in Khurásán at the time of Sháh Tahmásb.

It is the Third Administration, formed at the end of 927/1521 that we meet at Sháh Tahmásb's accession. According to HABIB/553, 590, Safavid Khurásán then extended from "Simnán" (or "the borders of Mázandarán") "to the Ámú" , "and southward up to [tá] Ghúr and Gharjistán and Sístán". (Ghúr and Gharjistán in the northern foothills of the Hindúkush, together with Balkh, Qandahár, Qunduz and the Pamir salient of Badakhshán were held by Bábur.)

The titular governor was then the seven-year old Sâm Mírzá, the younger brother of Sháh Tahmásb; his laleh, the real governor, was Dúrmish Khán Shámlú. Along with the new Shámlú¹ administra-

tion distinct from the Turkmán of Turkmenistan whom we shall meet on the Safavid-Khwárizmian frontiers. These were a nomadic tribal group who were not fully incorporated among the Qizilbásh úymáq.

It is of passing interest to note that the Mughal and Chaghatáy sources (e.g. BABUR/354a, TABAQAT/61, RASHIDI/234, 236) sometimes use the term "Turkmán" to refer to the Qizilbásh in general, evidently on the assumption that the Safavids were a direct continuation of the Aqquyúnlu-Turkmán régime. This is in line with Prof. Minorsky's thesis of the close connections between the Aqquyúnlu and the Safavids.

1. The Shámlú had been associated with Khurásán from the very beginning of the conquest. The first governor appointed by Sháh Ismá'il at his initial entry into Harát was Husayn Bek Laleh, whom LUBB/242 cites as a Shámlú. Another Shámlú, Zaynal Khán was appointed upon the Sháh's second entry into Harát and headed what we have called the First Administration. The Third Administration was again Shámlú (under Dúrmish Khán). The narrative below will give a detailed account of the Shámlú in Khurásán until their fall from grace in 941/1534. The Shámlú subsequently played a very minor role in Qizilbásh affairs until the period of Sháh Muḥammad Khudábadeh when 'Alí Qulí Khán revived the fortunes of the Shámlú as Sháh 'Abbás' laleh--significantly enough, once again in Khurásán.

tion came such Qizilbāsh figures as Khalīfeh Muḥammad Sultān, Sirāj al-Dīn Bek, Halhal Bahādur and Khizr Bek. Among the administrators sent by the Court to be attached to the Shāmlú were Khwājeh Muẓaffar Tabakchī (Bitikchī?) and Khwājeh Habībullāh, who became vazīr of the province. y^c

Dūrmish Khān himself appointed the following as sub-governors for the areas of Khurāsān outside Harāt:

Zayn al-Khān Shāmlú to Astarābād (Jurjān); Zayn al-Dīn Sultān Shāmlú to Isfarāīn and Nīshāpūr; Būrūn Sultān Takkalú (who had previously held Isfarāīn) to Tūs and Mashhad; Chakirgeh Sultān Shāmlú was confirmed at Sabzivār; Ahmad Bek Afshār (formerly governor at Mashhad) was finally appointed to Farāh and the Harātrūd river valley after a period of sulking and Shāh Ismā'īl's personal intervention in the matter.

Other personnel active in Khurāsān in 930/1524 will be introduced in the main narrative of events.

It is thus seen that by 930 western Khurāsān was a fully integrated province of Safavid Iran. It had its own dynastic representative -- Sām Mirzā, its own úymāq -- mostly the Shāmlú, and an imposing array of Tājīk administrators. Like Iran as a whole however, this entire provincial edifice was to be severely shaken at the accession of Shāh Tahmāsb and the changes in the dynastic-úymāq balance which ensued, for the same issues and frequently the same personnel were involved at both the Court and at Harāt. The chaos that was to fall upon Khurāsān was moreover intensified by its special problem: it was a border province, directly exposed to the Úzbeks who were ever ready for an opportunity to revive the feud begun by Shībānī Khān and Shāh Ismā'īl and dispute the Safavid occupation.

Chapter 2. The Situation among the Ūzbeks

A. The Origins of the Two Ūzbek States¹

A detailed account of Ūzbek origins would carry us very far afield indeed.² There are however a few basic facts which should be considered if the Ūzbek internal situation at the time of Sháh Tahmásb's accession is to be understood.

Both the Mávará'al-nahr and the Khwárizmian Ūzbeks trace the descent of their ruling Dynastic Houses from Shíbán,³ son of Júchí, son of Changíz (Jengiz) Khán. There was in addition a third con-

1. Fuller references to the Khwárizmian Ūzbek state will be found in Appendix I.

2. Tracing the origins of the Ūzbeks and of the tribes associated with their dominion would entail a total study of Turco-Mongol tribal history to ca. 900/1500. By far the best bibliography compiled for such a study is to be found in Prof. Zeki Velidi Togan's Tarihde Usul (Istanbul 1950) pp.193-282. Of more immediate concern to the Ūzbek Dynastic House up to the death of Shíbání Khán in 910/1510 are the lists given there for the Mongols (pp.210-213), Tímúrids (pp.213-218) and the Ūzbeks themselves (pp.235-6).

For a general description of the early history of the Ūzbek Dynastic House see: Encyclopaedia of Islam (London and Leyden 1913-1934) ("Abú'l-Khair" by W.Barthold; "Shaibánids" by W.Barthold; and "Shaibání Khán" by L.Bouvat) ; Bugúnkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve yakín tarihi (Istanbul 1942-1947) by Zeki Velidi Togan, pp.31-32, 41,42; Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR (Akademiya Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, Tashkent 1956) pp.380-391; Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR (Akademiya Nauk Kazakhskoy SSR, Alma-Ata 1957) pp.131-143 (containing an interesting study of the "ethnogenetical" process in the formation of the Kazakh (Qazaq) and Ūzbek peoples of today) ; and History of the Mongols by Sir Henry Hoyle Howorth (London 1870-1927) Part II pp.680-695, 876-879.

3. The transliteration of Turkish and Mongol names such as Shíbán or Júchí (often written "Júji") does not of course represent the true pronunciation of the vowels. The correct pronunciation, established by Zeki Velidi Togan in Bugúnkü Türkili (op.cit.) in his notes on p.123 and p.18, should be Shíban and Jochí. The usual transliteration as Shai-bánid or Shey-bánid should therefore be amended to Shí-bánid. For the j/ch confusion (as in Júchí and Changíz) see the Ūzbekische Grammatik by A.von Gabain (Leipzig 1945) p.24.

temporary "Shibánid" line (not however "Úzbek") in western Siberia or Túrâ.¹ The customary use of the term "Shibánid" to apply exclusively to the Mávará'al-nahr ruling line is thus seen to be quite inappropriate. It is an equally misleading term if the reference is meant to Muḥammad Shibání Khán, the founder of the Mávará'al-nahr Úzbek state, for at his death the leadership passed through the lines of his brother and uncles; his direct descendants play a very minor role in the subsequent history of Mávará'al-nahr.

The chronicles, both indigenous and Safavid, use the term "Úzbek" (more properly: Úzbak) to apply indiscriminately to the ruling element of both states, and, indeed, in Safavid sources there is sometimes doubt as to which of the two states a reference is meant to apply. The origin of this term "Úzbek" (pronunciation: özbek ²) is still debated, although the general impression would be of some tenuous connection with Úzbek Khán of the Golden Horde.³


The terms "Changízid", "Júchid", "Shibánid", and "Úzbek" used in the sources, and the split between what subsequently became the Khwárizmian Dynastic House of the "Yádgárids" and the Mávará'al-nahr Dynastic House of the "Abú'l-Khayrids" become clearer from the following condensed genealogical table: ⁴

1. For the Bek Qúndí Shibánid line of Sibir, see Bugünkü Türkili pp.123-4, 135-6 and Howorth(op.cit.)pp.978-1010.

2. For the correct pronuciation as özbek for the written úzbak, see Ozbekische Grammatik p.4.

3. See for example, W. Barthold, Histoire des turcs d'Asie Centrale (Paris 1945) pp.139-140.

4. The Safavid sources giving the descent of the Yádgárids and Abú'l-Khayrids are: NUSAKH/159b (and the derivatory HAYDARI/56b and SHIRAZI/260a), KHULASEH/237b and AHSAN/234.



According to GHAZI/194-207, the forefathers of the Ūzbeks, the two brothers, Ibráhīm and 'Arabsháh nomadized together, and a definitive split between the two branches of the family did not occur until the death of Abú'l-Khayr Khán (873/1408) when the hegemony he had gained over the Dasht-i Qipcháq (the general area of modern Kazakhstan) was dissolved. The two branches then went their separate and mutually hostile ways. By 906/1500 Shībání Khán had taken Samarcand from the Tímúrids and had begun the Abú'l-Khayrid dominion over Mávará'al-nahr. And by ca.916/1510 Ilbárs Khán had taken the city of Vazír from a momentary Safavid occupation and had begun the Yádgarid dominion over Khwárizm on the Ámú River delta of the Aral Sea.

Although both "khánates" shared many common traditions, their history from that point on diverged and their rival ambitions were sometimes to clash. Sháh Tahmásb had thus to face two independent Ūzbek states with distinctive foreign policies. Both bordered on Khurásán and both posed threats (albeit of different natures) to the Safavid control of the area. In general it may be said that the Yádgarid Ūzbeks of Khwárizm (as well as the Turkmán tribes who were gradually being incorporated into the Khwárizmian state at this time) were principally concerned with raiding and sporadic attempts to hold strategic border towns; the Abú'l-Khayrid Ūzbeks of Mávará'al-nahr, however, were attempting the direct annexation of Khurásán.

B. The Uzbek Political System

While this dissertation is not directly oriented toward a presentation of either Safavid or Uzbek domestic history,¹ it is quite obvious that the respective internal situations will play an essential role in foreign relations, and must accordingly be taken into account. The degree of stress on domestic events will however depend on the relevance to the specific investigation attempted here of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Uzbeks. To understand the internal Uzbek situation in 930/1524, and indeed to follow the subsequent relations with Sháh Tahmásb, it is decidedly relevant to describe what appears from the traditional Islamic point of view to be a peculiar form of political arrangements.

1. For a broad discussion of the economic and social history of the Uzbeks in the 10th to 12th/10th to 18th centuries, see Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR (In Mávará'al-nahr: land tenure and "feudalism" -- pp. 391-398; administration -- pp.398-402; financial structure -- pp.402-404. In Khwárizm: social organization -- pp.422-424; economic organization -- pp.424-427.) It might be pointed out that the Soviet debunking of the "idealization of individual historical personalities" (op.cit. p. v) leaves precisely four sentences (p.405) to 'Ubayd Khán, the major Uzbek "personality" with which this dissertation is concerned in its more political (and "bourgeois") orientation.

For the specifically economic history of the Uzbeks in these two centuries, see Bugünkü Türkili as follows: The effect of the new European sea-routes to Asia -- pp.112-120; the rise of a new north-to-south (i.e. from Siberia to India) trading axis replacing the older east-to-west orientation -- pp.121-122; a general economic survey of Mávará'al-nahr -- pp.178-188. The new importance of the north-south trading axis with India serving as the entrepôt for the European-Asian trade is, as pointed out by Zeki Velidi Togan, of considerable importance in understanding the economic background of the Safavid-Uzbek-Mughal clash in Khurásán, particularly at Balkh which was an important center in this new trading route. The subject can regrettably not be pursued in this dissertation.

Another Uzbek internal factor glossed over in this dissertation (as not being sufficiently relevant to Safavid-Uzbek relations) is the position of the tribes who were closely associated with the Uzbek Dynastic House. For a brief statement on their status, see Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR p.390; for the detailed list of these associated tribes, see Bugünkü Türkili pp.42-45.

The political system of the two Ūzbek states may best be viewed within the context of what seems to have been a traditional organization form of the Turco-Mongols (cf. the Seljūcs, the Mongols and even medieval Russia).¹ In its pure and theoretical form this system is in marked contradistinction with that of the Safavids, which, despite the Shī'eh and Qizilbāsh innovations of Shāh Ismā'il is, comparatively speaking, well within the framework of the "Irano-Islamic" or even European theoretical concept of the kingship where there is a clear locus of power in a specific individual with the succession automatically passing from father to son into the next generation.

By contrast, in the Ūzbek structure the locus of power is devolved upon the entire ruling Dynastic House--rather than upon the the ruling individual. The specific expression of this power, in the person of the "khān", is held by the eldest member of the entire Dynastic House, extending from uncles in the first generation to cousins who become further removed with each passing generation (the "sultāns"). The difference in the systems is apparent in the content of the dynasty: Shāh Tahmāsb headed his dynasty; 'Ubayd Khān represented his.

The khān himself, although he did have certain prestigious privileges (e.g. the possession of the Dynastic seat or capital; chairmanship of the curultāys; and in the Islamic context, the rights to the khutbeh and sikkeh insignia of rulership), was essentially a "par inter pares".

1. For the best description and discussion of the subject, see Zeki Velidi Togan's Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş (Istanbul 1946), pp.42-43, 57-58, 106-109 and especially 287-293.

The khán's "peers", the sultáns, met in consultation (the curultáy) to decide general policy of interest to the entire ruling house. The basis of these sultáns' power was in their inherited appanages held with apparently complete control. This independence of the sultáns is particularly marked in foreign affairs, and it will be seen that they both sent and received their own diplomatic envoys and that they were by no means always committed to a common foreign policy.

In actual practice a varying amount of deviation from this theoretical pattern of power is found in both Úzbek states. (From the Appendix on khwárizm it will be seen that the Yádgárids were more conservative in this respect.) The most obvious lapse of the theory is the usurpation of the title khán by the leading sultáns. Thus HABIB/e.g.532,579, finished just prior to Sháh Ismá'il's death, already refers to 'Ubayd (or 'Ubaydulláh) as "khán", a title to which he was theoretically not eligible until 940/1533.¹

Again the concept of a fixed dynastic seat (very much as in medieval Russia for example ²) to which the "grand kháns"³ were

1. It should be noted however that 'Ubayd is referred to as "sultán" in the contemporary sources up to the death of Shíbání khán in 916/1510 (thus HABIB/388, LUBB/233, RASHIDI/234). In fact, RASHIDI/206 is quite explicit in referring to "'Ubaydulláh Khán who was Sultán" in an event pre-dating Shíbání Khán's death. These same sources, however, refer to him as "khán" in the events which follow, apparently in recognition of his leading role in reestablishing the Úzbek state (thus HABIB/532, LUBB/233, RASHIDI/245).

2. See the articles udel, udel'nye knyazhestva and udel'nyy period in Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entziklopediya (second edition, Moscow 1950-57

3. The term "grand khán" in orientalist literature is useful in referring specifically to the "chief-of-state" among the Úzbeks and obviates the confusion caused by the theoretically unwarranted usurpation of the title.

assigned, was very soon ignored in Mávará'al-nahr. Kúchkúnjí Khán was in fact given Samarqand, the Abú'l-Khayríd seat, upon his accession to the khánate at the death of Shíbání Khán. 'Ubayd Khán however remained in his own appanage of Bukhárá ¹ after his formal accession and the Kúchkúnjids held on to Samarqand as their private appanage until forcibly expelled and eliminated by their rival, 'Abdulláh Khán in 986/1578 (ABD/112a-123a). In Khwárizm however the practice of assigning Úrganch to the newly acceding grand khéns was maintained considerably longer.

These gradually increasing deviations from the political "norms" form part of the necessary background for understanding the Úzbek internal situation, for it was by this process that the Úzbek states were gradually being converted into a sub-variety of the "Irano-Islamic" type. The process may conveniently be termed as completed in Khwárizm at Hájim Khán's accession to Úrganch in 973/1565-6, and in Mávará'al-nahr at 'Abdulláh Khán's victory over the allied sultáns of Samarqand and Táshkand (Tashkent) in 986/1578.

That is to say, Sháh Tahmásb faced Úzbek states which were going through a difficult period of political evolution. It is true that the Úzbek political crisis did not break out into dramatic violence until 944/1538 in Khwárizm and 957/1550 in Mávará'al-nahr ², i.e. either at the very end of the "First Phase" of Sháh

1. GIPCHAQ/591b and SILSILAT/120b specifically state the fact that 'Ubayd Khán made Bukhárá his "capital" (qarargáh; maqarr-i shahri-yári) upon his accession.

2. For the outbreak of what may be called "The War of the Bukhárán Succession" at the death of 'Abd al-'Azíz, the son of 'Ubayd Khán, in which the Kúchkúnjids, Sháh-Budáqids and Suyúnjids were allied against the Jánibegids, see ABD/34b ff.

Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks to be discussed here, or well into the Second Phase. Nonetheless, there are signs, even with the meager sources at our command for the period, that the crisis was already beginning in the 930-946/1524-1540 period. For this reason it will be useful to view the Ūzbek situation at the time of Shāh Tahmāsb's accession as already within the framework of a changing political organization.

There were certain weaknesses inherent in the system itself, and it may be conjectured that had the Ūzbek states not been converted into a variety of the "Irano-Islamic" type in which the succession passed to a new generation and to an individual rather than to a clan, they might well have ended in warring petty sultānates, the prey to a new eponymous founder -- either from within the Dynastic House or from without--who would have then repeated the cycle. As will be seen from the Appendix this process had actually become extremely advanced in Khwārizm.

The first inherent weakness in the system was the role of seniority.¹ It is quite obvious that the eldest was not necessarily the ablest or the most ambitious. Thus 'Ubayd Khān had to wait through the "reigns" of Kúchkúnjī Khān (ca.916-937/ca.1510/1530) and then Abú Sa'īd Khān (937-940/1530-1533) before he was eligible for the title of "grand khān" on the basis of seniority. In all

1. An interesting example of the role of age in Ūzbek society is found in ABD/85b: 'Abdullāh Khān in 978/1570-1, i.e. at a time when he was already the most dominant Ūzbek and the de facto leader of his own Jānībegid clan, "followed the ancient traditions" (ri'āyat-i yāsāc-i cadīm namūd) and went to congratulate his cousin, Ūzbek Sultān, for a victory because Ūzbek Sultān was "a few months older". On this occasion 'Abdullāh Khān was forced to endure his cousin's insults because of the age factor and despite his de facto powers.

this time however he was the paramount personality among the Úzbeks.¹ That this lack of the prestigious title was an important weakening factor in the relations with Sháh Tahmásb will become apparent in the narrative which follows.

The practice of rule by the eldest may well have been violated by Shíbání Khán, the founding father, himself; for among the confusing riváyats or reports² of the situation immediately after his death in battle, is one which states that he had designated his son, Muḥammad Tímúr, as his successor and that the khutbeh and sikkeh were actually made in his son's name. Muḥammad Tímúr soon disappears from history³ however and Kúchkúnjí Khán is described as succeeding as the "grand khán" by virtue of his seniority in the Abú'l-Khayrid House. Until the breakup of the system each of the

1. 'Ubayd Khán had led the Úzbek reconquest of Mávará'al-nahr from Bábur and the Qizilbásh and was thus the second founder of the Úzbek state. His leadership in the khurásan campaigns previous to his selection as "grand khán" will become evident in the main narrative. RASHIDI/283 makes his de facto position quite clear: "...he had, in reality, conducted the entire affairs of state; and if he had chosen to assume the title of Khán, no one could rightfully have opposed him. Nevertheless the Úzbek adhered to the old rules and conferred the Khánship upon the most advanced in years". Also cf. HAYDARI's/55a statement that "the control of state lay with him [i.e. 'Ubayd Khán] and they [i.e. Kúchkúnjí Khán and Abú Sa'id Khán] had nothing of the government but the name" (ikhtiyár-i saltanat bá ú búd va ishán az hukumat juz námi nadáshtand). "Nevertheless, it may be stated here, that one of the conclusions reached in this dissertation is that 'Ubayd Khán did not actually have the great powers attributed to him in these and similar quotations.

2. (a) Muḥammad Tímúr succeeds his father, Shíbání Khán, in QIPCHAQ/590a, RAQIM/90b, AHSAN/123. (b) Kúchkúnjí succeeds Shíbání Khán in RASHIDI/283, SILSILAT/113a, ILCHI/205a, HAYDARI/52b, SHIRAZI/257a, MUNECCIMBAŞI/11/710. (c) A joint Muḥammad Tímúr-Kúchkúnjí succession is given in ABD/21a and ANONYM/20b.

3. SILSILAT/116b is the sole source to place his death as late as 927/1520-1. All other accounts suggest his death by ca. 920/1514.

"grand khán" is generally cited as having been chosen in curultáy on this basis.¹

Some stability in the succession was theoretically provided by the appointment of a qaghilgháy or qa'lkhán² i.e. the "eldest heir-apparent" during the "grand khán's" reign. This however had its shortcomings for both of Kúchkúnjí Khán's qaghilgháy died before the grand khán they were slated to succeed (QIPCHAQ/590a, RASHIDI/283, ANONYM/21b). There is no further mention of any qaghilgháy (for a possible reference in Khwárizm, see Appendix p.XLI) until 'Abdulláh Khán named his own son to the post (MUQIM/27a). This evolution in meaning of the term is a telling example of how the original Ūzbek theories of state were converted into the newer concepts based on an "Irano-Islamic" model for the dynastic succession.³

1. Thus ABD/21a: The curultáy chose Kúchim Khán (i.e. Kúchkúnjí) "by virtue of the ancient principles of the 'túreh' and 'yasáq'", for "he was the eldest of all" (b-sál az hameh buzurgtar búđ). Again in QIPCHAQ/589b where it is stated that Kúchim khán was named to the post because he was "the eldest of the Abú'l-Khayrids" (asann-i avlád-i Abú'l-Khayr Khán); and RASHIDI/283 calls him "the eldest sultán".

The Safavid chroniclers too were well aware of this system: thus ILCHI/265a says Kúchkúnjí Khán was selected because he was the eldest of the Júchíd kháns and "princes"; LUBB/233 is particularly explicit: "He [Kúchim Khán] was the eldest, and their [the Ūzbeks'] custom is such that whoever of their line is the eldest, he becomes the khán" (asann búđ rasm-i túreh-yi ishán chunín est har kas az nizhád-i ishán esann bāshad khán shavad). Cf. also TAAA/37.

Similar statements are occasionally given for the accessions of Abú Sa'id Khán and 'Ubayd Khán (e.g. RASHIDI/283, QIPCHAQ/591a, ILCHI/260a); however as will be seen in the main narrative there is some doubt as to the real significance of the age factor in these selections.

2. The term is garbled in the texts. The form qaghilgháy is taken from Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş p.107. It frequently appears as ca'lkhán or qaghilkhán.

3. A similar vestige of rule by seniority is perhaps to be seen in the 11th/17th century when in both khwárizm and Mávará'al-nahr there are several examples of brother succeeding brother as grand khán.

Within these terms of succession by seniority it is possible to understand the Úzbek situation in 930/1524 when the grand khán was Kúchkúnjí (Kúchim) Khán at the Samargand capital, but the dominating personality was 'Ubayd Khán with his appanage at Bukhárá. In Khwárizm the same sort of situation seems to have prevailed at this date: the grand khán at the Úrganch capital was Husayn Qulí Khán, cousin of the founding father, Ílbárs Khán; the dominating personality was Sultán Ghází Sultán (note: not khán), the son of Ílbárs Khán, at Vazír.

A second structural weakness inherent in the Úzbek system was the theoretical equality of the "peers", i.e. the sultáns, who, meeting in surultáy or "assemblage of peers" had the right to veto or at any rate to abstain from any general policy they objected to. This, as will be seen in the narrative, was sometimes acutely embarrassing to 'Ubayd Khán and his designs on Khurásán. He could never be sure of winning the support of his "peers" even after his elevation to the position of grand khán. And on only one occasion in all the military relations with Sháh Tahmásb was a total Úzbek army to be committed (at the Battle of Jám).

Furthermore, this right to veto, or even to mutiny, apparently extended to the umará, i.e. to the "leaders" or "chiefs" of the allied tribes incorporated into the Úzbek state but remaining outside the Dynastic House. 'Ubayd Khán had frequently to yield to the "advice" of his umará, and on at least one occasion they threatened to use force against him to ensure the acceptance of their "opinions".

Thus in 930/1524 we have a situation among the Úzbeks where a determined and unified policy was difficult to achieve and where the total military assets were not easily mobilized or fully dis-

ciplined.


The third and final structural weakness to be discussed in the Uzbek political system is the appanage arrangement, whereby the collateral lines of the Dynastic House were assigned--apparently unconditionally--specific areas within the total territory under dynastic control. Since these appanages were inherited, the result was inevitably the rise of near-autonomous states linked ever more tenuously by the common Abú'l-Khayrid tradition and the curultáy. The individual sultán is thus seen to have been bound to two loyalties: the one to his Dynastic House, the other to his appanage clansmen. The situation is difficult to describe, for there is no proper terminology¹ to cover the case of "collateral", semi-autonomous states organized upwardly by ties to a common eponymous Dynastic House (e.g. Abú'l-Khayrid) in which the succession is open to all on the basis of seniority; and then organized downwardly on "neo-eponymous" lines (e.g. the Kúchkúnjids or descendants of Kúchkúnjí Khán) in a specific hereditary appanage.

The formation of these "neo-eponymous" "appanage-states" can best be understood from the following condensed genealogical table.² It should be noted that the "neo-eponyms" were not necessarily themselves in actual possession of the appanage inherited in their name (e.g. Sháh Budáq had died when Shíbání Khán was still a child and considerably before the conquest of Bukhárá).


1. The terms "neo-eponymous clans", "appanage-state" or "Dynastic House" are contrived and admittedly cumbersome. Zeki Velidi Togan, in his general description of the system (see above, p.25, note 1) refers to the complex as "ülüs sistemi", i.e. "appanage-system".

2. Established mostly from ABD/passim and especially 18b-19a, 21b; ANONYM/22a-23a; SUBHAN/passim and especially 49a-b, 54a-56a, 68b; RACIM/80b-82b.

In the genealogical tables which follow, the "neo-eponyms" through whom the appanage succession is passed are noted thus ; the appanages are noted /thus/; "M" stands for "Muhammad":



The relationship of the grand khán to the "appanage-system" may be seen from the following table in which the sequence is numbered:



The establishment of these "neo-eponymous appanages" goes back to the very beginnings of both Ūzbek states. It is important to note that both Shībānī Khān and Īlbārs Khān made their original conquests independently of the other members of their respective Dynastic Houses, and that their relatives were invited to join in the new state after the taking of Samarqand in Mávará'-al-nahr and Vazīr in Khwārizm (see e.g. RASHIDI/120, 160-7, GHAZI/207-217). That is to say, the total Dynastic Houses took part in the expansion of the new states, and not in their inception.

The very first qurultáys¹ of the new and rapidly expanding states established (with some subsequent modifications) the "neo-eponymous" collateral lines in the appanages they were to hold until inter-appanage warfare broke out in Khwārizm (in 930/1524 and 944/1538) and in Mávará'-al-nahr (in 957/1550).

The result of the long, drawn-out series of civil wars on "neo-eponymous" lines which then ensued was, in Mávará'-al-nahr, ultimately the elimination of all the collateral ruling clans but one (the Jānībegids) and the substitution of a new single eponym ('Abdullāh Khān) for the entire Ūzbek state. A new Dynast-

1. There were three major qurultáys in Mávará'-al-nahr in which the appanages were distributed: (a) at Shībānī Khān's conquest of Samarqand and the coming of the other Abū'l-Khayrids to join him there; see ABD/19b, (b) at Shībānī Khān's conquest of Harāt; see SILSILAT/112a-b, HABIB/388, (c) at 'Ubayd Khān's reconquest of Mávará'-al-nahr (the so-called "division" or taqsīm of Jānībeg Sultān); see ABD/21a, QIPCHAQ/598b.

There are a few differences between ABD and QIPCHAQ for the final appanaging. According to QIPCHAQ, Muhammad Tīmūr was appanaged to Kīsh, Tirmīz and Balkh; in ABD he is appanaged to Samarqand jointly with Kūchīm Khān (presumably as the valī'ahd or "heir-apparent by primogeniture"). At any rate it is clear that Kūchīm Khān was first appanaged in "Turkistān" (i.e. the eastern area) and was then re-appanaged in Samarqand, the dynastic seat, in his role as eldest of the Abū'l-Khayrid Dynastic House.

the house was then established which, although derived from the "neo-eponymous" Jánibegids, was no longer organized along the traditional lines of the original Ūzbek state.

In 930/1524, however, and all through the period covered in this dissertation the system of "neo-eponymous" appanages was successfully maintained although the cracks in the system were already sometimes apparent (particularly in Khwárizm). The appanaged sultáns were still closely linked to their common Abú'l-Khayrid or Yádgárid traditions, selected the grand kháns on the basis of seniority in the entire Dynastic House, and met in qurultáy as "peers" to decide issues of general concern.

The situation within the "neo-eponymous appanage-states" of Máverá'al-nahr was then as follows:

A. Kúchkúnjids: At Samarcand. The family was led by Kúchkúnjī (or Kúchim) Khán, the grand khán himself, and by his son, Abú Sa'íd Sultán who was to succeed to this position on his father's death in 937/1530. Kúchkúnjī Khán was already an old man in 930, for we are told that he was over 80 at his death (QIPCHAQ/591a).

B. Jánibegids:¹ At Karmíneh and Míyánkál (the area between Samarcand and Bukhárá). Jánibeg Sultán had an important voice in Ūzbek qurultáys and was shortly (in 931/1525) to become the caghilgháy or "heir-apparent by age". At his death in 935/1529 his son, Iskandar (the future father of 'Abdulláh Khán) succeeded in Karmíneh. A branch of the family was established in Balkh by Kistan

1. ABD and ANONYM (and SUBHAN which follows them here) were written for 'Abdulláh Khán and therefore have a Jánibegid slant; for the madh (encomium) and history of Jánibeg Sultán see ABD/22a ff; ANONYM/20a ff and SUBHAN/55b ff (all three are essentially identical). Also see the Safavid source MIFTAH/542b-543a.

Qará Sultán when the city was taken from "the last of the Tímúrids", i.e. Bábur in 932/1526.

C.Suyúnjids: At Táshkand and "Turkistán" (the Úzbek held areas north and east of the Sír Daryá River [the Jaxartes]). At the death of the "neo-eponym", Suyúnj Khwájeh Sultán (or Khán), who had also been the qaghilgháy, the family was led by Baráq Sultán (or Khán), his son.¹

D.Sháh-Budáqids: At Bukhárá. They were led by 'Ubayd Khán, the dominant Úzbek personality of the period and organizer of the Khurásán invasions. It should be pointed out that there is no source-authority for the term "Sháh-Budáqid", but it is convenient since it groups the two branches of the family (descending from the brothers, Shíbání Khán and Mahmúd Sultán respectively) both of which had appanage rights at Bukhárá.² It is important to note for the subsequent narrative that after the taking of Harát, Shíbání Khán seems to have intended making Khurásán his own personal appanage; Samarcand was assigned to his son, Muhammad Tímúr, and Bukhárá to his brother, Mahmúd (see especially ABD/21a). Sháh Ismá'il's conquest of Khurásán, however, left a gap in the "neo-eponymous" arrangements. Ideally the Sháh-Budáqids should have

1. For the death of Suyúnj Khwájeh in 931/1524-5, see RASHIDI/375. The Suyúnjids under Bába Sultán, the son of Baráq Khán, were to be the most determined enemies of 'Abdulláh Khán and were the last of the "neo-eponymous clans" to be eliminated. ABD/ 124a ff devotes some 70 large folio-pages to the narration of the final phase of the Suyúnjid resistance beginning in 980/1578.

2. This becomes evident from the troubled joint succession at Bukhárá by Muhammad Yár (grandson of Shíbání Khán) and Burhán (great-grandson of Mahmúd Sultán) for which see ABD/34b, 36a, 42b. The Sháh-Budáqids were the first of the "neo-eponymous clans" to be eliminated; for their last holdout at Chahárjú (on the Ámú River) in 905/1557-8, see ABD/59a.

split into two "neo-eponymous" clans: one at Harát and the other at Bukhárá. This should be considered in following 'Ubayd Khán's personal attempts to take Harát (not always supported by the total Dynastic House) and the appointments of his son, 'Abd al-'Azíz, to several governorships in Khurásán.

Conclusion. The Abú'l-Khayrid Úzbek situation in Mávará'al-nahr in 930/1524 is thus as follows: The "grand khán" was Kúch-kúnjí Khán, appanaged at the Dynastic capital of Samarcand; the most dominating Úzbek personality was 'Ubayd Khán representing the Sháh-Budáids at Bukhárá; the Jánibegids were centered at Miyánkál but were shortly to be established at Balkh as well; the Suyúnjids held the eastern areas. A unified Úzbek policy (e.g. against Sháh Tahmásb) and the raising of a total Úzbek "Grande Armée" was possible only with the consent of all the "peers" or sultáns. Khurásán was regarded as dár al-harb ("religiously sanctioned military target") for raiding purposes by the Úzbeks in general, but specifically as terra irredenta by 'Ubayd Khán and his branch of the Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House.

Chapter 3. Safavid-Úzbek Relations

A. Sháh Ismá'il's Conquest of Khurásán

It is fascinating to watch the simultaneous foundings of the Safavid and Úzbek states, with Sháh Ismá'il and ShíbáníKhán rushing toward each other over the collapsing Áqquyúnlú on the west and the Tímúrids on the east. Each conquest of the one was countered by the other: Samarcand in 906/1500 and Tabríz in 907/1501-2; Herát in 913/1507 and Baghdád in 914/1508. By 915/1509-10 the new Cizilbásh empire extended from Diyárbakr and Baghdád to Mázandarán and Kirmán; the new Úzbek empire extended from Táshkand and Khwárizm to Herát and Astarábád. The void had been filled and the two vigorous founding fathers faced one another head-on.

The clash centered over Khurásán, an area that was essentially extraneous to a power based on 'Iráq and Ážarbáyján, as it was to a power based on Mávará'al-nahr (Transoxania). Khurásán had had its periods of westward orientation (e.g. under the Sásánians, Arabs, Seljúcs and Mongol-ílkhánids); it had also had its periods of northward and eastward orientation (e.g. under the Sámánids, Ghaznavids, Khwárizmsháhs and Tímúrids). The clash of Safavid and Úzbek over Khurásán may thus be viewed as part of a venerable historical tradition which was to be broken only when the Russian and British "successor states" rather artfully decided the issue by partition and the creation of Afghanistan.

Sháh Ismá'il's dramatic victory over the Úzbeks at the Battle of Marv (Merv) in 916/1510 (in which Shíbání Khán himself was killed) and the final Úzbek evacuation of Khurásán in 919/1513, may be said to have decided the issue: most of Khurásán was to be westwardly

oriented throughout the Safavid-Úzbek period. The Úzbeks, however, did not accept the Safavid solution as permanent and twice made determined efforts to reverse the decision of Marv: once, under 'Ubayd Khán (the subject of this dissertation), and again a half century later under 'Abdulláh Khán.

The Úzbek attempts to recapture Khurásán are the most dramatic events in Safavid-Úzbek political and military relations, but they are not typical. Much more usual were the Úzbek raids on Khurásán undertaken for plunder and not at all for permanent possession. Raiding of this sort continued even after the Safavid period, particularly from the Khwárizmian side. The Turkmán, whose relationship to the Khwárizmian Úzbeks varied at different periods, were most actively engaged in this.

Sháh Ismá'il's military relations with the Úzbeks may be conveniently divided into the period of the "Wars for Khurásán"¹ (916-919/1510-13), and the remainder of the reign² (920-930/1514-1524).

1. The "Wars for Khurásán" are covered on the Safavid side basically by HABIB/503-543. The other Safavid references are: LUBB/251-255, 203-4, 233, JANG/61b-76b, NUSAKH/204b-207b, ILCHI/264a-265b, AHSAN/passim under the years 91b-919, KHULASEH/58a-72a, ROUZAT/72b-95b, TAAA/27-31.

The Úzbek sources are: ABD/19b-21a, ANONYM/15b-22a, RAQIM/93a-100b, SUBHAN/15a-b, QIPCHAQ/588b-590a, SILSILAT/113b-116a. Also see GHAZI on Shibání Khán and RASHIDI/232-251, 259-264.

The Mughal or Indian sources (e.g. AKBAR/233-4) have very little to say about these events despite Bábur's prominent role in them, for this is one of the gap periods in BABUR, the basic Mughal source for this entire period.

2. The sources for the 920-930 period are: (a) For the Úzbek raids of about 920-921: HABIB/553, AHSAN/154, NUSAKH/209a (b) For the Úzbek threat of 926: HABIB/562 (c) For the 927 siege of Harát: HABIB/572-3, 579-581, JANG/98a-102a, NUSAKH/210b, AHSAN/171-2, KHULASEH/71b, ROUZAT/115a-116b.

The only Úzbek reference is SILSILAT/116b which is presumably referring to the Harát siege when it states that Kúchkúnjí Khán led the Úzbeks against Tahmásb Mirzá (i.e. "Prince" Tahmasb, his title when governor of Harát).

The "Wars for Khurásán" may be usefully summarized here as providing a very necessary background for understanding the situation inherited by Sháh Tahmásp at his accession. More than the fate of Khurásán had been involved, for in the course of these wars the new Úzbek state was extinguished and then revived, and Bábur made the last serious Tímúrid effort to recover the Mávará'al-nahr homeland from the Úzbek conquerors.

The first phase of the "Wars" was utterly disastrous for the Úzbeks: Shíbání Khán was killed at the Battle of Marv; Sháh Ismá'il entered Harát, and Balkh was ceded to him; Bábur, with Qizilbásh aid, retook Mávará'al-nahr; and the Úzbeks were forced to retire beyond the Sír Daryá.

The second phase of the "Wars" marked the Úzbek comeback. Led by 'Ubayd Khán, they drove Bábur out of Mávará'al-nahr; crushed a major Qizilbásh army at Ghijduván (near Bukhára) led by Sháh Ismá'il's vazír, Najm al-Sání; and reoccupied Harát and Mashhad.

The third and final phase gave the victory to Sháh Ismá'il who personally led the Qizilbásh in his second Khurásán campaign. Khurásán was definitively occupied this time--but the Úzbeks had not at all been thereby eliminated. The Úzbeks had evacuated Khurásán, but they remained in force on the other side of the Ámú River --unreconciled to the Safavid conquest.

The sources provide very little information for the second and comparatively calm period of Sháh Ismá'il's relations with the Úzbeks (920-930/1514-1524). There are references to Úzbek raiding in 920-921/1514-1515, and to an Úzbek threat in 926/1520 which put a major Qizilbásh army on the alert at Fírúzkúh (east of Mt. Damávand). The threat did materialize in the following spring of 927/1521 when

'Ubayd Khán led a twelve day siege of Harát. That this siege was a relatively minor affair is demonstrated by the alacrity with which it was given up and by the fact that 'Ubayd Khán is the only Úzbek of the Dynastic House whose presence is cited at the siege.¹ This attempt on Harát, however, did establish a precedent which was to continue all through the "First Phase" of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks.

Sháh Tahmásb had inherited Khurásán: but with it came the Úzbek problem.

1. HABIB/579, a contemporary account, specifically states that 'Ubayd Khán received permission from Kúchkúnjí Khán (the "grand khán") and then came against Harát. SILSILAT/110b (a very late account written in the 12th/18th century) says that Kúchkúnjí Khán led the Úzbek "princes" (sháhzádegán) on a campaign against Khurásán. This would mean that the 927/1521 attempt on Harát was a major all-Úzbek affair. SILSILAT's statement should probably be discounted, for it is a late source and the context in which it appears is rather vague.

B. The Sectarian factor

The alleged sectarian factor, i.e. the traditional Sunni-Shi'eh hostility in Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks will be an often recurring theme in the narrative which follows. The analysis there will attempt to distinguish between theory and propaganda as opposed to actual practice. Account will also be taken of the diplomatic level of "la grande politique" and "Realpolitik" where ideology will sometimes be seen to clash with political self-interest. The diplomatic level will be examined from a study of the correspondence and the political alignments of the time; a useful insight into individual attitudes and the differences between theory and practice on the operational level will be gained from a close study of the periods of Úzbek-Safavid (and/or Sunni-Shi'eh) changeover in Khurásán.

It will therefore be useful to provide a brief background of this factor in the period of Sháh Ismá'íl's relations with the Úzbeks. It must be emphasized however that pending a detailed study of the subject the conclusions expressed here are tentative.

To begin with, there would seem to be certain basic differences in the character of the sectarian role between the periods of Sháh Ismá'íl and Sháh Tahmásb. Thus, on the diplomatic level, in view of the later correspondence between 'Ubayd Khán and Sháh Tahmásb in which the sectarian antagonisms and polemics constitute a major element, it is quite interesting to note that the Sháh Ismá'íl-Shibání Khán correspondence ¹ is quite free of bitter

1. The famous letter of Shibání Khán to "Ismá'íl Dárúghah" ("governor" Ismá'íl), which is frequently referred to in the sources, is given in full in AHSAN/112-114. For references to the diplomatic missions exchanged, see HABIB/504-5, NUSAKH/205a, RASHIDI/232-3, TAAA/27-8.

religious polemic. The insults, boasts, taunts and threats exchanged are in the raw tradition of "Realpolitik". This should be contrasted to the near-contemporary letters of the Ottoman Sultán Salím to 'Ubayd Khán preserved in FERIDUN/1/374,374,415 (dated 920/1514 and 921/1515) which already contain the strident anti-Shí'eh clichés which are later to be found in 'Ubayd Khán's correspondence with Sháh Tahmásb.

This correspondence however does not prove very much, for it would seem that on the operational level in the period of the "Wars for Khurásán" the Úzbeks were indeed looked upon by the Khurásánis as the champions of the Sunní cause, as were the Qizilbásh represented as the champions of the Shí'eh. Examples of this are to be seen in the series of events preceding and following the second Úzbek occupation of Harát in 919/1513 when the population seems to have divided itself into pro-Úzbek and pro-Qizilbásh factions along religious lines (HABIB/532-3,536-7). Similarly at Andakhúd (Andkhúy, in northern Afghanistan) the population was pro-Úzbek on specifically religious grounds, and only a general massacre ended the determined resistance against the Qizilbásh conquerors (HABIB/540, AHSAN/139).

In the period of Sháh Tahmásb this was also theoretically true and indeed much of the political motivation in the sources is presented under this guise; however, in actual practice so general a formula as "pro-Sunní equals pro-Úzbek; pro-Shí'eh equals pro-Qizilbásh" cannot stand except with considerable qualification.

It is difficult to estimate even approximate percentages of sectarian affiliations in Khurásán before the Qizilbásh conquest. The whole question of the Tímúrid attitude toward Shí'ism is yet

to be investigated. (Bábur's flirtation with the Shí'eh sect at his reconquest of Samarqand in alliance with the Qizilbásh--see especially HABIB/524 and RASHIDI/246 --is the most spectacular example.) Of course the Tímúrid régime in Harát was officially sunní and the Shaykh al-Islám, the leading Sunní functionary (Sayyid Ahmad ibn Yahyá ibn Sa'd al-Dín Taftazání), was eventually executed by Sháh Ismá'il for his unyielding loyalty to the Sunní cause (see e.g. RASHIDI/236, AHSAN/124, NUSAKH/205b).

Yet the Shí'eh in Harát must at the time already have been of some consequence,¹ for AHSAN/98 notes that at Shíbání Khán's entry into Harát in 913/1507, the Harátís were warned to drop Shí'eh tendencies and to rally around the (Úzbek-)Sunní cause.² There is however no mention of any anti-Shí'eh atrocities at the first Úzbek entry into Harát (--nor of any other severe atrocities for that matter, except for some economic pressures cited in HABIB/378-381 and the rather petty complaints mentioned by BABUR/200a). It is thus reasonably certain that there was a Shí'eh element in Khurásán even before the victorious coming of the Qizilbásh brought it out into the open--and into sectarian strife.

While on the level of "Realpolitik" the "Wars for Khurásán" between Sháh Ismá'il and the Úzbeks cannot be construed as a

1. For the Ismá'ilí Shí'eh sect in Badakhshán, see RASHIDI/217-219, 227 to which the Kúhistán references in G. le Strange, The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge 1930) pp.354-6 should be compared.

2. They were warned: "Say not that God, Muhammad and 'Alí are your heart's companions; but say that God, Muhammad and the Four [Sunní] Companions are your heart's companions" (Magú'id keh Alláh va Muhammad va 'Alí yárat bád; bigú'id keh Alláh va Muhammad va Chahár Yár yárat bád.)

strictly sectarian clash, nonetheless the religious issue was obviously of major concern, at least from the Safavid domestic point of view: for Shi'ism was one of the basic building-blocks of the new Safavid state which was then still in the formative stages of development. It is important to note then that the Qizilbāsh massacres at Marv, Qarshī (south of Samarcand), Bādghīs (near Harāt) and Andakhūd¹ do not find any real parallel on the Uzbek side--nor on the Safavid side in the succeeding period of Shāh Tahmāsb.

In comparing the sectarian factor in Khurāsān in the periods of Shāh Tahmāsb and of Shāh Ismā'īl, it would seem that although certain parallels in the 930-946/1524-1540 atrocity stories may be drawn with the earlier events, nonetheless the sectarian role involved does not seem to reach the same level of intensity as in the period when the issue (i.e. the politico-religious control of Khurāsān) was new and more dynamic.

There is however a possible qualification to this conclusion, for from the more detailed study of the later period it may be quite conclusively stated that the sectarian differences in Khurāsān were frequently used to cloak obviously opportunistic and non-

1. Marv: Neither HABIB nor AHSAN mention a massacre of civilians at Marv; LUBB/252 is however quite explicit: "The soldiery of memorable deeds [i.e. the Qizilbāsh] plundered Marv, the residence of the Ūzbeks, for three days. After the three days the royal grace took concern for the fate of the helpless and of the local residents [ʿajazeh va masākin-i ānjā] and caused them to be forgiven". The massacre at Marv is confirmed in ABD/19b where reference is made to the razing of the walls of Marv and to a "massacre" (catl-i ʿamm) there after the Battle of Marv. It is also noted in RASHIDI/235.

Qarshī: HABIB/528, LUBB/254, NUSAKH/206b, ILCHI/205b, AHSAN/131-2, SILSILAT/114a, RASHIDI/260.

Bādghīs: HABIB/539, AHSAN/139.

Andakhūd: HABIB/540, AHSAN/139.

religious motivations. How much of this religious opportunism is to be read into the times of Sháh Ismá'il can only be determined by a much closer study of that period than has been attempted here.

By 930/1524 Khurásán then was officially Shí'eh; but it had bitter memories of the Safavid-Úzbek clash which had been strongly tinged by the religious rigor of the new self-consciously Shí'eh state. The precedents for atrocities in the name of religion had been set by both sides. The sectarian problem had not been resolved by the Safavid conquest and Sunnis were to appear publicly and vengefully with each Úzbek success. It was the Sunnis' turn, however, to practice taciyeh ("religious dissimulation") for Khurásán was then and was to remain under Shí'eh-Qizilbásh control.

Chapter 4. Bābur and the Tīmūrīds

In 930/1524 Bābur, "the last of the Tīmūrīds", was still a possible third contender for Khurāsān. From his Kābul base, Balkh, Qunduz, Badakhshān and Qandahār had been taken and were being held against both the Safavids and the Ūzbeks. Within two years, however, Bābur had entered Āgra, and the Tīmūrīds had become the "Great Mughals" of India.

This is not to say that the Mughals forthwith renounced all claims to Khurāsān: for although Balkh was shortly to fall to the Ūzbeks, and Qandahār was soon to be subject to Safavid menacings, there was nonetheless a major flurry of Mughal activity in Khurāsān during the period of Humāyūn's (Bābur's emperor-son) refuge to the "west" in what is today Afghanistan from 951 to 962/1544-1555. Furthermore, Badakhshān, a deep salient into the Ūzbek territory of Māvarā'al-nahr, was successfully held until 991/1583 when it finally fell to 'Abullāh Khān Ūzbek. Even in the 11th/17th century there was a three-way (Mughal-Safavid-Ūzbek) squabble for Balkh during which the Mughals briefly occupied the city. And Qandahār was to shift between Safavid and Mughal occupation all through the 10th to 11th/16th to 17th centuries. Nonetheless, the generalization may well be made that the Mughals were primarily committed to India proper: attempts at expansion in khurāsān were essentially "adventurous".

As to the relations between Shāh Ismā'īl and Bābur, it is sufficient here to point to their active military alliance against the Ūzbeks in the period of the "Wars for Khurāsān" (916-919/1510-1513): there were Qizilbāsh contingents with Bābur at his taking of Samarcand; Bābur's khutbeh there was read in the name of Shāh

Ismá'il; his coins were struck with a Shí'eh motto; the Qizilbāsh "generalissimo", Najm al-Sānī, led the allied forces at the fiasco suffered against the Ūzbeks at the Battle of Ghijduván. After this (and indeed, according to HABIB/523,524, NUSAKH/200a, AHSAN/127, even as early as Bābur's occupation of Samarqand) relations between the allies became somewhat strained, particularly at Bābur's aggressions in Balkh, Gharjistān and Qandahār. Nonetheless, at Shāh Tahmāsb's accession, a tenuous alliance, or at least a community of interests seems to have maintained itself in the face of the common Ūzbek enemy.

The situation in 930/1524 in the Bāburid held areas in, or adjacent to, Khurāsān which were to be involved in Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks, was as follows:

BALKH: The Tīmūrīd, Muḥammad Zamān Mirzā,¹ who had taken refuge with Shāh Ismā'il from the Ūzbeks, revolted against his protector just prior to the Battle of Chāldirān (fought against the Ottomans in 920/1514) and began a series of adventures in Astarābād and then Gharjistān (including a raid on Safavid Harāt) in an attempt to revive the Tīmūrīd fortunes. By 922/1516 he had taken Balkh and near-by Shiburghān from their Safavid governors. Bābur, however, from his base in Kābul, soon defeated Muḥammad Zamān in an inter-Tīmūrīd war but then graciously restored him

1. HABIB/394-404 gives a very detailed account of these events in Balkh and Gharjistān personally witnessed by the author who was then residing in Gharjistān and was in the service of Muḥammad Zamān Mirzā (p.397 and passim). AHSAN's account is clearly derived from HABIB. However AHSAN's/169 account of a second Qizilbāsh expedition to Gharjistān in 925/1519 is not mentioned in HABIB; this would presumably indicate that Khwāndamīr, the author, was no longer in Gharjistān by that date.

to Balkh as his governor. BABUR/227a,238a mentions receiving correspondence and gifts from his governor in 925/1519. HABIB/404, in its closing account of the Tímúrids, in a passage written in Zú'l-Qa'deh 929/September 1523, states that Muḥammad Zamán Mírzá was then Bábur's governor in Balkh, and that he had been sending occasional good-will embassies to the Safavid Court; and the pious hope is expressed that he will soon join the Safavid cause. This was however not to be, for by 930/1524 Balkh was already being threatened by the Ūzbeks and was to fall into their possession about two years later.

BADAKHSHÁN:¹ Khán Mírzá (or Sultán Uvays Mírzá), Bábur's cousin, had taken the province in the confusion following Shībānī Khán's occupation of Harát and the Tímúrid fiasco. He had paid his respects to Sháh Ismá'íl at the first Qizilbāsh entry into Harát, was "confirmed" in Badakhshán, and joined Bábur in the brief Tímúrid reconquest of Mávará'al-nahr in the "Wars of Khurásán". Bábur took advantage of his death in 926/1519-20 to name his own son as governor there, i.e. Humáyún, who administered the province until 935/1529.

CANDAHÁR:² The local Arghún governors of Candahár, who had held the province under the Tímúrids, had managed to stave off direct Safavid annexation (an expedition sent by Sháh Ismá'íl in 919/1513 had not been a complete success) but seem to have been within the new Safavid "orbit". Bábur, however, successfully

1. For the period of 916-930/1510-1524, see: BABUR/218b, 244a-b, AKBAR/230,233, RASHIDI/353-355,387, HABIB/516,524,525, and AHSAN/127.

2. For the period of 916-930, see: HABIB/572-3,578-9, 585-591, AHSAN/169-170, 174-5, RASHIDI/357.

parried the menaces and cajoleries from Harát and persisted in a three or more year siege of Qandahár. His victory in 928/1522 was finally won as much by diplomatic manoeuvring and intrigue as by military force and Kámrán Mirzá, his other son, was installed as governor. Sháh Tahmásb had thus inherited the "Qandahár question", which was to remain a vital issue in subsequent Safavid-Mughal relations.

Section II. The Duel for KhurāsānChapter 1. The Period of the First Invasion(Pīchī-Takhācūy-It/930-932/1524-1526)A. The Troubled Accession of Shāh Tahmāsb¹

The new factor in Safavid-Ūzbek relations, the accession of Shāh Tahmāsb (19 Rajab 930/24 May 1524) can now be assessed against the background given in Section I.

As for the internal situation in Iran, it may be said that the advent of any new shāh would probably have led to the disturbances and the jockeying for position usual at such times. To this must be added the facts that, as pointed out above, the role of the Qizilbāsh ūymāq was not as yet fully defined in the newly consolidated Safavid state, and that the new shāh was still a child (three months past his tenth solar birthday) and a regency thus became necessary. The dynastic-ūymāq balance struck by Shāh Ismā'il was thus ended and the uncertainty in the new roles to be assumed soon led to a vicious rivalry and even armed combat among the ūymāq for the control of the royal person and the regency. This situation was to continue intermittently until 942/1525 and dovetails with most of the "First Phase" of Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks. By the end of this period the Qizilbāsh state had once more become a dynastic-ūymāq partnership with the Shāh occupying the predominant role.

The Qizilbāsh umarā present at Shāh Ismā'il's death acted quickly to prevent the disturbances feared at the change of ruler.

1. Except where otherwise stated, the narration of the accession and the related events is based on the standard account in ROUZAT/120a-b.

Tahmásb, the eldest son, was enthroned the following morning and a joint regency established by the Rúmlú, Dív Sultán and the Ustájlú, Kapak (or Mustafá) Sultán.

It is important to note that Sháh Ismá'íl's vakíl (or amír al-umará), the Ustájlú, Cháyán Sultán, had died a few months before the new sháh's accession, as had his son and successor to this post, Báyzíd Sultán (see above, p.12,n.1). According to LUBB/258-259, NUSAKH/211a and AHSAN/181, Dív Sultán Rúmlú had already been appointed to succeed to this post before Sháh Ismá'íl's death; SHARAF/548 adds that Kapak Sultán (the late Cháyán's brother) had also been appointed at the same time by Sháh Ismá'íl as co-vakíl. Whether this co-vikálat was established just before or just after Sháh Tahmásb's accession, the fact remains that the situation was ripe for inter-úymáq rivalry in 930/1524.

Some of the confusion that was to follow may be understood by the fact that the new co-vakíl, Kapak Sultán (i.e. Cháyán Sultán's brother and Báyzíd Sultán's uncle) would, as representative of the Ustájlú, have been in a position of trying to regain ground just recently lost. This may also explain why the other úymáq mainly sided with Dív Sultán and the Rúmlú, for the dislodgement of the Ustájlú would leave the field of opportunity in the new régime open to all newcomers.

That this joint-regency could not last would seem to have been obvious, but the terrible repercussions which were soon to follow permit us to question the degree of stability achieved by Sháh Ismá'íl and his new úymáq-system state.

Outwardly all went reasonably well on the home-front during the first yaylâq and qishlâq (summer and winter-quarters) at Tabriz.¹ However in the vizârat (the post of the "grand vazîr") Shâh Ismâ'il's incumbent, Khwâjeh Jalâl al-Dîn, was executed (AHSAN/184, TUHFEH/56) and Qâzî Jahân was named to this office. From the events which follow, it is quite clear that Qâzî Jahân was the Ustâjlû nominee, and we can therefore judge that despite the outer calm which prevailed at Court during the first few months of the new régime, the contest for control was already under way.

There are no indications, however, of any attempts being made to replace the úymâq governors in the provinces. Neither Rûmlû nor Ustâjlû could have risked offending the other úymâq at this fluid point. Thus the Khurâsân administration of Dûr-mish Khân Shâmlû and Sâm Mîrzâ (the latter's status had however changed from royal-son to royal-brother) was confirmed and new patents of investiture sent to Harât.

However, by the time these patents of office arrived in Khurâsân, another element had been added to the "troubled accession of Shâh Tahmâsb": the first of the five Uzbek invasions was already in progress.

1. The qishlâq of this first "Turkî year" of Pîchî extended into the next Hijrî year of 931 and corresponds to the winter of 1524-25.

B. The Uzbek Siege of Harát ¹

There are two partly contradictory accounts (essentially

1. The narrative established here is a compendium based upon the following sources. References common to the major sources have not been listed separately; the following however contain the variations which are presented here in some detail as an example of the "variations in the sources" which will be frequently referred to throughout the dissertation:

i. AFZAL/4b-8b contains the most detailed account, which however is not always in keeping with the JANG-ROUZAT and AHSAN-KHULASEH version. AFZAL's independent source is probably the missing "History of Harát" of "ujúmi Haraví, for which see Appendix on Sources p.XLVI. The data found exclusively in AFZAL are: (1) AFZAL alone specifically places the beginning of the Uzbek invasion prior to the death of Sháh Ismá'il; the following are in keeping with this: (a) the Úzbeks invaded b-dastúr ("as their usual wont") before the news of the Sháh's death is received; (b) the coming of the curchí (royal guardsman), 'Alí, just as the siege was about to begin, with the news and with a farman confirming the Khurásán administration; the khutbeh was then read for the first time in the name of Sháh Tahmásb; (c) this news emboldened the Úzbeks who began the close investiture of Harát immediately; (d) 'Alí, the curchí, remained in Harát but a day and then hurried back to Court to inform the new Sháh of the Uzbek siege. (2) The actual text (súrat) of Sám Mirzá's reply to Kúchim Khán is apparently given (6b-7a). Although AFZAL calls this a mazmún (which generally implies a synopsis rather than the full text), nonetheless, the munshiyáneh ("exaggerated bureaucratic") style, the full salutation and the concluding va'l-salám would indicate that this is actually the true text. (It should be noted in this connection that AFZAL contains many full súrats not preserved elsewhere.) Another factor supporting the view that this is the actual súrat of Sám Mirzá's letter is the comparison with the abridged version found in AHSAN/180-7 which is set off in proper style for quoting a súrat by the rubric javáb ("reply"). (The AHSAN text however merely gives the beginning of the letter albeit in a form which can be seen to have been derived from the súrat as given in AFZAL.) (3) The full name is given of the leader of the Qizilbásh sally into the Bágh-i Murád: Muhammad (?) Bek, known as Qará Ishík Shámlú. It was he who brought the news to the Sháh of the final Uzbek withdrawal from Harát and was rewarded by being appointed governor of Tabas--where we find him later giving refuge to Sám Mirzá at the time of his revolt. (4) Sám Mirzá sent a report to the Sháh of the Uzbek withdrawal which reached the Court at the end of winter at Tabriz. (It is typical of AFZAL throughout to add the Court reaction to the events narrated; these added references to the Court make AFZAL particularly valuable.)

ii. JANG/118a-122b and ROUZAT/127a-129a: ROUZAT is clearly following JANG here (for ROUZAT's self-citation of JANG as its main authority, see Appendix on Sources, p.LIX) although a few additions are made in the interests of clarity and linkage to non-Khurásán events. ROUZAT/127b alone of all the sources dates the event by

AFZAL and JANG) for the events in Khurásán at the death of Sháh Ismá'il. Since both of these riváyats (versions) very likely stem from Harát itself, it is difficult to come to definite conclusions.

According to the one riváyat (AFZAL), the Úzbeks had invaded Khurásán and were close to Harát even before the death of Sháh Ismá'il; and Dúrmish Khán, the governor, was already preparing the defences of the city when a royal messenger arrived with the news of the new régime at Court and with patents confirming the

putting the appearance of the Úzbeks outside of Harát in 931. The details found exclusively in this double source are: (1) Sháyimáneh (ROUZAT: Shádímáneh) is located as Kúchim Khán's headquarters at one-half farsakh (about two miles) from the center of Harát. (2) Abú Sa'id's position at the siege is given as extending from the Der(-i ?) Qará Bridge to the village of Farzan. (JANG's "Farzan" is very legibly written and should probably be read instead of AHSAN's "Marán".) (3) For the Qizilbásh positions on the city-gates, the Khúsh and Qipchág gates are added and the position of Timúr-úghlí accordingly changed. (4) In the Qizilbásh sally against the Bágh-i Murád, the statement is made that the gházis (i.e. the Qizilbásh) narrowly missed the capture of the two Úzbek kháns because of their erroneous belief that the Bágh was too well policed. (5) The revolts of the border umará at Sháh Ismá'il's death are cited in JANG/118b-119b, ROUZAT/127a.

iii. AHSAN/186-7 and KHULASEH/92b-93b: Both give similar and moderately detailed accounts. They both accept the invasion as following Sháh Ismá'il's death but present no exclusive details. They are both very likely derived from JANG.

iv. ILCHI/35b has a brief account but states that the siege lasted two months and to the list of Úzbeks present is alone to add Jánibeg Sultán, Kistán Qará Sultán and Baráq Sultán.

v. TAAA/38 likewise has a brief account but states that the siege lasted "several months" (chand máh)

vi. TEZ/10 barely mentions the event but confuses the chronology problem here by stating that the news of the invasion came in Takhácúy/931 while the Sháh was at the yaylác of Sahand and Úján.

vii. ABD/22a, ANONYN/26a-27a, SUBHAN/55b-56a: These almost identical Úzbek sources refer to the event briefly as a march on Khurásán under Jánibeg Sultán (for whose family the basic Úzbek account was written) and the other kháns, who upon the death of Sháh Ismá'il in 930, sought revenge for the killing of Shibáni Khán. The invasion date is given in 931.

viii. NUSAKH/212b under Takhácúy/931 records a raid on Khurásán by a Khalíl Úzbek. This is difficult to place since it is a unique reference and there is no other mention of a Khalíl among the Úzbeks of either Mávará'al-nahr or Khwárizm.

Dürmish Khán-Sám Mirzá administration. The khutbah was then read for the first time in Sháh Tahmásb's name in Harát. The Uzbek siege then began in earnest.

This is very difficult to reconcile with the other riváyat (JANG), according to which, at the news of Sháh Ismá'il's death some of the umará of the frontier areas and the generally "evil-minded ones" (sardarán-i sarhadd va sharíran) began thinking of shaking off their obedience to Dürmish Khán and were planning on "independence" (istiqlál). However, when a messenger arrived from Court, announcing the peaceful accession of the new Sháh and armed with a fármán (decree) confirming Dürmish Khán and with instructions to all the population to renew their obedience to him, the revolts were nipped in the making and security was restored to Khurásán. Only then did the Úzbeks determine to take advantage of the new situation and invade Khurásán. If the often quoted date of the Uzbek invasion, 931, is to be taken as the actual Hijrí year, it would represent a minimum of six months after Sháh Tahmásb's accession.

A possible reconciliation of the riváyats is the rather obscure possibility that the references to the revolts in the frontier areas apply to Qizilbásh who were cooperating with the first stages of a leisurely moving Uzbek invasion. Another possibility is seen in GHAZI/215-216 (whose chronology for this period is however not to be taken too literally). It states that at the death of Sháh Ismá'il, the Qizilbásh governors north of the Khurásán Mountains (i.e. presumably the Köpet Dagħ) fled the areas under their control in the face of determined "Úzbek" (i.e.

here, Khwárizmian-Úzbek) attacks. It has been noted above (p.21) that the term Úzbek is used indiscriminately in the Safavid sources, and a faint possibility thus arises that the references to an early Úzbek appearance in Khurásán and to the troubled state of the frontier, refer in fact to the Khwárizmian-Úzbeks, rather than to 'Ubayd Khán and the army of Mávárá'al-nahr and Turkistán.

The concern here is not with the chronology per se, for basic questions arise if the first Úzbek clash with Sháh Tahmásb's Iran is to be properly understood: Did the Úzbeks begin their offensive before or after the death of Sháh Ismá'il? Is this first collision to be interpreted as an Úzbek "adventure" against Harát (as the 927/1521 attempt described in Section I, pp.40-41), or is this already the first attempt to annex Khurásán? The confusion in the sources on the sequence of events makes it difficult to decide.

A possible resolution of the problem is that the Úzbeks started out on an "adventure", or perhaps merely on a large scale raid, and were unprepared to take full advantage of the new situation which arose with the advent of the new sháh and the convulsions in the Safavid state which soon followed. At any rate there is a great deal of difference between this first Úzbek attempt on Harát and some of the subsequent invasions which were clearly aimed at permanent annexation of all Khurásán.

From the AFZAL riváyat the conclusion would be that in 930/1524, somewhat before Rajab/May (the death-date of Sháh Ismá'il), the Úzbeks gathered under 'Ubayd Khán, and as in the past (i.e. as for example in 927/1521) set out to "adventure" against Harát. From the JANG riváyat the conclusion would be that in 931/1524, probably

about Muharram/October, the Ūzbeks gathered under 'Ubayd Khán to take advantage of the new situation in Iran resulting from the accession of Sháh Tahmásb, and set out to "conquer" Khurásán.

Whatever the intentions, it is clear from the personnel involved that this was a major Ūzbek undertaking since all four of the "neo-eponymous clans" seem to have been represented. With 'Ubayd Khán, the most prominent Ūzbek of the time and the probable de facto leader of this expedition, were the grand khán, Kúchim Khán; his son and heir-apparent, Abú Sa'id Sultán; and Suyúnj Khán of Táshkand. To these ILCHI adds Jánibeg Sultán, his son, Kístan Qará Sultán, and Baráq Sultán, the son of Suyúnj Khán.

The Ūzbeks must have approached Harát leisurely (see "E" below for the apparently simultaneous pressure against the Tímúrids at Balkh), for mention is made of some preliminary pillaging on the frontiers of Khurásán and also of the fact that the local population was able to take shelter in time.

In any case, Dúrmish Khán had ample opportunity to arrange for the defence of Harát: supplies were brought in, the walls repaired and barricades (kúchehband) set up outside the city walls. A defence council was called and the following assignments made to the guarding of the city gates, with the Shámlú garrison providing the major fighting force, but interestingly enough with two Tájik administrators in key positions: Firúzábád Gate (from the Khákistar Tower on the right to the Amin Bába Mahmúd Tower on the left) -- under Khwájeh Habíbulláh, the Tájik vazír of Khurásán; 'Iráq Gate -- under Halhal Bahádur; Malik Gate -- under Husayn Mírzá Shámlú, the brother of the

governor, Dúrmish Khán; Khúsh Gate -- under Tímúr-úghlí (oğlu); ai-chác Gate -- under the Tájik, Ahmad Bek Núr(f) Kamál, the personal vazír of the governor.

When the Úzbeks appeared outside the city, they made the following deployment: Kúchim Khán, in the village of Sháyimáneh (or Shámiyáneh or Shádimáneh); 'Ubayd Khán, in the Bágh-i Áhú (Garden of the Deer); Suyúnj Khán in the Bágh-i Murád (Garden of Desire); Abú Sa'id Sultán from the Dar(-i?) Qará Bridge to Farzan village.

The first Úzbek assault was on the Fírúzábád Gate: this was repelled by the fire of Khwájeh Habíbulláh's detachment from the ramparts above. 'Ubayd Khán then personally led an attempt against the kúchehbands, but this too was repulsed with casualties on both sides. The Úzbeks continued their assaults but were unable to penetrate the kúchehbands.

The Úzbeks then tried diplomatic means and a letter in the name of Kúchim Khán was sent to the Harát governor. Although the actual wording of the letter as variously given in the sources is probably apocryphal, it is nonetheless very interesting for summing up the political situation of the time as seen by the Úzbeks, for Kúchim khán pointed out that since Sháh Ismá'il was dead and a child had succeeded him, it would be most difficult for the Qizilbásh to resist simultaneously (a) the Úzbeks, (b) the Ottomans and (c) the internal enemies (i.e. the contending úymáq umará). The letter continued with the offer of a bribe ("If you surrender Harát to us, you will be rewarded with any part of Túrán you may desire and you will be enrolled among the great umará of the Úzbek

realm") and ended with a threat (va illá, "or else"... "you can hold yourself responsible for the inevitable catastrophe which will befall the people of Khurásán upon our conquest").

The reply of Dúrmish Khán (pointedly written in the name of Sám Mirzá, the de jure infant royal governor) is of less interest although in this case it would appear that the actual text is preserved in AFZAL. In the reply, the Úzbeks were reminded of Shíbaní Khán's fiasco; their taunts of Sháh Tahmásb's age were countered by the statement that God had entrusted this child with the spread of the Shí'eh religion; and that Dúrmish Khán could not conceivably part from his devotion to the Safavid House. The reply concluded with what is apparently intended as a taunt in return to the effect that Kúchim Khán should not be led astray by Amír 'Ubayd Khán and should depart at once, "for the 12,000 defenders of Harát are prepared to resist for a year, while your army cannot maintain the siege for more than a month".

This firm rejection of the Úzbek terms is in marked contrast with some of the events that were to follow upon subsequent sieges of Harát, when entire garrisons (including Husayn Mirzá, soon to become Husayn Khán, and Sám Mirzá himself) surrendered the city upon terms negotiated with the Úzbeks. It is also worth noting that there is nothing of any serious sectarian polemic in this exchange of correspondence at the very walls of Harát.

This reply closed all peaceful attempts at securing Harát and the Úzbeks resumed their fruitless assaults. There were also sorties made by the Shámlú garrison; one in particular is gleefully described in near-identical terms in most of the sources (e.g. AHSAN/187). In this sortie a Qizilbásh "commando" group

advanced into Suyúnj Khán's headquarters and forced both Suyúnj and 'Ubayd Khán to flee in rather humiliating circumstances. Had 'Ubayd Khán been taken in this raid, Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks would have been quite different, for as will be seen, he alone of the Úzbeks was willing and able to maintain the sustained drive necessary to take Khurásán.

The Úzbek leaders had suffered more than a loss of dignity: their morale was deeply effected. The Úzbeks immediately withdrew from their forward positions and within "two or three" days after this famous Qizilbásh sortie, they abandoned the siege and retired beyond the Ámú Daryá River back to "Túrán", the poetical name of their Mávará'al-nahr homeland.

It has been seen that there are chronological difficulties in the description of the siege. The evidence, however, would seem to indicate a rather short and off-season siege of perhaps two to four months, lasting through the winter of Píchí/931/1524-25, i.e. the same winter that Sháh Tahmásb had made his first qishlác at Tabríz. It would seem that the Úzbeks, despite the presence of a large army, were not prepared for an all-out, determined effort. There is no mention of an Úzbek domestic crisis at the time, or of an external threat (from the Qazáqs or Chaghatáy¹, for example), and certainly no prospect of a Qizilbásh relief army to account for the early abandonment of the siege.

A plausible explanation would be that this first attempt on

1. See "E" below for the Chaghatáy invasion of Mávará'al-nahr in 931/1525 which could only have occurred after the Úzbek abandonment of their Harát siege.

Harát was an "adventure". It was however on a more ambitious scale than a mere "raid", for the Ūzbeks came with a "Grande Armée" with the heads of all four "neo-eponymous clans" probably present. This campaign should therefore best be compared with the 927/1521 attempt on Harát during the Sháh Ismá'íl period, and not with the subsequent campaigns which were more clearly aimed at holding Khurásán. We would therefore refute the wording of the chroniclers who call this an attempt at taskhír ("conquest"). It may simply be a matter of lexicology, for it is difficult to find a word to describe the situation mid-way between "raiding" and "conquest". The English word "adventure" seems best able to describe it.

The defences of Harát had been probed; it was discovered that the Qizilbásh meant to resist despite the new situation at Court; and so the Ūzbeks, satisfied with the plunder they had gained, called the attempt off and withdrew. For in the absence of sieging engines and heavy cannon, the only way to have taken Harát was by a war of attrition (this point will be resumed below). This entailed not an "adventurous" spirit, but the dogged determination to conquer and to hold. Only 'Ubayd Khán had the tenacity of purpose for this sort of campaign and it was the method used in the subsequent Ūzbek invasions which were almost entirely the personal projects of 'Ubayd Khán and his Sháh-Budáqid clan. This first invasion, however, was an all-Ūzbek affair and it would seem that 'Ubayd Khán's personal concern in Khurásán was diluted by the presence here of his "peers" whose motivation was either plunder or "adventure". 'Ubayd Khán's motivation, by contrast, was the creation of a new appanage for his own "neo-eponymous clan".

To follow the subsequent relations of Sháh Tahmásp and the Úzbeks, it is now necessary to consider the civil wars which broke out in Iran. The new situation at the Safavid Court with its repercussions in Khurásán, and the inability of the Court to organize a lasting deterrent force, was to lead to a new phase in Safavid-Úzbek relations. It meant that the Úzbeks, and in particular, 'Ubayd Khán, were in a position to revive the Khurásán question. This was not to be in the manner of the "adventure" against Harát just described, but more in the style of Shíbaní Khán in the preceding generation and of 'Abdulláh Khán in the succeeding generation, when the intent was very clearly the incorporation of Khurásán into the Úzbek realm.

C. The First Ustājlu War ¹

'Ubayd Khān's attempt on Khurāsān at the beginning of the new reign obviously called for a centrally directed eastern campaign on the part of the Safavid Court. And as a matter of fact a royal expedition was being prepared until it was subverted by the rival contenders for the regency, Dīv Sultān and Rūmlū-Takkalū axis on the one side, and Kapak Sultān and the Ustājlu on the other. Both sides seized upon the Ūzbek threat to further their own ends, for "as the expression goes, 'first things first'" (b-mazmūn-i al-shamm fa'l-shamm mashghūl gashtand) (ROUZAT/127a).

Many of the sources speak openly of Dīv Sultān's bahāneh (pretext) of going off to fight the Ūzbeks to mask his real intentions of gathering an army in the provinces to use against his Ustājlu rivals at Court. Even without these hints offered by the sources, the chronological evidence alone would refute any possible claim to the sincerity of his purpose, for by spring, when Dīv Sultān set off to assemble a Qizilbāsh army at Lār, ostensibly to counter the Ūzbeks, 'Ubayd Khān had already withdrawn from the siege of Harāt.

Dīv Sultān's departure from Court was also advantageous to the Ustājlu side for it removed their great rival (who,

1. Detailed accounts of the Lār concentration, Dīv Sultān's coup at Tabriz and the First Ustājlu War are found in ROUZAT/127a, 132a-135a and in AHSAN/187-9, 191-4. These two sources complement rather than duplicate one another. AFZAL/15b-16a, 21b-22b, ILCHI/33b-34a, TEZ/10, JANG/130a, 133a contain a few added details. The events are also noticed in SHARAF/548-550, SHIRAZI/000a-b, NUSAKH/212b. KHULASEH/93b ff is similar to AHSAN; TAAA/34-36 specifically cites AHSAN as its source (p.34).

according to TEZ/10 already had the precedence). The idea may well have originated with the "grand vazir", Qāzī Jahān, as suggested by AFZAL/15b; for it has already been noted that he was in the Ustājlu faction at Court. He is said to have advised the Shāh that appointing Dīv Sultān to the generalship of Khurāsān would serve two purposes: it would keep the eastern frontiers secure; and by separating the two rivals at Court, it would bring security to the home front as well.

It was with such mixed motivations that Shāh Tahmāsb sent off his first expedition to the east in the spring of 931/1525.

When Dīv Sultān arrived at the Lār staging grounds in Māzandarān, he used the royal farmāns at his disposal to summon the provincial ūymāq governors and their levees, particularly the Takkalú governors of Isfahān (Júheh¹ Sultān), of Hamadān (Qarājeh Sultān), of Mashhad (Būrūn Sultān), and of Qazvīn (?) (Akhi Sultān), along with the Zū'l-Qadar governor of Shīrāz ('Alī Sultān). Encouragement in the way of gifts (to pay the troops) and direct military supplies were also furnished by the semi-independent rulers of Māzandarān. ILCHI/34a and AFZAL/15b add that the Shāmlú governors of Khurāsān (Dūrmish Khān at Harāt and

1. The origin of this unusual name is given in HABIB/539, where in a description of the Bādgīs massacre in 919/1513 reference is made to a certain Dīlú Bakhshī "who, because of [his] knowingness in the arts of war received the sobriquet [laqab] of Jújī Sultān, which the Qizilbāsh pronounce as 'Júseh' or 'Júheh'". (The reference is to Jújī, the eldest son of Chengīz Khān.) That this is the same person who was later to figure so prominently as Shāh Tahmāsb's vakīl is made clear by AHSAN's/139 parallel description of the Bādgīs massacre in which the name appears in full as Chūheh Sultān Takkalú. The name also occurs in the sources as "Júqeh" and "Júheh" (the latter form has been adopted in this presentation).

Zaynal Khán at Astarábád) pledged their moral support and encouraged some of the Khurásán Shámlú, notably Damrí (Dabrí) Sultán, governor of Dámghán¹ to join the Rúmlú-Takkalú movement.

Dív Sultán now made his real plans public. (It would be doubtful whether many of the assembled umará at Lár had been naive enough to believe they were really going on an Uzbek expedition.) At a great banquet, he explained that, inasmuch as the Uzbek threat was then over, there was no longer any reason to go on to Dúrmish Khán's aid in Harát. However, there was another pressing matter which might usefully be discussed by the assemblage: the problem of the Ustájlú control of the royal person. (The guests would obviously have known that this meant Ustájlú control over the major positions of office and prestige.) The Sultán brought forward his "legitimate" rights to the post of vakíl as inherited from the days of Sháh Ismá'íl.

The assembled umará agreed to the necessity of eliminating Kásek Sultán and his Ustájlú faction and they began the "march on Tabríz" that fall (toward the end of 931/1525).

Thus a major part of the Qizilbásh army, ostensibly gathered to parry the Uzbek threat, had been subverted for the use of the Rúmlú-Takkalú side in the civil war which now began and which

1. ILCHI/33a, under the year 930, makes Damrí Sultán the governor of Fírúzkúh and Simnán. Most other sources, for the events of Fírúzkúh/933/1527 where he figures prominently, consider him the governor of Dámghán. For the confusion in the sources regarding the governorships held in this period (particularly the separate riyáyats of ILCHI and AFZAL) see below Chapter 2, p.102 note 1.

was to continue intermittently until 942/1535 -- this, despite the determined efforts of the Ūzbeks to effect the annexation of Khurásán on the east, and a similar attempt by Suláymán the Magnificent upon Āzarbáyján on the west.

One of the basic flaws in the ūymáq system is thus exposed: without a member of the Safavid House/^{to} provide cohesion or unity of purpose (as in the case of the child-sháh, Tahmásp), the individual ūymáq fell apart. They began pursuing separate policies which had little to do with their original purpose of defending the Safavid-Qizilbásh cause. In fact, without a Safavid sháh, the ūymáq could no longer properly be called Qizilbásh. They became instead contending tribes pursuing individual interests as opposed to such "national" (i.e. Safavid-Qizilbásh) interests as the defence against the Ūzbeks in Khurásán. This becomes quite clear from the events which now followed the "march on Tabríz" of the Rúmlú and allied ūymáq.

At the news of the arrival of Dív Sultán and his allied Qizilbásh near Tabríz, Kapak Sultán, the Ustájlú co-vakíl, realistically came out to welcome the victor officially (istiobál); for he had been completely outmanoeuvred. Dív Sultán took over immediately: he executed two leading Ustájlú; imprisoned the "grand vazír", Qází Jahán, and appointed his own man, Amír Ja'far Sávjí to this post; sent Kapak Sultán off on a ghazá ("raid") of Georgia; and most important, appointed Júheh Sultán Takkalú as the new co-vakíl with the specific function of muhrdár ("Keeper of the Seal"). This last was doubtlessly the price paid for Takkalú support, a price that was shortly to lead to Dív Sultán's own downfall. The Court then went into oishláq (931-932/1525-1526)

where we are told (ROUZAT/133a) much fear and contention prevailed.

It has already been seen that Damrí Sultán, the Shámlú governor of strategic Dámghán on the main Khurásán Highway, and Búrún Sultán, the Takkalú governor of Mashhad, had joined Dív Sultán's army at the Lár concentration and had presumably gone on to join the royal cishláq at Tabríz after Dív Sultán's coup. In addition, Zaynal Khán Shámlú, the governor of Astarábad, now appeared at Court to protect his own interests. As ROUZAT/137a puts it: "Like other umará of Khurásán, he [Zaynal Khán] went to the Royal Court because of the contentions of the umará at the foot of the ...throne".¹

This meant that many of the leading Qizilbásh of Khurásán were away from their posts. When this is combined with the death of Dúrmish Khán at about this time in Harát and the anarchy that followed there, it can be seen that the internal situation in Iran was a lure indeed for the Úzbeks. It was not long before they seized this opportunity to launch a major attempt at taking Khurásán from the Qizilbásh in the "Second Invasion".

The first actual inter-Qizilbásh armed hostilities began the following spring (Ít/932/1526) when the Ustájlú made their first unsuccessful attempt to come back to power. Kapak Sultán assembled his Ustájlú at Sultáníyeh (about half-way between Tehrán and Tabríz) but was defeated in battle (at Saksanjúk in Sha'bán/

1. "Chún sáyir-i umará-yi Khurásán b-vásiteh-yi ikhtiláf-i umará-yi páyeh-yi sarír-i khiláfat b-moukib-i jáh ú jalál tavajjuh farmúdeh."

932/May 1526.

With Dív Sultán at this battle were three umará who would more profitably (from the "national" point of view) have remained in Khurásán to prepare against the coming Úzbek invasion: Búrún Sultán Takkalú, the governor of Mashhad; Damrí Sultán, the governor of Dámghán; and Akhí Sultán Takkalú, who seems to have been governor of both Bistám on the Khurásán Highway and Qazvín. Despite the Rúmlú-Takkalú victory, Búrún Sultán was killed in the battle. The fact that Mashhad was thus deprived of its qizilbásh defender was one of the immediate factors in the timing of 'Ubayd Khán's Second Invasion.

After the defeat in battle, the Ustájlú fled to Gílán, were pursued, and another major battle was then fought (at Kharzavíl/Kharzabíl). The Ustájlú were again defeated and forced to seek refuge in Gílán on the Caspian shores.

It is of interest to note the complete lack of personal power of the young Sháh during these events. In his Diary (TEZ/11), and as elucidated in ROUZAT/134b, he hints at an Ustájlú attempt to reach him at Qazvín; the Rúmlú-Takkalú however marched on Qazvín and prevented any possible royal rapprochement with the Ustájlú.

The timing of the victory celebrations which were then held at Court at the beginning of the Qazvín qishláq (933/1526-27) to mark the triumph of the Rúmlú-Takkalú coalition is significant for the concern here with eastern affairs. At the same time that the victors were building a triumphal pyramid of the Ustájlú heads severed as war-trophies, the news arrived in Qazvín of the Second

Invasion of Khurásán and of the initial Uzbek victories. The inter-úymác factional strife had nullified any attempt to protect Khurásán, and 'Ubayd Khán was prepared to take full advantage of the temporary collapse of the Safavid-Qizilbásh institutions.

D. Anarchy in Khurásán ¹

It has already been seen that according to JANG/ROUZAT, at the first arrival of the news of Sháh Ismá'il's death to Khurásán, some of the Qizilbásh governors of the border areas began to seek their independence from the Dúrmish Khán-Sám Mírzá administration in Harát, and that only the timely arrival of re-confirming patents from the new Court had prevented serious defections. The immediate Úzbek threat from both Khwárizm and Mávará'al-nahr, and the involvement of key Khurásán governors in the Ustájlú Wars have also been alluded to. A new source of trouble was now to rock Khurásán: the most untimely death of Dúrmish Khán, the

1. For the death of Dúrmish Khán and his replacement by Husayn Khán: The basic source is JANG/122b-124a and the dependent ROUZAT/129b-130a. AFZAL/17b ff cites the event briefly but then adds a number of anecdotes for Dúrmish Khán's obituary which testify to the Khán's justice and generosity; AFZAL here quotes the non-extant history of NUJÚMÍ HARAVÍ as its source. KHULASEH/95b-90b summarizes the event. AHSAN/189, TAAA/38 and TEZ/9,10 have brief notices.

For the Shámlú shulúq ("riot") and the lynching of the vazír: The major sources give a very detailed account, generally similar in content, which is probably derived from JANG, the contemporary source from Harát. AFZAL adds a few details (e.g. the Court reaction at the news) and specifically cites AHSAN as its basic source (where however there is no mention of the Court reaction). Neither JANG-ROUZAT nor AHSAN, however, include the detailed obituary for the Khwájeh found in KHULASEH and AFZAL in which the Khwájeh is named as the patron of Khwándamír and the source of the title of his history, "Habíb al-Siyar".

The specific references are: JANG/124b-127b, ROUZAT/130a-132a, KHULASEH/90a-99a, AFZAL/23a-24a, AHSAN/197-8. TEZ/10-11 has a brief and obviously independent reference to the event, but the text is somewhat garbled for a key point, viz. Husayn Khán's involvement in the affair.

The Úzbek source RAQIM/115a-b has a most unexpected and independent reference to the event. (It gives three chronograms, blames the event on a crime (jarímeh) committed by the Khwájeh, and names other victims of the shulúq.) It gives as its source Amír 'Abd al-Khayr ibn Ibráhím Qánuní, the sadrnishín of Bábur, who was present at the event.

shámlú governor for the entire province, and the resultant confusion and rioting in Harát.

Dúrmish Khán is said to have taken to heavy drinking after the Úzbek retirement from their siege of Harát in the First Invasion, and to have died soon after. It would help the chronological problem of this immediate period if the date were known with more precision, but here again the sources are contradictory; the most likely date which reconciles most of the differences is very early (possibly Muharram/October) 932/1525. The famous poet Mouláná Hilálí composed a rather inelegant chronogram for the occasion: Afsús! Hazár hayf! Afsús! Afsús! (to be freely translated perhaps as: "Oh me! Oh my! Oh me!") which does however manage to yield the required date of 932.

Dúrmish Khán is given very proper obituary notices in the sources, and anecdotes are cited attesting to his justice and generosity. His death may be symbolically interpreted as the passing of the Sháh Ismá'íl era of comparative stability in Khurásán.

Khwájeh Habíbulláh Sávjí, the vazír of Khurásán and a Tájik, or non-Qizilbásh, acted swiftly to maintain order. On the same day as Dúrmish Khán's death he summoned a council of the leading umará (i.e. of the Qizilbásh) and atyán (of the local "great families") and raised Husayn Khán (the brother of Dúrmish) to the governorship, or more accurately to the lalegí of Sám Mírzá, who remained as the royal de jure governor. The Khwájeh then wrote a report to the Court simultaneously announcing the death of Dúrmish Khán and the fait accompli appointment (literally: jalús or "accession") of Husayn Khán.

The chaotic situation at Court and the concomitant abandonment of Khurásán to its own devices is seen in the royal response;¹ for the act was recognized and a patent was sent "confirming" Husayn Khán as governor of Khurásán, and robes of honor (khil'at) were sent to the new governor, to Sâm Mírzá and to the Khwájeh himself.

This type of local self-action in which the Tájik administrators and the Qizilbásh were both involved was to occur again in Khurásán whenever the Court was too preoccupied with its own inner tensions or with an Ottoman threat to concern itself with the provincial affairs of far-away Khurásán. It will be frequently seen throughout this narrative that the affairs of Khurásán were only sporadically given a priority rating by the Court.

The Khwájeh however could not however hope to maintain order in Khurásán at the same time that Iran as a whole was plunged in an inter-Qizilbásh civil war. He was instead to be lynched for his efforts by the local Shámlú.

The date of his murder is significant: Rajab 932/ April 1526, i.e. the same date that Kapak Sultán was leading his Ustájlú at Sultániyeh to face the Rúmlú-Takkalú coalition for the first time. The events cannot be isolated, for the Qizilbásh are seen to have been on the rampage both at Court and in Khurásán. It will be recalled that both Takkalú and Shámlú from Khurásán were directly involved in the events at Court; similarly it should be noted that the Shámlú rioters in Harát were joined by the Afshár, Ahmad Sultán

1. The attempt of the Sháh in his Diary to cover up his true status at this period is revealingly indicated by his references (TEZ/9,10) to this event: "I appointed Husayn Khán to replace [Dürmish Khán] " (Husayn Khán...rá...cáyim-macám-i ú kardam; já-yi úrá b-Husayn Khán dádeh búdam).

and the Rúmlú, Darvísh Bek. The failure of the Khwájeh to hold the Qizilbásh line at Harát soon put the local Shámlú in complete and irresponsible control. The chaos that followed, both at Court and in Khurásán, was an open invitation for 'Ubayd Khán to launch his Second Invasion which was to be much more serious in intent than the First.

It is quite apparent that the Khwájeh had been well aware of the danger, for in his report to the Court upon the death of Dúrmish Khán he also noted the misconduct of the local gházis (Qizilbásh). It is probable that he did not trust Husayn Khán; at any rate the new governor was to make no attempt to intervene at the Shámlú rioting and lynching of the vazír of Khurásán. As a matter of fact, Husayn Khán was probably directly involved in the events, for he must have been chafing at the financial controls his vazír was trying to enforce. In typical fashion the new governor had begun his administration by distributing financial rewards based on written notes to specific areas, and by outright gratuities. This was the immediate background of the events which now followed.

A group of Shámlú called on the Khwájeh and demanded payment drawn on the sub-province of Asfuzár (or possibly Isfaráín).¹ The Khwájeh was rather brusque in attempting to dismiss them and point-blank refused their demands. The Shámlú forced the issue and demanded a release, in writing, from the Qizilbásh service. The Khwájeh,

1. ROUZAT/130a has substituted "Asfuzár" (a dependency of Harát) for the "Isfaráín" in the other sources. This is preferable since distant Isfaráín had its own local governor and was only indirectly dependent on Harát.

losing his judgement as well as his temper, complied. (He had been interrupted at a backgammon game.) This written release was a powerful weapon in the hands of the anti-Khwájeh Qizilbásh elements, for the Shámlú indignantly (although most likely, jubilantly) showed the release to Yár Ahmad Khalífeh, the Shámlú chief in Herát, and demanded action against the Khwájeh -- and presumably against the entire non-Qizilbásh administrative staff. This was the opportunity awaited for and Yár Ahmad immediately summoned his men and prepared to take action.

Either by design or by chance, a dinner given by Siráj al-Dín Sultán Shámlú, the uncle of the governor, provided an opportunity for the matter to be discussed publicly, for both the Khwájeh and Yár Ahmad were guests. Yár Ahmad had the bad manners to bring up the subject and insult the Khwájeh for his niggardliness in refusing to pay the sums due. The reply of the Khwájeh, given in somewhat varying terms by the sources, most likely gives the clue to the entire situation (even if the exact wording, as in KHULASEH/96b, be fabricated): "Political and financial affairs are not running smoothly as in the times of Dúrmish Khán; the lack of order in these matters leads to confusion in the affairs of state."¹ The Khwájeh insisted that although he could easily pay the petty amount, a question of principle was involved.

Needless to say, such pious sentiments only hastened Yár Ahmad's determination to murder the Khwájeh on the spot. He decided however to wait for the Khwájeh to become drunk(er?) and thus

1. "Umúr-i mulkí va málí b-dastúr-i ouqát-i Dúrmish Khán mutamashshí namishayed va az 'adam-i tamshiyat-i in umúr ikhtilál-i moufúr b-muhimmát-i mamlakat ráh yábad."

missed his opportunity, for the host of the dinner dissuaded him from murdering a guest in his home. That night the Khwájeh was safely escorted home by another Shámlú, Halhal Bahádur, who was in the personal service of Sâm Mirzá.

The next morning (these events are in Rajab 932/April 1526) the Shámlú began a shulúq ("riot" or "demonstration") in front of Government House (Bágh-i Shahr) in Harát. The Khwájeh sent out Muẓaffar Tabakohí, the other non-Qizilbásh administrative leader in Harát, in an attempt to appease the rioters, but to no avail. The Shámlú and other Qizilbásh (notably Darvísh Bek Rúmlú) marched on the Khwájeh's home and surrounded it.

By now the Khwájeh seems to have realized the seriousness of the situation and he finally agreed to sacrifice his principles and pay off the Shámlú. But by now it was too late, for it is clear that more was at stake than the specific issue of the payment due on Asfuzár. The Khwájeh sent someone to the roof of his home to announce his capitulation, but the man was hooted down.

The Shámlú then forced their way in, killed the Khwájeh's two sons and all his relatives and retinue. The Khwájeh himself was seized by Darvísh Bek¹, the leader of the rioters, who however agreed to bring the Khwájeh before the final judgement of Sâm Mirzá. The Khwájeh was however forcibly taken from his custody and lynched on the spot.

Over 100 persons (TEZ says 70) are said to have been killed

1. All sources but one call Darvísh Bek a Rúmlú; the exception is KHULASEH/97b which makes him a Shámlú.

that day. Among the victims were the scholar, Mírzá Qásim Haraví, the poet, Mírzá Káfí¹ and, as added in RAQIM, Sháh Mahmúd Sharbí. Burial arrangements were made by Ahmad Bek Núr Kamál, who had been in Dúrmish Khán's service; but the Khwájeh's body was removed and the corpse dragged through the streets of Harát by the victorious Qizilbásh.

This same Ahmad Bek Núr Kamál was then named by the Qizilbásh as vazír to replace the Khwájeh. As will be seen below, he was a Shámlú partisan and was to become the "grand vazír" of Iran during the period of the Shámlú control of the Court.

The Qizilbásh úymáo were now in full control of Khurásán just as they were at Court. The semblance of loyalty to the Safavid House was however maintained: the Rúmlú-Takkalú at Court had Sháh Tahmásb; the Shámlú in Khurásán had Sám Mírzá. Although legitimacy was thereby secured for their assumption of control, it is quite clear that the úymáo were actually attempting to supersede the Safavid House as the major force in the Qizilbásh system. However, as has already been noted, it is doubtful if they could actually have succeeded, for the entire system developed by Sháh Ismá'íl required the cohesiveness and unity of purpose provided by a de facto as well as de jure Safavid head.

1. TUHFEH/71 notes that he was killed in 932 in Khwájeh Habíbulláh's home "at the hands of the Turks" (b-dast-i atrák). By "Turks", Sám Mírzá, the author of TUHFEH; means the Qizilbásh and he is doubtlessly referring to the events just described. Fusayn Khán's implication is perhaps hinted at here, for we are told that Dúrmish Khán, his brother, had been on hostile terms with the poet, who had been in the latter's service.

E. The Ūzbeks Vis-à-vis the Chaghatáy and Tímúrids

1. The Chaghatáy Invasion of Mávará'al-nahr¹

There is a lull of perhaps a year and a half in Safavid-Ūzbek military relations between the abandonment of the Harát siege and the launching of 'Ubayd Khán's Second Invasion of Khurásán. It might appear strange that the Ūzbeks were not taking full advantage of the chaotic internal situation in Iran during this period of pause (climaxed in Rajab 932/ April-May 1526 by the battle against the Ustájlú at Saksanjúk and the lynching of the vazír of Khurásán in Harát). The explanation would appear to lie in the Ūzbek preoccupation with their neighbors to the east -- the Chaghatáy (i.e. the self-styled descendants of Chaghatáy, son of Changíz Khán), and with those to the south -- the Bábur-Tímúrids.

The Chaghatáy of Mughúlistán (the area of the Ilí River valley of Kazakhstan and Kirghizia plus Sinkiang) had been pushed out of Táshkand and Fargháneh by the new Ūzbek state; however, Sultán Sa'íd Khán, the contemporary Chaghatáy ruler at Kashghar, was still hopeful of reconquering these lost areas. Thus, he was prepared to act at the news of the death of Suyúnj Khán, the eponymous head of the Suyúnjid appanage-state centering about Táshkand,

1. The Chaghatáy invasion of Andíján is described in RASHIDI/375-377. While RASHIDI, the basic and contemporary source for the Chaghatáy history of this period, contains useful information on the Ūzbeks up to about 920/1514, there is very little data given for the period of Sháh Tahmasb. A very brief resumé of Ūzbek history is given up to the death of 'Ubayd Khán (pp.282-3) and the whole subject is then dismissed: "I shall have no further occasion to refer to the Ūzbek in this history"(p.283).

whom we have seen as present at the Uzbek siege of Harát.

The news of Suyúnj Khán's death was received by the Chaghatáy "towards the end of summer" in 931, i.e. about Zú'l-Qa'deh or August of 1525 ¹ (the events that follow presumably extend into Hijrí 932) and Sultán Sa'íd Khán promptly marched westward to seize Andíján in the Farghánah valley. The Chaghatáy had already taken Úzkand and were marching on Úsh (both in Farghánah), when the Uzbek sultáns, alive to this common threat, "all poured into [Andíján], like locusts or ants, from every quarter" and forced the Chaghatáy Khán to retire.

The combined Uzbek army is said to have totaled 100,000 men; this is the same figure given by BABUR/270a for what is presumably the identical Uzbek army at the siege of Balkh (to be described under "ii", below), and is approximately the same figure given by the Safavid sources for the combined Uzbek army at the Battle of Jám in 935/1528. It is important to note in this connection that we thus have a reference to the Úzbeks being able to maintain a unified "Grande Armée" (i.e. a combined

1. The date given here in RASHIDI has been useful in the attempt to establish the absolute chronology for the first Uzbek siege of Harát. The fact that all the Uzbek sultáns were already in Mávará'al-nahr by the summer of 931 would make their retirement from Harát by the beginning of the preceding spring a distinct possibility--a conclusion also reached from the other totally unrelated sources. This would become conclusive if the hypothesis made here in the narrative of the fall of Balkh (below, "ii") is accepted: viz. that the Uzbek army cited in BABUR as besieging Balkh, is identical with RASHIDI's Uzbek army which came to the defence of Andíján at approximately the same time. This would seem to indicate that the "Grande Armée" of the Úzbeks had (a) abandoned the siege of Safavid Harát in favor of an attempt on Timúrid Balkh (probably at the beginning of spring/Takhácúy/931/1525 and, (b) had then then turned from the siege of Balkh to protect Andíján against the Chaghatáy invasion.

Ūzbek army with representatives from each of the appanage-states) about one year before 'Ubayd Khān and his Shāh-Budāqids were to launch the Second Invasion -- quite independently of the other "neo-eponymous clans".

II. The Ūzbek Conquest of Balkh ¹

The second Ūzbek preoccupation during the lull on the Safavid front was with the Balkh area, held in Bābur's name by Muḥammad Zamān Mīrzā (see above, pp.48-9). The initial siege of Balkh seems to have been an all-Ūzbek effort (probably attempted directly after the abandonment of the siege of Safavid Harāt); however, the final conquest was most likely a private Jānibegid project, led by Kīstan²

1. AHSAN/196-7 and KHULASEH/99a are the only Safavid sources consulted which mention the fall of Balkh to the Ūzbeks. Their accounts are identical and extremely terse. They simply state that Kīstan Qarā Sultān had sieged Balkh for some two years before Bābur summoned Muḥammad Zamān Mīrzā to Āgra (thus permitting the Ūzbeks to take the city). This statement fits in with the information given in BABUR. BABUR under the years 932 and 933 mentions the events at Balkh in random passim references to past events, for the years 930 and 931 are part of a gap period not covered by this source. The folio references are cited in the narrative which follows.

2. The name "Kīstan" (pronunciation: Kīstān/Kīsten) easily lends itself to variant readings because of the form it takes in the nasta'liq style of writing. Thus A. Beveridge in her index to the Bābur-nāmah facsimile (The Bābur-Nāmah, London 1905) reads "Kītin", as does R.R. Arat ("Kītin") in his Istanbul-Turkish translation of the same work (Vekayi, Ankara 1946). Seddon, in his edition and translation of AHSAN reads "Kaskan", the form also found in TAAA. It would seem that the scribes in the various manuscripts consulted were themselves confused by the name and it frequently appears in a different guise even within the same manuscript.

The form "Kīstan" is established here on the basis of two chronograms which feature the name in RAQIM/127a and 130b. Although the form of the name is no more legible in RAQIM than in the other sources, nonetheless the only way the chronograms can be made to yield the necessary sums is through the form "Kīstan" (e.g. Janūn [-1] Kīstan Qarā equals the requisite 950). "Kīstān" as a Chaghatay and Kazan-Turkish word in Radloff's Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialekte (St. Petersburg 1899), vol. II, p. 1388 meaning "rod" ("dubina", "Prügel").

Qará Sultán, the son of Jánibeg Sultán, for it was he who was arranged to Balkh at its fall.

The Úzbek occupation of Balkh and the general area south of the Ámú to the Hindúkush (e.g. Ghúrí) was to expose Khurásán to the dangers of a new eastern frontier with the Úzbeks, and Herát was soon to suffer from independent Úzbek attacks stemming from both Bukhárá and Balkh.

Aside from the terse AHSAN/KHULASEH account and the random references in BABUR, there is little data on how this came about, and the story can only be partially pieced together and certain hypotheses offered.

It would seem that there was an Úzbek threat of varying intensity for about two years (930-932/1524-1526) before the final surrender. BABUR's/270a list of his territories at the time of his conquest of India (the date of entry into Ágra is 28 Rajab 932/10 May 1526) includes Badakhshán, Qunduz, Qandahár and Kábul (Balkh is conspicuously absent), and he notes that he had received no aid from certain of these provinces because they themselves were in need of aid against "the traditional Úzbek enemy" (qadimi dushman idi) who was pressing them closely.

The events leading up to the Úzbek conquests south of the Ámú may be summarized as follows: In the summer¹ of 931/1525 Bábur was preparing to follow his ally, Álam khán to Láhúr for the definitive conquest of India. Before he could leave, however, there was a new

1. The date or season upon which our hypothesis here depends is not given precisely in BABUR. However, from the fact that (225b) Álam khán left Kábul for Láhúr "in such hot weather" (ishbudáq isic havadá) we can infer the summer season in Kábul.

turn in the Uzbek threat to Balkh: he received word that a large Uzbek army (with "kháns and sultáns"¹, i.e. presumably a joint all-Uzbek affair) had come to siege Balkh. Bábur thus postponed his departure for India and turned instead to relieve the threatened area (255b-256a).

That is all we hear of this phase of the matter from BABUR, for the gap in the source extends to the end of the year 931, and the above information is only mentioned in passing.

The next seen of Bábur (251b), he is apparently disengaged from the Balkh threat and is finally departing for the Indian campaign on 1 Safar 932/ 17 November 1525.

The gap can possibly be filled in from RASHIDI's account of the Chaghatáy invasion of Andíján which occurred "towards the end of summer" (i.e. very probably the same summer of 931), for as has just been seen above ("i"), a total Uzbek army quickly gathered at that time to save Andíján. Presumably the Úzbeks had been drawn away from the Balkh siege to meet the Chaghatáy threat. It was then possibly this event which had freed Bábur to turn once again to his planned campaign against India.

This of course did not end the pressure on Balkh (it will be recalled that the Chaghatáy pressure on the Úzbeks had been of short duration); however, the final phase of its conquest was no longer an all-Úzbek affair, and it seems to have become the private project of the Jánibegids led by Kístan Qará Sultán.

The Jánibegid siege of Balkh which then ensued must have begun immediately after Bábur's departure for India and the concomitant

1. "Úzbek khánlarí sultánlarí tamám kílíb"

recall of Humáyún from his post in Badakhshán to join in the Indian campaign (252a). This is seen from Bábur's record of 6 Safar/22 November (251b) where he mentions sending a large portion of gifts he had recently received to aid in the defence of Balkh (Balkh maslahatí úchún).

Balkh, however, was probably close to surrendering by 26 Rabí'I/10 January 1526 when Bábur sent one of his umará, Bâqí Shaghávul, together with financial assistance to maintain the defences of the city (261a). Muhammad Zamán Mirzá must have surrendered the city within the next few months (i.e. between Rabí'I and Rajab 932/ January and May 1526, for as has already been noted it was no longer part of Bábur's dominions at his accession to India in Rajab/May).

The only other references to these events (308a-309a) is under the date 3 Rabí'II 933/ 7 January 1527 when some of the local Báburid governors of the area south of the Ámú arrived in India after a flight from the Úzbek advance. They brought with them the head of a renegade officer of Humáyún who had deserted to the Úzbeks and had aided Kístan Qará Sultán in his final conquest of Balkh, and then in the taking of Ghúrí, Aybak and Khurram (i.e. the area up to the Hindúkush, but excluding Badakhshán which was to remain Tímúrid-Mughal for some sixty more years).

The important results of these Úzbek conquests, when viewed within the scope of this dissertation, were: first, the Tímúrids had been effectively eliminated as a serious potential third contender for Khurásán; second, an important section of Khurásán

proper was now definitively held by the Ūzbeks who had extended their Ámú boundary to the Hindúkush ; and third, there was now a new fluid frontier, difficult to secure against raiding, running approximately north to south along the Murgháb River to Gharjistán. Qizilbásh Khurásán was thus exposed to a new Ūzbek threat from the east -- in addition to the already existing threats from the north (Mávará'al-nahr) and northwest (Khwárizm).

Chapter 2. The Period of the Second Uzbek Invasion
(It-Tungúz-Sichdán/ 933-935/ 1526-1528)

Part 1. The Uzbek Conquest of Mashhad and Astarábád

A. The Favorable Situation for the Uzbeks

'Ubayd Khán's second attempt against Sháh Tahmásb's Khurásán was not an all-Uzbek "adventure" as the First Invasion most likely was. He came prepared enough for two qishláqs in the field and two long sieges at Mashhad (Tús) and Harát. Before attempting Harát itself, he carefully protected his right flank by first occupying Astarábád and blocking the Qazvín-to-Mashhad Khurásán Highway at Dámghán. And his conquests were everywhere consolidated by the appointment of Uzbek governors and garrisons. Furthermore, this was a private affair: there were no representatives from the sultáns of the other "neo-eponymous clans" and it is significant that his first appointment to Astarábád was his eldest son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán. This drive by 'Ubayd Khán for the permanent conquest of Khurásán was now to become the central theme of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Uzbeks until close to the Khán's death in 946/1540.

'Ubayd Khán was obviously very well aware of what was happening in Iran. It has already been seen how the first attempt of the Sháh to organize an eastern campaign had been subverted at Lár at the beginning of the inter-úymáq civil wars: the army raised was used in Tabriz to force Kapak Sultán Ustájlú out of the joint-regency. It has also been noted that the Khurásán Qizilbásh were involved in these events and had joined in on the anti-Ustájlú bandwagon: the Shámlú governors of Harát (Dúrmish Khán)

and Asterábád (Zaynal Khán) had lent their moral support to Div Sultán; Damrí Sultán Shámlú, the governor of strategic Dámghán, had been with the Rúmlú-Takkalú forces in the First Ustájlú Wars; and Búrún Sultán Takkalú, the governor of Mashhad, had been killed in these same wars. According to JANG/ROUZAT (see above p.68), Asterábád, too, had been left without a governor, for Zaynal Khán is said in this source to have repaired to the Court in order to protect his own interests, and also perhaps with the altruistic motivation of attempting to reconcile both sides and thus bring about unity in the face of the Úzbek danger.

In Harát itself there were two factors of weakness for the Safavid cause: (1) the recent death of Dúrmish Khán, the successful defender of Harát and the bearer of the prestige of Sháh Ismá'il's reign; and (2) the provincial repercussions of the situation at the central Court as expressed in the local assumption of power by Husayn Khán Shámlú, and the unpunished lynching of the vazír, Khwájeh Habíbulláh at the hands of a Shámlú mob which still continued terrorizing the city.

To this should be added the fact that the Úzbek internal situation seems to have been remarkably stable at this time and 'Ubayd Khán had sufficient personal prestige to maintain his de facto control. Nor was there a foreign threat: Qásim Khán, the great Qazác ruler was recently dead (AHSAN/183); the Chaghatáy, Sultán Sa'id Khán of Kashghar, had been successfully repelled at Andíján; and Bábur had just entered Ágra and was involved with his conquest of Indía.

The situation was thus remarkably favorable for a second Ūzbek attempt on Khurāsān.

It is possible to date the beginning of this Second Invasion with some confidence despite the ambiguity of the sources (the Hijrī years given: 931, 932, 933; the Turkī years given: Qáy, Īt, Túngúz!), by a collation with the events at Court which are more precisely dated. The beginning of the campaign should probably be placed toward the end of 932 in Īt/1526.

B. The Uzbek Advance from Marv to Mashhad ¹

1. Marv

'Ubayd Khán crossed the Ámú River at Chahár-jú and headed first for Marv on the main Bukhára-Mashhad Highway. Marv was presumably still under Safavid rule, but there was no garrison and the Úzbeks simply walked in. The fact that he restored the waterworks and issued farmáns for the development (ábádí) of the oasis-town is evidence that this was no raid or "adventure", but rather that he was acting in terms of permanent occupation.

The Úzbek source, RAQIM, however, contradicts this statement and asserts instead that 'Ubayd Khán carried off most of the population of Marv and resettled them in Bukhára. This is RAQIM's

1. AFZAL/24a-25a gives the most detailed account; there is however no mention of the preliminary actions at Marv and Sarakhs; the main action is described at Mashhad; 'Ubayd's magnanimity (as elsewhere in this source) is described. AHSAN/196 has a much briefer account; the action is put at Tús. JANG/130b gives a similar brief account with the action however at Mashhad. It should be stressed that while JANG is a basic source for the events at Harát, it is rather weak for the Mashhad details. JANG here skips over the events of the entire military season of Túngúz/933/1527 (i.e. the Astarábad and Bistám campaigns) by having 'Ubayd come to the Ghúryán cishláq immediately after the fall of Mashhad. ROUZAT/135b-137a follows JANG as in most of its accounts of Khurásán. TAAA/38 has a brief notice which is not here dependent on AHSAN; thus 'Ubayd's crossing at Chahár-jú is specifically cited, and the scene of action put at Mashhad unlike AHSAN's Tús. ILCHI/35b has a brief independent reference to the event and is alone in stating that 'Ubayd sent a detachment of his troops to siege Harát while he himself concentrated on Mashhad. BABUR/301b, writing at the end of 932, gives what must have been an intelligence report. He gives independent details on Marv and Sarakhs, says Mashhad surrendered at once but that Tús held out for eight months, and accuses the Úzbeks of atrocities at Tús. HAYDARI/55a is obviously taken from BABUR. QIPCHAQ/590a-b and RAQIM/115b are the only Uzbek sources consulted with brief references to this event. RAQIM mentions the taking of Marv (in 933); QIPCHAQ has an account of a massacre against the Shí'eh in Mashhad (toward the end of 931).

sole statement on the entire campaign and should therefore at best be held off pending further evidence.

BABUR's statement that there were only 10-15 ra'yat in the ark (fortress) of Marv at 'Ubayd Khán's arrival would imply that the oasis was mostly deserted at this time; but BABUR concurs in the accounts of the Úzbek ábádí (development) of the oasis and states that the Khán spent 40-50 days there repairing the dams (Marvning bandini cir illik kúnda baghláb).

ii. Sarakhs

According to BABUR, 'Ubayd Khán's next stop along this same Highway was at Sarakhs.¹ There was a small Qizilbásh garrison of 30-40 men which did resist here; however, the local population (the ra'yat) went over to the Úzbeks and opened the gates for them, and the Qizilbásh in the fort were all killed. It is interesting to note that BABUR, which is generally bitterly anti-Úzbek in its sentiments, does concede the fact that the Úzbeks were welcomed here. (Evidence will be seen all along that 'Ubayd Khán could not have been the terror to the local Khurásánis as depicted in some of the Safavid sources. The discussion of the Khán's humanitarianism and/or atrocities in Khurásán will be continued as the narrative proceeds.)

1. The last previous reference to Sarakhs is at 'Ubayd Khán's brief siege of Marát in 927/1521. At that time the Qizilbásh governor there is called Sündúk Bek in AHSAN/181, and Súyúndúk Bek Afshár in HABIB/579.

iii. Mashhad

'Ubayd Khán now turned to Mashhad, the major target of this first phase of what appears to have been a carefully planned invasion of Khurásán.

The sources are confusing here on two points: (a) whether it was Mashhad or Tús or both which were besieged; and (b) whether the siege lasted one, two ... or eight months. The conclusions reached here (and they are open to revision at any new evidence) are that : (a) 'Ubayd Khán's coming was probably at the time when Mashhad had not yet entirely superseded the older and neighboring Tús; there was probably some resistance at Mashhad itself, but the major Qizilbásh defence was most likely at the fortress of Tús;¹ and (b) if the chronology set up here is correct, the siege would have begun just prior to the qishláo (winter) season of 932-933 (i.e. 1526) and would have ended by spring when 'Ubayd Khán was ready to turn his attention to the conquest of Asterábád and northwestern Khurásán to the borders of 'Íráq-i 'Ajam (the major province of central Iran).

It has already been stated that the governor of Mashhad, Búrún

1. This is the last time Tús is mentioned specifically as the defence-point of the area and it can probably be assumed that Mashhad took on this role very shortly afterwards. In the period of Sháh Ismá'il references are already to the "governor of Mashhad", but it is possible that the fortress of Tús still remained as the defence base. That 'Ubayd's appearance at this time is contemporary with the Tús-to-Mashhad shift, is indicated by the next Uzbek siege--definitely in Mashhad itself, in 935/1529 at which time AHSAN/221, AFZAL/49b and TAAA/42 specifically tell us that Mashhad had to rely on kuchehbands (barricades) for its defence because the fortifications (barú; hisár) were not yet completed.

Among the public-works of Sháh Tahmásb, listed in the obituary notice in KHULASEH/364b and AHSAN/489, are the fortifications (barú) of Mashhad (and incidentally, also of Tehrán).

Sultán Takkalú had left his post in order to participate actively in the events at Court and had been killed in the First Ustájlú war. He had however left a small Takkalú garrison under the command of his wife (sic) and eldest son. The wife (whom AFZAL calls, "that shír-zan " , i.e. "that lion-hearted woman") led a determined defence against the Úzbek siege and sent appeals for aid to both the Court and to the new governor of Khurásán, Husayn Khán Shámlú. The situation at Court and at Harát has been noted and there can be no surprise that the lady's appeals were unanswered.

One of the pieces of evidence that has led to the conclusion that the siege lasted for at least four months, is the starvation that now took place among the besieged. The usual grim accounts that appear in the sources in the descriptions of starvation-sieges are given here: the eating of boiled leather, the drinking of horse-blood, and the use of saw-dust and tree-bark as fodder for any livestock still remaining.

The Takkalú finally surrendered and 'Ubayd Khán graciously permitted Búrún Sultán's widow and "family" (khánehkúch) as well as the remaining Takkalú to depart unmolested back to 'Iráq-i 'Ajam. And as the frequently pro-Úzbek AFZAL puts it: "He turned to consoling the spirit of the inhabitants of Mashhad".

iv. The Question of Atrocities at Mashhad

This magnanimity is however denied by BABUR who asserts that after the long siege and final conquest (of Tús) all the men were killed and the women taken in violation of the negotiated surrender terms. BABUR's intelligence reports are however not to be trusted

implicitly (cf. the distorted reports he received of the Battle of Jám; see p.128 below); nor are his moral condemnations of the Ūzbeks to be accepted without first taking the Ūzbek-Tímúrid animosities into account. At any rate no sectarian motivations are given in BABUR for the massacre he reports.

The only other notice of atrocities here is, strangely enough, in an Ūzbek source, QIPCHAQ,¹ which also adds the sole note we have here of sectarian animosities. Mention is made of "Shí'eh" soldiery who took refuge at the Holy Shrine of Imám Rizá in Mashhad, but were nonetheless cut to pieces (páreh páreh kardand) by the Ūzbeks. QIPCHAQ however is a late source (early 12th/18th century) and like the other Ūzbek sources consulted for the events of this period, is of modest value. It would thus be seemingly best to ignore references to sectarian inspired massacres at this particular phase of Safavid-Ūzbek relations.

1. QIPCHAQ has probably confused the sequence of the Ūzbek invasions and is here referring to the execution of 300 Qizilbásh in Mashhad ordered as a military measure by 'Ubayd Khán at the city's fall in 935/1529 (in the Third Invasion). See below p.148.

C. The Second Postponement of a Royal Khurásán Campaign ¹

1. The Second Ustájlú War

It has been seen that while 'Ubayd Khán was passing the winter in the taking of Mashhad, the Qizilbásh at Court, led by the co-regents, Div Sultán Rúmlú and Júheh Sultán Takkalú, were busy at Qazvín celebrating their victories in the First Ustájlú War. Efforts were, however, being made during the Qazvín qishlác to resume the plans for the Royal Eastern Campaign which had been sacrificed to the priorities of domestic affairs.

Thus with the spring of the new "year" (Túngúz/933/1527) the Court left Qazvín (24 Rajab/26 April) for the Sávuq Bulágh staging area near Rey, where the provincial úymáq governors and their levees had been ordered to assemble for the Khurásán campaign. However, the Ustájlú, in their refuge in Gílán, soon became aware of the fact that their úymáq rivals were going east, and that the Rúmlú and Takkalú homegrounds in Ážarbáyján and Chukhúr(-i) Sa'd (the Nakhchiván-Eriván area of modern Armenia) were undefended. The Court was still at Sávuq Bulágh when the news came that the Ustájlú had taken advantage of the situation and had invaded Ážarbáyján. They had taken Ardabíl (where they killed the Rúmlú governor, the 90-year old hero of the Sháh Ismá'il period, Bádinján Sultán), had occupied Tabríz, and were already marching

1. The sources present very much the same account of these internal developments; the minor variations do not effect the account of the Uzbek relations. The most important accounts are: AFZAL/26b-27a, AHSAN/198-200, 205, TEZ/13-14, ROUZAT/135a-136a, NUSAKH/213a-b (with marginal notes in manuscript), ILCHI/36a, SHIRAZI/601a-b, SHARAF/551-2.

northward to plunder Dív Sultán's personal estates in Chukhúr Sa'd.

This is one of the low points (there are others to follow) in the personal career of Sháh Tahmásb: the 13-year old Sháh was simply deserted as Dív Sultán and Júheh Sultán took off with perhaps 8000 Qizilbásh horse and 1000 qurchi (i.e. the royal guard) and sped toward Nakhchiván to deal with the plundering Ustájlú. Thus ended the second abortive Royal Eastern Campaign, and the Sháh himself went west to Sultániyeh to await developments.

The "developments" were that a battle was fought between the Rúmlú-Takkalú and the Ustájlú near Nakhchiván (sometimes referred to as the Battle of Shurúr); the Ustájlú were decisively defeated; Kavak Sultán himself, the arch-rival of the allied coalition was killed in the battle; and the remaining Ustájlú, particularly Menteshá Sultán, fled once more back to their Gílán refuge. This essentially ended the Ustájlú phase of the inter-úymáo rivalry wars for the regency, although the Ustájlú themselves do play an important role in the next phase of the civil wars.

As has just been seen, the Sháh had been left to his own devices at Sultániyeh. If the dates given here are to be trusted, we have an important indication that the Sháh, for the first time, was attempting to act independently in the absence of his regents. For the climax of the Second Ustájlú War is said to have taken place toward the end of Ramazán/June; and ILCHI/36b states that in Ramazán the Sháh issued farmáns (decrees) to the local Qizilbásh of Khurásán to unite under Zaynal Khán and drive the Úzbeks out of Astarábád. As will be seen, the Khurásán forces were

briefly able to retake Astarábád as a result of this first moral support from the Court.

The second projected Royal Eastern Campaign was thus limited to some moral support of the local Khurásán Qizilbásh--and this, too, only when the regents were absent from Court.

11. The Takkalú Hegemony

The victorious Rúmlú-Takkalú now rejoined the Sháh at Sultámi-yeh. There was still time to salvage something of the Eastern Campaign (it was 25 Shavvál/ 25 July and the news of a Khurásán-Qizilbásh disaster at the Battle of Bistám came the following day); but instead the Court went into yaylác (summer-quarters) at Gúzal Dareh (Güzel Dere).

For still another domestic upheaval now occurred in which the úymáq balance at Court was dramatically changed, and although the method used was simple assassination, the effects were almost the equivalent of another Ustájlú War. The reference is to the end of the Dív Sultán Rúmlú-Júheh Sultán Takkalú joint-regency and coalition. Júheh Sultán had Dív Sultán murdered and emerged as the single and all-powerful regent of the Sháh. The Takkalú hegemony was thus established.

The abject position of the Sháh through all this may be understood if SHARAF's/552 claim is accepted that Júheh Sultán forced the young Sháh to participate personally in the murder and thus share the responsibility for the act. It is doubtlessly significant in this regard that the Sháh's Diary (TEZ) makes no reference whatsoever to what lay behind the emergence of the new regent.

With the assumption of power by a single úymáq, the Takkalú,

Sháh Tahmásb's Iran was given a period of almost three years of some stability, marred only by an attempted Qizilbásh usurpation at Baghdád. During this period it was possible to carry out two Royal Eastern Campaigns and to defeat 'Ubayd Khán (although inconclusively) on the sole occasion that Sháh faced Khán in a pitched battle.

Sháh Tahmásb and the Qizilbásh system had however to pay the price for this stability: the Takkalú had complete control over the major posts during this period (e.g. the new governorships to Qazvín, Baghdád and Harát). The real ruler of Safavid Iran at this time was Júheh Sultán Takkalú and as several of the sources phrase it (e.g. ILCHI/36a, SHIRAZI/601b): nothing was left of Tahmásb's pádsháhi ("royal prerogative") except the name (juz námi).

There is one source that seeks to contradict this, viz. Sháh Tahmásb himself. He writes in his Diary (TEZ/14): "At this time [i.e. after Júheh Sultán's succession to the sole regency -- a fact glossed over by the Sháh] I became pádsháh in fact [b-haqícat]". He then records his first personal holding of court in Qazvín, and obviously considered it a major occasion for he notes the date with precision (Thursday, 12 Zú'l-Hijjeh/ 9 September). Probably more significant, however, is the appointment made to the governorship of Qazvín on the memorable date: the Takkalú, Muhammad Sultán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí, whom ROUZAT/139b calls a mulázim (officer) of Júheh Sultán.

Nonetheless it does appear true that a new factor was now injected into the inter-úymáq struggles for the hegemony and

regency, i.e. the royal person himself. The Sháh was shortly to become involved in these struggles and was clearly playing party politics in an effort to establish his own freedom of action and the cause of the Safavid House. The subsequent reappearance of the Ustájlú at Court and their royal welcome there is a case in point. Even more obvious is the ambivalent role the Sháh was to play in the final overthrow of the Takkalú hegemony.

The conclusion would be that although the Sháh was beginning to emerge as a political influence, the hegemony was still very much in the hands of the úymác (the Takkalú at this point in the narrative) and that the inter-tensions among the contending úymác were still very much to remain in evidence. There was however a temporary lull in the domestic crises and once again the Qazvín cishláč was spent in preparing for a Royal Eastern Campaign, the first one that would actually be carried through.

While the Second Ustájlú War and the Takkalú rise to power were taking place, the Úzbeks were naturally not idle. It has already been seen (in "B" above) that by the beginning of this year same year of Túngúz, they had already taken Mashhad. By the end of this "military year" they had full control of the Khurásán frontier, were raiding westward into 'Iráq-i 'Ajam and Mázandarán, and 'Ubayd Khán himself was wintering at Ghúryán, outside of Herát. The events leading up to this situation in Khurásán will now be presented.

D. The Uzbek Conquest of Astarábád ¹

I. The Clash at Isfáráin ²

According to the chronology set up here, the Astarábád or Jurján campaigns began with the spring season of Túngúz/933/1527 and continued all through the "military year" (from the beginning of spring to the beginning of winter). The Court had planned a Khurásán campaign to counter this, but as has just been seen (in "C" above) it was paralyzed during this period by the dramatic domestic events.

The first clash reported between Uzbek and Qizilbásh was at

1. AFZAL/28a-30b is by far the most detailed account and most of the unique items can be collated with the data in the other sources, except for the killing of Chakirgeh Sultán at the Bistám Battle (the other sources agree that he was killed the following year at Fíruzkuh). For AFZAL's contributions to the listing of the Khurásán governors, see below p.102 n.1. AHSAN/201-2 has a briefer account which tallies with AFZAL except for the account of Chakirgeh Sultán. TAAA/38-9 has a similar account but adds to AHSAN (e.g. Damrí Sultán is described as the father of Aghzívar Sultán who figures prominently in Khurásán affairs). TAAA also adds that the Úzbeks "still" (hanúz, i.e. at the time of Sháh 'Abbás) talked of the bravery of the Qizilbásh at the Bistám Battle. ILCHI/36b-37a has a unique account of 'Ubayd's second taking of Astarábád and the sequence of the Bistám Battle. JANG/133a-b and ROUZAT/133b, 136b have an independent riváyat for which see the narrative. NUSAKH/213b, SHARAF/552 and TEZ/13, 14 have brief references to these events.

2. The sources are: AFZAL/25a-b, AHSAN/197 and KHULASEH/99a ff. AFZAL and AHSAN are near identical, but AFZAL is more precise in the relative chronology. KHULASEH begins its account much as AHSAN, but a blur occurs in the microfilm here which continues to the events of 940. It might be noted that up to this break, KHULASEH has been very close to AFZAL, AHSAN and JANG and that this similarity is again established when the microfilm again becomes readable. The real value of KHULASEH as an independent source becomes appreciable for the events beginning about 900/1553.

Isfaráin (Isfará'in/Isfaráyin). The facts as collated from AFZAL and AHSAN are as follows: When 'Ubayd Khán left Mashhad on his Astarábád campaign (or perhaps while the siege was still going on), he sent Chaghatáy Bahádur, his newly appointed governor of Mashhad, with a rather large force (3000 horse is the figure given) to raid or perhaps to probe the Isfaráin area. The Qizilbásh governor here, Zayn al-Dín Sultán Shámlú¹, who had 600 horse at his disposal, informed the Sháh of the Úzbek approach and organized a local resistance. The van of his army, under Mahmúd bek, first engaged the Úzbeks at a point some six farsakh (ca. 24 miles) from Isfaráin and was rapidly weakening under Úzbek pressure when the Qizilbásh governor himself arrived and turned defeat into victory.

The Safavid sources are quite right in claiming a victory here, for despite the fact that the Qizilbásh force did lose about half its men (300) to the Úzbeks' relatively fewer 700 (out of 3000), Chaghatáy Bahádur did retire from the area, and according to AFZAL, Isfaráin remained an isolated center of Qizilbásh resistance while the rest of the area from Mashhad to Astarábád fell to the Úzbeks.

The Isfaráin governor (strangely enough nothing further is heard of him in the sources, unless he appears under another name) sent word to the Court announcing his victory, but warning of the danger. This report reached the Sháh at Sultániyeh, where, as has

1. For his appointment to Isfaráin (and Nishápúr) in the Sháh Ismá'il period by Dúrmish Khán, see Section I, p.19.

been seen, he had been deserted by his co-regents when they had gone off to fight the Ustájlú. As AFZAL/25b phrases it: The Sháh "was taken up with the dissensions and disorders of the Takkalú, Rúmlú and Ustájlú sultáns".¹

The three sources (AFZAL, AHSAN and KHULASEH) mentioning this clash at Isfaráin record it under the year "932" as an event isolated from 'Ubayd Khán's main drive on Jurján (Astarábád province) which is recorded under the year "933". Nonetheless, the fact that AFZAL specifically states that Chaghatáy Bahádur had set out from Mashhad after 'Ubayd Khán's departure for Astarábád, and the added fact that the news of the Qizilbásh victory at Isfaráin reached the Sháh at Sultániyeh (i.e. about Ramazán/June of 933/1527, would seem to indicate that the Isfaráin affair was actually very much a part of the main Úzbek drive westward.

A possible interpretation is that the Úzbek detachment was sent out against the Isfaráin area as a feint to cover 'Ubayd Khán's main drive over the more northern desert-mountain route through the Turkmán territory of Khwárizm, undertaken in an attempt to surprise Astarábád; for it would appear that 'Ubayd Khán did not advance along the main Khurásán Highway (i.e. via Bistám) in this phase of the campaign. ILCHI/36b does in fact give the Khwárizm route as 'Ubayd Khán's itinerary; however the context is vague, and in general it may be said that ILCHI's account of this campaign does not fully jibe with the other sources and is somewhat suspect

1. "giriftár-i fitneh va áshúb-i salátín-i Takkalú va Rúmlú va Ustájlú".

here.

This first Ūzbek-Qizilbāsh clash at Isfarāin may simply have been an independent large-scale raid by the new Ūzbek governor of Mashhad; at the same time the possibility that it represented a strategic feint in a well-organized military campaign should not be overlooked.

II. The First Conquest of Astarābād

JANG/ROUZAT has an independent rivāyat (i.e. an independent source for the version of the narration presented) for 'Ubayd Khān's Astarābād campaign. In this account, Zaynal Khān Shāmlū, the governor of Astarābād was away participating in the politics at Court at the time of the first Ūzbek approach, and in fact it is expressly stated that 'Ubayd Khān was taking advantage of the governor's absence and was thus able to take the city without any serious opposition. This same rivāyat also presents a unique account of Zaynal Khān's death in the Battle of Fīrūzkūh the following year.

This rivāyat is however contradicted by the other sources, and inasmuch as JANG (but by no means ROUZAT, which does not always slavishly follow its basic source) is often weak in its references to affairs outside of Harāt--and particularly at Court, it may be kept in abeyance pending further evidence. It should be added that the case for the JANG rivāyat is weakened here by the fact that it has slid over most of the developments of this military year of Tūngūz, and its apparent independent rivāyat may be nothing more than due to a confused compression of the events.

The sources for the rivāyat (there are variations within it) more generally found in the accounts of 'Ubayd Khān's first conquest of Astarābād may be collated as follows: Since domestic affairs were being given priority at Court, Zaynal Khān, in Astarābād, had to rely on the local Qizilbāsh forces at his disposal from Jurjān and northwestern Khurāsān to stave off the Ūzbek Khān bent on a major campaign of conquest. Zaynal Khān, Damrī Sultān Shāmlū (the governor of Dāmghān) and Akhī Sultān Takkalū (the governor of Qazvin and apparently of Bistām as well)¹ prepared

1. The sources are frequently contradictory here in the matter of the identification of the Qizilbāsh governors of Khurāsān and even concerning their ūymāq affiliations. The following is a list, with the variations, of the personnel involved in this account:

Zayn al-Dīn Sultān Shāmlū: The governor of Isfarāin (see "1" above); he had been appointed to both Isfarāin and Nishāpūr by Dūrmish Khān; he is not heard of again after his victory over the Ūzbeks.

Zaynal Khān Shāmlū: The governor of Astarābād.

Damrī Sultān Shāmlū: Generally considered the governor of Dāmghān; however ILCHI (in 930) calls him the governor of Firūzkūh and Simnān and has as Alāsh Sultān (no other mention) as governor of Dāmghān at the time of 'Ubayd Khān's invasion of Astarābād.

Akhī Sultān Takkalū: Most sources consider him the governor of Qazvin, but AFZAL explains his presence in these events by naming him as governor of Bistām. This is quite possible since no other source cites any of the umarā mentioned as being governor of Bistām at this time. Strangely enough, however, AFZAL calls him a Zū'l-Qadar, whereas he is very clearly a Takkalū in all other sources. There is a somewhat parallel example of this in AFZAL/15b which may somehow explain this, for there 'Alī Sultān, the governor of Fars, who is very clearly a Zū'l-Qadar, is called "'Alī Sultān Zū'l-Qadar-Takkalū"; and similarly on folio 34b, the very much Takallū, Ūlameh Sultān, is called "Ūlameh Sultān Takkalū-Zū'l-Qadar-ūghlī". While this usage seems unprecedented and the exact meaning of this double ūymāq name is not clear, it may indicate that Akhī Sultān falls into this same unknown category which would explain why he is Takkalū in most sources, but Zū'l-Qadar in AFZAL. For a possible explanation, arising out of the particularly close ties between the Takkalū and the Zū'l-qadar(ūghlī), see below p.206.

Chakirgeh Sultān Shāmlū: Governor of Sabzivār; for his confirmation there by Dūrmish Khān, see above p.19. ILCHI alone disputes this and calls him governor of Nishāpūr.

(Continued on following page)

to resist the Uzbek invasion. Qiyápa Bek Qájár (or Ustájlú), an officer of Zaynal Khán, was first sent out, and the battle against the Úzbeks began when this vanguard met up with the advance scouting patrols of the Úzbeks. The three Qizilbásh governors as well as 'Ubayd Khán himself soon joined in the battle in which the Úzbeks were victorious. Qiyápa Bek was killed; Zaynal Khán gathered his possessions from Astarábád and fled to Ray (Rey); and the other Qizilbásh either retired to their own seats or else followed Zaynal Khán to 'Iráq-i 'Ajam.

'Ubayd Khán now entered Astarábád where he appointed his eldest son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán as governor. AFZAL/28b once again mentions 'Ubayd Khán's magnanimity and even notes that "special favors were shown to the Shí'eh, the sayyids, and the local population as a whole".¹

After a few days in Astarábád, the Khán began his return to Mashhad. All of the area from Astarábád to Mashhad, including the towns of Sabzivár and Nishápúr on the main Khurásán Highway,

(Note continued from preceding page)

Bábá Ílyás Bayát: Governor of Nishápúr (in AFZAL only).

Pír Qulí Kangarlú: Governor of Simnán and Khwár (in AFZAL only); he is perhaps the same Pír Qulí Sultán cited as the governor of Isfaráin (in ILCHI only). There is also a Pír Qulí Sultán Shámlú mentioned as participating in the Battle of Jám.

Ahmad Sultán Kangarlú: Governor of Ray (in AFZAL only).

Mustafá Sultán Shámlú: Governor of Sáveh in most sources; but he is called Afshár in NUSAKH/marginal note to 213a and again in SHARAF/533.

Qiyápa (or Qapán) Bek: An officer of Zaynal Khán in Astarábád; called Qájár in AFZAL and Ustájlú in AHSAN.

Muhammad Bek Rúmlú: Appointed to replace Damrí Sultán Shámlú after his death at the Battle of Bistám, i.e. presumably to Dámghán (in TEZ only).

1. "anvát-i 'ináyat b-Shí'iyán va sádát va sakíneh-yi án viláyat kard".

were now occupied by the Ūzbeks and governors were appointed.

According to AFZAL, there was however one island of resistance, the fortress of Isfaráin, which, as has been seen above, had already fought off an Ūzbek raid or attack at the beginning of the Astarábád campaign. The remnants of the Qizilbásh forces in northwestern Khurásán (particularly, Chakirgeh Sultán Shámlú, governor of Sabzivár and Bába Ílyás Bayát, governor of Nishápúr) now gathered at Isfaráin and strengthened the defences there. Demrí Sultán (of Dámghán) and Akhí Sultán (of Bistám ?) had however probably followed Zaynal Khán to Ray.

The Ūzbeks under 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán (at Astarábád) were now on the frontiers of the Safavid heartlands; Dámghán provided the base for raids into both Mázandarán and 'Irác-i 'Ajam (Central Iran).

III. The Retaking of Astarábád by the Qizilbásh

Despite the domestic situation at the Qizilbásh Court, we do see the first glimmerings of some Central (i.e. Safavid) support in an attempt to counter the fiasco in Khurásán. It was little more than token support but it did raise the morale of the Khurásán umará sufficiently to enable them to make a comeback at Astarábád. Although the attempt was ultimately to end in utter disaster, it is nonetheless an interesting indication that the Khurásán Qizilbásh were ready to rally around the Central authority to counter the Ūzbeks.

The Court did not offer any direct military aid: it simply issued fermáns (apparently independently of the co-regents who were then engaged in the Second Ustájlú War) to the Khurásán

Qizilbásh to unite under Zaynal Khán and recover Astarábád.

These farmáns (dated about Ramazán/June) were addressed to:

(a) the governors who had fled Khurásán and were then waiting further developments in 'Iráq-i 'Ajam (they were probably grouped around Zaynal Khán at Ray); (b) the governors still holding out at Isfaráin; and (c) the governors guarding the Khurásán-'Iráq-i 'Ajam frontiers, viz. Pír Qulí Sultán Kangarlú of Khwár and Simnán, and Mustafá Sultán Shámlú of Sáveh.

Despite the essentially local character of this offensive, the figures given of 10-12,000 Qizilbásh involved (even if not taken quite literally) would indicate that this was a serious attempt to push the Úzbeks back from the 'Iráq frontier. The fact that 'Ubayd Khán himself rushed back from Mashhad to oppose them would also indicate that a major operation was involved.

There are no details given for the Qizilbásh campaign which was to result in the temporary liberation of Astarábád and the area up to Sabzivár. 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán, 'Ubayd Khán's son and governor of Astarábád probably simply evacuated the area at the approach of the Qizilbásh under Zaynal Khán. The other Úzbek governors of the northwestern area followed 'Abd al-'Azíz in the flight to his father's headquarters (given variously as at Mashhad, on the Ámú, or enroute to Balkh). Chakirgeh Sultán personally pursued 'Abd al-'Azíz up to his own Sabzivár, which he liberated when the local Úzbek governor joined in the exodus.

The Qizilbásh grew overconfident at this easy victory and the allied army was disbanded. The local governors separately returned to their liberated seats and the umará of the Khurásán-

'Irác (-i 'Ajam) border provinces returned home.

iv. The Second Uzbek Conquest of Astarábád and the Battle of Bistám

The Qizilbásh had been most rash in disbanding their army after their initial successes, for 'Ubayd Khán had no intention of yielding Astarábád and northwestern Khurásán so easily. With a force differently estimated as 10,000 or 20,000 he made a rapid return. He must have been aware of the error made in the first conquest of Astarábád by not following up his victory and thus permitting the Qizilbásh to escape and then re-form. This time he advanced directly along the Khurásán Highway and the local Qizilbásh were foolish enough to engage in a pitched battle.

There are certain variations in the description of the battle at Bistám which now ensued. In the main, a modified AFZAL version will be followed here; but it should be noted that: a) Chakirgeh Sultán is present (and killed) at Bistám only in the AFZAL version; the other sources have him killed at the Battle of Fírúzkúh in the following year (in Chakirgeh Sultán's place, AHSAN and TAAA have Sháh 'Alí Sultán Ustájlú who does not appear in Khurásán in any of the other accounts during this period); b) ILCHI first has 'Ubayd Khán come via Khwárizm and occupy Astarábád, after which the Battle of Bistám takes place (in the other sources, 'Ubayd Khán's second entry into Astarábád is placed after the victory at Bistám).

A possible version of the events at Bistám is as follows: Chakirgeh Sultán, who had just regained his territory of Sabzivár, was the first to be exposed to 'Ubayd Khán's new threat. He left a

local, influential sayyid, Mír Shams al-Dín 'Alí¹ (he reappears in our narrative) in Sabzivár, presumably to surrender to the Úzbeks, and hastened to Bistám to alert the Qizilbásh and organize a new defence line. Akhí Sultán and Damrí Sultán now gathered there and rashly insisted on immediately engaging the Úzbek enemy. They ignored Chakirgeh Sultán's more prudent plan (in AHSAN, where Chakirgeh does not appear, this role of prudence is ascribed to Damrí Sultán) of gathering in Astarábád under Zaynal Khán and waiting for the Khurásán-'Iráq border umará to join and thus re-form the allied army.

In the Battle of Bistám which then ensued there are said to have been 2500 Qizilbásh ranged against 10- or 20,000 Úzbeks. On the Úzbek side, 'Ubayd Khán held the center, with Zaynish Bahádur on the right and Qanbar 'Alí on the left; on the Qizilbásh side, Akhí Sultán held the center, with Chakirgeh Sultán on the right and Damrí Sultán on the left (AHSAN has Damrí on the right and Sháh 'Alí Sultán on the left). The Qizilbásh were disastrously defeated in the battle: Damrí Sultán was killed; Akhí Sultán was captured; and the remaining Qizilbásh fled toward 'Iráq-i 'Ajam. 'Ubayd Khán attempted to win over his prisoner, Akhí Sultán, but his blandishments were rebuffed and the Sultán was finally executed.

The Sháh reveals an interesting insight into his own personal convictions when he summarily writes off this event in his Diary (TEZ/14). He states that Akhí Sultán and Damrí Sultán "went off

1. There is a detailed notice of him among the sayyids of Sabzivár in TAAA/112-113.

without my consent, seeking 'religious renown' (rashíd va sáhib-i dá'iyeh báshánd); they did not realize that: kár b-kúshish níst " (i.e. such renown is not ^{to} be had by the mere effort to obtain it; or--fame and fortune come not by personal efforts, but by the grace of God).

It is not clear whether Zaynal Khán had remained in Astarábád during the Bistám Battle by choice or whether there had not been sufficient time to join with the other Khurásán umará. At any rate, his position was untenable after the Qizilbásh defeat and he evacuated Astarábád and once again took refuge in 'Iráq-i 'Ajam.

'Ubayd Khán reentered Astarábád, the area up to Mashhad was again occupied, and Ūzbek governors once more installed. His son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán had apparently lost too much prestige in his desertion of Astarábád and was not reappointed. His place was given to Zaynish Bahádúr.

AFZAL/29a again mentions 'Ubayd Khán's clemency to the Astarábádís even on this second entry. He seems to have been very pleased with the area and wrote a quatrain on this occasion (given in ILCHI/37a): "To Gunbad-i Qábús has God given to me; the thought of Harát does not even come to me; Harát can never be like Astarábád; Yes, Astarábád is most pleasing to me."¹

1. "Tá Gunbad-i Qábús Khudá dád mará
Az shahr-i Harí nayámadi yád mará
Hargiz nabuved chú Astarábád Harí
Bisyár khúsh'ámád Astarábád mará."

(Gunbad-i Qábús is the famous tomb-tower of Qábús (d.1012 A.D.) located in the Astarábád-Gurgán area.)

v. The Uzbek Qishlác Near Harát

Despite the sentiment expressed in the verse, 'Ubayd Khán now made his preparations for the real target of this Second Invasion: Harát. His right flank was now protected; the Khurásán Highway was cut; and the way was open for prodding attacks on 'Irác-i 'Ajam.

Zaynish Bahádur, the new Uzbek governor, was left with an army of perhaps 5000 at Astarábád, Dámghán and Bistám to either guard or threaten the 'Irác frontier in accordance with developments. (As a matter of fact, raids were carried out during the ensuing winter which reached as far as Simnán, Khwár and Fírúzkúh.) Separate governors were also appointed at Isfaráin, Khabúshán, Sabzivár, Nishápúr and Mashhad.

The military season was now drawing to an end and 'Ubayd Khán was cautious this time in his move on Harát. He made no attempt to invest it, but rather went into qishlác at Ghúryán¹, which was close enough to Harát to keep it under surveillance. The winter at Ghúryán was spent in making preparations for the assault on Harát and in raiding the near-by areas of Kúhistán and Asfuzár, as well as Sístán and Báburid held Qandahár (ROUZAT/137a). The Qizilbásh in Harát, under Husayn Khán Shámlú, were thereby given the opportunity to prepare for the inevitable spring offensive of the Úzbeks.

1. G. LeStrange in The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge 1930) locates Fúshanj, which he identifies with Ghúryán, at "one day's march to the west of Herát" (p.411). JANG/130b distinguishes between Fúshanj and Ghúryán but links them together as mansúbát-1 Harát ("dependencies of Harát").

Part 2. The Siege of Harát and the Battle of Jám

A. The Second Uzbek Siege of Harát ¹

I. The Qizilbásh Resistance

It has been seen that 'Ubayd Khán had spent the winter close to Harát at Ghúryán, and that the Qizilbásh governor, Husayn Khán Shámlú, had had time to prepare his defences. There is some mention of 'Ubayd Khán's use of va'd va va'id ("promises and menaces") to get Harát to surrender without a fight, but this was rejected (ILCHI). With the coming of spring, the Úzbeks advanced to the city walls, made their headquarters at the village of Shámiyáneh and began the second siege against Sháh Tahmásb's Harát. It was to last for seven months.

When their first three storms failed, the Úzbeks turned to a war of attrition. The city's water-supply was cut off and all supply routes leading into Harát were effectively blocked. As an example of the severity of the measures, the sources cite a merchant, disguised in beggar's garb, who was discovered attempting to smuggle a bit of salt into the city and was cruelly executed as a warning to all.

The siege continued, but all Uzbek assaults were parried by the Qizilbásh. It may here be pointed out that the Úzbeks of this period do not seem to have had any large-scale sieging

1. The accounts of this second siege of Harát are all approximately the same. The only essential differences in the sources is the amount of detail presented. The original riváyat probably stems from JANG. AFZAL specifically cites AHSAN here as its source. The references are: JANG/130b-130b, ROUZAT/137a-138b, AHSAN/205-7, AFZAL/30b-32a, 36b, TAAA/39, ILCHI/37a-39a.

engines or cannon, and that neither of 'Ubayd Khán's subsequent two entries into Harát were effectuated by heavy bombardment or mining. Reference will ~~made~~ be made below to the awe of the Úzbeks when Sháh Tahmásb came against them with the new-style military hardware captured from the Ottomans.

In the fourth month of the siege, the declining morale of the Úzbeks was perked up by the arrival from Bukhára of 'Ubayd Khán's leading official, Yárfí Bí, his amír al-umará (in this Úzbek usage apparently meaning "grand vazír"). He was the son of Ján Vafá Mírzá who had played an important role in Úzbek affairs at the time of Shíbání Khán. With the often-quoted freedom of the Úzbeks, he began at once to criticize 'Ubayd Khán for the sluggish nature of the campaign. He called for a general assault directly against the walls instead of the muddling around the kúchebands (barricades). He was, however killed on a tour of inspection of the Harát defences when he rashly ventured too close to one of the kúchebands he had so deprecated (at the Khákistar Tower) by the chance shot of a Qizilbásh fusilier. When Husayn Khán discovered the identity of the head brought in by the fusilier, the Qizilbásh fives jubilantly began to taunt the Úzbek from the ramparts.

The day was not a complete loss for the Úzbeks, however; for that very morning a messenger had arrived from 'Ubayd Khán's governor at Astarábád and Dámghán (Zaynish Bahádur) with the news of the victory at Fírúzkúh (for which see "B" below) and bearing the head of Zaynal Khán Shámlú, the former Qizilbásh governor of Astarábád, to confirm the report. The sources take advantage of the coincidence of the two events on the same day to philosophize

on the ups and downs of victory and defeat and of life in general.

II. The Qizilbāsh Expulsion of the "Civilians"

The situation in Harāt was now growing serious, for the war of attrition could not be as successfully carried as the enemy's assaults. The close pressing of the siege (despite Yārī Bī's criticism) was taking effect and starvation began in Harāt. As in the subsequent sieges of Harāt, the Qizilbāsh turned to the most obvious way of conserving food: the forcible expulsion of the "civilians". (The gulf between the two groups will become more apparent in the later discussion of the local Harātī uprising against the Qizilbāsh, for which see below pp.300 ff .)

The term "civilian" is used in a rather restricted sense; it is fortunately defined in JANG/134a as "the middle and lower class [families] and [in general] the unknowns and the undistinguished" (avāsīt al-nās va adānī va jam'ī keh ma'rūf ū mashhūr nīstand); that is to say, "the nobodies". That this was no mass expulsion stripping the city down to its maximum defence capacity is quite obvious, for it is stated that after the exodus no ra'iyat were to be seen in the bazāār, and that although food continued to remain scarce it could be had at the exorbitant prices of the speculating hoarders.

AHSAN (and AFZAL which specifically cites AHSAN as its source for these events) further explains the nature of the expellees and adds to the avsat al-nās, "...and those who were undistinguished in [their] Shī'ism" (...va ānānī keh b-tashayyūf shuhrat nadārand), i.e. possibly those suspected of being crypto-Sunnīs.

It will be seen, through all of the excesses committed at Harát which are yet to be examined, that sectarianism is frequently cited in the sources as a major factor, particularly at the Qizilbásh changeovers in control and at times of inner tensions within Harát itself. Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that here, as in the subsequent atrocities, the victims were singled out for their being avásit (or avsat) al-nás and adání (i.e. "nobodies") and not their being "undistinguished in their Shi'ism". (It must be admitted however that the two could have been synonymous in officially Shi'eh Khurásán.) Certainly in this case, as in the later events, there is nothing to indicate that the "nobodies" among the Shi'eh were treated with any special privileges. At any rate, JANG, the contemporary source of events at Harát, makes no mention of the sectarian role in this particular forced expulsion.

Another possible explanation stems from the fact that there seems to be a more specialized usage of the word "Shi'eh" which will become more apparent in the subsequent narrative: it seems to have been applied at times specifically to the Tájik who were actively collaborating with the Safavid-Qizilbásh Shi'eh sect as administrative associates. It may be that the reference to "those who were undistinguished in their Shi'ism" is, by contrast, meant to apply to the Shi'eh of the non-Qizilbásh variety who might well fit into the category of "nobodies".¹

1. It may be pointed out in this connection that in the later history of the Dynasty, the "Qizilbásh" element of the Safavid-Shi'eh ideology was gradually dropped and the Safavid House became Shi'eh in the broader sense of the word. That is to say, the distinguishing features of the Safavid-Qizilbásh sect of the Shi'eh seem to have been gradually lost, and at the end, the Safavid dynasty no longer represented an extremist sect of the Shi'eh.

Expulsion included the expropriation of all personal effects: the expellees were simply driven out of the city gates, but not of course until they had been thoroughly stripped (including the women) and searched for hidden wealth. This lucrative task was in the hands of gháziyán-i durusht ("harsh gházis--or Qizilbásh") as cited by AHSAN/207 (the author of which it will be noted, was a Qizilbásh himself) and their clerks (navísandegán) who had been stationed at the checkout points for this purpose by the Harát administration. JANG/134b is apparently being sarcastic here in its reference to the conduct of the rijál-i Qizilbásh (the "noble" Qizilbásh) during the expulsion.

The expulsion of the "civilians" does not seem to have decisively affected the starvation problem. The anecdote is told, for example, of salt being secreted in the folds of a turban and carefully licked as required. It would seem that while the expulsion might have been intended as a military measure, it had degenerated into an occasion for personal profit. It will also be recalled that the Qizilbásh then defending Harát were the same Shámlú who had turned to mob rule at the lynching of Khwájeh Habibulláh.

iii. The Uzbek Retirement

The siege now went into its seventh month: the Qizilbásh were still waiting for the royal relief which had been promised but which was very slow in getting organized; 'Ubayd Khán was still patiently waiting outside the city walls for the surrender.

At this point the news came that the Sháh had finally entered

Khurásán and that Júheh Sultán had defeated and killed Zaynish Bahádur, the Úzbek governor, at Dámghán. With the fall of Dámghán, 'Ubayd Khán's flank was exposed and he had to abandon the siege to avoid being cut off from Bukhárá.

The Safavid sources put this flight in other terms and state that the mere approach of the Sháh had filled the Khán with such terror that he hastily abandoned the siege of Harát and fled ignominiously back across the Ámú. Be that as it may, the fact remains that 'Ubayd Khán had hastily left Harát and quickly returned to Káverá'al-nahr; but once there, he gathered together a full Úzbek army and prepared to return once more to Khurásán.

Despite all the favorable conditions, 'Ubayd Khán had failed to carve out a Khurásán appenage by his own efforts, and now called on all the Úzbek sultáns of the other "neo-eponymous clans" to join him against a new power factor -- the momentarily unified Qizilbásh state of Sháh Tahmásb and Júheh Sultán Takkalú. The Battle of Jám soon followed. It was to be the one direct clash of Sháh and Khán in the long period of the duel for Khurásán.

B. The Uzbek Victory at Fíruzkhúh¹

During the previous qishláo season of Túngúz/933-4/1527-8 when 'Ubayd Khán was outside of Harát at Ghúryán and the Sháh was wintering at Qazvín and making preparations for a spring expedition to liberate Khurásán, Zaynish Bahádur, the Uzbek governor of Astarábád and Dámghán had been carrying out a series of raids into the 'Iráq-i 'Ajam border areas of Simnán, Khwár and Fíruzkhúh (ILCHI). The Court was sufficiently alarmed at this threat to alert a trio of Shámlú governors in qishláo at Ray into repelling these raids. The three were: Zaynal Khán, the refugee governor of Astarábád; Chakirgeh Sultán, the refugee governor of Sabzivár (according to AFZAL: he had already been killed at the Bistám Battle); and Mustafá Sultán, the governor of Sáveh in the threatened area, who has already been seen with the local Khurásán army which had temporarily retaken Astarábád.

The trio, however, did not begin their operations until the coming of spring of Sichqán/934/1528 when they marched out to repel Zaynish Bahádur's aggressions against the Fíruzkhúh area. The engagement seems to have been fought when the Qizilbásh were caught by surprise during a hunt by a detachment of Uzbek marauders. The battle here was thus on a minor scale; nonetheless it was even more disastrous for the Qizilbásh than the Bistám Battle, for all three of the Shámlú governors were killed.

1. The main accounts are in AHSAN/207-8, AFZAL/32a (similar to AHSAN except for the question of Chakirgeh Sultán, the addition of the date, and the mention of the Court reaction at the news), JANG/132b-133b, ROUZAT/133b, 136b, ILCHI/38a-b. Brief mention is found in TAAA/39, TEZ/14, SHIRAZI/601b, SHARAF/553, NUSAKH/213a and marginal note on 213b.

Zaynish Bahádur (the accounts are conflicting as to his personal presence at the engagement) did not occupy this forward area after the victory, but returned to his base at Dámghán, stopping long enough at Simnán, however, to burn the crosses. He sent on the victory news and the head-trophies taken to 'Ubayd Khán, who, as has been seen, was by then actively engaged at the siege of Harát.

Several of the sources (even those with conflicting rivá-yats of the events of this period) give an identical and precise date for the battle at Fírúzkúh: 21 Sha'bán 934/11 May 1528. While the date is not particularly significant, it is one of the major pegs used here to build up both the relative and absolute chronologies.

The news of the Fírúzkúh fiasco ended any further delays by the Court which had by then left the Qazvín qishlác but had still been vacillating in its decision to go east. The expedition thus got under way and its first goal was to be revenge against Zaynish Bahádur: One month later the Royal Banners were at Dámghán and the Úzbek governor had been killed.

The above account of the events at Fírúzkúh is an attempted collation based upon several conflicting versions offered in the sources. According to JANG/ROUZAT (which as pointed out above, p. 101, has an independent riváyat for the events around Astarábád) Zaynal Khán had been waiting around in the Dámghán area after the fall of Astarábád, which had occurred while he had been away at Court. In this account, the "Battle of Fírúzkúh" is simply an affair between a small Qizilbásh hunting party (Zaynal

Khán alone is mentioned in this account) caught by surprise by a somewhat larger Uzbek group of hunters (JANG) or raiders (ROUZAT).

It is only ILCHI and the marginal addition in NUSAKH which specifically link the Fírúzkúh event with the Court and cite the Sháh's farmans directing the Shámlú trio to engage the enemy. In the other accounts, the Fírúzkúh event is simply mentioned as an aside and the Uzbek victory thus deprecated.

But despite the discrepancies, the sources agree that the fiasco at Fírúzkúh was an important factor in frightening the Court and thus ensuring the follow through in the planned royal campaign to Khurásán.

I. The First Royal Liberation Campaign

I. The Situation at Court and the Baghdad Usurpation¹

It has been seen that the Sháh had wintered at Qazvín and the Khán at Ghúryán and that both had been making their preparations for the respectively planned campaigns. With the coming of spring, 'Ubayd Khán did begin his siege of Harát; the Sháh however was not quite as punctual. The Court left Qazvín, but only to go into yaylár at nearby Kharqán; the Khurásán expedition did not get under way for another two months. What provided the final impetus and ended the apparent reluctance of the Court to engage the Úzbeks was the news of the disaster at Fírúzkúh which reached the Sháh at the yaylár; for Fírúzkúh, in the Mt. Damávand area, was well within the Safavid heartlands.

Thus it was that at the beginning of Ramazán 934/ 20 May 1528 of the Turkí year Sichqán, the Sháh and the Qizilbásh umará finally set off to contest 'Ubayd Khán's claims to Khurásán.

It is indeed fortunate that the Court had been so resolutely committed, for yet another crisis now occurred on the domestic front. The news reached the Court at Tíhrán (Tehran), while already enroute for the east, of a Qizilbásh revolt in Baghdád. With this came the first faint rumblings of the power of Sulaymán the Magnificent, even though the Ottoman Sultán was then occupied in distant Hungary.

1. The Safavid accounts are all approximately the same. See e.g. ANZAL/32a-33b, ROUZAT/142b-143b, AHSAN/208-9, SHARAF/553, SHIRAZI/501b-502a, TEZ/14-15, TAAA/71-2, ILCHI/40b-41a.

It would seem natural for the provincial Qizilbāsh of the western provinces at this time to have regarded the Shāh's move to the east to cope with the Ūzbeks as an opportunity for adventurism, for, as will be seen, the new Takkalū hegemony established by Jūheh Sultān had by no means ended the inter-ūymāq contentions for the regency, and the Central power was still to prove its strength. So it was that the governor of Baghdād, Ibrāhīm Khān Musillū Turkmán (brother of Tahmāsb's laleh, Amīr Khān, in the Khurāsān administration of Shāh Ismā'īl) was murdered by his nephew in a yaylāq outside of Baghdād. The nephew, Zū'l-Faqār or Nukhūd Sultān, then began to ^{be}siege Baghdād itself (4 or 14 Ramezān/ 23 May or 2 June). This news reached the Shāh, then at Tihlán, in the form of an appeal for aid from the besieged in Baghdād.

A decision had now to be made: East or West? It was the same decision that Shāh Ismā'īl and Shāh 'Abbās had to face, and a dilemma that was of course a primary factor in Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks.

The Safavid sources make no direct mention of any Ottoman connections with the usurpation at Baghdād and treat it as a purely local affair. Nonetheless, the fact that Shāh Tahmāsb did hesitate before going on to the east, and the fact that the Khurāsān expedition once under way was then halted despite the victory at Jām in order to attend to the Baghdād usurpation, would make us suspect that more than a local uprising was at stake, and that despite the Ottoman engagement in Europe, there was some need to fear the Ottoman intentions at Baghdād.

This surmise is indeed confirmed from the Ottoman sources.¹

SOLAKZADE/483, PEÇEVİ/174 and MUNECCİMBASI/111/489 state that Zû'l-Fağâr, "the governor of Baghdád", had in fact sought the aid of Sulaymân; he had sent one of his trusted officers with the keys to Baghdád and had openly submitted to the Porte.

The question of the "Double Front" will be more advantageously discussed below (pp.255 ff) where the Ottoman menace from the west was more direct and was threatening the very existence of Shâh Tahmâsb's Iran. At this particular time, the Ottoman position on Baghdád was probably no more than opportunistic meddling, although it was undoubtedly a factor that the Shâh had to consider. It is quite possible that had the news from Baghdád arrived while the Court was still at its yaylâq, there would have been no Khurâsân campaign this year, and 'Ubayd Khân would have been fully justified in his patient siege of Harât.

We quote from the Shâh's Diary (TEZ/15): "I said, 'now is not the time for that [i.e. to relieve Baghdád]. Let God's will be done: that is victory enough. Let Baghdád be charged against

1. These Ottoman reports are compressed into the introductory remarks serving to give the background of, and causes for, Sulaymân's first Iranian campaign, which may be said to have begun when Ibrâhîm Pâshâ went into a preparatory cishlâq at Aleppo in Rabî'II 940/October 1533. This compression of the narrative has led PEÇEVİ into a dating error, for it places Zû'l-Fağâr's "becoming governor" of Baghdád in 939 and adds that Ibrâhîm Pâshâ had begun the campaign in order to accept the submission of Baghdád, but that Shâh Tahmâsb had intervened and retaken Baghdád first. From the chronology established here from the Safavid sources, this is seen to be quite impossible. The other two Ottoman sources quoted here, leave the dating in a vague context but would also seem to bring the Baghdád Usurpation up close to the beginning of Suleymân's Iranian campaign.

PEÇEVİ adds the interesting remark that Zû'l-Fağâr had abandoned his Shi'ism (mezkûr mezheb-i Şi'eden ru-gerdan olup) in his submission to the Porte.

our account'. So it was that I did not become involved with other things and went to repel the Ūzbeks".¹

The decision made did cost the fall of Baghdád to the retels shortly afterwards, and the fact that Baghdád was "charged against the Sháh's account" must be kept in mind in following the events of this first royal Khurásán expedition. For the campaign, while essentially successful, was abortive and the victory gained at Jám was not pressed. The Sháh hastened back to the west to make preparations to attend to Baghdád. And within a few months after that, 'Ubayd Khán had regrouped his forces and was able to enter Mashhad and Harát.

ii. The Sizilbāsh Victory at Dámghán ²

By the end of Ramazán/June 19, the Sháh had camped at a yaylān in the Fírúzkúh-Simnán area and was ready to begin operations against Ūzbek-occupied Khurásán. The first target was Dámghán, "the key to Khurásán" (Kilid-i Khurásán: AFZAL/36b), strategically

1. "Guftam hálá vaqt-i án níst har cheh khwést-i Parvardigár est chunán khwáhád shud ya al-haqq in ma'ná ham fathí bud va hálá der hisáb-i Baghdád az má shud va b-dágar chizhá muqayyid nashudam va mutavejjuh-i daf'-i Ūzbek shudam."

2. AFZAL/34a-36b, AHSAN/210-12 and ILCHI/38b-39a have the major accounts. TAAA/39-40 and NUSAKH/213b (with marginal note), 214a also notice the event.

The JANG/ROUZAT riváyat for the events of this period is seen to be at least partially unreliable by the account given of the fall of Dámghán. JANG's/136b only reference to this phase of the Liberation Campaign is limited to the statement that the royal vanguard won a victory in Bistám province. This has clearly led ROUZAT/139b astray for it has confused this event with the Battle of Bistám and thus has Akhí Sultán and Damrí Sultán killed during the storming of Dámghán, and has put the ever-recurring Chakirgeh Sultán along with Juhé Sultán's vanguard.

located on the main highway to Mashhad, and which 'Ubayd Khán's governor, Zaynish Bahádur, had strongly fortified to serve as his base of operations for raiding into 'Irâq-i 'Ajam and Mázan-darân. The Sháh did not participate personally (only at Jám did he ever face the Úzbeks directly) but followed after the army sent under the regent, Júheh Sultán, and including Úlámeš Sultán Takkalú and Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí, the son of the last of the Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí dynasts of Anatolia.

Zaynish Bahádur had not apparently expected to see a major Qizilbásh army soon (about one month) after his victory over the Shámlú governors at Fírúzkúh and was evidently completely surprised. The Úzbeks did not attempt an open battle and took refuge instead in the fort of Dámghán.

The siege now began, and it is interesting to note that the Sháh sent his heavy-fire detachments--the Rúmlú and Isfahán fusiliers -- into action under Ustád Shaykhí Túpchibáshí. As already pointed out, the Úzbeks do not seem to have had extensive firepower, although they did possess guns of inferior quality.¹ Dámghán was thus subjected to withering firepower, and although the Úzbeks did attempt to fire back and make brave sorties, it was soon clear that they could not hold out.

Thus at the first signs of the Qizilbásh storm, the Úzbeks began deserting over the walls. Among those attempting to flee was

1. For an excellent discussion of the weapons available to the Úzbeks and of the smuggling of inferior arms into Mávará'al-nahr from the Persian Gulf and India on the one side, and Russia on the other, see Zeki Velidi Togan's Bugünkü Türkistan pp.117-118.

Zaynish himself, who however broke a leg in his drop down from the walls and was taken prisoner. He was promptly beheaded as were, according to AHSAN and ILCHI, all other Úzbek prisoners, and the heads were sent back to the Sháh who had by then advanced to Bistám.

AFZAL however is, as usual, less bellicose in its account and states that the Úzbeks who had called for quarter were spared in accordance with the Safavid cánún ("code") established by Sháh Ismá'il: the prisoners were allowed the choice of rejoining 'Ubayd Khán (and thus spreading the word of the Qizilbásh might), or of entering the Safavid service.

After the victory, Júheh Sultán rejoined the Sháh and the Qizilbásh army was once more united and ready to advance along the Khurásán Highway. Sháh Vardí Bek Ziyád-úghlí Qájár was then appointed to the liberated area of Astarábád (the fall of Dámghán and the Úzbek defeat there had automatically meant the Qizilbásh reoccupation of all of Jurján province), and the renowned Astarábádí sayyids were liberally favored by the Court.

III. The Securing of the Khwárizmian Frontier and the First Pilgrimage to Mashhad¹

Upon the news of the fall of Dámghán and the approach of the main Qizilbásh army, 'Ubayd Khán had abandoned the seven month siege of Harát and the Úzbeks simply evacuated Khurásán. The governors of Sabzivár, Isfaráin and presumably Mashhad (which is

1. The only detailed account is AFZAL/37a-38b. AHSAN/212-213 has a brief notice, as does ROUZAT/139a-b.

not specifically mentioned)¹ followed the retreat back to Mávará'-al-nahr. 'Ubayd Khán had realized that he could not hope to meet the Royal Army with his own personal troops and had realistically gone back to gather a full Úzbek army with contingents from the Samarcand, Miyánkál and Táshkand "appanage-states".

The Sháh now passed along the Khurásán Highway enroute to the shrine of a third claimant for the title of "The Sultán of Khurásán", i.e. Imám Rizá of Holy Mashhad.

Júheh Sultán was however sent on a side mission to reduce the fortress of Khabúshán (modern Qúchán just north of the Atrak River) which had been made into a strongpoint by Qanbar 'Alí, 'Ubayd Khán's governor of Isfaráin. By the time the Qizilbásh detachment arrived in the area, the Úzbeks had already evacuated the fortress and there was no opposition.

A Kurdish garrison of Chakan(i) Qizilbásh was left there to guard the frontier against the second possible Úzbek threat to the Qizilbásh hegemony over Khurásán --i.e. the Yádgárid Úzbeks of Khwárizm who had pressed southward across the Qará Qum Desert and had occupied the Abívard-Nisá-Bághbád line of oases in what is today southern Turkmenistan, but in what was then considered to be part of Khurásán. The frontier fortress of Khabúshán was to play an important role in the subsequent relations of Sháh Tahmásh with the Khwárizmien Úzbeks. (See Appendix One, p.xv).

The Sháh had in the meantime entered Sabzivár and Nishápúr.

1. Chaghatáy Bahádur, who had been defeated in the Isfaráin clash (see above pp.98-101), was presumably still the Úzbek governor in Mashhad at the time of the Royal Liberation. AHSAN's/197 claim that he had retired to Bukhárá after his defeat at Isfaráin is not confirmed in AFZAL/25b which is a more detailed account. He appears again at the Battle of Jám, as does Qanbar 'Alí, the governor who now fled from Isfaráin and Khabúshán.

Although the Uzbek governor of Sabzivár had fled, the Uzbek governors of Nishápúr and of "other towns of Khurásán" now came forward to pay their respects to the Sháh and entered the royal service (dar silk-i mulázimán dar ámadand). As possibly at Dámghán as well, those Uzbek who chose so, were however given the option of rejoining 'Ubayd Khán.

The Sháh then entered Mashhad for the first time and was enthusiastically welcomed by the populace in a formal istiqbál, or "welcoming ceremonies" and by the mutavallí ("custodian") of the Shrine, Mír Niẓám al-Mulk Rizáví. The Sháh then humbly performed the rites of pilgrimage.

It is not quite clear whether or not the Sháh had intended to visit Harát on this occasion. At any rate, rewards were sent to the heroes of the Harát siege, and Husayn Khán, the governor, soon appeared bearing gifts. Júheh Sultán also rejoined the Court at Mashhad after securing the Khwárizmian frontier, and the court complement was made complete by the arrival of the "grand vezír" (the i'timád al-douleh), Mír Ja'far Sávjí.

The challenge had been thrown by the Qizilbásh: it was now up to the Úzbeks.

D. The Battle of Jām ¹1. Introduction

Almost every one of our sources has something to say about the Battle of Jām and there are detailed accounts in the major

1. AFZAL/38b-45b, 61a-62b (Note that the folios in this point of the manuscript have been misplaced; actually the account forms one complete sequence. The proper folio pagination should read 44, 45, 61, 62, 40, 47; similarly 57, 58, ... [there is at least one missing folio here] ... 59, 60, 63, 64.) This is the most detailed account of the events at Jām. AFZAL lists its sources here (42b) in deciding between the one-day vs. two-day rivāyat for the duration of the battle: it cites Hasan Rumlū (i.e. AHSAN) for the one-day rivāyat (found in all the sources consulted for this dissertation); for the two-day rivāyat (which AFZAL finally opts for) it cites (a) Moulānā Nujūmī's "Terikh-i Harāt va Khurāsān", (b) "Khuld-Ārā", (c) "Bahjat al-Tavārikh", and (d) "Miftāḥ al-Qulūb". (For these missing sources, see Appendix Two, p. XVI.) Without these sources at our disposal, it is difficult to judge AFZAL's two-day rivāyat. It is possibly based on a misconception which appears in TEZ/15 where the Shāh does describe a night of vigil at Jām--but after the flight of 'Ubayd. AFZAL's version does however seem to have been the officially accepted one at Court (AFZAL's abundant use of "true copies" [sūrat] of official correspondence attests to its Court connections) for it appears again in a letter of Shāh Tahmāsb to Sulaymān dated 901/1553-4 which is given in AFZAL/198b-199a. In this letter, the Shāh is attempting to impress the Porte with his might and gives the details of the victory at Jām as a warning of what might happen to the Ottomans. This official sūrat gives the two-day version of the battle as reported in AFZAL's main account. However certain embellishments have been added to the letter, evidently to make it more effective (e.g. the number of Ūzbeks is given as 200,000 as contrasted with the more modest 80,000 cited in AFZAL's main narrative; similarly the sūrat states that the Shāh was left with only 4000 horse on the night of crisis, as opposed to the 7000 given in the main narrative; the Shāh in the letter cannot apparently refrain from exaggerating his youth at the time of Jām, for he says he was 14 -- his actual age was 15 lunar years and two weeks; the sūrat also repeats the persistent lie that Kūchīm Khān was killed at the Battle). The first phase of the battle description in AFZAL is however in direct keeping with the accounts in JANG, AHSAN, etc. although a few added details are found here as well. AFZAL also adds an "Aftermath" to the battle found in none of the other sources except ROUZAT--and that account is much less detailed.

AHSAN/213-220 although having less detail than AFZAL is one of the basic accounts. TAAA/40-42 follows AHSAN, but not slavishly; there are some changes and LUBB is specifically cited for the question of the number of troops involved (AHSAN gives no estimates on this matter). TEZ/15-16 has the Shāh's own modest description of the events, but is very brief. JANG/135b-143a and ROUZAT/139b-142a present a major account of the events and although the basic

(Continued on following page)

works. It was the first contest engaged in directly by a Qizilbásh

(Continued from preceding page)

facts tally with AHSAN, there are numerous minor divergencies and an independent arrangement of the details. Since JANG is oriented on Harát, the role of Husyan Khán, the governor of Khurásán, is given great prominence and he emerges as the hero of the battle. ROULAT adds an "Aftermath" not found in JANG and which parallels AFZAL. ILCHI has two descriptions, one on 205b in the section on the Juchids, and the other on 39a-b in the section on the Safavids. It is a minor account however and its data conforms to what is learned from the other sources. NUSAKH/214a has a brief mention in its text, but a rather detailed account in the margins which would seem to be an independent version based on a personal, eye-witness source. As in most of the marginal notes in NUSAKH however, the additions are generally of rather petty nature, although it is of interest to note that the Qizilbásh had 700 arábeh, with each one mounting four zarbzán. The marginal note also adds the frequently found error (e.g. also seen in the long marginal addition in AFZAL/44b) that Kúchim Khán's head was taken at the battle. SHIRAZI/602a-b, SHARAF/555, LUBB/293 and MIFTAH/542a also make some reference to the events at Jám.

BABUR: The accounts of the First Royal Liberation of Khurásán and the Battle of Jám are derived from (a) (345b-346a): an intelligence report received from Bábur's son, Kamran (in Qandahár and Kábul) on 21 Safar 935/4 November 1528 with the news of Zaynish Bahádur's defeat at Dámghán and 'Ubayd's evacuation of Harát; (b) (347a-b): an intelligence report from his other son, Humáyún (in Badakhshán) which arrived 10 Rabí'I/22 November (the messenger had left Badakhshán 19 Safar/2 November) reporting that 40,000 Qizilbásh had thoroughly defeated 105,000 Úzbek by the use of Rúm dastúrí lufank va arábeh ("Ottoman style muskets and caissons") and that it was doubtful if any of the major Úzbek leaders had escaped alive. There is also an interesting reference here to the Úzbek use of shamans (yadehjílár) to cast the evil-eye upon the Qizilbásh; it is quite possible that these yadehji are the same as the 40 ulamá(sic) mentioned in AHSAN/220 and TAAA/40 as having been brought along by 'Ubayd Khán to pray for victory at the battlefield. (c) (354a-b): This is a wildly exaggerated account of the events at Jám brought to Bábur by an officer of Biv Sultán, who arrived as late as 16 Rabí'II/28 December with a tale of 300,000 Úzbeks and the death in battle of all the Úzbek kháns and sultans except for Abú Sa'id. However this account is very interesting for the use of the Ottoman battle style adopted by the Qizilbásh: "The Qizilbásh drew up arábeh, zarbzán and fusiliers in the Ottoman way (Rúm dastúrí bíleh); the Shah [and erroneously added: Júheh Sultán] remained inside the arábeh [laager], while the flanks were put outside. Those on the inside [of the laager] then opened up the chains, advanced outside, and the battle was joined here, too" (ichidákílár zanjírni achib chiqárlár munda ham zarb úrush bulúr).

ANONYM/26b-27a and SUBHAN/56a-57a are near identical Úzbek notices of the Battle of Jám. The brief reference does acknowledge the Úzbek defeat here. QIPCHAQ/590b is the other Úzbek source with a bare mention of the event. 10,000 casualties are mentioned for both sides; and after the defeat, the Úzbeks are to have withdrawn via Marv.

sháh and an Úzbek khán in which their respective total armies were committed (Shibání Khán had had his own personal troops only, when he met Sháh Ismá'íl at Marv). It should have decided at very least the fate of Khurásán. And yet, despite the clear Qizilbásh victory (even the Úzbek sources ANONYM-SUBHAN refer to the "defeat of Islám's army of victorious renown" --i.e. the Úzbeks) nothing new was solved here, for there was no pursuit and the Úzbeks were able to withdraw with the bulk of their army still intact. The Sháh returned to the west ostensibly to attend to the Baghdád affair; and within a few months after Jám, 'Ubayd Khán easily retook Mashhad and entered Harát for the first time.

The Úzbeks however had been taught a lesson at Jám: they now knew it quite hopeless to attempt to defeat in the field a major Qizilbásh army equipped with the new type fighting methods imported by the Safavids from their Ottoman neighbors and the new weapons brought in by the Portuguese at Hurmuz on the Persian Gulf. The Qizilbásh had learned the same lesson some fifteen years before when they had been defeated by the Ottomans at Chál-dirén and had since then been adopting the new techniques (essentially consisting of infantry with concentrated firing power, mobile light-cannon [the 'arábeh or "caisson" with mounted zarbzán] which could be chained together in the form of a corral or laager serving as a defence point, and heavy cannon for siege purposes).

The Úzbeks however were not in a position to duplicate this, and only inferior, cast-off weapons trickled through to Mávará'al-nahr. There was to be an attempted modernization (about 957/1550) and

Ottoman Janissaries were actually imported into Mávará'al-nahr, but their use was subverted into domestic purposes and the attempted reform was not maintained. The fact was that the shifting of the world trade routes had partially isolated Mávará'al-nahr and made any sustained access to the modern weapons impossible. The only direct source was Russia, but only on the level of smuggling, for it was against the policy of the advancing Russians to arm the Úzbeks.¹ Ubayd Khán was thus unable to profit from the lesson learned by his defeat at Jám.

There were to be several more invasions of Khurásán launched by 'Ubayd Khán, but he was inevitably forced to renounce his conquests whenever the comparatively "modernized" Royal Army marched to the liberation, for Jám had made the Úzbeks conscious of their military inferiority in the field. This was the significance of the Battle of Jám for Sháh Tahmásb's relations

1. For the history of armaments at approximately this time and for Russian policy, see Bugünkü Türkistan pp.117-118. For the theory of the effect of the shifting of the world trade routes on Central Asia, see ibid. pp.112-122. This is the same theory advanced by V.V. Bartol'd (see, e.g. in Mussulman Culture, translated by S.Suhrawardy, Calcutta 1934, p.137) and now discredited in Soviet historiography. Soviet scholarship has made a major contribution to the economic history of the post-1500 period in Central Asia in the attempts to prove that the Russian trade through Siberia more than made up for any losses suffered through the new sea-routes. Thus Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR devotes a full chapter (pp.434-444) to a study of Russian-Central Asian relations (largely economic) from about 1500 to 1750. Even if the emphasis on Russianism is taken into account, there still remains a sound study of a new economic orientation for Central Asia. Zeki Velidi Togan (op.cit) has pointed to very much the same thing in his description of the new North-South trading axis stemming from Siberia, but he also indicates the negative aspects, i.e. that Central Asia was being cut off from its traditional ties with the Islamic culture to the south, and that the way was being prepared for Russian imperialism.

with the Úzbeks -- not the temporary victory gained in the field.

To this should be added another indirect effect of the victory at Jám: Sháh Tahmásb emerged with a new prestige which was to influence the domestic political situation. When the úymác were finally subjected to the Central Authority, the Úzbeks had to face a united Qizilbásh state against which they could do little but raid and harry.

ii. The "All-Úzbek" Army.

It has been seen that when the Royal Army entered Khurásán, Ubayd Khán abandoned his exposed position at Harát and hastened back to Mávará'al-nahr to raise a total Úzbek army to face the Qizilbásh. He left his personal army and supplies in Marv and himself crossed the Ámú back into Mávará'al-nahr to persuade his "peers" of the "neo-eponymous clans" to join him against the Sháh in order to achieve the permanent conquest of Khurásán and even 'Irác-i 'Ajam (ILCHI). He made personal calls on the grand khán in Samarqand and on Jánibeg Sultán in Miyánkál. In the incredibly short time of perhaps one month (the cited "seven month" siege of Harát would have extended at the latest into Zú'l-Hijjah -- which ties in with the Sháh's itinerary, for Júheh Sultán had been sent against Dámghán in Shavvál) the entire Úzbek army was fully prepared for battle and "the largest army since the time of Changíz Khán had crossed the Ámú" (AFZAL, AHSAN) and by 10 Muharram 935/24 September 1528 was already deep into Khurásán, near Jám.

The Safavid chronicles give a rather detailed list of the

Úzbek personnel at the Battle of Jám (essentially the same list is given in AFZAL, AHSAN and TAAA). This is most fortunate from the viewpoint of Úzbek internal history, for the Úzbek sources at our disposal are most insufficient for a study of this period. The list which follows has been collated from the various sources; the genealogies are mostly derived from the passim references in ABD:

Sháh-Budáids: 'Ubayd Khán; his son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán; Suyúnj Muhammad Sultán, son of Shíbání Khán; Fúlád Sultán, probably the son of Tímúr Sultán, son of Shíbání Khán.

Kúchúnjids: Kúchim Khán, the "grand khán"; his two sons, Abú Sa'id Sultán and 'Abd al-Latif Sultán.

Jánibegids: Jánibeg Sultán; his son, Kístan Qará Sultán (of Balkh).

Suyúnjids: Baráo Sultán.

In addition to the major kháns and sultáns, the names are also given of the leading Úzbek umará many of whom are to be met with in the Khurásán campaigns and also in the internal history of the Úzbeks in the post-'Ubayd Khán period. They are listed here (together with the kháns and sultáns) in the order of battle at the Battle of Jám:

Center: 'Ubayd, Kúchim, Kístan; Qamish Úghlán (Oǵlan), Tinish B́, Sayyidam Mírzá, Chaghatáy Bahádur, Biyáqú Bahádur, Háfiz Qunurát, Shaykh Abú Sa'id Afrásyáb.

Left Flank: Baráo, Fúlád, 'Abd al-'Azíz

Right Flank: Jánibeg, Abú Sa'id; Kaldí (Geldi) Muhammad Sultán.

Reserves: Suyúnj Muhammad; Qanbar 'Alí B́, Shaykh Darvísh B́, Rustam Qulí B́.

Vanguard: Ta(n)bal Khwájeh Mír Ákhúr, Qarájeh Bahádur.

It is interesting to note that not only was this a total Uzbek army drawn from the direct Dynastic realm of Mávará'al-shahr, Farghāneh, Táshkand and Turkistán, but that there were also contingents from Kashghar (i.e. the Chaghatáy), the Qazáqs and the Sirghiz.

The figures given for the number of Úzbeks at Jám are in the order of 80 to 120,000. There is probable exaggeration in many of the Safavid chronicles to make the victory of the outnumbered (e.g. by 10 or 20 times) Qizilbásh even more glorious. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that the Úzbeks were totally committed at Jám and that this was a maximum effort.

iii. The Qizilbásh Order of Battle

The Sháh is said to have heard the news of the new Úzbek invasion while still at Mashhad and to have prayed at the Holy Shrine for Divine aid before he bravely marched forth to meet the Úzbeks. It seems likely that he was actually heading for Harát (JANG/ROUZAT), and was surprised enroute near Jám, a major point on the Mashhad-Harát Highway, by the sudden proximity of the Úzbeks.

The number of Qizilbásh engaged at Jám varies in the sources from 24,000 to 40,000 to 80,000 to "countless". The Qizilbásh were very likely outnumbered, but they had (TAAA) tarábehhá-yi pur zerbzan-i farangí ("European"-style "caissons" replete with light cannon) numbered at 700 in NUSAKH(margin) and 2000 in BABUR, as well as infantry-fusiliers (numbered at 6000 in BABUR).

It becomes quite clear from examining the Qizilbásh order of battle at Jám that they too were fully committed and this was their

maximum effort. The order of battle given below is an attempted collation of the rather variant reports given in the sources:

Center: Sháh Tahmásb; his brothers, Bahrám Mírzá and Alrás Mírzá (ILCHI has Sám Mírzá, the titular governor of Khurásán, at Jám; but this is most unlikely); Mír Ja'far Sávji, the "grand vezír"; Mír Qivám al-Dín, the sadr; Shaykh 'Alí, the "mujtahid [leading Shí'eh divine] of the time"; Mír Nizám al-Mulk Rizávi, the mutavallí of the Holy Shrine; a detachment of qurchis; and probably Muhammad Sultán Sharaf-al-Dín-úghlí Takkalú, governor of Qazvin. The 'arábehs, under Ustád Shaykhí Túpchibáshí were also part of the Center(qalb).

Right Flank: Júneh Sultán Takkalú, the regent or vakíl; Hamzeh Sultán Takkalú; Ahmad Sultán Afshár, governor of Kirmán and/or Feráh; Ya'qúb Sultán Qájár, governor of Qarábágh (north of the Aras River in Ázarbáyján).

Left Flank: Husayn Khán Shámlú, governor of Khurásán; Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí, governor of Isfahán(?); Tabarruk Khán (Khalífeh) Shámlú; Pír Qulí Sultán Shámlú (same as Kangarlú, governor of Simnán and Khwár ?) ; Ahmad Sultán Ustájlú, governor of Kirmán (?); Hasan Sultán Dúrhúd-úghlí (same as Hasan Ján Sultán Rúnlú ?); Malik Bek Khúyí, governor of Khúy (in Ázarbáyján).

Vanguard: Úlámeb Sultán Takkalú.

iv. The First Phase of the Battle: The Qizilbash Rout

We have seen that the Sháh had left Mashhad apparently heading for Harát which might have ^{been} suspected as the Úzbek target. At Khargird (or Khusrougird), near Jám, his patrols reported

the Úzbeks close by. Reconnaissance brought back word that the full Úzbek army was at nearby Zúrábád (variants: Rúzábád, Zírábád). From this it would appear that it had been the Úzbeks who were on the offensive and had sought out the Qizilbásh army in order to force a pitched battle. That night, the eve of 10 Muharram, saw patrol action and prayer while both sides prepared for the morning contest.

It is curious that although some of the sources refer to the dates as tású'á (the ninth) and 'áshúrá (the tenth) i.e. in reference to the holy Shí'eh commemoration of the martyrdom of Imám Husayn at Karbalá, there is no mention of any special religious associations of the day, and the sources ignore the opportunity for literary comparisons. It would thus seem that the special significance and pageantry of 'Áshúrá was not as yet fully developed in Safavid Iran, although TAAA/458 does refer to a ta'ziyeh (the religious representations of 'Áshúrá) and to changing into libás-i matam (the traditional mourning costume) during the siege of Eriván in 1013/1604 as a perfectly normal occurrence.

At any rate the battle generally referred to as the Battle of Jám (variations referring to the actual battle sites: Zúrábád, Khargird, Sárú Qamish and 'Umarábád) was fought on the morning of 'Áshúrá, 10 Muharram 935/ 24 September 1528.

Jáníbeg Sultán Úzbek began the battle by attacking the Tekkalú on the Qizilbásh right flank; the Takkalú were defeated on this first charge and fled the battlefield. The regent himself was among those who so fled and deserted the Sháh. Jáníbeg Sultán

continued the pursuit until he reached the Qizilbāsh stores (úrdú-bázár) behind the lines and the Úzbeks turned to plunder. In the meanwhile the Qizilbāsh left flank had also been shattered and the umará there also fled. It seemed to all that the battle was now at an end and that the Úzbeks had won the day. Thus Malik Bek Khúyí and Ya'qúb bek Qájár are said to have fled all the way to Simnán without pausing to stop once; similarly, Ahmad Sultán Afshár fled all the way to Kirmán. 'Ubayd Khán was already receiving congratulations for the victory, and the Úzbek army had broken ranks to loot the Qizilbāsh camp and were even beginning to return to Mávará'al-nahr with their winnings.

There was however one Qizilbāsh group which everyone seems to have overlooked -- for the Sháh and the Qizilbāsh Center protected behind its fine array of modern firepower had not even been engaged. What seems to have happened (from BABUR's account) was that the Center had formed itself in the Ottoman fashion of chaining together the 'arábehs in a laager protected by infantry-fusiliers. The Úzbeks had not attempted a frontal assault on this modernized Center, but had devoted their attacks to the enemy flanks who fought a more traditional style battle, and had succeeded in turning the rear of the Qizilbāsh defences and thus outmanoeuvring the heavy Center. The Úzbeks must have assumed that the Center would flee along with the defeated umará of the flanks. This is the only way to account for the disaster which now fell upon the Úzbeks. It seems quite clear that they were completely surprised by the sudden offensive which broke forth from the Center, when by all proper standards it should have

long since fled.

There are two rivâyats which are pointed out by AFZAL/42b for the timing of the royally inspired Qizilbâsh charge on the Qzbeks which turned the fortunes of battle. It is not of course particularly significant whether the attack came immediately after the flanks were defeated, or whether the Shâh retreated during the night and made the devastating charge the following morning, i.e. whether Jâm was a one-day or two-day battle. It does however point out the difficulties in attempting to arrive at a simple statement of "what happened when and where" even when the contemporary sources are relatively abundant.

Whether it was the afternoon of the same day, or the following morning, the fact remains that our two main characters were now left on the battlefield of Jâm: Shâh Tahmâsb, deserted by most of his umará in their flight from defeat; and 'Ubayd Khân, deserted by most of his sultâns in their pursuit of plunder.

II. The Second Phase of the Battle: The Qizilbâsh Victory

The accounts of the second phase of the battle have little of the bombast used to camouflage the defeat. The story is generally told in a series of anecdotes which have the liveliness of soldiers' tales of battle. The sources here generally prefix their accounts by stating that: This was heard from actual participants in the battle; or mancûl ast keh ("it is related that"). In fact some of the accounts (particularly in BABUR, but in the purely Safavid chronicles as well) are so much "on the spot" as to be completely erroneous (e.g. the rumors of the death of Kúchim Khân and even 'Ubayd Khân in battle). AFZAL and NUSAKH have long

marginal notes complementing, but sometimes contradicting the narrative in the text, which are very clearly based on dramatic eyewitness accounts.

It is thus related that when 'Ubayd Khán was being congratulated for his victory, he saw an undefinable black spot standing still off in the distance. "I see something that may be a part of the Qizilbásh army", he said. And although the Úzbeks remaining around him insisted that this could not be since the Qizilbásh had all fled, 'Ubayd Khán did finally send someone to investigate. By then it was too late, for the black spot was no longer standing still, but was moving straight on to the White Banner under which 'Ubayd Khán (and Kúchim Khán?) were standing.

For Sháh Tahmásb had refused to listen to the voices of doom from the few umará and advisors who still remained with him and had not followed their plea to accept defeat for the time being and to leave Khurásán and 'Iráq-i 'Ajam to the Úzbeks. It was the Sháh's first chance to act on his own, and with the optimism of his age (he would have had his fifteenth lunar birthday a fortnight before the battle) and his complete tavakkul or "trust" in God, Muhammad, 'Alí and the Imáms, he inspired the sagging morale of the troops still with him (about 5000 most of whom were probably qurchís of the royal guard) and a sudden charge was made directly on 'Ubayd Khán's White Banner. The Úzbeks were too startled to put up much of a fight and soon fled in panic. The Sháh is very modest about his own role in the charge; he simply notes in his Diary (TEZ/15): adam-i chand píshtar raftam ("I went a few steps forward").

Most of the sources repeat the tale of how 'Ubayd Khán was wounded in his flight by a qurchí who did not recognize his victim and did not think enough of the Khán's appearance to bother finishing him off. The Khán's hearing is said to have been effected by the blow received and the Safavid chronicles are sometimes pleased to call him 'Ubáyd-i kar,' 'Ubayd the Deaf'. There are several other stories of this nature, one, particularly persistent, includes the taking of Kúchim Khán's head. This report is obviously based on hearsay only, for the grand khán was to die quite peacefully in Samarcand the following year.

It was certainly a time of wild rumors: the first news was of a major Gzilbásh defeat which spread through Iran by those fleeing from the first phase of the battle and served to encourage the insurgents at Baghdád. The first reports reaching Bábur in India gave the opposite impression of the complete destruction of the Úzbek army and the death of all important Úzbek Kháns and sultáns, including 'Ubayd Khán and Kúchim Khán. Bábur was even ready to make plans for another try at Máverá'al-nahr.

The truth of the matter would appear to be that all of the leading Úzbek sultáns made it back safely to Marv, and that Sháh Tahmásb (TEZ/15) spent the night after the victory in fear that this Úzbek retreat might only be a strategic feint.

VI. The Aftermath

The Battle of Jám ended with 'Ubayd Khán's third evacuation from Khurásán since the Sháh's accession. There was no attempt at pursuit. Instead the Court, while still on the battlefield and then at nearby Nishápúr first turned to rewards and punishment.

Although the Takkalú had fled in the first Úzbek charge, Júheh Sultán had managed to reappear beside the Sháh immediately after the defeat had turned to victory. It will be seen from subsequent domestic affairs, that the Sháh began acting somewhat more independently with the new prestige he had gained. It would not be long, for instance, before the Ustájlú would be welcomed back at Court.

At any rate, none of the Takkalú were reprimanded. Among those who had fled, however, Malik Bek, the Kurdish (?) governor of Khúy, was dismissed from his post, as was Ya'qúb Bek Qájár, the governor of Qarábágh. AFZAL states that Ahmad Sultán Afshár¹, the governor of Kirmán, was put in the custody of his own vazír, apparently pending sufficient penance for his wild flight from Jám clear back to Kirmán.

Among those who had remained loyal at the battle was Husayn Khán; he and his Shámlú were rewarded and sent back to Harát and a special khil'at (honor robe) was also sent to Sám Mírzá, the younger brother of the Sháh and the royal governor of Khurásán. An interesting appointment was also made to Sabzivár: the Sayyid, Mír Shams al-Dín 'Alí Sabzivárf, whom the Sháh had previously honored on his passage through Sabzivár and who had remained loyally at the Sháh's side all during the crisis at Jám, was now appointed as governor and given the title of "sultán" despite the

1. This is possibly an error for Ahmad Sultán (Súfi-úghlí) Ustájlú who is named at the Lár concentration of Dív Sultán (931/1525) as being governor of Kirmán. Ahmad Sultán Afshár had been appointed governor of Faráh by Dúrmish Khán. Nonetheless, it must be noted that AFZAL distinguishes clearly between the two Ahmad Sultáns in the account of the battle.

fact that he was not of the Qizilbāsh.

There is no mention anywhere of any intention of consolidating the victory by continuing the campaign against the Ūzbeks who were still gathered at Marv. This illustrates one of the most striking features in Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks: his eastern campaigns were undertaken only at the provocation of a new Ūzbek offensive against Khurāsān. When the particular Ūzbek threat was parried, the Shāh generally returned to the west in short order. There was generally good reason for hurrying back to the west to counter domestic crises or an Ottoman threat which might have arisen during his absence. But this is not always a satisfactory explanation as becomes apparent in the later phases of Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks when an Ottoman peace had been signed and there was no longer a western threat.

Thus although there was the Baghdād Usurpation in the west to attend to, this can only be a partial explanation of the reasons for not attempting to follow through on the victory at Jām. As a matter of fact, the Court first went into qishlāq at Qum before embarking upon the Baghdād liberation campaign. It would therefore seem that even this early ~~only~~ the passiveness of Shāh Tahmāsb's regime in foreign affairs--a major characteristic all through the Shāh's long reign--was already in evidence. With very few exceptions, the Qizilbāsh were moved against their enemies, both to the east and to the west, only when actively provoked.

Thus it was that when (TEZ/15-16) Khurāsān was cleansed of the "impure essence and vile presence" (louš-i vujūd va khubš-i junūd) of the Ūzbeks, the Court left Jām for the qishlāq at Qum and the preparations for the impending Baghdād campaign. And thus it was that with the spring, when the Shāh was at Baghdād, the Khān all but walked into Mashhad and Harāt.

Chapter 3. The Period of the Third Uzbek Invasion(Ud-Bars/ 935-937/ 1529-1531)Part 1. The Uzbek Occupation of KhurásánI. Shah Tahmasb's Baghdád Campaign: The Beginning of the Ottoman Factor in Safavid-Uzbek Relations¹

Sháh Tahmásb evidently thought the Battle of Jám had made Khurásán secure enough, for with the coming of the new "year" of 935/1529 he turned toward the west to deal with the Baghdád Usurpation. It will be recalled that the threat of the rebel, Zú'l-Faqr in 'Iráq-i 'Arab (Mesopotamia) had almost served to cancel the first royal expedition to Khurásán and that the Sháh had not followed up his victory at Jám, but had hurried back and turned his attention instead to the problem of the threatening western front.

From reading the Safavid chronicles it would seem strange that so much of the royal attention was devoted to a local coup and that a full-scale expedition should have gone out in the terrible heat of Baghdád in Cancer/June-July and that the new threat of the Uzbeks in their Third Invasion of Khurásán should have been ignored. As indicated above (p.121), the Ottoman sources give the possible explanation, for there we have seen that Zú'l-Faqr's usurpation was more than a local adventure and that after seizing Baghdád he had turned Sunni and offered up the city to the Ottomans.

1. There are some variations in the accounts of the Baghdád liberation but they need not concern us here. The main accounts are: AFZAL/61b-62b, AHSAN/222-4, TAAA/72, ROUZAT/143b-144a (not in JANG), ALCHI/40b-41a, TEZ/16, SHARAF/556, SHIRAZI/602a-b.

The Ottoman sources are as cited on p.121 (and note). They regard the Sháh's retaking of Baghdád as a provocative act for they consider Zú'l-Faqr an Ottoman client.

The Ottoman source SOLAKZADE/483 thus explains Sháh Tahmásb's haste in turning to Baghdád: "Lest the conquering ruler [i.e. Sulaymán] take possession of Baghdád and from that vantage-point march forth to seize Írán and subjugate Túrán".¹ If this is so, the Baghdád campaign this year would mark the beginning of the Ottoman factor in Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks.

It would be interesting to know whether Sulaymán the Magnificent was in actual correspondence with 'Ubayd Khán or not. Feridun Bey's Münşeat/i/374,377,415 has the correspondence of Sulaymán's predecessor, Sultán Salím, with 'Ubayd Khán in which the last letter is dated 921/1515; but the next Ottoman correspondence with the Úzbeks preserved here (i/606) is from Sulaymán to 'Abd al-Latíf Khán of Samarqand in 957/1550, i.e. well into the next phase of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks.

This correspondence of Salím and the later Sulaymán is militantly anti-Safavid and calls for united Ottoman-Úzbek action against the Qizilbásh. However there is nothing to indicate any specific attempts made to form an Ottoman-Úzbek axis during the period of Sháh Tahmásb's duel with 'Ubayd Khán over Khurásán, except possibly for some vague references in the later correspondence to good relations in the past between 'Ubayd Khán and the Porte. The question of Ottoman-Úzbek cooperation during the 16 year period under discussion here thus remains open pending further evidence. (The discussion is resumed below, p.255 , in

1. "mebada padşah-i keşver-güşa Bağdada malik ve ol takarrübiyle İran ve Turan zabt ve teshirine salik ola diye"

the reporting on Sulaymán's invasion of Iran.)

At any rate, Sulaymán was fully occupied in Europe when Sháh Tahmásb led the Qizilbásh against Baghdád and no aid was sent to the would-be Ottoman protégé. Zú'l-Faqár was murdered by his own men in Baghdád and the assassins presented his head to the waiting Sháh. Baghdád was thus quickly restored to full Safavid control and a new Qizilbásh governor, the Takkalú, Muḥammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí, was installed. By 3 Shavvál/10 June the campaign was over and Sháh Tahmásb could procede to his Qazvín yevlác at Abhar.

B. The Uzbek Occupation of Mashhad

I. The Beginnings of the Third Invasion and the Fall of Mashhad ¹

AFZAL/47a-49a has preserved a copy of the fathnámeh ("victory proclamation") of Baghdád, which was sent to Husayn Khán, the governor of Harát, and dated Shavvál 935/June 1529. In it the Sháh explains that since he was "relieved" (khátir jam') of the menace of 'Ubayd Khán, he had turned to Baghdád at the news of Zú'l-Faqr's opposition there. That he was not fully "relieved" however is made clear by his warning in this fathnámeh that the Khurásán governor not become unmindful (gháfil) of the threat of 'Ubayd Khán "the Deaf", for "as long as he has a head on his body" (tá sar dar badan dârad) he will never abandon his intentions to take Khurásán.

The Third Uzbek Invasion of Khurásán which began at about this same month of Shavvál proves that the Sháh was fully justified in not feeling fully "relieved". The timing would suggest that 'Ubayd Khán was fully aware of the diversion at Baghdád. As a matter of fact the Sháh was still in 'Irâq-i 'Arab when the first news came that the Úzbeks were besieging Mashhad (AFZAL). ILCHI adds what could only be a personal observation, that 'Ubayd Khán

1. AFZAL/49a-b, AHSAN/220-1, and TAAA/42 give approximately the same details on the military operations at Mashhad. To this AFZAL/46b adds the account of the disgraced governors' joining the defences and names Aghzîvâr as the governor of Mashhad. TAAA gives the date on the successful escape of the umarâ. ILCHI/41a has no mention of Mashhad and has 'Ubayd proceed directly against Harát; however on 260a, in the section on the Júchids, there is a reference to 'Ubayd's pilgrimage at Mashhad which may refer to this particular invasion. JANG/ROUZAT make no mention of the fall of Mashhad.

had expected the Sháh to be bogged down by a long siege at Baghdád. Actually, as has been seen, the affair had been terminated successfully in very short order. But there were other factors at Court, which will be examined shortly, which were to give the ʿOzbeks a free hand in Khurásán, for instead of marching to the relief of Mashhad, the Court went into its yayláq at Abhar.

There was a rather imposing Qizilbásh garrison at the time in Mashhad which consisted of 3-4,000 gházis and fusiliers (AHSAN) under the Shámlú governor, Aghzívar Sultán. (He was the son of Damrí Sultán, the governor of Dámghán who had been killed at the Battle of Bistám.) Mashhad had further been strengthened by the presence of three major umará, Ahmad Sultán Afshár, Ya'qúb Bek Rájár and Malik Bek Khúyí, each of whom it will be recalled had been disgraced for their flight from the Battle of Jám and stripped of their governorships. The trio had been sent in disrepute to aid in the defence of Mashhad, but with the possibility of regaining their lost prestige by rendering faithful service there (AFZAL).

There was however a major point of weakness in the defence of Mashhad: the walls of the city had not yet been completed and reliance had to be placed on the kúchehbands (barricades). (See above p.90 for the building of the walls of Mashhad.)

As pointed out above, the Qizilbásh victory at Jám had not been completely for nought: it was not a newly re-formed "all-ʿOzbek" army which launched the Third Invasion of Khurásán. It was rather the private project of the Sháh-Budáqid clan. At that, 'Ubayd Khán did not appear personally until the siege of Mashhad

was already well under way. He had first sent his son, 'Abd al-'Aziz Sultán and his cousin, Suyúnj Muhammad Sultán (the son of Shitání Khán) with 6000 horse.

The Mashhad garrison, realizing that the Shrine-city was physically unprepared for a siege, went out to meet the Úzbeks and even drove them back to the Turuq area (AHSAN); but their victory was inconclusive and Mashhad was soon under full siege behind its kúchehbands.

After two months 'Ubayd Khán finally appeared with another army and joined the siege operations. When the Khán personally began leading the assaults on the kúchehbands, the garrison realized that further resistance was impossible and began deserting. The Qizilbásh were soon forced to flee Mashhad and, despite an Úzbek pursuit, Aghzívar Sultán and Ya'qúb Bek managed to reach Mazínán (on the Khurásán Highway, west of Sabzívar) and Ahmad Sultán Afshár reached Faráh to which he had been (re-?)appointed after being deprived of Kirmán (TAAA and AFZAL).

Thus it was that 'Ubayd Khán entered Mashhad and began a new occupation of Khurásán in the same lunar year, 935, as the Battle of Jém (although in the following solar-Turkí year of Úd/1529). He did not stay in Mashhad long; he appointed one of his officers to the governorship there and marched on directly to the political center of Khurásán--Harát.

II. 'Ubayd Khán's Pilgrimage at Mashhad: Aside on Inter-Sectarian Relations on the Court Level

It would seem that the defending umará at Mashhad had simply deserted their men, for it is stated that 300 gházis (i.e. Qizil-

básh) who still remained in the city at its fall were ordered executed by 'Ubayd Khán.¹ This however should probably be viewed as military expediency for there is no mention of any atrocities or even looting of the local civilian population.

On the contrary, ILCHI/266a is possibly referring to this particular occupation of Mashhad when it cites 'Ubayd Khán's pilgrimage to the Holy Shrine and his composition of the following quatrain:²

"O heart, how long will you remain in these dire straits
As twisted as love-combing curly locks?
Enter the service of Imám Rizá, the true Sultán of Khurásán;
Be straight-forward like his humble servitors."

As stated above in Section I (p.42) an analysis of inter-sectarian relations should distinguish between the official level of operation motivated by either propaganda or "Realpolitik", and the individual level of operation motivated by either emotional attachment or opportunism. In the case of 'Ubayd Khán's alleged pilgrimage and verse and similarly for the pilgrimages to the Shi'eh shrines made by such Sunni rulers as the Ottoman, Sulaymán in 941/1534 and the refugee ruler of India, Humáyún in 951/1544, we have interesting examples of the two levels operating simultaneously.

These royal pilgrimages may be cynically interpreted as nothing more than official acts of diplomacy performed to gain the

1. This is probably the origin of QIPCHAQ's notice of a massacre of Shi'eh soldiery in Mashhad which is cited in that source however as referring to the First Invasion. See above p.92.

2. "Tá chand dilá bísar ú sámán báshí
Chún turreh-yi mihr-shán paríshán báshí
Khwáham keh chú khádimán z rú-yi ikhlás
Dar khidmat-i Sultán-i Khurásán báshí."

good-will of the local Shí'eh in a newly conquered area (i.e. Sulaymán at Baghdád and 'Ubayd Khán at Mashhad) or to gain vizilbásh aid for military purposes (i.e. Humáyún). 'Ubayd Khán's verse in praise of Holy Mashhad or the favors shown to the Asterábád sayyids (see above pp.103,108) may therefore be interpreted on this level as officially-inspired "Realpolitik" and linked with the propagandistic statements we shall shortly examine in his correspondence with Sháh Tahmásb.

However the individual feelings of these monarchs may well have been operating on a more emotional level. This is clearly seen in the case of Sháh Tahmásb himself for his Diary is a most convincing testament to his religious sincerity and sectarian loyalty. This is indicated by his bleak comment on the "Realpolitik" necessitating the Ottoman peace ("Praise the Lord that peace has been achieved; it is now several years that Muslims have been able to live in security"¹) after he had first expressed his horror at an Istanbul fatvá (religious pronouncement) declaring the Shí'eh infidels ("Let the Lord of the Worlds decide between us"²).

Similarly in the case of Humáyún, JOUHAR/especially p.66 makes it quite clear that despite his outward conformity to Shí'eh sensitivities, there was nonetheless a strong undercurrent of sectarian hostility. And in the case of Sulaymán's pilgrimage, SOLAKZADE/487 assures us that the shrines were first purified and

1. "Al-hamdu l'illáh keh sulb váqí' shud va chand sál ast keh Musalmánán b-farághat ouqát migužarânand." (TEZ/72).

2. "Hazrat-i Rabb al-'álamín miyáneh-yi má va ishán hukm far-bayad." (TEZ/05).

repaired before the royal visit because: "Those unclean infidels had affronted that Imám by heaping refuse and garbage upon that shrine to which respect is due".¹

As for 'Ubayd Khán, it is somewhat more difficult to decide whether or not there was a similar gulf between his "Realpolitik" and propaganda on the one side, and his personal feelings toward Shi'ism on the other. The Úzbek sources (ABD/20b, SUBHAN/51b-52a, SILSILAT/117b-118a, QIPCHAQ/591b and MUQIM/20b-21a) assure us that he had had an excellent education on the traditional lines reserved for the (Sunni) 'ulamá or "scholar-clerics" and that he frequently associated with the religious teachers of his time. However, nothing specific is stated in the sources of any particular fanaticism against the Shi'eh, and even the abuse heaped upon him in the Safavid sources is mostly restricted to the generalities a chronicler permits himself in the obituary notices. Thus ILCHI/266a is particularly vituperative in its obituary for 'Ubayd Khán and says: "He was extremely harsh toward the Shi'eh and considered it absolutely incumbent upon himself to slaughter them".² Nonetheless, neither ILCHI nor any other source have any specific facts beyond their vague generalities to demonstrate this point, and in fact are sometimes constrained (especially AFZAL) to allude to some special mitigating act of 'Ubayd Khán when his Úzbeks sometimes got out of control.

The Sháh in his Diary (TEZ/22) does however attempt to portray

1. "Reva'iz-i nepak ol hazrete ihaneten ol makam-i lâzim ül-ihitrami pür has U hasak etmişler idi."

2. "Bâ ashâb-i Shi'i b-ghayat bad bud va qatl-i ishân rá bar khûd vájib ú lâzim midânist."

'Ubayd Khán as being personally a violent anti-Shi'eh. According to the Sháh: The Khán was once sitting in a majlis, or combined banquet and literary session, when the remark was made, "No one is a Muslim who does not have a grain [jou] of hatred for 'Alí". To this the Khán is said to have pointed to an orange he held in his hand and rejoindered: "And the hatred in my heart for 'Alí is more like this orange than like your 'grain'". Anecdotes of this sort, however, are probably more useful a gauge of the temperament of the Safavid Court than that of the Úzbek Court.

The conclusion would be that 'Ubayd Khán's performance of the pilgrimage rites at Mashhad and his quatrain in honor of Imám Rizá were most likely political acts and divorced from his real emotional ties and loyalties to his own sect.

It has been thought useful to interject this aside on the rulers' personal sectarian convictions at this point as providing a preliminary understanding of the next series of events at Harát where a similar dichotomy will be observed between theory and practice, or between ~~genuine~~ genuine conviction and opportunism ostensibly based on inter-sectarian hostility. In the case of the rulers some documentation is possible: it is much more difficult to follow individual motivations from the sources consulted, on the non-Court level. Furthermore we should now be in a better position to follow the official correspondence (with its propagandistic emphasis) which was exchanged between Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán on the occasion of the Second Royal Liberation campaign which was to follow shortly (see pp.180-186).

C. The Uzbek Occupation of Harát ¹

1. The Fall of Harát and Factionalism at the Safavid Court

Just one year before Harát had undergone a seven month siege which had utterly exhausted the defenders and the defences of the city. It had been saved only by the Sháh's march to the east and the victory at Jám. The Husayn Khán-Sám Mirzá administration had then been confirmed in Khurásán, but the city had nonetheless not been given sufficient time to recover from the devastations of this seven month siege.

Thus when 'Ubayd Khán marched from his victory at Mashhad and appeared once more before the city there was an acute shortage of military supplies and a scarcity of food. When the new siege began the prospects of another round of starvation were thus immediate. JANG also adds that the ra'iyat (the "lower class" inhabitants of the city and its suburbs) were "weak". This presumably refers to their morale as well as to their physical state

1. JANG/143a-b, a contemporary Harát source, has the most detailed description of the events in Harát and is apparently being followed by: ROUZAT/145a-b, AHSAN/221-2, 224, TAAA/42-43, and AFZAL/50a-b.

AFZAL mentions two different riváyats for the damning verse attributed to Hilálí: it cites AHSAN for the riváyat followed here, and then cites NUJUMI to the effect that Hilálí's literary enemies singled out a beyt (verse) from his famous Sháh ú Gadá which they twisted into a Shi'eh context.

ILCHI/41b ignores the conquest of Mashhad, adds the Court intrigue cited in our narrative, and makes no mention of any Uzbek oppression in Harát. NUSAKH/marginal note 214b has a brief notice which is most likely inaccurate: it describes a protracted starvation siege and adds that Baráo Sultán and Kistán Qará Sultán were with 'Ubayd at Harát. (For Kistán's preoccupation with Humáyún at this time, see below, p.170.)

Of the Uzbek sources, RAQIM/117b gives the cited chronogram; SURHAN/90a-b adds to the description of Hilálí's execution; SILSILAT/120a has more on Hilálí but strangely states that he was spared by 'Ubayd at this time.

Other references of a more specialized nature in this sub-chapter are cited directly in our narrative (FERIDUN, ABD, RABINO, TUHFEH and Sidi Ali Reis).

for they could scarcely have forgotten the atrocities committed by their own Shámlú garrison during the evacuation of the "civilians" during the last siege.

It has been noted above that the Court made no attempt to rush to the aid of Harát after the liberation of Baghdád, and this, despite the fact that the campaign had been brief and was over by Shavvál/June. There had thus been ample time for the already mobilized Qizilbásh army to procede versus the new Úzbek invasion. Instead however the Court had gone into yaylác at Abhar and then made its qishlác at Qazvín without any attempt having been made at relieving Harát.

ILCHI/41b provides an interesting behind-the-scenes account of the political situation at Court which goes far in explaining this official diffidence. We are told that the regent, Júheh Sultán, who still held the Sháh "in the palm of his hand" (dar kaff-i ictidár) had vetoed any Khurásán campaign at this time. And the reason? He wanted Husayn Khán to fall into the hands of the Úzbeks and was willing to sacrifice Harát for his personal motives. The cause for such intensive animosity is not however given, but it can be guessed that it must certainly have been intensified by the prestige gained by Husayn Khán who had stuck by the Sháh at Jám while Júheh Sultán himself had fled. Beyond this there would be the undercurrent of the inter-úymáq contentions for the regency which was soon to reach a new phase in which Husayn Khán and Júheh Sultán were to be the opposing rivals.

Thus ILCHI asserts that when a messenger arrived at Court from Harát with an appeal for aid, the answer sent back was negative. The Court retired to its qishlác instead.

ILCHI's account is fully creditable and fits in with the subsequent events at Court. The author's later position as a foreign ambassador at the Court of Sháh Tahmásb (he arrived from Ahmadnagar in India in 952/1545) would have given him access to the type of background gossip which would be filed in a diplomatic report but which would hardly find its way into the more official types of chronicles. There will be several other instances when ILCHI's insights into Court politics provide an important source for following Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks.

With such factors in mind as the physical and moral weakness of Harát and the lack of support (or even sabotage) from the Court, it is easy to see why 'Ubayd Khán could now accomplish his objectives without any great difficulty. There was no need for a protracted siege or storm: Harát fell by negotiated surrender.

Husayn Khán sent Khwájeh Ishaq Siyávasání to place his terms before the Úzbek Khán. All that was asked was that the Úzbeks withdraw a few stages from Harát and permit the Qizilbásh garrison and "the Shi'eh" (i.e. probably the associated Tájik administrative staff and the "Qizilbásh sectarians") to evacuate the city with their families and property without fear of Úzbek pursuit. These terms were readily granted and Husayn Khán led Sâm Mirzá and the Qizilbásh out of the city toward a refuge in Sístán. (For the possibility, given in another context in ILCHI, of there having been other, and presumably secret, terms which involved marriage alliances between Husayn Khán, Sâm Mirzá and the Úzbeks, see below pp.219-223.)

Thus it was that on 18 Safar 936/22 October 1529 'Ubayd Khán began his first occupation of Sháh Tahmásb's Harát and "sat on the

throne of Khurásán". RAQIM and the Úzbek sources which follow it, have noted that when the date (day and month) of this first entry into Harát is written out in the Arabic letters: (hijdahum shahr safer -- "the eighteenth of the month of Safer"), the numerical value of the component letters yields a total when added together of 930, i.e. the correct Hijrî year corresponding to 1529.

11. The Úzbek Oppression in Harát: A Refutation of the Alleged Sectarian Motivation

The Safavid chroniclers make the general statement that the Úzbek occupation of Harát was marked by considerable zulm ("oppression") abetted by sectarian animosity. When the actual facts are presented however, it turns out this was not mass, indiscriminate oppression but was restricted for the most part to financial expropriation and the execution of wealthy individuals. With the Úzbek occupation the element of religious animosity could be interjected as a pretext, but in fact there is really little to distinguish this Úzbek zulm from the zulm the Harátis had to suffer from their own Qizilbásh garrisons. The zulm of the Shámlú garrison at the time of the lynching of Khwájeh Habíbulláh and at the expulsion of the "civilians" during the last siege of Harát has already been noted, and there are as yet a number of further instances to be recorded here for the period under discussion. It will be seen that the Qizilbásh outrages compare with the worst of the Úzbek zulm.

As far as sectarian antagonism is concerned, it must be stressed that beyond vague "propagandistic" generalities there is no mention of any Úzbek massacre as such of the Shí'eh during 'Ubayd Khán's

occupation of Harát.

What we do have however throws an interesting reflection on the role of sectarian differences on a lower but parallel level to that of the "Realpolitik" of the Court and its officially inspired propaganda line as seen in the sources. On this lower level the operating terms are "individual opportunism" and "sectarian pretext" rather than the "Realpolitik" and "official propaganda" on the Court level.

This is not to deny the existence of deep personal animosities engendered by sectarian differences, and we have already attempted to demonstrate the rulers' personal--as opposed to official--feelings and actions.

There is an important Ottoman source, which while somewhat later (1553-1556) than the immediate period under discussion, does provide a glimpse of individual attitudes toward this question on the non-Court level: this is The Travels and Adventures of...Sidi Ali Reïs... (translated by H.Vambéry, London 1899). The author is an Ottoman admiral who after shipwreck had made his way overland from India to Istanbul and passed through Central Asia and Iran. It is most interesting to note that this Sunní (he would presumably have been of the official Fanafite rite of the Ottoman Court) records his pilgrimages to the Shí'eh shrines in 'Irâq (pp.5-7), at Rey (p.92) and most important for our purposes at Mashhad (pp.85-90) where he paid his respects to Imám Rizá to fulfil a vow he had made at a dangerous moment at sea. And yet despite his obvious respect for the Shí'eh Imáms, and despite the Ottoman-Safavid peace which was then in effect, he nonetheless records the bitter personal in-

sults and imprisonment he had to endure from the Shí'eh. There are not many personal records of this sort and it is important that there is a contemporary documentation for the commonly accepted generality of sectarian antagonisms on the individual emotional level.

Nonetheless it is essential that we go beyond this generality in reporting on Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks and examine some of the other motivations in the sectarian problem which have received less publicity. The official chronicles, whether Shí'eh-Safavid or Sunni-Úzbek, Ottoman or Mughal, automatically heap sectarian abuse upon their enemies when making generalized statements of policy or sometimes merely to fill in the literary requirements of saj', or the stylized rhymed prose affected. However in most cases it will be observed that the sectarian differences are considerably toned down when references are made to specific events and details. It is important when dealing with these chronicles to deflate some of their generalities and recognize the fact that they rarely go beyond the official propaganda line in explaining the conflict between Sháh Tahmásb and the Úzbeks over Khurásán.

The description of the Úzbek zulm in Harát at 'Ubayd Khán's first occupation illustrates this point very nicely. The sources generally prefix their account with an automatic and generalized reference to the wicked irreligiosity of the Úzbeks and their persecution of the innocent Shí'eh. Thus AHSAN/222 refers to "the evil Úzbeks and the [bitterly anti-Shí'eh] Khárijite Samarqandís" who "extended the arm of oppression and tyranny over the Turks and

Tájiks, the near and the far [i.e. all ranks of the population]¹; or JANG's/145a reference to 'Ubayd Khán's acts as being "opposed to religion and Islám" (read: "opposed to Shí'ism").

And yet when the specific facts are presented we get a very different impression of what actually happened, for the sources do finally agree that the sectarian differences were used only as a pretext for expropriating the property of the wealthy --khwáh Sunni khwáh Shí'eh ("be they Sunni or be they Shí'eh") (JANG/145b). Similarly TAAA/42 records that "many convinced Sunnis were executed for their wealth on the [false] pretext of their being heretics or Shí'eh".²

JANG, a contemporary Harát source has the most detailed description of how the expropriations and executions were carried out. According to this source (AFZAL, ROUZAT, AHSAN and TAAA have similar but less detailed accounts), a Harátí suspected of any wealth was brought before a cázi ("judge") and accused there of having been heard to have cursed (la'nat and sabb-i shaykháyn) the specifically Sunni caliphs (especially Abú Bakr and 'Umar) during the Shí'eh administration of the Qizilbásh. The requisite two witnesses who were in on the plot were produced and their perjury promptly accepted without question by the cázi who would then order the expropriation and have the muhtásib ("civic morality officer") drag the accused Shí'eh to the main bazaar of Harát for

1. "Ashrár-i Úzbakiyeh va Khavárij-i Samarqandiyeh dast-i zulm ú sitam b-Turk ú Tájik va dúr ú nazdík daráz kardand."

2. "Basá az mardum-i yaqín al-tasannun rá b-tam-i mál b-baháne-yi rafz va tashayyuq maqtúl sákhtand."

public execution.

It is made quite clear that a wealthy Sunni as well as a wealthy Shi'eh were subject to this zulm; and it is specifically stated that the poorer Shi'eh were unmolested because they had no wealth to attract attention to themselves, but that wealthy Sunnis were falsely accused of Shi'ism and accordingly expropriated of their wealth and executed. We are also told of organized blackmail gangs or racketeers who approached their prospective victims (of either sect) and threatened to produce two witnesses to certify to their la'nat (cursing of the orthodox Sunni caliphs) if they did not pay "protection money". The victims paid off, but only to fall into the hands of a rival gang.

The most famous victim of the Uzbek zulm during this occupation was the poet Hiláfi. The description of his trial and execution is in complete accordance with the facts just presented: he was charged with excessive Shi'ism but actually executed for his wealth. TUHFEH, written by Sâm Mirzá who knew Hiláfi personally in Harát ("he would frequently come to converse with me", ibid/91) is quite explicit. It states that: "At the end a most curious thing happened to him, for although he was famous for being a Sunni, yet 'Ubayd Khán executed him for being a Shi'eh" (p.94).¹

His case was however complicated by the fact that as the leading literary figure and satirist of Harát he had many personal enemies and that 'Ubayd Khán himself passed the final judgement.

1. "Dar avákhir úrá 'ajab hálati dast dád keh dar tasannun mashhúr búd va 'Ubayd Khán Úzbak úrá kusht keh tú Shi'eh."

He was accused by a group of Harátis (and not Úzbeks) of lèse-majesté and his famous quatrain attacking 'Ubayd Khán and ending "...If you are a Muslim, then I am an infidel" (Káfir básham agar musulmán báshí) was brought to the Khán's attention.

The Úzbek sources SUBHAN and SILSILAT have a more dramatic account of how this verse came to the Khán's attention: It is said that at the siege of Harát the Khán had requested the poets among the besieged to compose appropriate verse. All the poets (evidently realizing the fall of Harát was near) complied with verses of madh (encominum). The one exception was Hilálí who offered instead the above-cited insulting quatrain.¹ It would seem that Hilálí's sectarian position, despite his being a Sunní, was opportunistic or at best ambivalent, for it is said here that this verse had first been written to allay Sháh Tahmásb's doubts as to his loyalties.

When Hilálí was faced with this damning quatrain he tried to counter it by writing a more appropriate madh which began: "It is for Khurásán, the heartland of the wide world, that he has come; And now life has come to it. Yes! 'Ubaydulláh Khán has come".² However this madh was apparently not worth the value of his property, for we are told it was rejected and that the great Hilálí was tortured and executed at the public square of Harát "to secure his great wealth" (va b-jahat-i asbáb ú jahátí keh dásht maqtúl gasht: TAAA/43).

1. SILSILAT adds to this that 'Ubayd Khán (his verses are frequently quoted in both Safavid and Úzbek sources) wrote a verse in reply to Hilálí which was impinged on an arrow and shot into the city. This same verse is cited in AHSAN/241 where, however, it does not apply to Hilálí but is part of the exchange of verse between 'Ubayd and Khwájeh Amír Bek during the subsequent "long siege" of Harát in 938-940/1532-33.

2. "Khurásán síneh-yí rú-yí zamín az bahr-i 'án ámad
Keh ján ámad dar ú ya'ní 'Ubaydulláh Khán ámad."

iii. 'Ubayd Khán's Intentions in Khurásán

'Ubayd Khán had assumed the rule of Khurásán and it would seem most likely that he fully intended to remain there. As TAAA/43 puts it: "When he had occupied the proud city of Harát he saw himself as the ruler [málik] over Khurásán." The permanence of his intentions is illustrated by the Úzbek source, SILSILAT's/120a reference to the issuing of farméns for building mosques and schools (madraseh) in Harát, Mashhad, Marv and in other towns and villages.

It is important to note that while 'Ubayd Khán represented the major force among the Úzbeks he still did not have the prestige of the "grand khán" and that when Kúchim Khán died at about this time he was again passed over and it was Abú Sa'id, the son of Kúchim Khán, who was nominated to this post. (See fuller discussion below p.206 .) He had only his personal prestige with which to influence his "peers" in the Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House, and as will shortly be seen, this prestige, tarnished as it had been at Jám, could be insufficient to raise a new "grande armée" among the Úzbeks. An important consideration would be that his economic and military potential was limited to his personal control of Bukhárá, but that an empire in Khurásán would have given him the leverage to unite the Úzbeks under his rule.

It is difficult to define the exact limits of 'Ubayd Khán's occupation of Khurásán. AFZAL/51a is alone in asserting that by the time of the Second Royal Liberation of Khurásán in the following year, Sabzivár and Nishápúr as well as Mashhad had Úzbek governors. It is not stated how this came about, or whether or not

the Uzbek occupation this time included the Astarábád area.

From the fact that Astarábád is not mentioned in this campaign as either being conquered or liberated, it can perhaps be assumed that the Úzbeks did not penetrate to the Caspian area during this occupation. As against this however, it is known from RABINO's (Persian text pp.27-8) Astarábád inscription dated 1 Jumádí III 937/ 20 February 1531, i.e. six months after the Uzbek evacuation of Khurásán, that a new governor (the Sultán Muhammad Zú'l-Qadar of the inscription is to be identified with the Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí of the sources) had arrived at that date. There is the possibility that this indicates a new take-over of the city from the Úzbeks, especially since nothing is heard of Sháh Vardí Bek Qájár who had been appointed Astarábád governor at the First Khurásán Liberation just before the Battle of Jám (AFZAL/37a).

There are also isolated references at this period to Qizilbásh resistance against the Úzbeks at Sabzivár. Thus Aghzivár Sultán Shámlú, the refugee governor of Mashhad who had fled to Mázinán at the Uzbek occupation (see above p.147) is said in AHSAN/234 to have repulsed a 1000 horse Uzbek attack on Sabzivár led by Dín Muhammad, the brother of Zaynish Bahádur (the latter, it will be recalled, was the Uzbek governor who had been defeated and killed at Dámghán). The Qizilbásh are said to have had only 100 horse in this engagement but to have killed Dín Muhammad and sent the Uzbek heads back to Court. Similarly NUSAKH/marginal note 214b states that Amír Shams al-Dín 'Alí Sultán (for whose appointment to Sabzivár, see above p.140) had been successfully holding Sabzivár against the Úzbeks. These local actions must have been

of temporary value only however, if we accept AFZAL's presence of Uzbek governors at Sabzivár and Nishápúr by the time of the Second Royal Liberation campaign.

NUSAKH/loc.sit. also records the resistance of a Khwájeh Turshízi Mír Muhammad against the Úzbeks at Qáyin (? text reads "Qáyim") in Kúhistán; and AFZAL/51b tells us that Sarakhs, under Mír Hasan Khán, had held out against the Úzbeks all through this period of 'Ubayd Khán's occupation of Khurásán.

There is more information (JANG/146a, ROUZAT/145b-146a, AHSAN/225, TAAA/43) on 'Ubayd Khán's attempt to expand southward. He left Harát with the "new year" (Bárs/ 11 Sha'bán 936/10 April 1530) to take Faráh, which was then under Ahmad Sultán Afshár, who, as has been seen, had fled from the Úzbek occupation of Mashhad and had escaped to his new post at Faráh. The Afshárs put up a stout front against the Úzbeks and forced them to retire from the siege after "a few days" (JANG, AHSAN), or after "a long while" (ROUZAT) and to return to Harát.

The Úzbek sources SUBHAN/52a and SILSILAT/120b state that 'Ubayd Khán had grand designs at this time on 'Irâq-i 'Ajam (Central Iran) and Isfahán itself, in order to destroy the Qizilbâsh opposition to his rule of Khurásán and also to open up the direct pilgrimage route to Mecca which the Shí'eh of Iran now blocked. The Khán's verse is cited to this effect: "How should my heart not sigh for 'Irâq; for there is the melody 'I'm off for Híjáz".¹

1. "Chegúneh dil nakashad jánib-i 'Irâq marâ; b-dín sabab keh b-sú-yi Híjáz am áhang ast." There is a play on the word "Híjáz" here with its double meaning of the pilgrimage-site and of the name of a musical scale.

This however should not be taken too literally for there are no signs of any serious preparations for a campaign into the heartlands of the Qizilbāsh. The talk of Mecca and Isfahān should merely be regarded as gloating over the successes in Khurāsān and is to be compared with exchanges of Shībānī Khān and Shāh Ismā'il in the preceding generation when the Ūzbeks similarly boasted of intending to perform the pilgrimage rites in Mecca.

The reference to opening the pilgrimage route via Iran is however to be taken seriously for it was very much a live issue in Ūzbek diplomacy. There is not much further reference to this problem in the period of 'Ubayd Khān being discussed here, however it is very much alluded to in the later Ūzbek correspondence with Sulaymān the Magnificent (e.g. FERIDUN/ii/82), for the alternative pilgrimage route used by the Ūzbeks was through Istanbul (ibid./i/607). There is another reference to this issue in ARD/36a and the near identical SUBHAN/66a where the famous Ūzbek unifier, 'Abdullāh Khān, before beginning his internal campaigns of conquest (i.e. about 962-963/1555-1556), is urged by his followers to invade Khurāsān instead of attempting Bukhārā, for: "It has been a long time...that Khurāsān has been under infidel occupation...and that the great men of this realm have been deprived of the pilgrimage to the Holy Shrine at Mecca...".¹

The Ūzbek boasting was ill-timed for in the same spring that 'Ubayd Khān left Harāt for his unsuccessful attempt against Farāh, a change in the domestic climate at Court made it possible for the

1. "Muddat-i mudīd...ast keh vilāyat-i Khurāsān dar taht-i tasarruf...-i kufreh...ast...ashraf-i in diyār rā az ziyārat-i Kabbeh...bāz dāshteh and."

Qizilbásh to resume their plans to liberate Khurásán for a second time. When the news reached Harát that a new royal expedition was under way, 'Ubayd Khán evacuated the city and repaired to Marv to rally the allied Úzbek clans once more against the Sháh. This is a repetition of what happened at the First Royal Liberation in 934/1528, but this time there was to be no second Battle of Jám, and 'Ubayd Khán's retirement from Harát marked the end of the Third Úzbek Invasion of Sháh Tahmásb's Khurásán and of the first of the Khán's two occupations of Harát.

The occupation had lasted from 18 Safar 936 to 21 Zú'l-Hijjah / 22 October 1529 to 16 August 1530, i.e. ten months. Mashhad, which was also evacuated when 'Ubayd Khán pulled out of Harát, had had an additional four months of siege or occupation.

D. The Marv Qurultay and the Internal Uzbek Situation¹

As just seen 'Ubayd Khán had realized that he could not hope to cope with the approaching royal Qizilbásh army of liberation and had evacuated Harát and gone to Marv in order to raise a new "all-Uzbek" army. By the time he reached Marv, the Qizilbásh army of perhaps 90,000 was already in Mashhad and was threatening to advance directly against the Úzbeks.

According to AFZAL (and this is the only detailed account of the Royal Liberation campaign--AHSAN and TAAA concur but without giving any details) all the major Úzbek leaders met upon 'Ubayd Khán's summons in a curultay at Marv to decide whether or not to engage the main Qizilbásh army once again. The JANG/ROUZAT rivayat records instead that 'Ubayd Khán had sent messengers from Marv to the Úzbek leaders inviting them to unite against the Qizilbásh and that the Úzbeks had simply replied by return messenger. Qurultay or not--both rivayets¹ (in much the same language) report the negative reply of the Úzbek leaders to 'Ubayd Khán.

1. The most detailed account, which also includes a unique report of the Sháh's presence in nearby Sarakhs, is in AFZAL/51a-52a, 57b. AHSAN/225 and TAAA/43 are terse. JANG/146b and ROUZAT/146a have a similar account but substitute messengers for a curultay.

2. AFZAL and AHSAN have the rivayat of a curultay and yet both reproduce the full text of 'Ubayd's reply to the Sháh, in which the Khán specifically states that he had written letters to all the kháns and sultáns and was waiting for their arrival at Marv. Perhaps both messages were sent and a curultay held, although it would seem clear from AFZAL that 'Ubayd was already leaving Marv to return to Bukhárá when he sent this letter.

One way to collate the various accounts (including the reports of the Úzbek massing in Marv) would be to assume that those sultáns who were in favor of supporting 'Ubayd Khán did appear in a curultay at Marv, while those opposed simply sent their regrets by return messenger.

In Section I the Ūzbek system of government was examined and it was seen that in this system of "peers" agreement was necessary by each "khán" or sultán before joint action could be initiated. It has also been noted that the position of "grand khán" was held by Kúchim (or Kúchkúnjí) Khán on the basis of seniority in age and that although 'Ubayd Khán was clearly the most powerful of the Ūzbeks, he was legally on a par inter pares.

'Ubayd Khán's extra-legal influence would therefore depend on his personal prestige and power and these were strongly conditioned by his military successes. This prestige had however clearly suffered at Jám and the three previous evacuations of Khurásán: and yet here he was on his fourth evacuation of Khurásán since the accession of Sháh Tahmásb and once more asking that a total Ūzbek army be raised to come to his aid in his own personal war for the conquest of Khurásán.

To this must be added the unresolved problem of the "grand khán" succession. Jánibeg Sultán, the last of the qaghilgháys (heir-apparent on seniority basis) had died after the return from Jám (the date can be established by collating ABD/22b and RAQIM/116a as the end of Shavvál/beginning of July, 935/1529). Since Kúchim Khán was already 80 years old it would seem obvious that there would already have been an undercurrent of rivalry for the succession, for as pointed out in Section I the theoretical concept of succession by seniority may already have been deteriorating. At any rate, when Kúchim Khán died at just about this time, it was his son, Abú Sa'id who succeeded as "grand khán" evidently because he was senior to 'Ubayd Khán.

It is difficult to date the death of Kúchim Khán with precision (the sources have both 936 and 937); but from AFZAL's/51b statement that Abú Sa'id was already "the pádsháh ['supreme sháh' i.e. 'grand khán'] of all Turkistán" at the time of the Marv curultáy, and from the chronological evidence examined below (p205), there is a distinct possibility that Kúchim Khán had died either during or immediately after the events at Marv. If this is so then it would indicate a possible Úzbek domestic crisis precisely at the time of a major Qizilbásh threat. It would also partly explain the reluctance of the Úzbek sultáns to engage the enemy at this time, and particularly Abú Sa'id's role as spokesman for the opposition to 'Ubayd Khán. It might also explain why 'Ubayd Khán left Marv for Bukhárá in such obvious haste despite his vaunting of the Úzbek power in his letter to Sháh Tahmásb written at this very time. (For a further discussion of the election of the new "grand khán", see below p206.)

The Safavid accounts (there is no Úzbek mention) put the opposition to 'Ubayd Khán in the form of a speech delivered by, or a message sent by, Abú Sa'id. The exact wording is somewhat differently expressed in each of the sources but the mazmún or "general meaning" is the same.

The major objection voiced was that the Úzbeks had tried repeatedly to conquer Khurásán but had failed each time with nothing more accomplished than pillaging "innocent Muslims" and bringing disaster and disgrace to the Úzbek side. 'Ubayd Khán was told that he was free to engage the new, fully-massed Qizilbásh army on his own, but that they, the Úzbek sultáns, would no longer join in any of his personal schemes. His "peers" suggested

moreover that he remain content with his Bukhárá.

This may be considered Sháh Tahmásb's delayed victory of ján, for 'Ubayd Khán meekly left Marv and returned to Bukhárá without attempting to engage the Qizilbásh.

Although the speech just cited bears a strong Safavid slant and is presumably apocryphal, it does nonetheless point up an important fact that will become increasingly apparent as the narrative proceeds: 'Ubayd Khán's control over the Úzbeks could not have been as complete as we are led to believe by the generalized statements in both Safavid and Úzbeks sources. He was not another 'Abdulláh Khán (reigned in Bukhárá: 964-1006/1556-1598) to whom he is often loosely compared, for 'Abdulláh Khán had spent over 25 years in patiently uniting the Úzbek appanage-states under his full personal control before he embarked on his foreign adventures. The difference is perhaps to be explained by the fact that Úzbek political institutions were still essentially stable in the period of 'Ubayd Khán despite the chinks then becoming increasingly apparent.

E. The Uzbek-Mughal War of 935/1529

I. General Considerations

To view Sháh Tahmásb's political relations with the Úzbeks in proper perspective it is often necessary to consider the Ottomans as well, and this factor is fully taken into account by our sources. Similarly, for the the Úzbek side it is necessary to consider the generally hostile relations with the Mughals of India; unfortunately, however, the sources consulted have very little data on this subject.

The period immediately after the Battle of Jám is however recorded in BABUR and somewhat supplemented by RASHIDI and RAQIM and it is thus possible to document the Úzbek-Mughal tensions up to this period.

The Úzbek-Mughal War to be described, dovetails with the period of the Úzbek retreat from Jám and 'Ubayd Khán's resurgence at Mashhad and Harát. That is to say, while 'Ubayd Khán was carrying out an Úzbek offensive against the Safavids in "western" Khurásán (i.e. Mashhad and Harát), his Jáníbegid "peer", Kístan Qará Sultán was parrying a Mughal offensive against Balkh in "eastern" Khurásán.

II. Bábú's Planned Invasion of Mávará'al-nahr and the Attempt on Balkh

The first news received by Bábú (347a-348a) of the Úzbek fiasco at Jám was in a report sent in by his son Humáyún who was then governor of Badakhshán. This report had an exaggerated account of the Úzbek losses and implied their utter rout, so much so in fact that Hisár (due west of the Mughal salient of Badakhshán) was

reported as evacuated by the Ūzbek sultāns and already occupied by Ismā'il, of the local Bāburid umarā.

Bābur's reply to Humāyūn (the letter is given in full: 348a-350a) was written on 13 Rabī'ī 935/25 November 1528, just three days after receiving the news and about two months after the Battle of Jām. We learn from this letter that Balkh itself was openly inviting Mughal intervention (evidently in the absence of its Ūzbek ruler, Kīstan Qarā Sultān who had participated at Jām) and that a Bāburid officer, Qurbān Charkhī, had already entered the city. Bābur had been so encouraged by the news of the imminent Ūzbek collapse that he was now ordering an offensive carried out against Nāverā'al-nahr itself. Humāyūn is informed that the Mughal armies of Qandahār and Kābul (under Kāmran Mīrzā, Bābur's other son) had been instructed to join him and that they were to march on Hīsār and Samarqand. So sure of victory was Bābur that he was already making plans for the administration of the area: Humāyūn was to have Samarqand and Kāmran was to have Balkh!

Less than two months later (5 JumādīI/15 January) Bābur (356b) received the first news of the progress of the Mughal invasion: Humāyūn had gathered 40 to 50,000 men and was marching from Tirmīz, across the Āmū, toward Samarqand and that Kabadyān (on the road to Hīsār) had been taken by one of his officers to whom additional aid was being sent.

This report, which had been sent from Kābul, is the last we hear of the Samarqand campaign and of Mughal activity on the far side of the Āmū. It was presumably turned back by the Ūzbeks who had returned from Jām.

Bábur's letters (358b-359a) dated 30 JumádîI and 1 JumádîIII/9 and 10 February to Humáyún and to Khwájeh Kalán (the chief administrative officer in Mughal-held "Afghanistan") would confirm the fact that Humáyún's offensive had been stopped. He writes to Humáyún: if nothing further can be done at present (i.e. in regard to the offensive) then at least avoid pillaging and maintain the (outer) peace with the Úzbeks.

In the letter to Khwájeh Kalán, however, Bábur clearly implies that he has by no means given up his ambitions to return to the Tímúrid homelands, for he writes that he is most anxious to return to those regions as soon as conditions in India permit. AKBAR/270, which is derived from BABUR, removes all doubt as to Bábur's intentions for it interprets this reply of Bábur to the effect that Humáyún was to make peace with the Úzbeks but was to continue to make preparations for an expedition to begin when the affairs of India were in order and Bábur himself could return and join in the campaign.

There had been a flurry of diplomatic activity at Bábur's Court at this same time which may have had a great deal to do with the decision for an offensive against the Úzbeks and then the calling it to a halt. Under the date 6 Rabî'II/18 December, BABUR/351b-353b has a long description of a diplomatic banquet attended by the envoys of both Sháh Tahmásb and the Úzbeks. (For the Úzbeks, Amin Mirzá represented Kúchim Khán and Mullá Tagháýí represented Abú Sa'íd Sultán.) There is unfortunately no record of what the Qizilbásh or Úzbek missions were about, although it is perhaps significant that Bábur's letter of restraint was written to Humáyún some

five weeks after the Ūzbek envoys had departed (BABUR/357a-b fixes their departure date at 20 JumádīI/30 January.)

The mission of Kīstan Qarā Sultān's envoy (361a), who arrived on 2 JumádīIII/11 February i.e. two days after the restraining letter had been written to Humáyún, is however given. He had been sent to protest against Humáyún's raiding on the frontiers of Balkh. Bābur notes that farmāns were accordingly sent to the border umará ordering them to desist from any aggression against Ūzbek territory.

BABUR has nothing further to say on the subject; however from RAQIM/117a we learn that hostilities did apparently continue. This Ūzbek source states that when Khwājah Kamāl al-Dīn Qanāq of Balkh was returning from India he was seized enroute by Humáyún and that this precipitated a war between Kīstan Qarā Sultān and Humáyún. This can only have occurred after Bābur's restraining farmāns had been sent, because BABUR/361a mentions this same Kamāl al-Dīn Qanāq as being Kīstan Qarā's representative in India at the time when the Ūzbek protest was first delivered.

RAQIM has preserved this event in the form of the chronogram: Giriften-i Kamāl al-Dīn ("The seizure of Kamāl al-Dīn") which yields 936. RAQIM's "936" however must be a reference to the 935 part of the Turkī year Ūd (i.e. Hijrī 935-936) since Humáyún had already left Badakhshān by the end of the Hijrī year 935.

RAQIM also adds that in this same "year", Humáyún marched against Balkh in what seems to be a reference to still another Mughal invasion.

It is thus seen that after the Battle of Jām the full "calendar year" 935/1528-9 was marked by a series of hostilities which may

be termed the Uzbek-Mughal War of 935. This phase of Uzbek-Mughal relations came to a close when Humáyún departed from Badakhshán and made his permanent move to Ágra, where he was soon to succeed as Emperor at Bábur's death in 937/1530.

iii. The Uzbek-Mughal-Chaghatáy Convergence on Badakhshán

Humáyún's departure from Badakhshán did not however bring immediate peace to the area for there was a Chaghatáy intervention in Badakhshán as soon as he left. This is independently recorded in both BABUR (in the addition in the "Kazan manuscript") and in RASHIDI/387-8.

BABUR states that the Chaghatáy ruler, Sultán Sa'id had invaded Badakhshán as soon as a vacuum was created there by Humáyún's departure but that peace was finally restored when a sharp note of protest was sent to the Chaghatáy and Mírzá Sulaymán was installed in the area as the Mughal governor.

This Mírzá Sulaymán was the son of Khán Mírzá (Bábur's cousin). Khán Mírzá had held Badakhshán until his death after which Humáyún had been appointed in his place (see Section I. p.49). Mírzá Sulaymán was subsequently to hold Badakhshán for the Mughals against almost continuous Uzbek pressure.

RASHIDI's account is more detailed for the author personally participated in the Chaghatáy invasion. He dates the event (and much of the chronology followed here hinges on this) as the beginning of Muharrem 936/September 1529 (i.e. one month before the surrender of Herát to 'Ubayd Khán). He adds to BABUR's account, that the invasion was undertaken to prevent the Úzbeks from rushing in and filling the vacuum in Badakhshán, but that by spring the Chaghatáy had withdrawn and had recognized Mírzá Sulaymán as the Mughal gov-

ernor of the Badakhshán salient.

IV. Conclusion of Uzbek-Mughal Affairs

The sources at our disposal are almost totally blank on the subject of Uzbek-Mughal relations from 937 to 951/1530 to 1544. For the Safavid sources this is natural enough since little attention is generally paid to international affairs beyond the immediate scope of Irán; the Uzbek sources consulted are for the most part neither contemporary enough nor detailed enough to go into such matters; RASHIDI is too limited in its orientation on the the Chaghatáy to be of much service here; and the Mughal sources have nothing to go on after the period covered by the Báburnáme (Bábur died in 937/1530). The Mughal histories of Humáyún consulted pay scant attention to the Úzbeks until the period of that Emperor's refuge to what is now Afghanistan (951-962/1544-1555). For this later period there is however a great deal to say about the resumption of the Uzbek-Mughal wars.

It can be assumed that Uzbek-Mughal relations did not improve during the remaining period of our discussion (i.e. to 946/1540) and this fact should be kept in mind. However, this essentially ends our narration on the Úzbeks' second front during the period of Sháh Tahmásp and 'Ubayd Khán.

(It might be added at this point that the Uzbek concerns with the Chaghatáy of Kashgaria and with the Qazáqs and Qirghiz are too local in their implications to be considered here as part of a discussion on "the duel over Khurásán".)

Part 2. The Second Royal Liberation of Khurásán

A. The Liberation Campaign

1. Factionalism at Court and the Khurásán Campaign

It has been seen that immediately after the Baghdád liberation, the regent, Júheh Sultán Takkalú, had sabotaged the attempts to aid the beleaguered Qizilbásh of Khurásán because of his personal animosity toward Husayn Khán Shámlú, the governor of Harát. However his plan of getting rid of his rival at the expense of Harát had not been a complete success, for while Harát had fallen Husayn Khán had neatly extricated himself from the hopeless situation there by a negotiated surrender and with Sâm Mirzá, the titular governor of Khurásán, had been left free to depart in peace. There will be a great deal more to say about their subsequent adventures for they were to influence the course of the Second Liberation campaign and of ensuing events at Court.

This partisan action of Júheh Sultán was eventually to lead to his downfall for it was to provoke a Shámlú led attack on the Takkalú. There was a more immediate effect at Court however for the Sháh was able to assert a measure of independence against the Takkalú whose prestige had already suffered at Jám and who were now held partly responsible for the fall of Harát.

The Sháh made his move during the qishlác at Qazvín, i.e. the same winter (Úd/936/1529-30) in which 'Ubayd Khán was "sitting on the throne of Harát". Júheh Sultán was induced (we are not told how) to issue letters of istimálat or reconciliation to his úymác enemies, the Ustájlú who were still in refuge in Gilán, with an invitation to return to Court.

Most of the sources (e.g. AHSAN/234, ROUZAT/144a, SHARAF/558, TEZ/1b-17) mention the return to grace of such leading Ustájlú as Manteshá Sultán, Badr Khán and Hamzeh Sultán (the brother of Sháh Ismá'il's vakíl, Cháyán Sultán, and who is also referred to as Gázur/Gázín Sultán). But only ILCHI/41b gives the political background and openly states that they were invited back to Court by the Sháh to counter Júheh Sultán's reluctance to organize a Second Liberation campaign.

With the coming of the Ustájlú umará to Court in the spring, the Second Khurásán Liberation was soon under way.

ii. From Qazvin to Harát ¹

Were it not for AFZAL's account we would be singularly uninformed about the events of the Second Liberation campaign for while most of the sources make some mention of it their reports are quite terse. The explanation probably lies in the fact that there were no unusual events to record, for the Second Liberation was little more than an uninterrupted march from Qazvin to Harát. These sources have therefore overlooked the very significant exchange of correspondence between Sháh Tahmásb at Sarakhs at 'Ubayd Khán at Marv, which for purposes of understanding Safavid-Úzbek relations is on a par with the military exchanges at Jám.

From AFZAL we gather that this second expedition to the east

1. The only detailed account is in AFZAL/50b-60a (including the correspondence). Minor accounts are in JANG/147a, ROUZAT/146b, AHSAN/225-o. Brief mention occurs in TAAH/43 (where AHSAN is quoted for the 70,000 figure of the Qizilbásh army), ILCHI/42a, NUSAKH/214b, TEZ/17, SHIRAZI/602b.

began with greater earnestness and was on an even grander scale than the First Liberation campaign of two years before in Sichcán/ 934-5/1528 which had ended at Jám. The umará and their levees were ordered to mass at Bistám by the specific date of 25 Shavvál 936/22 June 1530, that is, in plenty of time for a military campaign further east. Júheh Sultán was sent on ahead to make the necessary arrangements while the Sháh followed behind on a leisurely march of one and a half months which brought him to Bistám precisely on the target date.

The Qizilbásh army was considerably larger than at the First Liberation. AFZAL which had put the Qizilbásh numbers at Jám as 24,000 now states that fully 70,000 men (the figure is repeated in AHSAN) were entered on the muster-rolls at Bistám by the lashgar-navís or military recording officer. To this figure AFZAL adds another 20,000 who joined the royal army from Khurásán for a grand total of 90,000.

Within five days of the Sháh's arrival at Bistám the royal banners began to move in the direction of Sabzivár. There was no Uzbek resistance here nor at Nishápúr or even Mashhad. The Uzbek governors simply fled at the approach of this giant army and brought the news to 'Ubayd Khán on "the throne of Harát". And as has been seen in Part 1 of this chapter, the Khán acted precisely as he had at the First Liberation and had evacuated Harát and gone to Marv to raise a new "all-Úzbek army".

The Sháh had meanwhile advanced unopposed into Mashhad and after performing the pilgrimage rites he quickly left in the direction of Marv. At Sarakhs, on the main Mashhad-Marv-Bukhárá High-

way, the Qizilbásh army paused to wait for the outcome of the Marv curultáy which was then in progress. It was at this point that the important exchange of correspondence between Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán took place.

We have here an arresting example of the lack of offensive thinking on the part of the Qizilbásh Court. It is quite clear from the fact that a full-scale army was brought as far as Sarakhs that the Qizilbásh were prepared to meet any new "Grande Armée" that the Úzbeks might have raised. And yet when the news came that 'Ubayd Khán had been vetoed by his "peers" and had slunk away to Bukhárá, instead of advancing to Marv and attempting some definitive action against the disunited Úzbeks, the Qizilbásh in turn slunk away toward Harát.

B. The Correspondence between Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán ¹

I. Sháh Tahmásb to 'Ubayd Khán

It has been seen that both the Sháh at Sarakhs and the Khán at Merv were waiting for the decision of the Úzbek sultáns as to whether or not there was to be a second Battle of Jám in which both sides were fully committed. The Sháh was fully aware that the debate among the Úzbeks was in progress when he initiated the correspondence and sent his envoy, 'Alí Bek Qurchí Ustájlú with the first letter.

The salutation here is most polite and 'Ubayd Khán is addressed as "the very great and honorable Sultán, the cream of the sultáns of the nations....'Ubayd Khán".

As a warning to the Úzbeks in the decision they were then debating, the letter then goes on to summarize the Qizilbásh victories over the Úzbeks in Khurásán from the time of Sháh Ismá'il (cited here as in most of Sháh Tahmásb's correspondence by the Turkish epithet, bábám or bábáy(i/a)m, "my father") through the Battle of Jám and to the present Úzbek invasion which he describes as only serving to bring devastation upon the people of Khurásán and as being "far from the ways of the people of Islám".

Then follows a boast that he will invade the Úzbek home territories (probably an answer to 'Ubayd Khán's equally empty vaunting of going against Isfahán; see above p.163). His taunt is put

1. The full correspondence and an account of the circumstances attendant upon its despatch is found uniquely in AFZAL as follows: Letter I: 52a-54a, Letter II: 54a-57b, Letter III: 57b-59b (with at least one folio page missing between 58 and 59).

AHSAN/226-233 has also preserved the second letter but without any of the details surrounding its despatch. TAAA/43 refers briefly to the correspondence.

thus: "Truly, if you flee this time as in times before and do not remain firm in the manly field [of battle], the imperial banners will soon inevitably be unfurled...over Samarcand and Bukhárá; and as soon as the people there have been bound with abjectivity and affliction I will immediately turn to the conquest of 'Khatá and Khutén' [i.e. to the figurative ends of the Úzbek realm]".

Needless to say however that when the news came that there was to be no total Úzbek army raised at this time and that 'Ubayd Khán had left Marv for Bukhárá, the Sháh turned south to Harát and not north across the Ámú.

The letter ends with an apologia for Shi'ism and offers as a pointed proof of the truth of his sect, the victory at Jám by the outnumbered Qizilbásh. For further proof the Sháh suggests that Úzbek ulamá and fusahá, i.e. "scholars and rhetoricians" be sent to hear the Shi'eh position. The disdainful taunt is then added that it is really very simple for the Úzbeks to free themselves of the Qizilbásh menace: let them only drop the ways of their ancestors and accept the Holy Imáms of the Shi'eh.

At the very end of the letter is the tantalizing statement that when the envoy arrives he will give an additional message in private audience. It is a reference to secret diplomacy which is frequently found in the correspondence, and clearly implies that the official súrats or "true copies" which have been preserved for us should not necessarily be taken too literally.

The implication is that only the official propaganda line is represented in some of the correspondence preserved--and not the "Realpolitik" in the diplomacy of the times which can then only be conjectured at by subsequent events. For instance, it can perhaps

be surmised here that the secret part of the envoy's message was communicated to the Ūzbek sultáns then engaged in making their decision, and that the final withdrawal from both Marv and Sarakhs was by mutual agreement.

It is thus apparent that on the official level of operations the dichotomy between propaganda and "Realpolitik" must be kept in mind if an attempt is to be made to get behind some of the generalized and bombastic statements which appear in the chronicles and official diplomatic texts and understand the true nature of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Ūzbeks.

II. 'Ubayd Khán's Reply to Sháh Tahmásb

The Sháh remained in Sarakhs while waiting for the return of his envoy and the news from Marv. (It is quite easy to imagine that in addition to delivering the royal messages, the envoy's mission had included gathering information on whether the other Ūzbek leaders were coming or not.) The envoy soon returned with a written reply from 'Ubayd Khán and accompanied by an Ūzbek envoy (Sálih Bī Bahádur). This is the letter also given in full in AHSAN.

The reply is in much the same tone of pride and vaunt used by the Sháh; however it is more defensive in nature and consists essentially of a rebuttal to eight points made in the original letter of the Sháh.

The salutation contains the first insult: the long line of elegant epithets clangs to a halt with the direct address: "Tahmásb Mirzá" ("princeling"). This is somewhat more elevated than Shībání

Khán's use of "Ismá'il Dárúgheh", i.e. "governor", in the exchange of correspondence in the preceding generation, but is nonetheless obvious *lèse-majesté*. The degree of the insult may perhaps be gauged by noting that the Sháh records in his Diary (TEZ/75) that he considered the Ottoman refugee-prince, Báyzíd, as bí-'aql and nádán ("stupid" and "ignorant") for having presumed to address him merely as "Sháh Tahmásb".

The eight point rebuttal which we paraphrase here then begins:

(1) Regarding: The havoc wrought upon Khurásán by the passage of the rival armies.

Rebuttal: The fault lies in the fact that Khurásán has been compelled to adopt Shi'ism and it is my duty to suppress this evil. My only intentions in Khurásán are for peace and justice to prevail for the ahl-i Islám (i.e. "the people of Islám" or more specifically here--the Sunnis).

(2) Regarding: The defeat at Jám.

Rebuttal: The Úzbeks were occupied in plundering the Qizilbásh stores and were thus unmindful (gháfil) of the fact that you were still hidden in the dust (of battle). But such are the fortunes of war and we have only to compare the situation with the Prophet Muhammad's defeat at Uhud to realize that defeats lead on to greater victories.

(3) Regarding: Our present flight from Harát to Marv

Rebuttal: Compare the hiireh or "exodus" of the Prophet and his withdrawal from Uhud to understand the necessity of a strategic retreat which culminates in victory.

(4) Regarding: The glorious rule of the Qizilbásh in Khurásán

--and in particular at the time of the governorship of Dúrmish Khán--when Harát bloomed even more than in the age of Sultán Husayn Mirzá Báyqará (i.e. at the great age of the "Tímúrid Renaissance" in Harát).

Rebuttal: I found the glorious public buildings of Sultán Husayn Mirzá in ruins and the great religious edifices turned into taverns or privies, and one of our first tasks in entering Harát was to restore these buildings. Is this what is meant by "the glorious age of Dúrmish Khán"?

(5) Regarding: Uzbek Atrocities.

Rebuttal: It is against our policy that believers should suffer at the hands of our soldiery. If such things sometimes happen without my knowledge, God will forgive me. It is only if I were made aware of such incidents and then did nothing to suppress them that I would hold myself responsible before God.

(6) Regarding: Our lack of respect for the Holy Imám, Hazrat-i 'Alí.

Rebuttal: It is agreed that one is not a Muslim who does not respect the "great companions" of the Prophet or their descendants and that Hazrat-i 'Alí is one of these "great companions". Our only quarrel is with those who have left the faith of their forefathers and turned Shi'eh, for it is precisely the Shi'eh who curse (la'nat) the "great companions" of the Prophet and their descendants--and not the Sunnis. Hazrat-i 'Alí himself followed the "great companions" as did your own ancestor, Shaykh Safí, who, we have heard, was a Sunni. We cannot understand why you persist in not following the example of Hazrat-i 'Alí and Shaykh Safí.

(7) Regarding: Our remaining in Marv and not coming to battle.

Rebuttal: We have written letters to all the kháns and sultáns of Samarcand, Táshkand, Turkistán, Andíján, Hisár, Balkh and Shiburghán to come join us here to engage you in battle. We are desisting from battle until they have all arrived. It will not be long before they do arrive and when they do we shall all join together to defeat the heretics.

(8) Regarding: Changing sectarian loyalties.

Rebuttal: If you will follow the "great companions" we have no quarrel with you; va illá, otherwise, it becomes necessary for us to destroy you.

'Ubayd Khán's reply ends with a very apt verse (most likely written by the Khán himself) which would appear to be a very good indication of the propagandistic use made of religion at this time to serve political ends. Sháh Tahmásb is chided thus:

"Why are you always vaunting your religious zeal?

It is to true religion--and not outer fame you should appeal." ¹

This admittedly partisan judgement given by 'Ubayd Khán of the Shéh's propagandistic use of sectarianism does permit a re-emphasis at this point of the views expressed in this dissertation, for it is an indication that the sectarian factor in Safavid-Uzbek relations could not have been as dominating as the reading of the above type of official correspondence might indicate.

Sectarian differences did not keep Sháh Tahmásb from making peace with the Ottomans or from being on cordial terms with the

1. "Cherá keh bá tú hamísheh ta'assub áyín ast
Bará-yi jáh nabáshad ta'assub dar dín ast."

Mughals. Nor did sectarian homogeneity prevent the Ūzbeks from fighting the Mughals over Balkh and Badakhshán at this very same period. There would most likely have been the same duel over Khurásán had, let us say, the Sunní Āq Quyúnlu dynasty remained in control of western Iran. Our conclusion here would be that although the sectarian differences may well have played an important role in the emotional life of the times, and could serve as a focus for antagonisms which to our mind might have little direct bearing on questions of sect, they did not play the dominant political role ascribed to them by the contemporary chroniclers and munshís (official scribes).

iii. Sháh Tahmásb's Reply

Although 'Ubayd Khán's reply to the Sháh is an important document for the historian, it can well be imagined that the Sháh was more interested in the news brought back by his envoy (and not at all mentioned in the official correspondence) that the Ūzbeks were not raising another "Grande Armée" and that the Khán had already left Marv to return to his own Sukhárá.

The Sháh began his march to Harát and ended the correspondence by a barely civil reply which he sent back with the Khán's envoy. There is unfortunately a missing folio (or folios) in AFZAL which occurs in the middle portion of this letter. We can judge the letter, however, to be of relatively minor importance, for the portions preserved consist mainly of repetitions of the boasts and threats made in the Sháh's first letter.

The letter begins most insultingly since there is no salutation whatsoever; instead there is the abrupt statement that the Khán's

reply had been brought to the royal attention. It goes on to refute 'Ubayd Khán's statement that he had come to Khurásán only in the interests of justice and the suppression of heresy, and points out instead that the Úzbeks have been guilty of atrocities and the violation of the Islamic code, and that the Khán instead of suppressing heresy had actually led more people into religious error. (The missing section of the letter occurs at this point)...And the Úzbeks have again fled from the brave gházis and the army of Islám whose only purpose was the suppression of heresy. This purpose is totally unlike that of the Úzbeks who seek nothing but plunder.

The letter closes with the roar that the Qizilbásh are "ready this year to destroy you so thoroughly that no traces will be left until the Day of Judgement", and with an apt verse from the famous Tímúrid poet, Jámí, refuting 'Ubayd Khán's comparison of his flight with that of the Prophet from Uhud.

Actually this second threatening letter of the Sháh was quite meaningless since the Qizilbásh army was already leaving Sarakhs for Harát when it was written. This compares with the Khán's threat of the coming of a total Úzbek army--written when he was already leaving Marv to return to Bukhárá.

C. Sháh Tahmásb in Harát

1. The New Khurásán Administration (The Third)¹

Sháh Tehmásb had liberated Khurásán and entered Harát without once engaging the Úzbeks. This was his first visit to the city since his early childhood days when he had served as the first royal titular governor of Khurásán for Sháh Imsmá'il (see Section I p.17).

The fact that the preceding governors of Harát, Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá, had long since fled and the implication that they were under suspicion by the Takkalú dominated Court has already been noted. It thus became necessary to appoint an entirely new administration for the province. The practice of appointing a Safavid prince as titular governor was maintained and Bahrám Mirzá, the royal brother, was named to this post. The fact that the Takkalú still had considerable influence at Court despite the recent waning of Júheh Sultán's prestige, becomes obvious from the choice made for the post of laleh, i.e. "guardian" or acting-governor: the Takkalú, Gházi Khán.

New governors were also appointed to the newly liberated areas. The most notable appointment was that of the Ustájlú, Mantashá Sultán to Mashhad. This must have been considered a direct insult to

1. The sources state little more than the fact that Bahrám and Gházi Khán were appointed; JANG/147a-b and ROUZAT/146b add the names of the new yazír and tutor. The appointments to Mashhad, Nishápúr and Astarábád must however have been made at approximately the same time, for by the following spring the new governors are already at their posts. RABINO's Astarábád inscription (cited above p.102) fixes the arrival of the new governor there on 1 Jumádí III 937/20 January 1531, i.e. about two months after the royal departure from Harát (10 Rabí' I 77 November). This would imply that the appointment had been made during the royal stopover in Harát. At any rate these new provincial appointments were obviously part of the reorganization of Khurásán into its third administration since the accession of Sháh Tehmásb (first: Dúrmish Khán-Sám Mirzá; second: Husayn Khán-Sám Mirzá).

Júhéh Sultán despite the Takkalú appointment to the main post at Harát, for Mantashá Sultán had been a leader in the Ustájlú Wars which had been fought so bitterly against the Takkalú, and had only been permitted to return to Court at the beginning of the Second Liberation campaign.

Other new provincial governors included Aghzívar Sultán Shémlú to Nishápúr, and Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí to Astarábad. The appointment of Aghzívar Sultán may be considered a "local" Shémlú appointment, for his father, Damrí Sultán had been governor of Dámghán, and he himself had already served briefly as governor of Mashhad before his flight from the Third Uzbek Invasion. The Astarábad appointment must however be considered a victory for the Takkalú faction, for Muhammad Khán is always very clearly associated in the sources with the Takkalú.

The administrative staff at Harát was completed by the appointment of Khwájeh Amír Bek as vazír of Khurásán, and of Amír Sultán Ibráhím Amíní (of the local Harát a'yán or "great families" and famous as a poet and scholar) as tutor to Bahrám Mírzá.

It is stated in JANG and ROUZAT that the new administration promptly inaugurated a government based on justice and in which scholars and literati were encouraged, the ra'yat protected, and public works constructed. From the utter chaos which was soon to fall upon Khurásán and the atrocities directly instigated by this same administration, we may consider this type of cliché description as being purely munshiyáneh ("stylistic 'moonshine'").

II. Aside on the Poet Jāmi, the "Grand Vazir" Qāzī Jahān
and Crypto-Sunnīs

AFZAL/60a-b has a very curious anecdote relating to this visit of the Shāh to Harāt. It is an interesting example of an old problem in Islamic literary history--the clash between religious puritanism (in this case Shāh Tahmāsb's ardent Shī'ism) and the more mitigating spirit of the poets (in this case, the great Tīmūrid poet, Jāmi: d.1492).

It seems that the Shāh was told by a certain official that Jāmi had been "an extreme Sunnī and his works were detrimental (khalal) to the faith of society". The Shāh immediately ordered the banning of Jāmi's works and anyone found reading them was made subject to the death penalty. The Harātīs were then ordered to demolish Jāmi's tomb and when this had been done the Shāh himself came to the site in order to burn the very bones of the poet. By divine inspiration, however, he was caused to pause and ask if anyone chanced to have a copy of Jāmi's Dīvān ("collected verse") so that a tafa'ul (divination) could first be made. It so happened that the "grand vazir", Qāzī Jahān, did have a copy. Sure enough, when the Dīvān was opened at random for the divination, an apt ghazal ("ode") turned up which made the Shāh pause once again in his intended sacrilege. The "grand vazir" then resolved the royal indecision by quoting other verses of Jāmi in praise of Hazrat-i 'Alī. The Shāh then repented and ordered the rebuilding of the tomb and the lifting of the ban.

Interesting as this account may be, there are nonetheless indications that it is apocryphal. For one, AFZAL is alone in

citing the story. In the second place, Qází Jahán was not "grand vazír" at the time and as a matter of fact was then still imprisoned in Rasht where he had gone along with the Ustájlú rebels. (He did not rejoin the Sháh until 942/1535 at which time he was reappointed as "grand vazír"; he may simply have been cited in this anecdote because of his known Sunni leanings.) The third objection to this account is to be found in the Sháh's second letter to 'Ubayd Khán which has been cited above as having been written just prior to the royal arrival in Harát: it will be recalled that Jámi himself had been quoted to refute 'Ubayd Khán's anti-Shí'eh tirades.

The importance of this anecdote for our discussion here is that, apocryphal or not, it does give another hint of the reasonably peaceful coexistence of Shí'eh and Sunni in Harát--a coexistence however, which we have seen and will see again, was subject to tensions with the coming of now Úzbeks now Qizilbásh with all the sectarian propaganda and animosities engendered by their wars of conquest and plunder.

Another point to be made in this connection is the extent of crypto-Sunnism in Sháh Tahmásb's Iran, for this problem is of particular significance for the study of Khurásán in this period. In view of the striking reappearance of Sunnis in the wake of each Úzbek return, the documented example of Qází Jahán may be usefully cited here.

The basic outline of his career is as follows: He was appointed "grand vazír" at the very beginning of Sháh Tahmásb's reign but was shortly involved in the factional politics at Court and had to

flee with the Ustájlú to Gílán. He was imprisoned by the local ruler of Gílán for ten years (AHSAN/374-5 says it was at the instigation of the Núr Bakhshí Shí'eh order) before he was reappointed as "grand vazír" in 942/1535 and then held this post until his retirement in 957/1550. He died three years later.

In AFZAL's/167a obituary for Qází Jahán, it is stated that he had been dismissed from office at the very beginning because of his suspected Sunni leanings. More important than this however is the interesting marginal note appended here (possibly in the hand of the author of AFZAL) which refers to his entire family, the Sayfí Sayyids of Qazvín, as being Sunni, but as hiding its sectarian beliefs and outwardly professing Shí'ism for worldly reasons of wealth and power. Included in this family is Mír Yahyá, the author of LUBB, whose wealth is said in this marginal note to have been expropriated for this very reason. (LUBB's/260-262 long and eloquent panegyric of Sháh Tahmásb, written in 948/1542, would therefore be nothing but pure mockery!) Other important examples of the Sunnism in this family are given up to the time of Sháh 'Abbás (i.e. to about 1026/1617 when AFZAL was written). As proof of this assertion, the marginal note cites the strong Sunni fanaticism (ta'assub) evident in the works of the members of the family who had sought refuge in India.

There is a completely independent source which confirms this judgement: that is Jouhar's history of the Mughal emperor, Humáyún. In describing the Shí'eh pressure put to bear upon Humáyún during his refuge to Iran in 951/1544, JOUHAR/66 mentions the solace offered in secret by the then "grand vazír", Qází Jahán. He told Humáyún that he was not alone in being made to suffer for there were

700 Sunnis there (i.e. presumably at Court) who shared his fate.

The "grand vazir's" advice: temporize on your sectarian beliefs.

If Sháh Tahmásb's "grand vazir" was a Sunni, and if Sháh Ismá'il II, his son and successor (reigned: 984-5/1576-7) could openly toy with Sunni ideas (see, e.g. TAAA/153-6, ROUZAT/228b-230a), the surmise may well be made that crypto-Sunnis played an important role in the Khurásán of Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán.

III. The Return of the Qizilbásh Army to the West

Although the winter season was now approaching the Sháh did not remain in cishláo in Khurásán. TAAA/43 says that this was due to the fact that Khurásán had been so badly mauled by the Úzbek sieges and occupation that there was a serious shortage of food. This can well be accepted as one reason, since it has been seen that the Qizilbásh army may have numbered up to 90,000 men and there would have been formidable problems of supply.

IICHI/42a with its keen insight into Court affairs adds another compelling reason: viz. the Court's distrust of the intentions of Musayn Khán and Sám Mirzá, the fugitive governors of Khurásán, who since their betrayal by Júheh Sultán had kept themselves aloof from the Second Liberation campaign and had by then settled down for a cishláo in Shíráz. For the further possibility that the fugitive governors had made secret commitments to the Úzbeks and thus merited this distrust, see below p.219.

This suspicion may well be the reason for the sudden withdrawal from Khurásán so late in the season (AFZAL/63a gives the departure date from Harát as 16 Rabí' I/7 November) by the direct

but rather unusual desert road via Tabas and Yazd to Isfahán. This would also explain the first royal qishlác in Isfahán, for it was a convenient point from which the activities of Husayn Khán and Sâm Mírzá could be surveilled.

From the new domestic crisis which was to follow in the spring it would seem that the Court was justified in withdrawing to the west. Be that as it may, this meant that the large Qizilbásh army which had finally been massed despite all the factional difficulties to destroy the Úzbek menace once and for all, now left Khurásán without having engaged the enemy at all. And as can be expected, a Khurásán empty of a Qizilbásh army inevitably brought 'Ubayd Khán back for another try.

An evaluation of the Second Khurásán Liberation campaign would note that it had succeeded in forcing 'Ubayd Khán to relinquish his hold on Khurásán and that this had been accomplished without any recourse to force. However, the real purpose of so large a striking force was not accomplished, for although 'Ubayd Khán had lost considerable prestige among his Úzbek "peers", he was still very much able to return to Khurásán with his own personal forces the moment the Qizilbásh left. And the Qizilbásh were compelled to leave because so large a force could not be maintained in Khurásán or because of the domestic situation.

Thus from a broader point of view it can be said that the Second Liberation was essentially a failure, even more than the First Liberation which had at least ended with the victory at Jám, and Jám did have an influence on Sháh Tahmásb's subsequent relations with the Úzbeks.

D. The wanderings of the Shāmlú Fugitives from Khurāsān ¹

On page 154 it was seen that in Ūd/Safar 936/October 1529, Husayn Khān Shāmlú, the governor of Khurāsān had surrendered Harāt to the Ūzbeks and been suffered to depart for Sīstān with the Shāmlú garrison and with Sām Mīrzā, the Shāh's brother and titular governor. It has also been pointed out that the regent, Jūheh Sultān's hatred of Husayn Khān had been so intense that he had not permitted any attempt to be made to relieve Harāt. This antagonism would explain why the Shāmlú fugitives did not return to Court even during the Second Liberation campaign and had instead spent a full calendar year in wandering through Sīstān, Balūchistān and Kirmān before settling down to a qishlāq in Shīrāz. It would also explain why the Court was suspicious of their actions and had hurried back from Harāt late in the season in order to winter at Isfahān vis-à-vis the fugitive camp.

In Sīstān they had been welcomed by the ruler, Malik Sultān Mahmūd Kayānī, of the old local ruling family, who held his patent of governorship from the Qizilbāsh Court. During the stopover there, Husayn Khān went on a campaign against a group of "rebels" and "highwaymen" who had not been paying their taxes (takālīf-i dīvānī). They are called the "Pusht-i Zareh" ("Trans-Zareh") in JANG and TAAA, evidently in reference to their geographical location

1. The most detailed account of the wanderings of the fugitives is in ROUZAT/144b-145a which adds a few more details to JANG/144a-b upon which it is essentially based. AFZAL/50b, AHSAN/221-2, TAAA/42 and ILCHI/41b-42a have less detailed accounts.

ILCHI has added the political implications for the Court; AFZAL has Malik Dīnār welcome the fugitives and makes no reference to the Qizilbāsh plundering of Balūchistān.

beyond Lake Zareh in Sístán. (AHSAN's "Bíst Varzeh" would seem to be an error.) ROUZAT however identifies them more specifically as being the Zarhí, Nakúdarí and Lakúr "nomadic tribes" (il-i shshám) on the frontier between Sístán and the Mughal-held "Garm-sírat" (the "Hot Regions" of Balúchistán and Sístán). They were successfully raided by Husayn Khán and his Shámlú and considerable booty had been taken.

The next stop of the fugitives had been in Balúchistán itself, for during the campaign against the Pusht-i Zareh it had been heard that Malik Dínár, of the old locally ruling family of Kich and Makrán in Balúchistán, was both wealthy and weak, and had moreover not been paying his yearly remittances (báj) to the Qizilbásh Court. Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá had therefore felt no compunction against thoroughly plundering the area.

From Balúchistán, the Shámlú fugitives had made their way to Kirmán, and from Kirmán they had marched to Shíráz for their ishlác.

The following spring they were finally persuaded to come to Court at Isfahán. When they appeared, it was to precipitate the downfall of Júheh Sultán and the "Takkalú Disaster".

Chapter 4. The Period of the Fourth Uzbek Invasion
(Tushcán-Lüy-Yılan-Yünt/937-941/1531-1534)

Part 1. The Domination of Domestic Concerns

A. "The Takkalú Disaster" ¹

The inter-úymáq contentions for the regency and their repercussions on Sháh Tahmásb's duel with 'Ubayd Khán for Khurásán have now been traced through the following phases: (1) the Rúmlú-Takka-lú coalition under Dív Sultán Rúmlú and the ensuing two Ustájlú wars; (2) the emergence of Júheh Sultán as sole regent and the establishment of the Takkalú hegemony; (3) the gradual emergence of the Sháh as a new political factor and the partial decline of Júheh Sultán's prestige; (4) the suspicious actions of the Shámlú fugitives from Khurásán under Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá.

The fifth phase, "the Takkalú Disaster" (there is yet to be a climactic sixth phase before the Sháh finally emerged as independent ruler over the úymáq) began at the yayláq of Kandimán near Isfahán in the summer of Túshqán (3 Zú'l-Qa'deh 937/18 June 1531) when the Sháh was almost four months past his seventeenth solar birthday and 23 days before his eighteenth lunar birthday. On that day (given by SHIRAZI) Júheh Sultán was murdered by Husayn Khán and a series of events began which led to the establishment of a new Shámlú-Ustájlú hegemony which was to last until the Sháh finally assumed control.

1. This event is naturally narrated in detail in the Safavid sources. The accounts are sometimes supplementary rather than merely repetitive and should be consulted together: AFZAL/65b-68b, 71b, ROUZAT/147a-149a, AHSAN/235-6, ILCHI/42b-43b, TEZ/17-18, TAAH/36-37, JANG/152b-153b, NUSAKH/214b-215a, SHIRAZI/603a-604a.

A "disaster" of this magnitude at Court could not fail but have major implications for Khurásán for it entailed: (1) the temporary inability of the Court to organize any central defence against the Úzbeks; (2) a resultant Ottoman involvement in these events which created a diversionary western front; and (3) the Khurásán Qizilbásh involvement in the events at Court by reason of their úymáo or partisan factional commitments.

Before turning to the direct implications for Khurásán it may be advantageous to go into some of the details of the "Takkalú Disaster" particularly as they concern the ex-governors of Khurásán, Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá, for they provide essential background for following the subsequent events. This is important, for before too long, Sám Mirzá was to be reappointed to Khurásán and with the Shámlú garrison there, and evidently with the connivance of Husayn Khán as well, was to rise in rebellion and expose Khurásán to its greatest crisis in the period under discussion.

The event is generally referred to in the sources as the "Takkalú Disaster" (Áfat-i Takkalú), a chronogram which dates the occurrence as 937 or 938.¹ Its origins have already been noted in the hurried westward withdrawal of the Court from the Second

1. The event actually began in Zú'l-Qa'deh, i.e. close to the end of the Hijrí year 937. The fact that the chronogram yields "938" may be interpreted in three ways: (a) the reference may literally be meant to apply to Hijrí 938, for while the sources narrate the events in a single sequence it is very possible that they lasted over two months which would bring the date beyond Muharram and into Hijrí 938; (b) the reference may be meant to apply to the Turkí year Tushcán which could easily be termed either "937" or "938" since it contained about six months of each; (c) the maddeh or long á of "á-fat" is perhaps to be ignored and thus yield the figure "937".

Khurásán Liberation campaign and the qishláq in Isfahán, apparently undertaken in view of the suspicious nature of Husayn Khán and Sâm Mirzá's presence in Fárs province.

The following spring, after a great deal of hesitation undoubtedly due to his mistrust of Júheh Sultán (ILCHI), Husayn Khán finally agreed to join the Court and bring Sâm Mirzá to the royal zeylác near Isfahán. When he did appear it was with a fully armed personal army of Shámlú. As for Sâm Mirzá, his fears were immediately allayed by the Sháh. He was cordially received and forgiven by his royal brother; however, despite previously given promises he was kept separated from his laleh, Husayn Khán.

The sources make it clear that it was only a matter of time before the inevitable clash of Júheh Sultán and Husayn Khán would occur. It was Husayn Khán who finally took the initiative and with 700 of his armed Shámlú suddenly attacked the regent. Júheh Sultán fled to the protection of the royal pavillion, and the degree of the Sháh's self-vaunted independence can be judged by the fact that a battle ensued in his very presence and that flying arrows passed dangerously close to the royal head during the fracas. (The Sháh was later to hold Husayn Khán responsible for the direction of these arrows.) Júheh Sultán was killed in the close fighting but the Takkalú soon rallied and forced the Shámlú to flee back to Fárs (Shíráz).

The Takkalú thus emerged briefly as the victors and they named Júheh Sultán's son as the new regent. The other úymáq, however, (the Zú'l-Qadar, Qájár, Rúmlú, Afshár and Ustájlú are cited) had seen the first break in the Takkalú hegemony and the prospects

of new political opportunities, and would not permit its reestablishment.¹ They formed a coalition and marched against the Takkalú.

A bloody battle was fought in which many of the leading Takkalú were killed and their possessions plundered. Many of the survivors fled to Baghdád where they sought the protection of the Takkalú governor there (Muhammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí). This Muhammad Khán however remained loyal to the Court and sent back a number of Takkalú heads to prove his good faith and his lack of involvement in these affairs.

The Shámlú were now recalled to Court and Husayn Khán was named joint-regent with the Ustájlú, 'Abdulláh Khán.² A new Shámlú-Ustájlú hegemony was formed in which Husayn Khán was the dominant personality.

The "grand vazír", Mír Ja'far Sávjí, who had served under the Takkalú administration, was dismissed and soon executed. The appointment of the new "grand vazír", Ahmad Bek Núr Kamál Isfahání, is an indication of the new times: he had served in the Khurásán administration of the late Dúrmish Khán (Husayn Khán's brother) and had then become Husayn Khán's vazír in the Khurásán administration formed after the lynching of Khwájeh Habibúlláh (see above p.77).

The most spectacular appointments of the new regency were to

1. SHIRAZI/603b says that the other úymáq were ázár ("fed up") with the Takkalú; ROUZAT/148b says that they had been opposed to the Takkalú az cadím ("for long past") and that they were now seeking their "vengeance for their several years' [suffering]" (inti-cám-i chend sáleh); TEZ/18 says, "...since they had long suffered from the Takkalú control" (chún muddathá tasallut-i táyifeh-yi Takkalú rá kashídeh búdand).

2. Both were maternal cousins of Sháh Tahmásb; i.e. their fathers had both married sisters of Sháh Ismá'il.

be made in Khurásán when the occasion finally presented itself to dismiss the Takkalú governor there (Ghází Khán). At that time Sám Mírzá was reappointed as governor of Khurásán and was given another Shámlú laleh (Aghzívár Sultán).

The Sháh's emerging political influence seems to have received a decided set-back by these events. In describing the events of the "Takkalú Disaster" in his Diary, the Sháh writes as if he were actually making the decisions; nonetheless, the sources either indirectly or directly (as in ILCHI/43a) make it plain that the Sháh's role in the affair was completely passive. ILCHI, the recorder of Court intrigue, goes on to state openly that Husayn Khán, like Júheh Sultán before him, put members of his own úymáq (the Shámlú) into positions of control and did not leave the Sháh with much power.

The obviously partisan execution of the "grand vazír" of the Takkalú régime, and above all, the subsequent reestablishment of Sám Mírzá and the Shámlú in Khurásán attest to the political stature of Husayn Khán, and not to that of the Sháh. The Sháh could do little more than signalize his displeasure at these events by ostentatiously ordering a burial for the executed "grand vazír" of the Takkalú at the Holy Shrine of Shí'eh martyrs in Karbalá (ILCHI).

B. The Ottoman Threat ¹

There remains one final repercussion of the "Takkalú Disaster" which must be mentioned even though its direct bearing is only on Ottoman relations: i.e. the flight of the Takkalú governor of Ázarbáyján, Úlámeš Sultán, to Istanbul.

Úlámeš had tried to recoup the fortunes of the Takkalú by occupying Tabríz. The allied úymáq however, with the Sháh in tow, marched against the new Takkalú threat and forced Úlámeš to flee and seek refuge with the Porte.

Úlámeš soon got to Sulaymán's ear and persuaded him that the Qizilbásh umará were on his side and that Iran was wide open for invasion. In what was obviously an act of provocation, Sulaymán then appointed Úlámeš to Bitlís (in the Lake Ván area), then held by a Kurdish client of the Sháh, and gave him an Ottoman army to occupy the town by force.

Bitlís was soon under siege, and it was with this threat of an Ottoman invasion that the Sháh went into cishlác at strategic Tabríz and ordered a general mobilization.

As can be expected, 'Ubayd Khán was not slow in taking full advantage of this western diversion of the Qizilbásh, and the following spring (Lúy/938/1532) brought a new Úzbek occupation of

1. The most important Safavid accounts have some variations and should be consulted together: TEZ/18-22, ROUZAT/148b-151b, AHSAN/239-240, ILCHI/43b-44a, AFZAL/70b-71b. The Sháh's Diary (TEZ) is particularly important here, as it is for much of the Ottoman relations.

The Ottoman sources consulted here are less detailed but should be seen for certain variations: NISANCI/225-227, SOLAKZADE/483, PEÇEVI/175, MUNECCİMBASI/111/489, GIESE/141-2, SULEYMANNAME/114.

Khurásán and the beginning of a famous siege of Harát which was to last for a year and a half. It is significant for understanding Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks, that the Ottoman siege of Bitlís on the west was contemporary with the beginning of 'Ubayd Khán's siege of Harát on the east, and that, that same spring of Lúy the Court had given first priority to the threatening western front and with a full Qizilbásh army had begun an offensive to relieve Bitlís--and not Harát.

Despite the Sháh's apprehensions it is quite clear that the Porte was not overly concerned with the Bitlís adventure, for the town was besieged by a local Ottoman detachment from Diyárbakr; Sulaymán himself was still fully engaged in Europe at this time and the beginning of his full-scale Iranian invasion was still some two years away. Thus when the Qizilbásh army reached Khúy (near the present frontier of Iran and Turkey) the news was received that the Ottomans had evacuated the Bitlís area at word of the royal approach and that Úlámeš (referred to as án harámzádeš, "that bastard" by the Sháh who was infuriated at his desertion to the Ottoman side) had fled once again back to Istanbul.

Although the Qizilbásh objective had thus easily been achieved, and the Kurdish client, Sharaf Khán, restored to Bitlís, it is obvious that the Sháh was still concerned about the possibility of a large-scale Ottoman intervention, for he went into yayláq in the Nakhchiván area of modern Armenia and then ended the "year" on the western front by again going into qishláq in Tabríz.

While the Qizilbásh were thus engaged on the western front and had made two successive qishláqs at Tabríz, the ambitious Fourth Invasion of the Úzbeks was in full progress and all of Khurásán from the frontiers of 'Iráq-i 'Ajam to the walls of Harát had been occupied.

C. The New "Grand Khán": Abú Sa'id Khán ¹

1. The Dating Problem

The Safavid sources place Kúchim Khán's death in 936 as does the Úzbek source RAQIM; two other Úzbek sources, however, QIPCHAQ and SILSILAT place the year as 937. Since our understanding of 'Ubayd Khán's rebuff at the Marv gurultáy and the timing of his Fourth Invasion of Khurásán is somewhat dependent on the chronology here, it has been thought useful to attempt to establish these dates with greater precision.

The date of Abú Sa'id Khán's accession can be fixed by collating the following facts: (a) RAQIM gives the date as 1 JumádíI, but does not specify the year; it must however refer to either 936, the date given in this source for the death of Kúchim Khán or to the succeeding year of 937. (b) Both RAQIM and QIPCHAQ cite the leading role of 'Ubayd Khán at the Samarqand gurultáy summoned at Kúchim Khán's death. (c) It has been seen from the narration of the Third Invasion that on 1 JumádíI 936 'Ubayd Khán was "sitting on the throne of Harát". RAQIM's date can therefore only be referring to the year 937. This date of accession reasonably close enough to QIPCHAQ's statement that it occurred in mid-937 to be considered as being corroborated by two independent sources. It can therefore be concluded that Abú Sa'id became "grand khán" on 1 JumádíI 937/ 21 December 1530.

It is not easy to date Kúchim Khán's death with such precision,

1. The Safavid references (they are quite minor) are: AFZAL/62b, ILCHI/265b-266a, AHSAN/234, TAAA/43, MIFTAH/542a, HAYDARI/55a.

The Úzbek references (they are brief but are all we have): RAQIM/117b, ANONYM/21b, QIPCHAQ/591a, SILSILAT/116b-117a.

for there is no way of knowing exactly how much time elapsed between his death, the summoning of the Samarqand qurultáy and the accession of the new "grand khán".

From the narration of the Third Invasion we know that 'Ubayd Khán had evacuated Harát on 21 Zú'l-Hijjeh 936/16 August 1530 and that he had gone directly to Marv to wait for the rallying of the Úzbek sultáns. The events at Marv would therefore have extended into Muharram, i.e. the first month of the new Hijrí year of 937. We have seen that Kúchim Khán's death, or what is perhaps more likely, the imminence of his death, may well have been an important factor in Abú Sa'id's overriding of 'Ubayd Khán's call for a new "Grande Armée" of the Úzbeks.

The fact that we have both 936 and 937 dates for the death of Kúchim Khán might then be interpreted as due to the fact that it occurred at about the Muharram turning point of the Hijrí calendar. It is just as likely however that we are merely dealing here with the "chronological tangle" and that both dates are simply meant to refer to the same Turkí year of Bárs with its six months of 936 and its six months of 937. This is a preferable interpretation, particularly if QIPCHAQ's statement is accepted that 'Ubayd Khán was already in Bukhárá at the news of Kúchim Khán's death, i.e. after the return from the Marv qurultáy and therefore clearly on the 937 side of Bárs.

The conclusion tentatively accepted here would be that Kúchim Khán was at the point of death during the Marv qurultáy and the Qizilbásh threat and that he died shortly afterwards in Bárs/ early 937/ late 1530.

II. The Accession and the Question of Seniority

Both QIPCHAQ and RAQIM briefly refer to a Samarqand qurultáy of the full Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House which met after the death of Kúchim Khán to choose a new "grand khán". As has been noted, according to the theory of the Úzbek state the eldest member of the entire Dynastic House automatically assumed this role and it was presumably the business of such a qurultáy to extend the recognition of the "peers" and to conduct the traditional coronation ceremonies. Nonetheless, in view of the hints at an Úzbek domestic crisis in the events concerning Abú Sa'id's death some three years later, and in view of what is known of later Úzbek internal history, it may well be conjectured that this qurultáy could have produced party partisanship on "neo-eponymous" lines and that the seniority rights may have been questioned.

ILCHI/266a is the only source to state specifically that Abú Sa'id was indeed the eldest of the Abú'l-Khayrids and was chosen because he was "the eldest son of Kúchim Khán and the eldest of the kháns of Turkistán and Mávará'al-nahr". The other sources ignore the question of seniority here: thus ANONYM merely states that since both qaghilgháys had died, the khániyat ("khán-ship") passed to Kúchim Khán's son; and QIPCHAQ states that Abú Sa'id was chosen because the "uncles" (i.e. the heads of the "neo-eponymous clans") and the "high dignitaries of the state" (arkán-i doulat) "deemed it advisable" (banábar-i savábdíd).

Despite the fact that most of the sources are silent on the subject of Abú Sa'id's seniority, it would appear that this was indeed a basis for the choice. Kúchim Khán had died at 80 and since

Abú Sa'id (the eldest of many sons) was third generation after Abú'l-Khayr, it would seem likely that he was older than the Sháh-Budáqid representative, i.e. 'Ubayd Khán who was fourth generation and about 44 (lunar) years old at this time.¹ Similarly the eldest Jénibegid, Iskandar Sultán (fourth generation) was also probably the junior of Abú Sa'id since he was yet to give birth to his first son (the future 'Abdulláh Khán) in 940 (i.e. about four years later) and did not himself die until 991/1583. And the eldest Suyúnjid, Baráo Sultán, while of the third generation, was still presumably young, for it was not until 959/1552 that he became "grand khán" (most likely on the basis of being the eldest Abú'l-Khayrid by then).

It would thus seem reasonably likely that Abú Sa'id was indeed the eldest of the Dynastic House. The silence of the sources may indicate that this fact was taken for granted; but then again it might indicate that the seniority factor was not necessarily "deemed advisable" by this time. We shall see much the same situation for the election of 'Ubayd Khán himself, although there are more sources in that case which speak directly of his seniority in age by that time. (For a further discussion of the gradual decline of the seniority factor, see Section I p.28.)

Abú Sa'id Khán gets the cliché description common the taẓkireh ("biographical notices") of the Úzbek kháns. He is thus described as being just, pious, poetically minded and devoted to the religious orders. That his rule was actually not quite that benevolent would

1. 'Ubayd Khán was born in 892/1487 (ABD/20a, QIPCHAQ/591b, SILSILAT/117b). This is confirmed by RAQIM's/127a assertion that he was "54" at the time of his death (in 946/1540).

be suggested by the chronogram chosen in RAQIM/12b to mark his death: "Oppression has departed" (Ẓulm az miyân raft). He seems however more spectacularly remembered for his corpulence, for he could barely mount a horse, and had to sleep in a sitting position because he could otherwise not have risen from his bed (HAYDARI, QIPCHAQ).

His "reign" covers the period of the Fourth Invasion of Aḥurá-sán and as will be seen, despite 'Ubayd Khán's apparent respect for the Changízid code and his acceptance of the decision of the Samarqand curultáy, there was soon to be considerable friction between the two kháns. (The beginning of this friction has already been observed at the rebuff given to 'Ubayd Khán at the prior Marv curultáy.)

The general statements in the sources to 'Ubayd Khán's paramount position among the Úzbeks even before he became "grand khán" himself (e.g. see the quote from RASHIDI, above p.29 n.1) are evidently meant to apply to the period of Abú Sa'íd as well as to that of Kúchim Khán. HAYDARI/55a is specific on this point and states: "In his [i.e. Abú Sa'íd's] time, 'Ubayd Khán was also [i.e. as in the time of Kúchim Khán] the man in control".¹

It is doubtlessly true that 'Ubayd Khán represented the major Úzbek military force at this time and that his Bukhárá was replacing Samarqand as the cultural center of Mávará'al-nahr. And there is no reason to doubt RAQIM's assertion that 'Ubayd Khán

1. "Dar zamán-i ú niz 'Ubayd Khán sáhib-i ikhtiyár búđ."

dominated the Samarqand qurultáy and that it was he who had placed Abú Sa'id on the takht-i saltanatí or "throne of rulership". But the extent of his control over the "appanage-states" of his "peers" and of their individual foreign as well as domestic policies was, as we have seen and shall see again, limited by such variable factors as his personal prestige and the consent of these "peers".

From the events which follow it will become increasingly clear that Abú Sa'id cannot be considered as the puppet of the would-be king-maker, Ubayd Khán, and that the Abú'l-Khayrid sultáns were "peers of the realm" in practice as well as in theory.

D. The Preliminary Uzbek Raid on Mashhad

'Ubayd khán did not take immediate advantage of the "Takkalú Disaster" and in fact the only record we have of Uzbek activity during this first "year" of Túshoán/937-8/1531-2 is a raid on the Mashhad and Nishápúr areas undertaken by the Khán's officers. The main part of the Fourth Invasion of Khurásán did not actually begin until the following spring of Lúy when the Sháh was engaged with the Ottoman threat at Bitlís. We have seen the possible reasons for this delay as arising from the Uzbek internal situation; but in the absence of any detailed information on the internal history of the Úzbeks for this period it is difficult to come to any definitive conclusions.

This Uzbek action, which led to the temporary occupation of Mashhad, was led by three of 'Ubayd Khán's major officers, all of whom have already been met with as participating in the previous invasions of Khurásán. They are: Qamish Úghlan (Oğlan), Tinish Bî and Shaykh Abú Sa'íd Afrasyáb. They crossed the Ámú and came via Sarakhs (on the main Bukhárá-Mashhad Highway) directly against Mashhad.

It is difficult to decide whether this Uzbek expedition was a raid undertaken merely for plunder, or whether it was meant to test the Qizilbásh defences at the time of the domestic crisis at Court. AHSAN speaks of yartáúl and AFZAL of ilghár, both of which would imply a large-scale marauding action. It could very easily have been a combination of both raid and probe.

1. AFZAL/68a and AHSAN/238 have approximately the same accounts; TAAH/43 has a brief reference.

Mantashá Sultán, the new Ustájlú governor of Mashhad, could not hope to face the Úzbeks alone, presumably because the walls of Mashhad were not yet properly fortified and/or the invading Úzbek group was a formidable one and not merely an isolated band of plunderers. He therefore abandoned Mashhad to the invaders and withdrew toward Nishápúr to form a joint local Qizilbásh army with the Shámlú governor of Nishápúr, Aghzívar Sultán.

This joint Shámlú-Ustájlú action in provinces evidently mirrors the new situation at Court. There is no mention of the Takkalú governor of all Khurásán (i.e. Ghází Khán at Harát) as having been at all concerned with this Úzbek action at Mashhad.

Samish Úghlan and the Úzbeks in their turn now evacuated Mashhad at the news of the joint Qizilbásh army's approach. They crossed to the other side of what is called the "Siyáh Áb" (the "Black River"¹) and were engaged at a ford by the Qizilbásh who were in pursuit. This seems to have been a minor action and both sides soon withdrew. The Qizilbásh umará sent a report of the event to Court along with a number of Úzbek heads to certify their victory, and were honored by the receipt of khil'ats ("robes of honor").

Shortly after their victory these local governors were summoned to Court evidently to participate in the "Takkalú Disaster" and/or to reap the rewards of the new Shámlú-Ustájlú hegemony. The Sultáns, Aghzívar and Mantashá, are shortly to be seen playing major roles in Qizilbásh affairs--but at Court and at the Ottoman front, and not in Mashhad and Nishápúr, despite the Úzbek threat. As so often observed in this narration, Court affairs and the Ottoman front came first and second--Khurásán was third on the priority list.

1. Possibly the Qará Sú (Turkish for "Siyáh Áb") although this would be closer to Astarábád than to Mashhad. The Qará Sú is similarly vaguely located in GHAZI/255 as the site of a battle "north of Mashhad". Perhaps the reference is merely to the Kashf River of Mashhad or to one of its minor tributaries.

Part 2. The Fourth Uzbek Invasion of Khurásán

A. The "Long Siege" of Harát ¹

1. The Uzbek Position during the Siege

With the coming of the spring of Lúy/938/1532 when the Qizilbásh were occupied with the threat of the Takkalú renegade, Úlámeš Sultán, and the Ottomans, 'Ubayd Khán launched his Fourth Invasion of Khurásán and began the most extensive of his six sieges of Harát in the period of Sháh Tahmásb: it lasted a year and a half.

It is remarkable that the rather long descriptions of this siege in the Safavid chronicles make no mentions of storms or sorties and it would therefore seem that even more than in the past sieges 'Ubayd Khán was relying on a war of attrition rather than a war of siege-engines (of which he apparently had none of any consequence) and assaults against the solid walls of Harát.

To understand the reason for the sluggish nature of the campaign against Harát it is important to recall that as in the other invasions of Khurásán (except for the First and for the Battle of Jám which have special features) this was not an all-out

1. JANG/148b-151a is probably the basic source for the situation inside Harát during the siege. ROUZAT/150b-151a is clearly following JANG, but as frequently the case, makes additions for further clarity. AHSAN/240-243 and AFZAL/69a-71a, 72a are parallel accounts although AFZAL adds the starvation letter, and AHSAN notes the presence of the atálig of Abú Sa'id. TAAA/44-45 is close to AHSAN, but in the exchange of verse between 'Ubayd and Khwájeh Amír Bek which is quoted in most of the sources, it substitutes the word "Khurásán" for "Bukhárá" in the first beyt and attributes half the verse to 'Ubayd (whom it calls mard-i sha'ir-pisheh or a "professional poet"), rather than to the Khwájeh. ILCHI/260a contains the peace negotiations of Abú Sa'id, and folio 44a also refers briefly to the siege. TEZ/22 and HAYDARI/55a notice the event with few details. The only Uzbek mention is SILSILAT/120b which refers to the internal Uzbek disorders which compelled 'Ubayd to abandon the siege.

Uzbek attempt backed by a full "Grande Armée" of the "neo-eponymous clans". It was essentially the private project of 'Ubayd Khán and the Sháh-Budáqids. As a matter of fact, although Kís-tan Qará Sultán, the Jánibegid ruler of Balkh, and possibly Abú Sa'id, the "grand khán" himself, subsequently did appear at the siege of Harát, so low had 'Ubayd Khán's prestige sunk that they proved much more of a hindrance than an aid to his designs.

Furthermore, even the personal army of 'Ubayd Khán was spread rather thin, for along with the siege of Harát a series of campaigns had been carried out in northwestern Khurásán and Astarábád which were so extended as to threaten the Ray-Tehrán area. Although 'Ubayd Khán's officers were successful in these campaigns, it did mean the appointment of governors and garrisons and thus served to deplete the potential against Harát.

II. The Qizilbásh Position during the Siege

The Qizilbásh garrison of Harát at this time was largely Takkalú and had been established there at the time of Júheh Sultán's supremacy at Court and the appointment of the new Bahrám Mírzá-Gházi Khán Takkalú administration of Khurásán (see above p.188). In view of the recent "Takkalú Disaster" at Court it is somewhat surprising to note the rather determined resistance put up by the garrison in the face of attenuating starvation and lack of support from the Court. There were, it is true, defections, atrocities and several attempts at a negotiated peace; but Harát did hold out for a year and a half.

Furthermore, there were no prospects of any immediate royal relief, for a courier had soon brought back the news that the Sháh

had been compelled to give priority to the western threat and that Harát must hold out on its own for the time being (AFZAL). The Takkalú might well have wondered if this were not a continuation of the "disgrace" or a revenge tactic by the new Shámlú regent, Husayn Khán, who had been abandoned in a similar predicament by the then Takkalú regent, Júheh Sultán.

Nothing is said specifically to this effect, but that this was possibly on the minds of the new Shámlú-Ustájlú clique is given plausibility by the council of war (jánqí) described in the Sháh's Diary (TEZ/21). In noting the deliberations of this jánqí it is important to consider the fact that it was held after Úlámeḥ and the Ottomans had abandoned their siege of Bitlís and when it was still possible for the Qizilbásh army to rush to the relief of Harát. Yet instead of Harát, the jánqí debated the plans advanced mostly by the Ustájlú, Mantashá Sultán (it will be recalled that he had been recalled from Mashhad to serve in the west) to carry out an offensive against Sívás and Diyárbakr in Ottoman held Anatolia; and, since Sulaymán the Magnificent was then engaged in Europe (b-ghazá b-jánib-i Firang raftēh) to occupy advance strategic positions which would be useful in the event of Ottoman aggression. Although this plan was not carried out the Court did pass the yayláq and qishláq seasons on the relatively pacified western front while Khurésán was being occupied on the east.

The question of the Takkalú loyalty at Harát thus remains unresolved. It can only be pointed out that when Ghází Khán did ultimately desert, it was to the Ottomans and under the very different circumstances of the "Grand Sedition" to be discussed

in the following chapter; and that the Takkalú governor of Baghdad, Muhammad Khán, had remained loyal during the "Takkalú Disaster" and also when Sulaymán was threatening Baghdád shortly later. It can only be said that úymáq-ties (úymáqiyat) were undoubtedly strong but that they do not explain all the motivations and patterns of loyalty of all the úymáq individuals. Partisan politics and the desire for personal advancement could apparently sometimes override the traditional úymáqiyat as will be demonstrated shortly by the apparent rapprochement of the Shámlú regent, Husayn Khán and some of the Takkalú (including the same Ghází Khán) in the "Grand Sedition".

iii. Starvation, Desertions and Atrocities in Harát

The "long siege" began about Shavvál/May when 'Ubayd Khán appeared outside the city walls and camped at his usual site of Sháymáneh. The first step of the Úzbeks was to cut off the food and water supplies of the city. Eventually famine began in Harát and the sources give the same gruesome details we have seen before of the eating of dogs and cats, drinking of horseblood and the use of such ersatz as boiled leather and tree leaves. AFZAL/69b-70b has preserved the full text of a private letter written in Harát at this time in which the generalities given in the sources of the sufferings of the city under siege and starvation become more personalized: The subject of the letter (in full munshiyáneh style) is a regretted inability to supply a requested bowl of pea-soup (nukhúd-áb):

As in the "seven-month siege" of 934/1528 the Qizilbásh had recourse to the ruthless method of expelling the "nobodies" among

the civilians (AHSAN here calls them mardum-i muhtáj, "the needy") and of thoroughly plundering them in the process. Horror stories are told in the Safavid chronicles of the "harsh and barbaric Takkalú" (shadíd va ghalí2: AFZAL) waiting at the expulsion points to strip "respectable women" (avráat-i mastúr: JANG) and rip through their remaining possessions in the search to find hidden valuables.

The Safavid sources quite openly contrast this "vile and abominable action" (fi'l-i cabíh ú shaní3: JANG) of the Qizilbásh with the Úzbeks outside, who are said to have treated the expellees kindly (mihribání namúdeh: AFZAL) and to have fed them.

This mass expulsion seems to have been carried out more thoroughly and ruthlessly than the similar action of the Shámlú in the "seven-month siege" for AHSAN records that "the city was so empty that no one was to be seen in the markets".¹ The result was that before too long only the "gházis and Shí'eh" (i.e. the Qizilbásh garrison and its associates) remained in Harát, and they too were soon faced with starvation.

Individual Qizilbásh now began "leaving their families and sect" (tark-i tiyál va atfál va mažhab: JANG) and deserting over to the Úzbeks. 'Ubayd Khán was artfully encouraging this by feeding and honoring the renegades. ROUZAT is alone in darkly adding (but most likely without any authority, for it is closely following JANG here) that after the feasting, the Úzbeks took the renegades aside and quietly disposed of them.

1. "Shahr b-martabeh-'í khálí shud keh dar asvâq kasí b-nažar dar namiyamad."

Ghází Khán resorted to drastic counter-measures in an attempt to halt these Qizilbásh defections. He issued an order making the home and property of any deserter fair game for any loyal Qizilbásh--with no questions asked. It is not clear whether the original order was meant to extend to the expellees' homes as well, and JANG says that there were at least one or two expellees in each home; but whatever the intention was, the Takkalú interpreted the order broadly and during the remainder of the siege they spent most of their time in digging for buried wealth hidden by the expellees and in a general licenced looting of Harát.

That these acts were contrary to the morality of the times is made evident by the fact that when the Sháh ultimately relieved Harát, Ghází Khán was reprimanded for licencing these atrocities and restitution of the looted property was ordered. Nonetheless, Harát was to be similarly looted thrice more by its Qizilbásh protectors before the close of the period under discussion. And yet the Safavid sources persist in their generalities of a wicked Uzbek ẓulm based upon the sectarian antagonisms in Khurásán.

iv. Attempted Peace Negotiations and Inner Uzbek Tensions

At one stage in the siege peace negotiations reached the point where Ghází Khán and Bahrám Mírzá had agreed to surrender the city on the same terms which had been granted to Husayn Khán and Sâm Mírzá at the first capitulation of Harát: i.e. the Úzbeks were to retire from the walls and permit the Qizilbásh to evacuate peacefully with their families and possessions and proceed unmolested to 'Irác-i 'Ajam. 'Ubayd Khán however proved unexpectedly adamant in his insistence that the Qizilbásh humiliate themselves before

the Úzbeks by first stooping to pass underneath the Khán's tent-ropes. This humiliation was rejected by the Takkalú and the siege continued.

We can only guess at the motivations involved here: Perhaps 'Ubayd Khán was confident that Harát would be forced to surrender unconditionally before long, and it is quite likely that at this point he needed a victory with all its trappings in order to bolster his declining prestige.

There are several indications which point to 'Ubayd Khán's no longer being in full control of the situation at the siege. Individual Úzbeks were secretly (AHSAN: nihán az 'Ubayd Khán) selling horses (for food) to the Qizilbásh and "fraternization" eventually reached the point where Úzbeks were actually bringing food into the city for sale (ROUZAT). The sources frankly state that the situation for the garrison would have been hopeless but for this unexpected source of aid, and that this was the major factor in making it possible for the Qizilbásh to continue to resist for a year and a half.

More important for understanding 'Ubayd Khán's personal position at this time is the fact that this "fraternization" (dústí) was not limited to commercially minded Úzbeks, but was carried on secretly (TAAA: nihání) by Kístan Qará Sultán, the Jáníbegid ruler of Balkh who had come to join in at the siege. Upon his arrival he had sent gifts of food to Bahráb Mírzá inside Harát, and then had had some of his men bring horses into the city for sale.

Of even greater significance for following both internal Úzbek history and the relations with Sháh Tahmásb is the possibility

of the presence of the "grand khán", Abú Sa'id himself, at the siege and/or of his alleged peace negotiations (over the head of 'Ubayd Khán) with the Qizilbásh. In trying to decide whether or not the "grand khán" actively intervened at Harát, we come up once more against the veil drawn down on Uzbek internal history during this period by the insufficiency or inaccuracy of the sources at our disposal.

AHSAN and TAAA record the appearance of the atáliq¹ of Abú Sa'id late in the siege and his unsuccessful peace negotiations with the besieged garrison. If this is accepted (it is perhaps strange that the other Safavid sources which have parallel accounts of the "long siege" make no mention of this particular event) the implication is that Abú Sa'id, although not necessarily personally present at the siege was decidedly intervening in 'Ubayd Khán's designs on khurásán.

V. ILCHI's "Rivāyat" of an Uzbek-Qizilbāsh Rapprochement

ILCHI has a unique account (based on a literary rather than a purely historical source) which while giving details on Abú Sa'id's alleged peace negotiations and thus corroborating AHSAN and TAAA cannot be fully accepted, for so sensational is the nature

1. Seddon's Persian text of AHSAN/243 reads: "atáliq abú sa'id khán nādashāh samarqand". His English rendition (p.111) as "Atáliq Abú Sa'id, the King of Samarqand" might seem to suggest that AHSAN means that the "grand khán" himself was present at the siege. Atáliq, the equivalent of laleh, in the Uzbek usage of the time seems to refer to a khán or sultán's personal administrative advisor, i.e. "a private vazír". (A random example is in ABD/89b where 'Abdullah Khán, after taking Tirmiž in 980/1572, assigns it to Mahmúd Sultán with the atáliq, Mankalí Bī Qushchí.)

The text here should most likely be read with an izāfeh and translated as "the atáliq of Abú Sa'id Khán, the King of Samarqand".

of the report and so much implied that the question immediately rises as to how it could remain unique. There are also internal difficulties in the story which give it very much the air of being apocryphal. Nonetheless it is worth citing here at least as an indication of the realm of possibilities in Safavid-Uzbek relations at this time. Furthermore every scrap of data on the Uzbek side of the relations with Sháh Tahmásb during this period is at least worth being noted.¹

1. It should first be noted that this account in ILCHI appears in the Uzbek section of the work, which is a General History, and that Abú Sa'id's name does not appear in the terse mention of the Harát siege which appears in the Safavid section of the same work. ILCHI's Uzbek section is comparatively brief and sometimes unreliable and is in great contrast with the excellent section on the Court of Sháh Tahmásb. An example of ILCHI's confusion in the same description of Abú Sa'id's reign (f.266a) is the statement that Abú Sa'id joined 'Ubayd Khán in 937 in a siege of Harát which lasted five years and six months. Even this quite impossible assertion is contradicted by the further statement that he reigned four years and six months.

The verse with which the text is fully sprinkled here is part of a mašnavi which is clearly ILCHI's authority for its riváyat. It is quite possibly extracted from Qásim Janábadí's Sháhnámeh devoted to Sháh Tahmásb which is frequently cited anonymously in the Safavid chronicles but which is specifically identified by AFZAL (see Appendix 2 p.XLVI). If this is ILCHI's source then the question is still unanswered as to why this riváyat is ignored in the other chronicles which were fully aware of the contents of the Sháhnámeh. One explanation would be that the chroniclers did not accept its full validity as a historical document. As against this however is AFZAL's/3a statement that Qásim Janábadí had been officially commissioned by Sháh Tahmásb to write his Sháhnámeh.

The problem must thus remain open and a weak surmise offered that perhaps the account of the Uzbek-Safavid rapprochement by the rebels, Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá, was regarded as either secret, or unflattering to the interests of the Safavid House and was thus suppressed. The author of ILCHI, a foreign envoy who completed his work in India, might not have felt bound by such qualms. The fact remains that the chronicles never do openly tell us the grounds for suspicion against the Shámlú fugitives, and are most unsatisfactory in the explanation of the motivations of Husayn Khán and Sám Mirzá in the subsequent "Grand Sedition". There may well have been secret diplomacy with the Úzbeks to which

(Continued on next page)

This is the tall tale that ILCHI (or more exactly the poem upon which it is based) has to tell: Abú Sa'id who was present at the Harát siege secretly sent word to Khwájeh Muẓaffer Tabakchí (he was a loyal Tájik administrator of both Sháh Ismá'il and Sháh Tahmásb and was particularly active in Khurásán) to act as intermediary for a Safavid-Úzbek peace to be established on an exchange-marriage basis. The daughter of the "grand khán" was to be given to Sám Mírzá (sic: not Bahrám Mírzá), and Abú Sa'id was in turn to marry the daughter of the late Dúrmish Khán (she would be the niece of Husayn Khán who [Husayn], it will be recalled, was a maternal cousin of Sháh Tahmásb). The plan was agreed to by both sides and representatives met in the Bágh-i Naẓargáh and signed the marriage contracts on the spot. Full peace was then restored to the extent that: "From the degree of fraternization, Who would know there had been contestation?" ¹ The account simply ends with the state-

(Continued from preceding page)

the mašnaví and ILCHI refer to so obliquely, and unfortunately, so inaccurately.

The possibility should therefore be kept open that this riváyat does contain a sub-stratum of truth, but has confused the 935-6 and 938-940 sieges of Harát. For the references to Sám Mírzá, to the late Dúrmish Khán (and thus indirectly to his brother, Husayn Khán), to Khwájeh Muẓaffer, and above all to the negotiations which led to a final peace, sound anachronistic for the period of the "long siege" but do partially fit into place if they are made to refer to the earlier siege ended by Husayn Khán and Sám Mírzá's negotiated surrender (see above, Third Invasion, p.154).

In any case it appears doubtful if Abú Sa'id was personally present at the "long siege", for, as we shall shortly see, SILSILAT/120b asserts that it was the news of Abú Sa'id's death in Mávará'al-nahr which finally drew 'Ubayd from the siege. This claim is partially confirmed by the Safavid sources which state that the Court heard the news of Abú Sa'id's death right after 'Ubayd's flight.

1. "Biná'í namúdan guft ú shunúd
Keh guftí keh hargiz khusúmat nabúd."

ment that Abú Sa'id then returned to Mávará'al-nahr.

At best it may be said that there is a confusion here of this "long siege" with the siege of 935-6/1529 which had ended in Husayn Khán and Sâm Mírzá's negotiated surrender and evacuation of Harát. There may actually be a sub-stratum of truth to the account of the Shámlú-Sâm Mírzá rapprochement with the Úzbeks, and that it has merely been recorded out of its proper context. If this is so, it would go far in explaining the "wanderings" of the Khurásán fugitives and the Court's suspicion of their activities in rárs (Shíráz), for it would imply some sort of agreement had been reached between the Shámlú and the Úzbeks to recognize Sâm Mírzá in place of Sháh Tahmásb. That this is not completely far-fetched will become more evident in the subsequent discussion of the roles of Husayn Khán and Sâm Mírzá in the "Grand Sedition".

Furthermore there are seven some slight grounds for accepting ILCHI's account as it stands: i.e. as referring to the "long siege" and the time of Ghází Khán Takkalú. For Ghází Khán, too, was to play a leading role in the "Grand Sedition" and was clearly linked to both Husayn Khán at Court and to Sâm Mírzá who had by then been reappointed as governor of Khurásán. It was Ghází Khán who most actively pushed the candidacy for the throne of Sâm Mírzá--however, it was to the Ottoman Porte that he made his representations, and not to the Úzbeks.

Too much is obviously being implied here on too little basis in fact. Nonetheless, it is important to examine every clue, for there is a possibility that the "Grand Sedition" and the revolt in

Khurásán to be discussed below had some of its roots in Mávará'-
al-nahr in addition to the more obvious connections with the
Safavid Court and the Ottoman Porte. If the Úzbeks were actually
involved, then the riváyat in ILCHI of a secret rapprochement by
marriage between the future rebels and the Úzbeks is decidedly
relevant.

B. The Uzbek Conquests from Mashhad to Astarābād ¹

I. The Northwestern Campaign of the Ūzbeks

While 'Ubayd Khān had personally gone against Harāt and was settled down for the "long siege", his son, 'Abd al-'Azīz, and two of his leading officers, Qamish Ūghlan and Khān Kaldī (Geldī) Bahādur, had been sent to take the area from Mashhad to Astarābād. According to TAAA, 'Abd al-'Azīz had been sent against Mashhad, Khān Kaldī against Sabzivār, Qamish Ūghlan against Astarābād and a fourth detachment against Bistām. These actions seem to have begun in the winter season preceding 'Ubayd Khān's spring appearance before Harāt.

Nothing is said about the fall of Mashhad, Sabzivār and Nishāpūr; but the Ūzbeks must have accomplished their missions here quite easily, for, as has been seen, the Qizilbāsh governors of the area (notably Mantashā Sultān Ustājlu of Mashhad and Aghzivār Sultān Shāmlū of Nishāpūr) had been recalled to Court at the "Takkalū Disaster" and were then at the Western front.

1. TAAA/44 has the best of the brief accounts of the conquest of northwestern Khurāsān and has a few details not given elsewhere. AFZAL/71b and AHSAN/243-4 have near identical accounts, RAQIM/118a has the chronogram referred to for the taking of Astarābād.

The accounts of the raid on Ray are about the same in: TAAA/44, AFZAL/72b, AHSAN/244, ROUZAT/150a-b, NUSAKH/215b, SHARAF/560-1.

Both AHSAN and AFZAL quote the same three beyts from a narrative maṣnavī which while anonymous in AHSAN is prefixed in AFZAL by the phrase: Shā'ir gūyad ("the poet says"). In AFZAL this phrase indicates a quote from Mirzā Qāsim's Shāhnāmah of Shāh Tahmasb (see above p.220 n.1).

It might be pointed out here that Seddon's reduced English version of AHSAN suffers from the automatic disregard of all verse in the Persian text. Not all the verse in AHSAN is ornamental rhetoric as in the case here, where the name of the Kirayli leader (Mirzā 'Alī) is given in the verse alone and is accordingly not mentioned in the English version (see Appendix Two, p.XLVII).

The Úzbek detachment sent against Bistám did however meet with opposition. When it appeared in the area, the Qizilbásh governor of Astarábád and Dámghán, Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí, sent to the nomadic Kiraylí Turkmán of the Astarábád-Jurján area for aid. The Kiraylí, under Mírzá 'Alí Sultán, immediately joined the Qizilbásh at Dámghán and the allies marched together against the Úzbeks outside of Bistám. A battle was fought (in which a certain Qará Haydar was the Qizilbásh hero) and the Úzbeks were defeated and forced to retire. Úzbek prisoners and heads were sent back to the Court which was then in the first Tabríz qishlâq where preparations were being made for the relief of Bitlís. Congratulations were sent by the Court in the form of khil'ats to both the Qizilbásh governor and his Kiraylí ally.

Nothing further is said about Bistám and it is barely possible that the Úzbeks did not occupy it during this Invasion, for we are told that when the Third Khurásán Liberation campaign was under way, the Qizilbásh advance army marched into Bistám, which then served as a base for the operations against Qamish Úghlan in Astarábád.

As for Astarábád, there are no details on its fall. The next heard of it, Qamish Úghlan was already established as the Úzbek governor there and Muhammad Khán, the Qizilbásh governor who had at first been victorious at Bistám, was in refuge near Ray.

RAQIM has a chronogram which if accepted would place the fall of Astarábád as early as Jumádí III 938/January 1532, i.e. more than three months before 'Ubayd Khán appeared at Harát. This same source gives the credit for the taking of Astarábád to 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán who, according to TAAA had been sent against Mashhad. The

the two independent accounts may however be reconciled by assuming that 'Abd al-'Aziz and Qamish Ūghlan both joined together for the Astarábád campaign and that at its termination the latter remained in Astarábád while 'Abd al-'Aziz returned to his governorship at Mashhad.¹

II. The Daring Ūzbek Raid on the Ray Area

After about a year of occupation of Astarábád and while the "long siege" was still in progress, Qamish Ūghlan carried out a raid deep into 'Irāq-i 'Ajam and penetrated as far as the Sāvúq Bulāgh (Turkish: "Cold Springs") area of Ray.

There is a striking parallel, which would indicate that many of the same factors were still at play, between this raid on Ray and the one carried out during the Second Ūzbek Invasion by Zaynish Bahádur to Fírúzkúh (see above p.116) to which the then Qizilbāsh governor of Astarábád, Zaynal Khán had fled. The timing was approximately the same, that is the very beginning of spring (Qamish Ūghlan's raid is dated as Sha'bān 939/March 1533); and the situation

1. RAQIM's chronogram is a double one for by writing out and totaling the letters of the month of the conquest (Māh-i Jumādī al-ākhīr) the year is supposed to result. The difficulty is that the year turns out to be 937 and is given as such in RAQIM.

Here is one case where we can prove the fallibility of the chronogram system without relying on the independent chronology established here, for the already cited RABINO's/27-8 inscription from the Astarábád mosque dates the arrival of the new Qizilbāsh governor, Muḥammad Khán, very precisely as the first of the same month of JumādīIII in the year 937! RAQIM's 937, even when buttressed by its clever chronogram, is thus seen to be actually referring to the 938 portion of the Turkī year Tūshcān (i.e. 937-938).

If the date is indeed JumādīIII 938, i.e. January 1532, it would indicate that the Fourth Invasion began in the winter preceding 'Ubayd Khán's appearance at Harát, and that Astarábád must have fallen very shortly after the Qizilbāsh victory at Bistám, the news of which reached the Court during its qishlāq.

at Court was approximately the same, that is, a long overdue Khurásán campaign was in the planning stages. The most important parallel is the fact that just as Zaynish Bahádur's raid into 'Irâq-i 'Ajam had set off the First Liberation, now too the Court was wrenched into realizing the danger of the enemy's deep penetration and warned against any further delay.

The parallel between the two raids is not however complete: unlike Zaynal Khán, the Qizilbâsh governor-in-exile in the new situation, i.e. Muhammad Khán, did manage to escape. His personal possessions were however plundered and the Úzbeks drove off a considerable amount of the livestock from the area (ROUZAT).

C. 'Ubayd Khán's Evacuation of Khurásán and his Election as
"Grand Khán" ¹

We have already described the sagging Úzbek morale at the "long siege" of Harát and the apparent efforts at interference or even sabotage by 'Ubayd Khán's Jánibegid "peer", Kístan Qará Sultán and by the atálic of Abú Sa'íd, the "grand khán".

The Safavid sources then state that with the approach of the formidable and invincible army of liberation of Sháh Tahmásb, 'Ubayd Khán fled once again from his siege of Harát without attempting to offer any resistance. Although such statements are munshiyáneh and not necessarily to be taken literally, nonetheless there is most likely an element of truth, for 'Ubayd Khán could hardly have been in a position to offer any serious resistance to the full-scale Qizilbásh army.

This can however be only part of the explanation for there is an unexplained lapse of somewhat over two solar months between the Khán's "flight" and the Sháh's entry into Harát (date of the Úzbek retirement: 14 Rabí'í 940/3 October 1533; date of the Sháh's entry: 22 Jumádíí/9 December). This does not suggest a wild "flight" at the approach of the Sháh; neither however does it per se disprove it.

There are some indications of a new turn in developments on the Úzbek domestic scene back in Mávará'al-nahr at this very time which would seem to be of relevance here in understanding why 'Ubayd Khán abandoned his Fourth Invasion without making any attempt

1. The Úzbek references to the accession of 'Ubayd Khán are: ANONYM/22a, RAQIM/120b-121a, SUBHAN/51a, 92a, SILSILAT/120b, QIPCHAQ/591a-592a. To this may be added RASHIDI/283.

The brief Safavid notices of the death of Abú Sa'íd and the succession are: AHSAN/247, AFZAL/74a, ILCHI/260a, HAYDARI/55a, SHIRAZI/257b, MIFTAH/542a.

to oppose Sháh Tahmásb's new liberation army. These internal events center upon the death of Abú Sa'id Khán (under mysterious circumstances?) and the emergence of 'Ubayd Khán finally as the full-fledged "grand khán" of the Abú'l-Khayrid Úzbeks.

It must first be reiterated that it is very difficult to follow the internal Úzbek situation for this period, and until new sources come to light we can only make conjectures based on random miscellaneous data scattered in different and sometimes contradictory sources.

It is reasonably certain, however, that Abú Sa'id died at about the time the "long siege" of Harát was drawing to an end. And this fact resolves the variations in the sources as to the number of years in his reign and the 939/940 years both given as the year of death. From the independent chronology established here the date of death can be placed at about the month of Rabi'II/September in 940/1533.

Another fact that is reasonably certain is the ensuing accession of 'Ubayd Khán as "grand khán", for all sources (except the obscure AHSAN-AFZAL riváyat to be discussed below) agree that 'Ubayd Khán succeeded at the death of Abú Sa'id. The sources are quite explicit: ILCHI, RASHIDI and QIPCHAQ all state that he was elected as the eldest of the Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House; a number of chronograms are given to mark the event (the most recurrent is Válí-yi mulk 'Ubaydulláh Khán which does yield 940); SUBHAN, SIL-SILAT and RAQIM attest to the fact that the khutbeh-sikkeh prerogatives were issued in his name; and finally QIPCHAQ has a brief description of the Samarqand qurultáy which met after Abú Sa'id's

death and elected 'Ubayd Khán. The evidence would seem totally acceptable that 'Ubayd Khán was in fact elected "grand khán" in 940/1533.

We are however on much less certain ground in attempting to understand the implications of these two interrelated events. There are seven apparently unrelated items in both the Safavid and Uzbek sources which when put together make it possible at least to make some surmise as to the nature of the events which led to 'Ubayd Khán's week evacuation of Khurásán and his succession as "grand khán".

Item 1:

Both SILSILAT and QIPCHAQ have references to disorders in Mávará'al-nahr at about this time and although their accounts are independent and do not jibe chronologically, they may represent an identical sub-stratum of fact.

SILSILAT states that 'Ubayd Khán left the siege of Harát at the news of Abú Sa'id's death and the ensuing "disorder and lawlessness in Mávará'al-nahr" (bad-nasaqí va bí-zábitgí-yi Mávará'al-nahr). The implication is that 'Ubayd Khán hurried back home in order to assert his legitimate claim as "grand khán" to which there was apparent opposition.

The cause of the "disorder and lawlessness" at Abú Sa'id's death is not explained in SILSILAT; but inasmuch as this is a relative term and is used here from the viewpoint of 'Ubayd Khán's ultimate success, the conjecture may perhaps be permitted that these disorders were concomitant with Abú Sa'id's death. That is to say, in view of what has been seen of 'Ubayd Khán's decline in prestige, administered at least partially by Abú Sa'id and perhaps abetted

by the Jānibegids, should the possibility not be considered that 'Ubayd Khān was personally involved in the disorders of the time of Abū Sa'id's death and that he had to rush back to Samarqand to protect his interests?

Item 2:

QIPCHAQ also speaks of disorders in Mávará'al-nahr. It asserts that after a year and a half of "residence" (sic: iqámat) at Harát, 'Ubayd Khān had to leave suddenly at the receipt of "frightening" (mutavabbish) news from Turkistán. He therefore left his son, Muhammad Rahīm in Harát, returned to Mávará'al-nahr, brought the "stubborn rebel" (mu'ánid) to condign punishment in Samarqand and then went to Bukhárá. It is unfortunately not stated what this "frightening" news was, nor is the identity of the "stubborn rebel" revealed.

Although it is tempting to link this account with SILSILAT (in Item 1), there is a major difficulty: QIPCHAQ claims to be referring to an event after the accession of 'Ubayd Khān and not before, and indeed the citing of Muhammad Rahīm's name is more in accord with 'Ubayd Khān's Fifth Invasion to be discussed in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, the reference to "a year and a half", i.e. the duration of the "long siege" is a lead. It might possibly suggest that QIPCHAQ's rivāyat is actually meant to apply to the time prior to 'Ubayd Khān's accession (i.e. to the Fourth Invasion) but has confused the reporting of the Fourth and Fifth Invasions.

If QIPCHAQ's statement could be made to refer to the period of the "long siege", then it would be complementary to SILSILAT's account and we could assume an active revolt against 'Ubayd Khān's

imminent assumption of the "grand khán" position at the death of Abú Sa'id, and thus explain the resulting disorders which arose while 'Ubayd Khán was still at his Harát siege.

Item 3:

While still in the realm of conjecture, one may speculate as to the identity of QIPCHAQ's "stubborn rebel". A clue is perhaps to be sought in the AFZAL-AHSAN riváyat of Abú Sa'id's succession according to which it was 'Abd al-Latíf, the brother of Abú Sa'id who succeeded as "grand khán", and not 'Ubayd Khán at all.

It could perhaps be argued that this particular Safavid riváyat arose through a misunderstanding of the Úzbek government system: for 'Abd al-Latíf did apparently succeed--but only to the Semarcand appanage of the Kúchkhúnjids. It might also be supposed that this misunderstanding arose from the fact that 'Ubayd Khán made Bukhárá his capital (QIPCHAQ, SILSILAT) rather than the previous Abú'l-Khayrid seat of Samarqand.

These explanations would seem rather flaccid however, for both AHSAN/295 and AFZAL/108a make it perfectly clear in their obituaries for 'Ubayd Khán that they considered him--by the time of his death some six years later--to have been the actual "grand khán". Thus AHSAN states: "His territory was Bukhárá and Kish [Shahr-i Sabz] although [literally: 'and'] the mintage [prerogative of the 'grand kháns'] in all of Mávará'al-nahr was in his name".¹ This statement clearly indicates AHSAN's awareness of the subtleties of the Úzbek system and its recognition of 'Ubayd Khán as the "grand khán".

1. "Mamlaktash Bukhárá va shahr-i Kish va dar jamí'-i Mávará'al-nahr sikkeh b-nám-i ú búđ."

There would then have to be another explanation for the unique reference to 'Abd al-Latíf as the successor to Abú Sa'id.

The answer is perhaps to be found in the fact that according to AFZAL, the source of this riváyat is a report received by the Sháh in mid-winter at the Harát qishláq, i.e. about three or four months after 'Ubayd Khán's abandonment of Harát and return to Mávará'al-nahr. It is thus quite conceivable that the report of 'Abd al-Latíf's succession "to the throne of Túrán" (bar takht-i Túrán) does actually represent a brief moment in Úzbek history and that 'Abd al-Latíf had momentarily usurped the position of "grand khán". Thus 'Abd al-Latíf might be QIPCHAQ's "stubborn rebel" or the cause of SILSILAT's "disorder and lawlessness in Mávará'al-nahr" which drew 'Ubayd Khán from the siege of Harát at the news of Abú Sa'id's death.

Item 4:

The fourth apparently unrelated fact is found in another passage in QIPCHAQ (591a). It is outwardly innocuous and quite possibly has no bearing on the situation. Nonetheless it is worth noting that 'Abd al-Latíf and Baráq Sultán (the head of the Suyúnjids of Táshkand-Turkistán) paid a respectful visit (b-mulá-zimat rasídand) to Abú Sa'id in Samarqand where they were greatly honored and graciously dismissed. The date of this meeting is of interest to the discussion here: 938, i.e. very likely when 'Ubayd Khán was engaged in his Fourth Invasion of Khurásán.

This item might well pass unnoticed except for the possibility that 'Ubayd Khán's claim to dominate Úzbek affairs might very possibly have been discussed. SILSILAT's "disorder and lawlessness" might then refer to the growing hostility of the "peers" and the

"grand khán" (of which evidence has been seen) or perhaps even to some sort of plot engineered against the Sháh-Budáqids while 'Ubayd Khán was away at the "long siege". Perhaps the attempted sabotage of the Jánibegids and of the atálıq at the Harát siege may be related to this particular seemingly innocent visit of state recorded in QIPCHAQ. In favor of such dark views is the fact that QIPCHAQ is a particularly terse source for the period of 'Ubayd Khán and it is striking that such an apparently petty detail should have been recorded unless it did indeed have a more general significance.

Item 5:

The remaining three items refer to later events but reflect on this period of 'Ubayd Khán's emergence as "grand khán".

The first is to be seen in the Úzbek succession after 'Ubayd Khán's death in 946/1540. The "grand khán" elected then is generally considered in the sources to have been 'Abdulláh Khán I (note: not the much more famous 'Abdulláh Khán II, the unifier of the Úzbeks). He was the son of Kúchim Khán and thus the brother of both Abú Sa'íd and 'Abd al-Latíf. After this 'Abdulláh Khán's death some six months later, 'Abd al-Latíf was finally recognized as "grand khán".

Since 'Abdulláh Khán had most likely been elected by virtue of his seniority in the Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House (ILCHI/267a describes him at that time as being "the eldest of the kháns"), he would of course automatically have been the eldest of his own Kúchkúnjid clan as well. That is to say, it would seem obvious that 'Abdulláh Khán was older than his brother 'Abd al-Latíf ,

and that at the time of Abú Sa'id's death it was 'Abdullah Khán rather than 'Abd al-Latíf who was the nominal head of the Kúchkúnjids.

This fact would have a direct bearing on the events leading up to 'Ubayd Khán's election as "grand khán" which we are attempting to reconstruct here: for it would mean that 'Abd al-Latíf, a junior in his own Kúchkúnjid clan, would have to be considered as a usurper by the Changízid code in any contest with 'Ubayd Khán over the position of "grand khán". 'Ubayd Khán would then have been defending his legitimate rights against the opposition of his "peers". This could certainly be considered as "disorder and lawlessness" on the part of a "stubborn rebel".

Item 6.

It will be seen from Part 3 "C" of this chapter that the Qizilbásh had planned an offensive against the Úzbek homelands directly after 'Ubayd Khán's precipitate flight from the Harát siege. Full scale preparations had actually been made by the Sháh in his Harát qishlág after the Third Liberation of Khurásán, to come up against the Ámú line and carry out an offensive which was to have definitively ended the Úzbek threat to Khurásán, and in keeping with this plan Qizilbásh detachments had been sent against Merv and Gharjistán, both of which had been occupied.

We shall return to this offensive below, but it may be pointed out here that it is certainly possible that the one and only forward campaign planned by Sháh Tahmásb against the Úzbeks may have been linked to a severe domestic crisis among the Úzbeks which might have encouraged the hopes of the Qizilbásh at this particular time. As will be seen below there is little other explanation

for the planned Qizilbásh offensive at this time of imminent domestic and Ottoman threats to the very existence of Sháh Tahmásp's Iran.

Item 7:

The final item is from negative evidence: 'Ubayd Khán did not launch his Fifth Invasion of Khurásán until a year and a half after his abandonment of the "long siege", and this despite the fact that it is the very period when Qizilbásh Iran seemed to be falling apart at the hands of the Ottoman invaders and an internal revolt with deep roots in Khurásán itself. To this may be added the fact that when the Khán did finally appear in Khurásán he had a contingent of Khwárizmian Úzbeks, and not of Úzbeks from his own Abú'l-Khayrid Dynastic House.

The interpretation might easily be that the Úzbek domestic situation during this period did not permit the luxury of a Khurásán invasion, and the presence of the Khwárizmians might imply that allies had been sought and found by the Sháh-Budáqids in order to secure their position against the opposition of the rival "neo-eponymous clans".

An attempted reconstruction of the events, based on the above seven unrelated items would be: There had been growing resistance among the rival clans to 'Ubayd Khán's would-be domination of Úzbek affairs and that this had been intensified during the Khán's long absence at the Harát siege. When the "grand khán", Abú Sa'íd, died in Samarcand under uncertain circumstances, the opposing party resisted 'Ubayd Khán's legal right to the accession by virtue of his seniority and recognized the Kúchkúnjid, 'Abd al-Latíf instead.

'Ubayd Khán was therefore forced to abandon his siege of Harát and could make no effort to engage Sháh Tahmásb's army of liberation. Upon his return to Mávará'al-nahr, 'Ubayd Khán defeated his enemies of the "neo-eponymous clans" and was finally elected as "grand khán" by a legal ourultáy in Samarqand. His position however was not fully consolidated for at least another year, during which time outside aid from the Khwárizmian Úzbeks was sought to counter the rival clans. When his position was secure he was ~~was~~ finally able to launch his Fifth Invasion of Khurásán.

It must be emphasized that the above reconstruction is tentative and is not based upon the direct evidence of any one source.

Part 3. The Third Royal Liberation of Khurásán

A. The Liberation of Northwestern Khurásán ¹

1. The Beginning of the Campaign and the Liberation of Astarábád

It will be recalled that the Court had remained in Āzarbāyján for two consecutive qishláos while 'Ubayd Khán's Ūzbeks had overrun most of Khurásán and had kept Harát under the "long siege". The fact that there had been no attempt at relief or even aid to the Qizilbāsh of Khurásán could not be ignored indefinitely and the Court had finally been committed to a Third Liberation. Preparations were therefore made during the second Tabríz qishlāq for the coming spring campaign of Yílán/939/1533.

The news of the daring Ūzbek raid by Qamish Ūghlan of Astarábád on the Ray area served as an impetus for these projected plans. The Ustájlú, Badr Khán was accordingly named as laleh to the Sháh's youngest brother, Alqás Mírzá and both were appointed to the governorship of Astarábád² and sent on ahead of the main Qizilbāsh army to

1. There are three reasonably detailed accounts: AFZAL/72a-73a, TAAA/44,45 and AHSAN/244-5. Although the accounts are parallel, there are some differences (particularly in the details of TAAA and AHSAN) and some additions (particularly in AFZAL). These variations are indicated in our narrative.

The other accounts are minor: ILCHI/44a, NUSAKH/216a, SHIRAZI/604a and TEZ/22. (ILCHI is quite clearly following TEZ here.) Both NUSAKH and SHIRAZI give the date of the beginning of the Third Liberation, a fact not given elsewhere (NUSAKH: the last 10 days of Zú'l-Hijjah; SHIRAZI: 8 Zú'l-Qa'deh).

2. Both ROUZAT/149b and SHARAF/561 record the appointment of Alqás and Badr Khán to Shírván at this same time, rather than to Astarábád. This may be due to a simple error in chronology, for they were both eventually appointed to Shírván upon its conquest by the Qizilbāsh in 945. Another interpretation would be that the appointment had actually been made to Shírván; that the Court was preparing for a conquest of Shírván during the second Tabríz qishlāq and had no clear-cut intention of beginning the Third Khurásán Liberation that spring; but that the news of the Ūzbek raid on Ray caused a change in plan; and thus Alqás and Badr Khán were shifted in their appointments from Shírván to Astarábád.

liberate the area to which they had been appointed.

The Sháh and the main Qizilbásh army followed along rather leisurely having left Tabríz as late as 8 Zú'l-Qa'deh/1 June. This late starting date (it was a long way from Tabríz to Harát) might simply indicate logistic difficulties, but it might also indicate that even now the Shámlú-Ustájlú clique at Court was not overly anxious to rescue the Takkalú--and Harát.

The newly appointed governors to Astarábád had left Tabríz as the advance army of the Third Liberation. Upon reaching Bistám a council (jánat) was held in which it was decided (by Badr Khán in TAAA; by Alcás Mírzá in AHSAN) to march directly against Astarábád and take Qamish Úghlan by surprise. So successful were the Qizilbásh in this, that most of the Úzbek garrison was caught ⁱⁿolling the hammám (bathhouse) when the súran or "war-cry" of 1500 Qizilbásh horse shouting "Alláh Alláh" and the blatant enemy military fifes suddenly sounded in Astarábád. The Úzbeks were caught in a most embarrassing position this Battle of the Hammám and were soon surrounded and captured. Although Qamish Úghlan and a few others (7/8 in TAAA; 5 in AHSAN) did manage to escape to Marv, his four brothers and some 500 of his men were taken and executed.

The severed Úzbek heads were jubilantly sent back to the Sháh who had by then reached Qazvín on the march east from Tabríz (AFZAL). Congratulatory khil'ats were sent to the new governors of Astarábád who remained in the liberated city with their detachment, and sought "to comfort" (tasallí-yi khátír) the Shí'eh population (AFZAL).

ii. The Liberation of Sabzivár, Nishápúr and Mashhad

The Court, continuing on its way east, now appointed a new advance detachment of Rúmlú horse (300 plus a group of Kúbíklú [?] in TAAA; 200 in AHSAN) under Súfyán Khalífeh Rúmlú. This advance party soon advanced to Sabzivár where the Úzbek garrison of 4000 men under the governor Khán Kaldí Bahádur was defeated (150 Úzbek were taken and executed) and forced to flee to Nishápúr.

Súfyán Khalífeh continued his pursuit but requested Qizilbásh reinforcements in order to defeat the remaining Úzbeks under Khán Kaldí and the 7000 (AHSAN:8000) horse still remaining with 'Abd al-'Azíz, the Úzbek governor of Mashhad. The advance detachment was thus joined near Nishápúr by a force under three of the leading Qizilbásh umará: the co-regent himself, Husayn Khán Shámlú, Aghzivár Sultán Shámlú, and Amír Sultán Rúmlú (the grandfather of the author of AHSAN).

The new Qizilbásh army was victorious over the Úzbeks in a battle near Nishápúr and began advancing on Mashhad (that is according to TAAA and AFZAL; AHSAN, the least detailed of the accounts has Súfyán take Nishápúr by himself and then joined by the reinforcements). The army was imposing enough to force 'Abd al-'Azíz to evacuate the Holy City and he fled to join his father, 'Ubayd Khán at the "long siege". The Qizilbásh thus entered Mashhad without any opposition.

According to AFZAL, the Sháh himself soon arrived in Mashhad (he had been leisurely hunting enroute while his umará were directly engaging the Úzbeks) and after performing the pilgrimage rites new appointments were made to the liberated areas of Sabzivár,

Nishábúr and Isfaráin.

Súfyan Khalífeh Rúmlú must have been appointed to one of these posts, for we find him the following year at Khabúshán where he was resisting an Úzbek raid; his presence there would suggest that at very least he had been appointed as governor of nearby Isfaráin at this time. A new Ustájlú governor, Sháh Qulí Sultán, was appointed to Mashhad evidently to replace the Ustájlú, Mantashá Sultán, who had become highly influential and remained attached to the Court. A new yazír for the local administration of Mashhad and the superintendence of the Holy Shrine was also named: he was Masíhá Khwájeh Rúhalláh Khúzání Isfahání, the grandfather of the author of AFZAL. (This latter fact presumably explains the many unique details given in AFZAL for events in Mashhad.)

iii. The Martyrdom of an Úzbek Sunni "for the love of Imám Rizá"

An Úzbek source (SUBHAN/91a-b) cites an interesting, although obscure tale which would seem relevant in understanding Sunni and Shí'eh attitudes toward Imám Rizá of the Holy Shrine of Mashhad, frequently referred to in the Safavid (and here also Úzbek) sources as the "Sultán of Khurásán". The account would seem to relate to this very period of Sháh Tahmásb's presence in Mashhad for the chronogram given (Shahíd-i 'Ishq-i Sultán: "Martyred for the love of the 'Sultán'") yields 939/1533.

The tale in brief is that the Úzbek poet, Mouláná Kúkchí, had been given leave by 'Ubayd Khán (presumably at the "long siege") to make the pilgrimage to Mashhad. The Mouláná had completed the pilgrimage rites, had left a casídeh (a longish poem of praise) in honor of Imám Rizá, and was already returning to Bukhárá when

Sháh Tahmásb heard about this sacrilege and sent a group of men after him. The Mouláná was "martyred" on the spot.

Although there are probably other factors involved in this tale which are not given by our source, the moral would seem to be that Úzbek Sunnis might very well have had a high regard for the Shi'eh Imáms (cf. above p.156 for the similar pilgrimage of the Ottoman, Sidi 'Alí Ra'ís), but that this was not considered sufficient grounds for religious fraternization by the extreme Shi'ism of Sháh Tahmásb's Court. For while sectarian fraternization might be acceptable on the level of "la grande politique", it was apparently not to be countenanced on the more individual and emotional level of action.

B. The Royal Entry into Harát and the Appointment of the Fourth
Khurásán Administration ¹

Some two solar months after 'Ubayd Khán's abandonment of the "long siege", on 22 JumádîI 940/9 December 1533, the Sháh finally entered Harát. Since the winter season was at hand the Qizilbásh army settled down for its first cishlâq in Khurásán.

After the welcoming ceremonies were over the Sháh heard the complaints brought in by the Harátis against the Takkalú atrocities during the siege. Ghází Khán was royally reprimanded; a number of Takkalú Qizilbásh was executed(JANG); restitution of looted property was ordered; and in cases where such restitution was not feasible the royal treasury was opened to make amends.

It is difficult to judge accurately the extent of genuine Court concern with the Qizilbásh atrocities on the "nobodies". The Takkalú actions were clearly against the morality of the times, but it is also quite apparent that their punishment was also used as a pretext for inter-úymâq partying. For it was an Ustájlú, the co-regent 'Abdulláh Khán, who was appointed to investigate the complaints (AFZAL) and he might not have been expected to have acted in the interests of abstract justice where the Takkalú were concerned.

1. The accounts are near-identical and probably stem from JANG/151b-152a. The references are: AFZAL/73b-74a, ROUZAT/151b, AHSAN/245-b, TAAA/45. (AFZAL alone cites 'Abdulláh Khán's investigation of the Takkalú atrocities.)

ILCHI/45b-40a repeats the political gossip of TEZ/25 (with the additional comment noted in our narrative) and states here that its author had received a copy of TEZ in India while he was engaged in writing his history and that he was making free use of it.

Factional politics is most obvious in the choice of the new governors to Harát: Sâm Mírzá and the Shámlú, Aghzívar Sultán. There will be a great deal to say about this appointment in the next chapter, for this new Khurásán administration was very closely involved in the dramatic events which were to follow.

Suffice it to say here, that while the panegyricizing chronicles speak of the magnanimity of the Sháh in censuring the Takkalú for their atrocities, the Sháh himself in his Diary (TEZ/25) records the fact that he had first asked Ghází Khán to remain on as governor of Khurásán but that this had been declined on the grounds that he and his Takkalú were too exhausted for further garrison duty after the rigors of the "long siege". (Only then, in the Sháh's personal account were Aghzívar Sultán and Sâm Mírzá invited to take on the responsibilities of defending Khurásán.) A better indication of Ghází Khán's status after the liberation of Harát is however perhaps to be seen in the fact that he very shortly deserted over to the Ottomans.

ILCHI gives another one of its keen insights into Court affairs by first noting the account in the Sháh's Diary and then adding in terms of a diplomatic observer that the reason for the appointment of the Shámlú, Aghzívar Sultán, was that the Shámlú regent, Husayn Khán, was then at the apogee of his power.

To this should be added the opposition (also recorded in TEZ) of the non-Shámlú umará at Court to this partisan--and in view of the past record--ominous reappointment of Sâm Mírzá and a Shámlú laleh.

To round out this new administration of Khurásán we should also note the appointments already cited of Alqás Mírzá-Badr Khán Ustájlú to Astarábád, Sháh Qulí Sultán Ustájlú to Mashhad, and Suyán Khalífeh Rúmlú probably to Isfaráín and possibly to Sabzivár and/or Nishápúr as well.

From the religious point of view however this secular administration was mere superstructure, for as AFZAL/75a expresses it: The Sháh "entrusted the territory of Khurásán to Sultán Abú'l-Hasan 'Alí ibn Músá al-Rizá [i.e. Imám Rizá of the Holy Shrine], upon whom be praise".

C. The Planned Qizilbāsh Offensive against the Ūzbeks ¹

I. General Considerations

We now come to the one time in the entire period of Shāh Tahmāsb's duel with 'Ubayd Khān in which the Qizilbāsh seem genuinely to have been thinking of an offensive against the Ūzbeks which would definitively end the threat to Khurāsān.

As a matter of fact all four of the Shāh's expeditions to the east may be described primarily as "liberations" for they were undertaken only when the Ūzbeks had occupied Khurāsān and there arose a potential threat to 'Irāq-i 'Ajam or Central Iran, itself. These campaigns should therefore be considered as essentially defensive in nature. The first two "liberations" were successful in accomplishing this limited end of expelling the Ūzbeks from Khurāsān; but then in both cases a major Qizilbāsh army under the royal banner itself immediately turned back and priority was given to nothing more urgent than a revolt in Baghdād in the first case, and the suspicious actions of Husayn Khān and Sām Mīrzā in the second. That is to say the initial Qizilbāsh successes were not followed through to any conclusion and actually accomplished very little toward mitigating the potential of the Ūzbek threat.

In this Third Liberation campaign however we have the only reference to genuine offensive thinking in all of Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with the Ūzbeks. In fact the generalization may well

1. The most important account is TEZ/22-24; ILCHI/44b-46b follows TEZ closely and cites it as its authority but adds a few details to this account. Another important account is ROUZAT/152a-b particularly for the details on the Marv and Gharjistān campaigns. Less detailed are: AFZAL/74a-75b, AHSAN/246-7, NUSAKH/216a-b, TAAAR/45.

be made that the Sháh's military ventures with both Ottomans and Úzbeks were largely passive in nature. There is no mention made of Sháh Tahmásb's thinking in terms of grand campaigns of conquest in the manner of such glamorous tenth/sixteenth century figures as Sháh Ismá'il and Sháh 'Abbás in his own family, 'Ubayd Khán and 'Abdulláh Khán among the Úzbeks, Salím and Sulaymán for the Ottomans, and Bábur and Akbar for the Mughals. As a matter of fact, Sháh Tahmásb retired from all active life in 964/1555 and until his death some twenty years later scarcely left the royal palace at Qazvín (see e.g. KHULASEH/364b, ROUZAT/224a-b). A more venturesome Qizilbásh sháh might well have been tempted to launch an offensive against the constantly plundering Úzbeks, for by that time the western front had been secured by a firm Ottoman peace and the Úzbeks were fully occupied domestically by the attempts of 'Abdulláh Khán to force them into unity (964-986/1555-1578). In terms of the influence of the ruler on national affairs, it can only be said that Sháh Tahmásb was neither "Magnificent" like Sulaymán, nor "Great" like Sháh 'Abbás.

The question of why an offensive was planned during this particular Third Liberation (and at no other time) is not answered by the sources at our disposal.

It cannot be suggested that the western front was quiet at this time for the news came during the very winter at Harát when the Court was actively planning its offensive that: án harámzádeh ("that bastard"), Úlámeš Sultán the Takkalú renegade, had been given a second Ottoman army; he had again come against Bitlís and killed Sharaf Khán, the Kurdish client of the Qizilbásh there, in battle;

and that there was the distinct possibility of further full-scale Ottoman aggression. And yet, despite the fact that two military seasons had been spent on the Āzarbāyjān front precisely in the event of such a contingency, the Shāh now records his reaction to this news in his Diary (TEZ/22) as follows: "Since there was no exigency in the affair, we overlooked it and did not feel duty-bound to act and so we made our qishlāq in Harāt".¹ Of course when the news came early in the following summer that Sulaymān himself had launched his first Iranian invasion and that Tabrīz had fallen, the situation was changed and naturally enough the luxury of the planned offensive against the Ūzbeks was forgotten--permanently.

We must thus leave as unresolved the question of the Court motivations in choosing this particular time in its relations with the Ūzbeks to carry out an offensive into the enemy's home territories. We have seen that the western front was unstable and shall very shortly see how precarious the Qizilbāsh domestic situation was. Against this we can only cite the possibility that 'Ubayd Khān's personal position was being challenged at this time by his "peers" and the Māvarā'al-nahr may have been seething with "disorder and lawlessness".

II. The Probing Qizilbāsh Missions against Marv and Gharjistān

The preparations for the coming campaign seem earnest enough for it is stated (TAAA) that artillery (asbāb-i túbkhāneh) was being assembled in Harāt. Even more striking is the evidence provided by two preliminary Qizilbāsh probing campaigns against the Khurāsān

1. "Chūn mahall-i muqtazā-yi ān nabūd taghāful namūdeh muqayyid b-dān negardideh dar Harāt qishlāq kardīm."

border areas of Marv and Gharjistán which set out early in the spring of the "new year" (Yúnt/940/1534).

The Marv mission was put under the command of the royal brother Alcás Mírzá and his laleh, Badr Khán Ustájlú (who, as has been seen, had liberated Astarábád and were the new governors there). The seriousness of the royal intention to advance into Úzbek territory is indicated by the orders alleged by RCUZAT to have been issued to the mission: they were not to return until 'Ubayd Khán's garrison there had been eliminated. The Qizilbásh however met with no opposition for the Úzbek governor simply fled at their approach. A Qizilbásh governor was then appointed in Marv and the victorious mission went (or returned) to Harát.

The strategic importance of Marv for the defence of Khurásán in this period is made abundantly clear by 'Ubayd Khán's constant use of it as a staging center for his invasions into, or retreats from Khurásán, for it was on the direct road via the Chahár-jú (Chárjúy) crossing of the Ámú River between Mashhad and Bukhárá.

Marv did not remain in Qizilbásh hands for long and was re-occupied by the Úzbeks during the Fifth of 'Ubayd Khán's Invasions. Shortly after that (GHAZI/255 says it was in the period of 'Ubayd Khán, but it is likely that its chronology here is off) passed to Dín Muhammad Sultán of the Khwárizmian Úzbeks and served as his base of operations for the frequent raids against Qizilbásh Khurásán. AED/71b makes its strategic importance for such purposes clear, for it states that the purpose of 'Abdulláh Khán's unsuccessful attempt on Khwárizmian held Marv (974/1566-7) was to use it as a base to raid the "infidel" Qizilbásh (the term jihád or "holy war" is used here) as his uncles and forefathers had done (this would

presumably include 'Ubayd Khán).

The purpose of the mission against Gharjistán, in the northern foothills of the Hindúkush, is not as clear, for although most of the area was probably under the loose control of the Balkh Úzbeks at this time, its terrain precluded its use as the royal road to Balkh. Nor was this mission as successful as the one sent against Merv even though it was led by three of the leading Qizilbásh umará of the time: Husayn Khán Shámlú, Mantashá Sultán Ustájlú and Amír Sultán Rúmlú. They did succeed however in forcing the local ruler there, Amír Sháh Muhammad Sayf al-Mulúk (he had beaten off attacks by both the Qizilbásh and Bábur from 923-925/1517-19; see above p.48 and n.1) to flee to the mountain recesses of his territory, and a Qizilbásh governor of some sorts was established there. However, the next heard of Gharjistán just one year later, it was apparently under full Úzbek control from Balkh.

When these two missions were sent out the Sháh himself went to Mashhad once again and prayed for divine aid in the coming campaign against the Úzbeks. The Sháh and the umará of the two missions all returned to Harát at about the same time, and final preparations were now made to advance on Balkh, i.e. deep into Úzbek home territory.

III. The Beginning and End of the Planned Offensive

Thus it was that at the beginning of the summer of Yúnt (on 11 Zú'l-Hijjah 940/23 June 1534) Sháh Tahmásb left Harát for the nearby staging grounds at Ulang-i Nishín, where the Qizilbásh levees which had been scattered for the past qishláq season were now ordered to reassemble for the big push against the Úzbeks. The

plan was first to march on Balkh and from there to cross the Ámú into Mávará'al-nahr and (to so) punish the Úzbeks that they would not dare to trouble Khurásán again.

While the preparations were going on the Sháh had an interesting dream, recorded in his Diary (TEZ/23), which points up the anxiety he must have felt about the venture into the Úzbek homelands. Hazrat-i 'Alí appeared to the Sháh in this dream and was asked how the Qizilbásh would fare if they should wage warfare "on that side [i.e. the Úzbek side] of the river". As is often the case with oracles the answer was rather evasive: e.g., "There is nothing on 'that side'; whatever is, is on 'this side'".¹

The Sháh interpreted Hazrat-i 'Alí's answer as meaning that the war would be fought "on this side of the river" (i.e. the Iranian side of the Ámú), and this is exactly what was to happen although it was to be with the Ottomans and not with with Úzbeks.

The frightening news from the western front came while the Sháh was still at the Uláng-i Nishín staging grounds: Úlámeš Sultán had taken Tabríz with an Ottoman army.

This was enough to cancel the scheduled offensive against the Úzbeks and steps were immediately taken to prepare instead to counter the western threat. And before long came the inevitable follow-up to the news. What the Sháh had been fearing ever since Úlámeš's flight to Istanbul from the "Takkalú Disaster" now came to pass: the "Lord" of the Porte, the "Khwándeğár", Sulaymán the Magnificent, was marching in person against Iran in full force.

1. "Dar án taraf-i Áb hích chíz níst har cheh hast dar in taraf-i Áb ast."

And so on 7 Safar 941/18 August 1534, some 40 days after leaving Harát for the first stage of what was to have been a leisurely campaign against Balkh and Mávará'al-nahr, the Qizilbásh army began instead a rapid forced march toward Ázarbáyján. The situation is summed up by ROUZAT/152b as follows: "In accordance with the saying al-ahamm fa'l-ahamm i.e. 'the more important becomes the most important', [the Sháh] realized that the suppression of Úlámeh's mischief and the defence against the inundation of that Darius of the Ottomans [i.e. Sulaymán] was more important than taking Balkh; [and so it was that] he canceled that intention".¹

This ended the period of the Fourth Úzbek Invasion of Khurásán and the Third Liberation campaign. The Úzbeks had occupied northwestern Khurásán during this period but had been stopped at the walls of Harát for a year and a half. When the royal liberation army approached, the Úzbeks had simply evacuated their conquests, although there is reason to believe that internal developments in Mávará'al-nahr had precipitated his flight. The Qizilbásh had planned to make this liberation definitive but had been caught in a double-front situation and had perforce to attend to the more serious Ottoman threat.

The period of the Fourth Úzbek Invasion was thus essentially a stalemate, for nothing of any great consequence had been resolved. The fact had simply been demonstrated once again that unless a basic change occurred in the situation, the Qizilbásh could only hope to hold Khurásán by maintaining a full-scale army in the east. This was however not feasible in a double-front situation.

1. "Mazmún-i al-ahamm fa'l-ahamm daf'-i fasád-i Úlámeh va mudáfa'eh-yi tughyán-i Dará-yi Rúm ahamm az taskhír-i Balkh dánisteh faskh-i en 'azímat namúd."

Chapter 5. The Ottoman Invasion and the "Grand Sedition"

(Yunt-Guy/ 940-942/ 1534-1536)

Part 1. The Ottoman "Campaign of the Two 'Irāqs"

A. General Considerations

Although we are not directly concerned here with Shāh Tahmāsb's relations with his western neighbor, nonetheless careful attention must be paid to what is called in FERĪDUN/1/584 "The Campaign of the Two 'Irāqs" and in other Ottoman sources, simply "The Baghdad Campaign" (e.g. NİŞANCI/227). This two year campaign of the Ottomans in 'Irāq-i 'Arab (Mesopotamia) and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam (Central Iran) is considered in the Safavid sources as two separate invasions broken by the winter qishlāq of the Ottomans at Baghdād and of the Qizilbāsh at the siege of Vān in eastern Anatolia.

An invasion of this magnitude and the efforts to counteract it could not help but have considerable indirect repercussions on the local situation in Khurāsān and on the Ūzbek designs on the area. Thus it has already been seen how this invasion ended the projected Qizilbāsh offensive against Mávará'al-nahr, and it will be seen in the next chapter that 'Ubayd Khān took full advantage of the western diversion as soon as conditions permitted the launching of his Fifth and Final Invasion against Khurāsān.

But much more important are the direct repercussions on Iran as a whole, for the Ottoman invasion brought in its wake not only the threat of the military conquest of western Iran (Tabríz and Hamadān were briefly occupied; Sultāniyeh, well past the half-way point on the road from Tabríz to Qazvín, was reached by the enemy; and Baghdād was permanently lost)--but also an internal Qizilbāsh crisis which rocked the foundations of the Safavid state. This

internal crisis, which will be referred to here as the "Grand Sedition", included the defection of leading Qizilbásh umará to the enemy side and a plot to overthrow Sháh Tahmásb himself. The revolt of Sám Mírzá and the Shámlú in Khurásán and the subsequent events there can only be understood in terms of this dual, basic threat to the very existence of Safavid Iran.

As a final consequence of the Ottoman invasion and the "Grand Sedition" on eastern affairs, it should be pointed out that Sháh Tahmásb's victory over both the foreign and domestic threats signaled his emergence as independent ruler over the úymáq. The end of the úymáo regency meant that a policy could finally be followed in the interests of the central authority and not in the localized interests of the feuding úymáq. This would be a key factor in ending the "duel over Khurásán" in the Sháh's favor.

It must be said at once that although there is no great problem in collating the Ottoman and Safavid sources for the military events, there is a great deal hidden from us in the accounts of the domestic developments. That there were serious defections to the Ottoman side; that leading Qizilbásh umará were planning to overthrow Sháh Tahmásb; that the Ottomans were involved in these developments-- are all reasonably clear. The answers to other questions which must be posed, however, are not as clear, viz. Are the events in Khurásán and Sám Mírzá's revolt to be considered as part of a vast plot aimed at Sháh Tahmásb? What, if any, is the Úzbek involvement in these internal events?

B. Uzbek-Ottoman Relations

The investigation of Uzbek-Ottoman relations during this period would properly form an independent study and would necessitate a search in the Turkish and Russian archival material and a consideration of the intermediary khánates of the Crimea and Astrakhán as well. For our purposes however it is sufficient to view these relations only as they directly effect the situation in Khurásán and for this limited purpose we have relied solely on FERİDUN's collection of diplomatic documents.

From the three letters preserved in FERİDUN/1/374-7,377-9,415-6, we know that in the preceding generation the Ottoman Sultán Salım (918-920/1512-1520) had been in correspondence with 'Ubayd Khán and that joint action against the common Qizilbásh enemy had been discussed. These letters written at about the time of Salım's invasion of Iran (culminating in the Ottoman victory at Cháldirán in 920/1514) are a possible indication that an active military alliance had been formed; for it is the same period as the Ūzbeks' second invasion of Khurásán (i.e. after the fiasco of Shíbání Khán) and of their continuing raids which lasted to about 921/1515.

FERİDUN has also preserved the correspondence of Sulaymán the Magnificent dated from 957/1550 to about 970/1562 with the later Ūzbek kháns contemporary with Sháh Tahmásb. This correspondence (1/606,612; 11/48,51,80,81,83,84) indicates that the Ottoman-Ūzbek "alliance" was still a diplomatic feature of the times and there is a great deal of discussion on the possibilities for joint action against the Qizilbásh.

However nothing has been preserved for the period of 'Ubayd

Khán's duel with Sháh Tahmásb over Khurásán. This does not necessarily preclude the fact that correspondence was maintained during this period and an independent study of the subject might reveal such material. As a matter of fact two of the later letters referred to above in FERÍDUN do refer vaguely to a continuing correspondence between 'Ubayd Khán and the Porte and they may very possibly be referring to the post-Salím period as well.

The references are in (1) a letter dated 903/1556 from Burhán Sultán (the grandson of 'Ubayd Khán) in Bukhárá to Sulaymán, in vol. ii pp.81-83; and (2) a reply to Úzbek Khán (the grandson of Jáníbeg Sultán) which while undated must from its context refer to some time shortly after 909/1561, in vol.ii pp.51-52.

Burhán's letter, in which he is requesting that Ottoman Janissaries be sent for use against the Qizilbásh, also states that his forefathers (abá va ajdád), especially the late 'Ubayd(ulláh) Khán (the text has "'Abdulláh" which is an obvious error), had spent most of their time fighting the infidel Qizilbásh and that although they had always (hamagí) sought aid from the Porte, this had not materialized in the past.

Sulaymán's reply to Úzbek Khán, in which he is discouraging the Úzbeks from attacking Sháh Tahmásb since an Ottoman-Safavid peace had been made, also refers vaguely to the past correspondence with 'Ubayd(ulláh) Khán and also with the latter's son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Khán who ruled in Bukhárá from 946-957/1540-1550. He states that those two kháns had "in past times" (sevalif-i evan ve sevabík-i ezmanda) "never ceased" (inkíta ve infisal göstermeyip) sending letters (maka-tibet) announcing their victories over the Qizilbásh and expressing tokens of their sincere friendship.

It will be seen that these references are exceedingly vague and that they bear out the negative evidence in the chronicles consulted in which there is no specific mention of any sort of Ottoman-Úzbek entente during the period of Sháh Tahmásb and 'Ubayd Khán. The tentative conclusion would be that Úzbek-Ottoman relations were actually not particularly close at the time of Sulaymán's "Campaign of the Two 'Iráqs".

FERİDUN/1/541-3 has preserved Sulaymán's threatening letter to Sháh Tahmásb which while undated would clearly seem to ^{be} referring to the period just prior to the first Ottoman invasion of Iran. There is a curious and indirect reference to the Úzbeks here (p.541) which is in keeping with the negative evidence we have presented of a certain lack of cordiality between the Porte and Bukhárá at this time. Sulaymán threatens to "pitch his tents" not only in Tabríz and Ázarbáyján, but also "in the lands of Írán and Túrán and the other province(s) of Samarqand and Khurásán".¹

Of course these threats are in the exaggerated munshiyáneh style of the contemporary diplomacy and were simply meant to boast of the Ottoman might. But nonetheless it is a possible indication of a certain lack of sympathy with the Úzbeks who, he surely knew, were the masters of Túrán and Samarqand and had "special interests" in Khurásán. One thing is clear: Sulaymán was not using the Úzbeks to threaten the Sháh with the prospects of a two-front war.

The problem directly affects our understanding of the situation in Khurásán in this period, for it is indeed strange that there was

1. "utak-i gerdun-nitak Tebriz ve Azerbaycan belki memalik-i Iran ve Turan ve sayir-i vilâyet-i Semerkent ve Horasan sahralarında kurulmak mukarrar oldu".

no Uzbek invasion of Sâm Mîrzâ's Khurâsân during Sulaymân's invasion of Iran when it seemed that Shâh Tahmâsb must be crushed between his foreign and domestic enemies.

There are several possible conjectures to explain this which may be briefly allude to here. For one, the factors which had led to the deterioration of 'Ubayd Khân's position among the Uzbeks (see above pp.236-7) may still have been operative. It will be recalled that he had been forced to abandon Khurâsân and that only the timely Ottoman invasion had spared the Uzbeks the prospect of a qizilbâsh offensive aimed at their home territories. It is doubtlessly significant that when he did finally launch his fifth and final Invasion of Khurâsân, despite the fact that he was then the legal "grand khân", it was without the aid of any of his "peers" from among the rival "neo-eponymous clans".

A second conjecture is the possibility which will be frequently alluded to, of 'Ubayd Khân's collusion with Sâm Mîrzâ and the Shâmlú in Khurâsân. If this could be proved we could actually have some basis for assuming a communality of interests between the Uzbeks and the Ottomans, for Sâm Mîrzâ had been officially recognized as an Ottoman client. As against this however is the fact that 'Ubayd Khân's final attempt on Khurâsân began only after Sâm Mîrzâ had already been bogged down for several months at the fruitless siege of Mughal held Qandahâr and it had already become obvious that the "Grand Sedition" had failed. Most important of all, by that time the Ottomans had already begun their withdrawal from Iran.

Whatever the explanations, it would seem clear that although the Uzbeks may have been, and the Ottomans certainly were, involved

in the "Grand Sedition", there is no positive evidence as yet to link the two major enemies of the Qizilbásh during this period. The only possible link offered in the sources--and it is admittedly a most tenuous one--is in the person of Muẓaffar Khán, the semi-independent governor of Gílán, who, as will be seen, was executed for his dealings with both Sulaymán and 'Ubayd Khán.

The tentative conclusion would thus be that 'Ubayd Khán's Final Invasion of Khurásán was planned independently of the Ottoman invasion: by the time it was launched it was already too late to force a two-front war on Sháh Tahmásb.

C. The Course of Action ¹

Unbeknown to the Sháh, while he was in the Harát cishlág making plans for a Mávará'al-nahr campaign, the Ottomans were simultaneously making theirs for an Iranian campaign. Úlámeš Tekkalú, the Qizilbásh renegade who was now back at the Bitlis front, had notified the Porte that the Sháh was fully engaged in Khurésán and that Ázarbáyján and 'Iráq-i 'Ajam were theirs for the taking (AHSAN/247). Ibráhim Páshá, the Ottoman "grand vazír", had accordingly been sent to Aleppo that same winter to make the necessary preparations for a spring invasion.

Thus it was that the same spring of Yúnt/940/1534 when the Sháh was beginning his offensive against the Úzbeks, Ibráhim Páshá easily advanced through Qizilbásh held eastern Anatolia and entered Tabriz unopposed (1 Muharram 941/13 July 1534). By that date Sulaymán the Magnificent had made his Austrian peace and had already begun his march eastward to join the "grand vazír's" advance army: he was at Tabriz some two and a half months after the entry of Ibráhim Páshá. Before the Sháh was even aware of the

1. Both Safavid and Ottoman sources are sufficiently ample for a reasonably well-balanced reconstruction of the events of Sulaymán's Iranian campaign; however both versions must be carefully collated for the point of view is naturally totally different.

The major Safavid accounts are: AHSAN/247-252, 256-260, KHULASEH/137b-140b, 144a-146a, TEZ/24-41, ROUZAT/153a-160a, ILCHI/47a-51a, TAA/49-51, NUSAKH/216b-217a, SHIRAZI/604b-606a. The Shah's Diary (TEZ) is particularly important here when balanced with the more "standard" accounts of the chronicles.

The Ottoman published sources consulted are equally detailed: SOLAKZADE/483-490, PECEVÍ/176-188, SULEYMANNAME/115-123, LUTFÍ/344-355, NISANCI/227-233, MUNECCİMBASI/111/489-492, GIESE/142-144, FERIDUN/17584-598. FERIDUN contains Sulaymán's itinerary for the campaign and is particularly important for establishing the chronology and for the mention of the Ottoman recognition of Sâm Mirzá.

personal arrival of the Khwāndegār, the Ottomans were already advancing along the main Tabriz-Qazvin Highway toward Sultāniyeh to engage the main Qizilbāsh forces.

As has already been seen the Shāh had left Harāt to counter the western threat on 7 Safar/18 August, i.e. some five weeks after Ibrāhīm Pāshā had entered Tabriz; but he was still unaware that he was faced with a full-scale Ottoman invasion marked by the personal presence of the Khwāndegār, Sulaymān. He thus sent an advance party (under the Shāmlú Qūrchibāshī or "head of the royal guards" and Mantashā Sultān Ustājlu) to learn the strength of the Ottomans, but he himself first went to the Holy City of Mashhad on the third pilgrimage (AFZAL/75a, ILCHI/46b) since the start of the Third Liberation.

It was most likely at this pilgrimage that the Shāh's famous toubeh (renunciation of wine and the other religiously illegal pleasures) came into effect. This toubeh was the result of a dream in which the Prophet Muḥammad himself promised military victories if the vow were taken (TEZ/30). The Shāh's toubeh at the age of 20 and a half (solar years) was not limited to his own person, for all of Iran was made to follow suit and despite the opposition of the libertine umarā (ibid.) all bordellos, taverns and gambling dens were closed and the government revenues from these sources were stricken from the financial register (ROUZAT/152b). In his Diary (TEZ/31) the Shāh claims all his subsequent victories were due to this religious abnegation. (We shall return to this toubeh below in the discussion of the time and locale of the poison plot aimed at Shāh Tahmāsb.)

The Sháh then hurried on to the western front and reached Ray in a total of 21 forced marches. He passed rapidly through Qazvin and finally reached Abhar on the road to Sultániyeh when the news was confirmed that not only had the Khwándegár arrived in Ázar-béyján, but that he was already hurrying toward Sultániyeh to engage the Sháh in battle.

But Sháh Tahmásp was not in a position to engage the full Ottoman army for the rapid march had exhausted his men and horses. Furthermore much of the Qizilbásh army had by then dispersed, TAAA/50 says to prepare for the coming campaign, but AHSAN's/250 explanation that they feared to face Sulaymán in their weakened state is probably more accurate. The Sháh was thus left with 7000 men and 3000 usable horses, for in addition to those who had disassociated themselves from the Sháh, the major umará had been sent out on "scouting duty". The number of these "scouting parties" would suggest that we have here the first signs of the "Grand Sedition", and it was not long before Qizilbásh morale had reached the point where the Sháh could not trust the loyalties of any of his umará (AHSAN/249).

It is however doubtful that even had the Sháh had a full complement of troops and equipment, and even had there been no desertions over to the Ottomans, would there have been a full-scale field battle between the Qizilbásh and the Ottomans. Except for the single case of Jám, Sháh Tahmásp did not fight his wars in the traditional manner expected of his times. He relied instead on "scorched earth" methods and a harrying guerrilla warfare. (There is no need to go deeper into this type of warfare since it was not applied to the eastern front; it is however fully documented, particularly in TEZ, ILCHI and ROUZAT and corroborated by the Ottoman accounts.)

These methods were ideal against the Ottoman army, for Sulaymán, who was not so "magnificent" in this case, had overextended his lines in Sultáníyeh, had advanced late in the season, and was bogged down with heavy equipment for the open field battle which the Sháh (TEZ/29-30) declined to engage in. A severe snowstorm and the early setting in of winter that year (beginning of November) were all that were necessary to force the Ottoman army into a disastrous defeat in which many men and much equipment were lost. The Safavid sources see the direct intervention of the Holy Imáms in this victory, for the Qizilbásh army had but very little to do with it.

Sulaymán was retreating via Hamadán and expecting to make his qishlác in Mousil (Mosul) when Baghdád was offered up to him by its Takkalú garrison. It will be recalled that a large number of Takkalú had fled to Baghdád at the time of the "Takkalú Disaster"; they had now ~~now~~ joined in the "Grand Sedition". Thus it was that Sulaymán made the first Ottoman entry into Baghdád.

The haphazardness of the campaign is seen in the fact that while Ázarbáyján was quickly reoccupied by the Qizilbásh and the Sháh advanced to make his qishlác at the siege of Ván, the Ottomans had occupied 'Iráq-i 'Arab and Sulaymán had made his qishlác in Baghdád.

The next spring Sulaymán again advanced on Ázarbáyján (the second Ottoman invasion of Iran by Safavid count) and thus forced the Sháh to retreat from his advanced position at Ván. Tabríz was again occupied by the Ottomans and although they advanced again toward Sultáníyeh, they were so severely harassed by small Qizilbásh guerrilla groups, and so successful was the "scorched earth" policy that they

were soon forced to retreat once more. There were a few minor engagements (in which neither Sulaymán nor the Sháh personally participated) which only served to harrass the Ottomans out of Iran and eastern Anatolia. At the end, the Qizilbásh were in possession of Anatolia up to the Lake Ván cities, but much more important was the fact that they had permanently lost Baghdád and 'Iráq-i 'Arab to the Ottomans.

We leave to the Ottoman historian the problem of understanding the rather poor showing of the army of Sulaymán the Magnificent against the outnumbered and out-equipped Qizilbásh who were in the throes of a severe domestic crisis. It is to this domestic crisis we now turn and to its ramifications on Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks.

Part 2. The "Grand Sedition"

A. Background on Inter-Úymáq Factionalism

I. Introduction

The "Grand Sedition" which was concomitant with the Ottoman invasion must be examined carefully, for it was of great significance for events in Khurásán and for Sháh Tahmásb's final relations with 'Ubayd Khán. It must be emphasized however that none of the sources speak of a "Grand Sedition" as such; we are merely given a number of apparently isolated events. Upon careful reading these "isolated events" do however suggest a certain pattern of unity which we have taken the liberty of calling the "Grand Sedition".

The most obvious of the seditious movements at this time were the defections of a number of leading umará to the enemy side. The question to be decided in this connection is whether or not these desertions were actually part of a more general plot--with roots in Khurásán--to overthrow Sháh Tahmásb's control of Iran.

II. The Substratum of Inter-Úymáq Relationships

As pointed out in Section I (p.11) a proper understanding of individual and úymáq feuds and coalitions would first necessitate a special study on the formation of the úymáq in the pre-Sháh Tahmásb period and that V. Minorsky (op.cit.) has already pointed the way by carefully noting the úymáq alignments in the period of Sháh Ismá'il. In this dissertation some of the inter-úymáq relationships have been discussed but only in the narrower context of the influence on eastern affairs and no claims to completeness are intended. However, as a suggestion of the ramifications of this substratum of inherited hostilities on the "Grand Sedition" of

941-942/1534-1535 it may be useful to cite briefly the examples of Úlámeh Sultán Takkalú and Muḥammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí.

Úlámeh Sultán (or Páshá), the arch-renegade and inciter of Sulaymán's "Campaign of the Two 'Iráqs", had joined the Qizilbásh only after first deserting from the Ottoman side in the time of Sultán Báyzíd (886-918/1481-1512), the grandfather of Suláymán. From the Ottoman sources (PEÇEVİ/175, SULEYMANNAME/114) we learn that he had joined the pro-Safavid Shí'eh movement of "Shaytán" Qulí in Anatolia (917/1511-12) and had deserted the tímar ("fief") given to him by Báyzíd in Takkeh (i.e. Tekke on the south Aegean coast: hence Takkalú or "Tekkelü") and that "he had become a Qizilbásh" (Qizilbaş olmuş idi :PEÇEVİ). The movement of "Sháh" (rather than the Ottoman pejorative "Shaytán" or "devil") Bába Qulí and the arrival of the Takkalú is recorded in the Safavid sources (e.g. AHSAN/125-6, 128) but no mention is made of Úlámeh or of the fact that the desertion to the Ottomans at the time of the "Grand Sedition" might be considered a return to an original loyalty, or that the Takkalú, as late arrivals among the Qizilbásh might have felt insecure. Furthermore, despite their rise to the hegemony in the early period of Sháh Tahmásb, it is quite possible that Sháh Ismá'il's massacre of a number of Takkalú upon their arrival at Court (AHSAN/126) had not been forgotten.

Similarly, the case of Muḥammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí who deserted over to Sulaymán at Sultániyeh with a group of Takkalú and 1000 horse, can be better understood with a reference to his background. He was of the ruling family of the old Zú'l-Qadar dynasty of Mar'ash and Diyárbakr in eastern Anatolia, a dynasty which had been crushed between Sultán Salím of the Ottomans on the west

and Sháh Ismá'il on the east. At the breakup of their state some individuals had joined the Ottoman service and some, including Muhammad Khán, had become Qizilbásh and formed the Zú'l-Qadar úymáq (AHSAN/155). To understand the factional politics at Sháh Tahmásb's Court it is necessary to note that it was the Ustájlú who had represented the Safavid side in the dismemberment of the Zú'l-Qadar state. As pointed out in TAAA/36 Muhammad Khán had been particularly zealous on the Takkalú side in the Ustájlú Wars at the beginning of Sháh Tahmásb's reign "for revenge of the events at Diyárbakr" (b-intiqám-i vaqáyi'-i Diyárbakr) in which his father and brothers had been killed by the Ustájlú. This is also noted in AHSAN/249 where it is stated that Muhammad Khán deserted over to the Ottomans because of the hostility ('adávat) he felt because of the killing of his father.

As will be seen shortly, a Takkalú-Zú'l-Qadar entente makes a great deal of sense since the common traditional enemy, the Ustájlú, are seen to be the leading loyalist party in the "Grand Sedition". Nonetheless, it must be admitted that this substratum does not tell the whole story, for while a Takkalú-Zú'l-Qadar axis may well be postulated, individual members of these two úymáq, such as Muhammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí Takkalú, the governor of Baghdád and Ghází Khán Zú'l-Qadar, the governor of Shiráz did remain loyal to the Sháh during the "Grand Sedition". As will be seen, factionalism had its individual motivations as well which could cut through the more traditional alliances or hostilities inherited from the past.

iii. The Úymáq Factions at the Time of the "Grand Sedition"

More important for the immediate purposes here than this substratum is the fact that the inter-úymáq rivalries for the regency now reached their climax. The invasion of Sulaymán had caught the Qizilbásh completely off guard and the rapid march back from Khurásán had entailed considerable disorganization in the Sháh's army. At this critical point when Sulaymán had already reached Sultániyeh well on the road to Qazvín, the Sháh was left with but 7000 men and we find that he could no longer trust any of his umará. Instead of a great rallying around the Sháh we find the old úymáq rivalries brought to the surface and now heightened by the smoldering effects of the "Takkalú Disaster" and a rift in the Shámlú-Ustájlú hegemony. To this should be added two new factors: one, was the fact that the Sháh could no longer be expected to remain as the puppet of any one úymáq group; and second, was the intervention of the Ottomans (and possibly the Úzbeks as well) in the domestic situation.

The background of this new domestic crisis has already been traced through the period of the Ustájlú-Takkalú Wars, the Takkalú hegemony and "Disaster", and the new Shámlú-Ustájlú coalition under the leadership of Husayn Khán Shámlú which had succeeded to the regency in 937/1531, i.e. about three years before the Ottoman invasion. The final phase of these inter-úymáq contentions, the "Grand Sedition" now broke out in the critical time of foreign invasion.

There are hints all through the sources of a "Grand Sedition"; but it is nowhere stated explicitly (and the Sháh's Diary makes no mention whatsoever) of what would seem to have been an úymáq plot

led by the Shámlú, and probably the Takkalú as well, to stage a coup d'état which would have unseated Sháh Tahmásb in favor of his younger brother Sám Mirzá, the then titular governor of Khurásán. Furthermore, it would seem that this grand scheme was to have been brought about under the cover of the Ottoman invasion. The Úzbeks may have been involved as well but this is conjecture.

As a matter of fact a certain amount of conjecture is inevitable if an attempt is to be made to give any unity to the apparently unrelated facts as given in the sources. The sources present gaps in the narrative and there is no overall situation-report. For instance we are generally given as isolated and unrelated events which are presented in haphazard chronological order such items as: a poison plot against the Sháh; desertions of specifically named leading umará over to the Ottoman side; Sám Mirzá's revolt in Khurásán; the execution of Husayn Khán and the "disgrace" of the Shámlú; the Ottoman recognition of Sám Mirzá, etc.

On the basis of our study of the past events it is certainly plausible to suggest that certain of the úymáq leaders (particularly from among the dominant Shámlú) were well aware that the royal person was no longer of an age (he was then almost 20 and a half solar years old) where he could be manipulated as before, for there were increasing signs of his independent actions. Sám Mirzá, the younger brother of the Sháh (he would have been 17 solar years old when the Sháh left him as governor in Harát), who was closely associated with the Shámlú, might well have been thought of as a more flexible puppet.

Another conjecture we may permit ourselves, based on the evidence at hand to be sure, is that of a split in the Shámlú-Ustájlú coalition

perhaps due to the fear and/or envy of the Ustájlú at the more dominant role of their partners. There is no specific reference to such a rift, but this suggests itself from certain actions of individual Ustájlú to be cited below which show an anti-Shámlú tendency, a continuing bitterness against the remaining Takkalú at Court, and a significant rapprochement with the Rúmlú umará. It may also be added in this connection that the Shámlú play a very minor role in the remainder of Sháh Tahmásb's reign; whereas the Ustájlú emerge from this period of crisis as the most influential of the úymác.

If the hypothesis of the Shámlú-Ustájlú rift is accepted, the next step that can be postulated is the formation of a new Shámlú-Takkalú axis in opposition to the new Ustájlú-Rúmlú rapprochement. The evidence for this is the fact that leading members of both úymác are linked together in the descriptions of the seditions-- both planned and realized. It is possible that the Takkalú were to have vouched for the Ottoman aid and the Shámlú were to have vouched for Sâm Mírzá's cooperation in the planned coup.

It is difficult to so much as speculate about the extent of the Uzbek involvement in this affair (outside of their direct military action in Khurásán, of course). Reference has already been made to ILCHI's suspect riváyat (see above pp.219-223) in which there is a hint of some collusion between the Úzbeks, the Shámlú and Sâm Mírzá, arranged during the Qizilbásh evacuation of Harát in 936/1529.

Other clues of 'Ubayd Khán's involvement will be examined (e.g. the alleged correspondence with the renegade governor of Gílán; the vague connection of some of Sâm Mírzá's Shámlú with Mávará'al-nahr,

etc.); but it may be stated here that the lack of Úzbek statements on the affair makes it difficult to judge whether there was active collusion with the "Grand Sedition" of the Qizilbásh úymáq, or whether 'Ubayd Khán was merely being opportunistic. The question will be resumed below.

B. Background on the Khurásán or Shámlú Aspect of the "Grand Sedition"


The complex narration of these events can best be begun by a study of the close associations of the Shámlú and Sâm Mirzá, for this is a key relationship in what follows.

Sâm Mirzá's connections with the Shámlú began as far back as the end of 927/1521 when the four year (solar) old prince was named titular governor of Khurásán and was given as his laleh, Dúrmish Khán Shémlú. Their administration continued into the reign of Sháh Tahmásb until the death of Dúrmish Khán in 932/1525 at which time Husayn Khán succeeded his brother in the same capacity to Sâm Mirzá (932-936/1525-1529). When Harát surrendered to the Úzbeks, Husayn Khán took off with his charge and began the famous one year "wandering" through Sístán, Balúchistán, Kirmán and eventually Fárs. Husayn Khán's intentions at this point were clearly suspect by the Court and we have seen that "ILCHI's riváyat" and the subsequent "forgiveness" of Sâm Mirzá by the Sháh point to the fact that the Khán may already have been planning to use Sâm Mirzá to further his own position. However, a less extreme method which culminated in the "Takkalú Disaster" was adopted instead by the Khán to secure his and the Shámlú ambitions to paramouncy at Court.

The result of all this was that shortly before the Ottoman invasion Husayn Khán had used his personal position to have Sâm Mirzá reappointed to Khurásán with another Shámlú laleh, Aghzívár Sultán (or Khán). The sources (JANG/154a, ROUZAT/161a, KHULASEH/142b) make the relationship between Husayn Khán and "fellow-tribesman" (ham úymác), Aghzívár, a close one and point up the fact that in addition to the normal ties of "family, association and úymác loyalties" (coumiyat va ittihad va úymáciyat: ROUZAT), Aghzívár was also the

"protégé" (terbiyat or tartīb yārteh) of the regent. All this adds up to the fact that Husayn Khán had attempted to build up a strong personal position in Khurásán just prior to the outbreak of the "Grand Sedition".

It is also important to note Husayn Khán's kinship relationship to the Safavid House: his mother was Sháh Ismá'il's sister, i.e. he was a first cousin (on the maternal side) to both Sháh Tahmásb and Sám Mirzá and had indeed been known as "Husayn Mirzá" ("Prince Husayn") before he was appointed to Khurásán with the title of "khán" (JANG/120a). This relationship had been consolidated by marrying off his daughter to Sám Mirzá (JANG, ROUZAT, KHULASEH, loc.cit.). If there were to be any changes in the Safavid House his position was quite strong for he would have been cousin and father-in-law to the new sháh and maternal uncle to his heir:



With all this evidence and with more which is yet to follow, it can be judged that the Court was fully justified in believing that Husayn Khán "was making great efforts to overturn [literally: 'to change'] the state and was inciting the people to recognize Sám Mirzá" ¹ (AHSAN/254 and repeated in different wording in AFZAL/80a).

1. "Dar taghyir-i doulat sa'y-i baligh namáyad va mardum rá b-saltanat-i Sám Mirzá targhib namáyad."

The first indications of the troubles ahead manifested themselves at the Husayn Khán inspired appointment of Sâm Mirzá and Aghzivar Sultán Shámlú to Harát. The Sháh in his Diary (TEZ/25; and given in a somewhat variant form in the derived ILCHI/46a,52b) records very significant advice offered privately (dar khalvat) just as the Court was leaving Harát to face the Ottoman threat by several of the non-Shámlú leaders, including the dominant Ustájlú, Mantashá Sultán and two leading Rúmlú umará. The Ustájlú-Shámlú rift, the new emerging Ustájlú-Rúmlú alignment and above all the distrust of the Shámlú intentions are all made quite evident here, for they strongly advised the Sháh against leaving Sâm Mirzá and Aghzivar Sultán in Khurásán "in such a time of emergency" (dar vaqt-i chunín) for "they are not devoid of hidden intentions at discord" (az nífác-i bâtaní khálí nístand: ILCHI/52b).

To this the Sháh replied: "Since they are not to be trusted it is wiser that they do not accompany us; for if there is to be foul play, it is better that they stay in Harát"(TEZ)¹. To make his point clear the Sháh then cites the ominous parallel of Darius who was killed by his own men in the war against Alexander the Great. To this ILCHI adds the parable of the worm which can only harm the tree if it is boring from within, but which can do no damage if it is kept away from the tree. That is to say, the Court decided it wiser to keep the unreliable elements away and to keep the danger quarantined in Khurásán.

There is much of interest in this warning to the Sháh and in

1. "Íshán chún mahall-i i'timád nabáshad hamráh níz nayáyand agar chúnáncheh mahall-i daghdagheh báshad dar Harát búdan-i íshán behtar est."

his reply and although picturesquely put there is reason to believe it apocryphal or depicting anything but the true state of Court politics just as the Ottoman invasion began. The Court might very well have suspected the Shámlú and Sâm Mirzá but could probably do very little about it in the absence of any overt action and in view of the forceful control exercised by the regent.

We are also incidentally given still another demonstration of the Court's attitude toward Khurásán: its priority was clearly secondary and if a choice had to be made Khurásán could be sacrificed. It must be admitted however that Sháh Tahmásb was fully justified by the events which followed, in the decision to quarantine the dissatisfaction in Khurásán, for the Ottoman and domestic threats might not have been successfully thwarted had the Shámlú been in full force with the Court on the Ázarbáyján front.

Wise as the decision may have been from the viewpoint of the Sháh's position, the abandonment of Khurásán led to an unprecedented localism which flared up in Qizilbásh looting, a rising against the Qizilbásh, jacquerie, and above all a new Úzbek occupation of Khurásán. In the end however, Sháh Tahmásb could lead a victorious and united Qizilbásh army under his own personal control back to Khurásán for a definitive liberation.

C. The Poison Plot ¹

The first of the many dramatic events of the period of the "Grand Sedition" is an apparent attempt to poison the Sháh. The word "apparent" is necessary here for there is some uncertainty as to what happened. The Sháh's Diary, which gives a detailed account of the Court events at this time makes no reference to it whatsoever. This is very likely a purposeful omission for strangely enough there is no mention either of the subsequent execution of Husayn Khán. It would seem clear from this that not only TEZ but the other Safavid sources as well are concealing something from us: we submit that they are concealing the unity of the "Grand Sedition".

The limited facts given are as follows: Báshdán (variant readings: Báshlán, Báshlá, Báshdán) Qará of the Yúzi Qará Shámlú (apparently a sub-tribe of the Shámlú), a close personal attendant of the Sháh, put poison in the royal goblet. The Sháh, either forewarned or by divine inspiration, noted the agitation of his cupbearer and set the wine down without tasting it. Thereupon Báshdán found a pretext to absent himself and immediately fled to Mávará'al-nahr.

Many of the rival umará accused Husayn Khán of being the instigator of this attempt, for Báshdán Qará was of the Shámlú, a relative and "protégé" of the regent, and owed his position of attendance upon the Sháh to his kinsman's direct influence. The Sháh however, for the time being, chose to ignore Husayn Khán's implication, presumably because there was no direct proof and because

1. JANG/153b, ROUZAT/155b, AHSAN/253, AFZAL/79b-80a.

All these accounts are similar and apparently based upon a common source (JANG ?). The most important omission in the Safavid sources is TEZ, i.e. the Sháh's personal Diary.

the motives of the anti-Shámlú umará in defaming the regent were quite obvious.

It is significant for the claim made here that information is being withheld, that the references to so important an event as an alleged attempt on the Sháh's life are brief and appear only in the notices of Husayn Khán's execution (for his complicity in the affair is given as one of the charges of past misconduct leveled at him by the Sháh).

Furthermore the event is never fixed in time or space. However, there are certain clues. AFZAL/80a does tell us, in a vague context it is true, that the attempt was made during the Sháh's return from Khurásán (dar hín-i murája'at) ; and since as pointed out by ROUZAT/155b the attempt would have had to occur before the royal toubeh (renunciation of wine) which was made in Mashhad, it is after all possible to date the alleged poison plot as having occurred at the time when the Sháh was hurrying back to face the Ottoman threat, and the place--somewhere between Harát and Mashhad.

There is also a negative clue from the Sháh's Diary, for it is very curious that the Sháh omits any reference to Mashhad in describing the march to the western front; he refers only to Jám and Isfaráin. From other sources however (see above p.261) it is known that he went through Mashhad for a pilgrimage and that this was most likely the time of his toubeh. This is confirmed, strangely enough, in another context in the Sháh's Diary, i.e. in his reply to a letter of Sulaymán (TEZ/30), where there is a very specific mention of a pilgrimage to Mashhad and to a toubeh there, and it would seem that the reference is to this very period of the attempt on his life.

The fact may be considered established since ILCHI/46b, although avowedly following TEZ, does make the connection and asserts that the Sháh while enroute to the western campaign made a pilgrimage to Mashhad at which time he ordered the closing of all dens of iniquity. This fits in with the facts much better than the 939 date given in some of the sources (e.g. AHSAN/246, NUSAKH/216a, SHIRAZI/604b) for the toubeh.

The apparently deliberate suppression of any reference to both the poison plot and to this Mashhad visit in the Sháh's Diary would therefore seem to indicate that the attempt was made in Mashhad itself at the very critical time when the Qizilbásh army was rushing westward. (It might in fact have had something to do with the decision for the toubeh.)

Another bit of evidence that points to the attempt having been made in Khurásán is the fact that the culprit, Báshdán Qará, fled directly to Mávará'al-nahr. There will be further occasion to discuss this Báshdán Qará and the possible implications of the attempt having been made in Khurásán, and of his flight to the Úzbeks. It is sufficient to state here that he provides the obvious link in the poison plot, Husayn Khán, the Khurásán Shámlú and Sâm Mirzá, for soon after Husayn Khán's execution at Court, the "protégé", Báshdán, suddenly appeared in Harát from Mávará'al-nahr, and began inciting Sâm Mirzá and Aghzivar Sultán to revolt openly against the Sháh. Whether he was also acting in the interests of 'Ubayd Khán will be discussed below.

D. Desertions and Waverings: The Takkalú Aspect of the "Grand Sedition"

For purposes of this discussion it is useful to consider the "Grand Sedition" in two aspects: the first, the beginnings of which have just been described ("C" above), may be termed the "Shámlú aspect" with the main action in Khurásán; the second, may be termed the "Takkalú aspect" with the main action on the western front. Since the events in Khurásán set off by the Shámlú revolt go beyond the main flow of the events of the "Grand Sedition" into local civil war and a new Úzbek occupation, it will be more convenient to follow them as a unit and to turn at this point to consider the "Takkalú aspect" on the western front.

It will be recalled that the Takkalú governor of Ázarbáyján, Úlámeḥ Sultán, had revolted and then fled to the Porte at the time of the "Takkalú Disaster". He was of great service to the Ottomans from his advance position at Bitlís in softening up Qizilbásh held eastern Anatolia and Ázarbáyján (GIESE/142 states: "Úlámeḥ went to Iran acting as a guide"¹), so that by the time Ibráḥim Páshá and Sulaymán began their move on Iran the area beyond Bitlís surrendered without a fight (SOLAKZADE/484, PEÇEVI/176) and Ibráḥim Páshá was simply invited into Tabríz (AHSAN/247). Similarly, the influence of Úlámeḥ is probably behind the surrender of Baghdád: the Takkalú garrison there refused to fight and the keys to the city were sent to Sulaymán.

ROUZAT/153b makes the role of Úlámeḥ in the "Grand Sedition" quite explicit, for it asserts that he sent letters of istimálat ("benevolent inducement") in Sulaymán's name to the Qizilbásh umará

1. "Acem diyarına kılavuz edip gitti."

with promises of honors and estates in Āzarbāyjān. That this intrigue was highly successful is made evident by the constant references in the Safavid sources to the wavering loyalties of the umará, their quarrels and distrust of one another and their reluctance to engage in battle with the Ottomans. The point was reached soon where the Sháh was left with a small personal force and could no longer trust any of his umará or officials (AHSAN/249).¹

It is easy enough to see how the remaining Takkalú at Court, in disgrace and constantly harried by their Ustájlú enemies whose power was then on the rise, would be attracted by Úlámeḥ to the Ottoman side and this would explain the first mass defection of 1000 horse under Muhammad Khán Zú'l-Qadar-úghlí (see above pp.266-7 for his connections with the Takkalú) and Husayn Sultán Takkalú (the son of the Mashhad governor Búrún Sultán killed in the Ustájlú Wars). But much more important is the fact that the Shámlú regent, Husayn Khán himself, was attracted to the Ottoman side, and his wavering loyalty and the distinct possibility of his desertion are given as the main reasons for his execution by the Sháh and for the ensuing fall of the Shámlú hegemony.²

The fact that Husayn Khán was involved in this Takkalú aspect of the "Grand Sedition" is one of the important bits of evidence

1. "Bar sáyir-i umará va arkán-i doulat bí-i'timád gasht."
2. For the execution of Husayn Khán see: AFZAL/80a-b, KHULASEH/140a-b, AHSAN/253-4, JANG/152a-154a, ROUZAT/155b, ILCHI/49a. TEZ has no mention; ILCHI while following TEZ and thus not noting the poison plot, does however refer to the execution of Husayn Khán. It refers to the execution as an 'ibrat ("example"), for the regent had "talked the same language as the Ottomans" (bā Rūmīyān zabān yakí dārad) and was "the instigator of all those troubles" (muharrrik-i an fitneh va fasād).

which has led us to suppose the unity of the Shámlú and Takkalú aims. The sources do not of course present such an all-embracing view, for the events in Khurásán and Ázarbáyján are noticed separately and the relative chronology and sequence of cause and effect become confused. For example, AHSAN in attempting to jump from the description of the western events to those of the east has slipped in a quite impossible extra qishlác season, which it states the Court spent in Tabríz (AHSAN/272 for the year "942").

However there does seem to be a genuine link between these two aspects. It is to be found in the person of Ghází Khán Takkalú, whose governorship of Khurásán is sandwiched in between the two Sámi Mirzá-Shámlú administrations there of Husayn Khán and Aghzívar Khán (or Sultán).

Allusions have been made several times to the probability of a new Shámlú-Takkalú axis having been formed, which was aimed negatively at the Ustájlú (and Rúmlú), but which, much more important, provided a positive focus for the "Grand Sedition". Conclusive evidence for this would be the close association described in the sources between Husayn Khán and Ghází Khán during this period of crisis. Thus, the two kháns were both at the near battle of Qará Aghách (Kara Ağaç in the Sultániyeh area) and were united in their refusal to engage the Ottoman enemy (AHSAN/249); they are described together as being in secret revolt and waiting for the proper opportunity to act openly (TEZ/31); the immediate cause for Husayn Khán's execution is given as the fear lest he use the opportunity of a scouting mission to desert and join Úlámeš and the other renegade kinsmen of Ghází Khán in Tabríz (AFZAL/80a says instead that Ghází Khán had deserted before

Husayn Khán's execution and that the Shámlú Khán was planning to join him during the siege of Ván); and finally (in the more usual version) Gházi Khán was forced to flee for his life to the renegade Takkalú in Tabriz after the execution of Husayn Khán when the Ustájlú, Mentashá Sultán, was urging the Sháh to finish the affair by executing the Takkalú Khán as well (TEZ/34 and the significant variation in ILCHI/49a).

Most revealing of all for considering Gházi Khán as the link between the Shámlú and Takkalú aspects of the "Grand Sedition" are his actions after his flight to join Ulámeh at Tabriz. He soon appeared at the Ottoman qishlác in Baghdád and the result of his activities there becomes apparent from the Safavid sources where he is described as the instigator of Sulaymán's "second invasion" of Iran (i.e. the offensive of the following spring). It is at this point that the tie-in of Takkalú and Ottoman, Shámlú and Sâm Mirzá comes out into the open: Sâm Mirzá and the Khurásán Shámlú openly revolted at the news of Husayn Khán's execution and the resultant fall of the Shámlú at Court; and Gházi Khán appeared at the Ottoman Porte with specific proposals to unseat Sháh Tahmásb in favor of his younger brother. Gházi Khán urged Sulaymán to try again in Āzarbáyjān and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam and to precede his invasion by making public proclamations recognizing Sâm Mirzá as the Khwāndegār's "son" and appointing him as ruler over "Sháh Ismá'il's kingdom". The Takkalú Khán pledged that he would undertake to bring their candidate to the Ottoman Porte and would arrange for the new khutbeh-sikke insignia of royal office in the new monarch's name.

There is really only one Safavid account (TEZ/35-6) of these negotiations of Gházi Khán with the Ottomans, for the other sources

which mention them (ILCHI/49b-50a, KHULASEH/140a and SHARAF/565) would seem to be derived from the Sháh's Diary. It is thus most fortunate that we have an independent, and enemy account which confirms the plot to establish Sâm Mirzá on the Safavid throne. This other source is Sulaymán's official itinerary of "The Campaign of the two 'Irács" which has been preserved in FERIDUN/1/584-598. None of the Ottoman chronicles we have been able to consult refer to this event (except for brief mentions of the appearance of Ghází Khán at Baghdád¹), and the fact that the negotiations are referred to only in Sulaymán's personal Itinerary and the Sháh's personal Diary would seem to be an indication that a whole background of secret diplomacy referring to this period of the "Grand Sedition" is omitted in the chronicles.

Sulaymán's Itinerary/594-5 while making only terse references to these events does fully corroborate the Sháh's account in TEZ. In the Itinerary of the march from Baghdád to Āzarbáyjân (i.e. the "second" Iranian campaign) it is noted that Úlámeḥ, under siege at Vén, first notified Sulaymán of Sâm Mirzá's revolt and added in his report, what could only have been a wild rumor at the time, that Sâm was marching west to offer his homage to the Porte. A week later the Itinerary records that a message had been received from Ghází Khán confirming the fact that Sâm Mirzá had submitted to the Porte and that he had received a communication from Sâm Mirzá to this effect. The final record in the Itinerary relating to this affair shows that Sulaymán had indeed acted upon Ghází Khán's advice

1. PEÇEVI/186, SULEYMANNAME/120, NIŞANCI/232. For Ghází Khán's subsequent but brief career at the Ottoman Porte, see LUTFÍ/382-384.

and had issued proclamations recognizing Sâm Mîrzâ and "ceding" him all of Iran west of the Qizil Ūzan (Qizil Uzen) River (i.e. west of Āzarbāyjân.

In addition to corroborating the main lines of the Safavid version, Sulaymân's Itinerary provides us with two additional facts of great importance for following the "Grand Sedition": (1) Ghâzî Khân in Baghdâd was in direct communication with Sâm Mîrzâ in Khurêsân; and (2) we are given the Ottoman price for aid in this Qizilbâsh sedition: the cession of Āzarbāyjân.

Although of course none of this ever materialized, it is most important that there is an independent source indicating the scope of the "Grand Sedition".

The recognition of Sâm Mîrzâ by the Ottomans brought panic to the Qizilbâsh side (SHARAF/565)¹; and the execution of several umarâ and the imprisonment of the "grand vazîr" (Ahmad Bek Nûr Kamâl Isfahânî, the Shâmlû incumbent) would indicate the seriousness of the situation. The rumors that Sâm Mîrzâ would march westward to meet his Ottoman allies and thus encircle the Qizilbâsh, forced the Shâh to abandon his siege of Vân and to hurry back to 'Irâq-i 'Ajam (ILCHI/50a).

And yet Shâh Tahmâsb emerged victorious from both the foreign and the domestic crises. The basic reason would appear to be that the key factor in all this elaborate intrigue did not come off: Sulaymân was militarily unsuccessful. Furthermore, Sâm Mîrzâ had actually made no attempt to come west; instead he had bogged himself down for a fruitless eight month siege of Mughal held Qandahâr.

1. "Tavâ-yif-i Qizilbâsh rûy b-tafarruqigî nihâdeh."

The details of Sâm Mirzá's activities in Khurásán will be given shortly; it is sufficient to point out here that it would seem that his collusion with the Ottomans (through the machinations of the Shámlú and the Takkalú) was probably based on nothing more solid than empty promises of mutual aid. It would appear quite probable that Sâm Mirzá in Khurásán was opportunistically waiting out the results of the clash between Sháh Tahmásb and Sulaymán. When the Sháh emerged the victor, Sâm Mirzá immediately executed his "inciting" Shámlú and craved the royal pardon.

E. Another Hint of Uzbek Involvement in the "Grand Sedition":

The Sedition of Muẓaffar Khān of Gīlān ¹

Before returning to the events in khurāsān, it should be pointed out that the "Grand Sedition" and the Ottoman invasion had their repercussions in other parts of Irān (ROUZAT/160a). Relevant to the discussion here are the actions of Muẓaffar Khān, the semi-independent ruler of the Caspian province of Gīlān, who has already been noticed as having offered refuge to the Ustājlu in their wars against the Takkalu.

When the Ottomans under Ibrāhīm Pāshā first appeared in Tabrīz, he immediately hastened to join them (with a force which most of the Ottoman sources place at 10,000) and urged the eradication (istisāl: ILCHI) of the Safavid dynasty. At Sultāniyeh he was dismissed by Sulaymān (the Ottoman accounts indicate that he had not been received too favorably) and returned to Gīlān. However there had been a local revolt against him during his absence and he was now forced to flee Gīlān. He made his escape by sea and landed in Shīrvān. He was however soon captured by the Qizilbāsh and executed in Tabrīz for his obvious collusion with the Ottomans.

What is of interest here is the added detail found only in ILCHI and KHULASEH that the further charge was made against him (i.e. in addition to the Ottoman collusion) that he had had dealings with the Ūzbeks. KHULASEH points out that he had been on friendly relations

1. The Safavid references: AFZAL/91a-b, ROUZAT/160a, AHSAN/273-4, SHIRAZI/605b. KHULASEH/152a and ILCHI/51a-52a are alone in adding the Ūzbek connections to the usual accounts.

The Ottoman references: SOLAKZADE/485, 486, PEÇEVİ/180, NİŞANCI/228, SÜLEYMANNAMÉ/116; MUNECCİMBASI/III/490, LUTFI/344. NİŞANCI says he appeared with 5000 troops; the other Ottoman sources say: 10,000.

(mušádeat) with 'Ubayd Khán and had been corresponding with him (kitábat) all along (payvasteh) in an "awful and improper" way (múhish-i námuláym). This is indirectly corroborated by ILCHI which asserts that when Muẓaffar Khán was forced by local conditions to flee, he had first set out by sea for the east Caspian port of "Akharcheh" (Aqrícheh, Aqrancheh¹) with the hope of reaching Mávará'al-nahr and joining 'Ubayd Khán.² A storm had however blown him off course and he had been driven to the other end of the Caspian at Báku in Shírván where he was seized and sent to the Sháh for execution.

That is all there is to go on, but it does give us a hint that 'Ubayd Khán may not have been a passive spectator to the events of the "Grand Sedition". Furthermore, the fact that Muẓaffar Khán was involved with both the Ottomans and the Úzbeks might lead to the conjecture that he represented a link between the eastern and western neighbors of Iran at the time of the "Grand Sedition". The question has been alluded to in the brief discussion above (Part I, "B") on the possibility of Ottoman-Úzbek diplomatic relations during this period.

So minor a scrap of evidence for Úzbek collusion in the "Grand Sedition" might be ignored were it not for the other hint alluded to above in the narration of the poison plot. It will be recalled that

1. ILCHI's "Akharcheh" is very likely the same as the "Aqrícheh" of TEZ/76 and the "Aqrancheh" of Háfiz Abrú cited in The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate p.457 as located at the mouth of the Amu River on the Caspian Sea.

The reference in TEZ is in the account of the Ottoman prince Bá-yazíd who had sought refuge in Sháh Tahmásb's Court (executed: 909/1501-2) and then planned to escape and join the Turkmán by crossing the Caspian from Gílán to "Aq(a)rícheh". This was apparently the same route planned by Muẓaffar Khán.

2. "Khwaíst keh b-taraf-i Akharcheh bírún ravad b-jánib-i Mávará'al-nahr b-'Ubayd Khán mutavassil gardad."

Béshdán Qará, the "protégé" of Husayn Khán and would-be assassin, had fled to Mávará'al-nahr and was soon to reappear in Harát in the role of an active leader in Sâm Mírzâ's revolt. This too suggests an Úzbek role in the Safavid domestic crisis.

However, in the absence of further evidence the most that can be said is that there is some possibility of 'Ubayd Khán's involvement in the "Grand Sedition" but that stronger proof is needed to demonstrate this satisfactorily.

F. The Revolt of Sâm Mirzá and the Shámlú in Khurásán ¹

1. The Beginning of the Revolt

With the background of the "Grand Sedition" in mind, it is not difficult to imagine the effect of the news in Harát of Husayn Khán's execution by the Sháh and the fall of the Shámlú at Court, for Aghzivar Khán and Sâm Mirzá were too closely involved in these events to have felt secure any longer. The fear was that the purge would soon spread from the Court to Khurásán.

At this critical moment a new factor was added to the troubled situation of the Qizilbásh in Harát: the sudden appearance of a number of Yúzi Qará Shámlú who had "fled" from Mávará'al-nahr under Báshdán Qará, the would-be poisoner of the Sháh. Most sources state that it was this new element which provided the immediate spark to the revolt, for upon their arrival they became the most active inciters in favor of an open and immediate break with Sháh Tahmásb's Court.

It is curious that the sources state that Báshdán Qará had "fled" back to Khurásán from Mávará'al-nahr; in the absence of any Uzbek reference to these events the reason for the "flight"--if indeed it was such--must remain obscure. The conjecture may perhaps be offered that Báshdán Qará and the Yúzi Qará Shámlú who appeared with him in Harát had been sent by 'Ubayd Khán possibly with instructions to

1. KHULASEH/142b-143a, 150a-151b, 159b, AFZAL/84a-85b, 93a, AHSAN/260-263, 275, TAAA/46, 48, JANG/154a-155a, 163a-167a, ROUZAT/161a-162b, 163a, 170a-171b, ILCHI/52b, 53b-55a, NUSAKH/220a.

The Mughal sources TABAQAT/48-49, AKBAR/307-8, MUNTAKHAB/453 are brief but do fix the chronology, as does RASHIDI/467-8, the author of which was in the Panjáb with Mirzá Kámran at this time. The only Uzbek reference is in RAQIM/124a where there is a chronogram referring to the defeat of Sâm Mirzá at the hands of Kámran (the same chronogram is given in MUNTAKHAB).

stir up the situation in Khurásán even further, or perhaps with certain guarantees or istimálat ("benevolent inducements") in regard to Sám Mirzá's position in Khurásán and in the "Grand Sediton". There is no specific evidence in the sources, but it may be significant in this regard that 'Ubayd Khán made no attempt to invade Khurásán at this time of general anarchy there and that the province was left to its own undoing before he actively intervened.

Thus open rebellion was declared in Khurásán at the very time of Sháh Tahmásb's great crisis in the west. It began with an official order (buqm) of the administration permitting the Qizilbásh troops in Harát to loot and plunder the city at will. The author of JANG who was living in Harát at the time (folio 154b) and most of the other Safavid accounts which are evidently derived from this one source, describe the atrocities, tortures and expropriations perpetrated by the Qizilbásh in their search for loot and hidden wealth. The "ruination and desolation" (kharábí va vírání) to Harát is described in much the same terms as the previous rapines of the city by the other Qizilbásh administrations and by the Úzbeks. The object of all this, although nowhere stated as such, was presumably to gain the support of the garrison and to pay for the outfitting and allegiance of the new army raised by the rebels.

When a rather modest army was raised (put at from two to four thousand troops) the rebels abandoned Harát for the great adventure against Mughal held Qandahár. They left Harát on 15 Sha'bán 941/ 19 February 1535, i.e. some three weeks before the new year of Qúy, at the time when the Sháh was at his qishláq-siege of Ván, and the Ottoman Khwándegár was planning the second phase of his Iranian campaign from Baghdád.

we can only conjecture as to why the rebels chose to abandon Harát for the adventure against Qandahár. It would seem that the intention was not to abandon Harát completely, for a small Shámlú group was left in the city under the dottering 80 year old Khalífeh Sultán Shámlú Mír Akhúr and two officers, Maḥmúd Bek and Ummat Bek. Not much however could seriously have been expected from them and within a very short time Harát was reduced to open civil war, jacquerie, Úzbek raids and finally Úzbek occupation..It cannot be therefore said that the Qandahár expedition was meant primarily as an attempt to add a new province to a new Qizilbásh state to be centered in Khurásán. Had that been the intention Harát would have been better garrisoned and the route of march would more profitably have been taken toward Mashhad which was still held by the Ustájlú governor, Sháh Qulí Sultán.

ILCHI, TABAQAT and RASHIDI imply that the Qandahár adventure was essentially a flight of the rebels who feared the Sháh's vengeance (presumably for their involvement in the "Grand Sedition"). ILCHI goes so far as to assert that Aghzívár'Khán's intentions were to set up a new state under Sám Mírzá in Mughal held "Afghanistan" (i.e. Qandahár, Kábul, Zábulistán and even further east) and thus find asylum from the wrath of the Sháh. This however would seem like much too grandiose a scheme for this small Qizilbásh force, for the emperor Humáyún still securely held India at this time.

ROUZAT/161a probably best sums up the mixed motivations of Sám Mírzá and the Shámlú rebels at this critical point in the "Grand Sedition" when it states: "The reason [for the Qandahár attempt] was to unfurl the banners of independence all through the province [i.e.

khurásán]and to spread the word of the movement far and wide".¹ That is to say, it was most likely propagandistic in nature and was meant to show that all anti-Sháh Tahmásb elements could find an effective rallying point around Sám Mirzá in the eastern provinces.

Essentially however, despite the obvious propagandistic sheen, the adventure against Qandahár should be interpreted as a period of waiting, for it must not be forgotten that by this time Sám Mirzá was in communication with Sulaymán and that the Ottomans had openly recognized him as ruler of Iran. An Ottoman victory in the west would presumably have drawn Sám Mirzá and the Shámlú from the cul-de-sac of Qandahár and more directly into the main current of events.

The round of conjectures may be concluded with the mention of the possibility of Uzbek connivance behind the attempt at Qandahár. It would be conceivable that 'Ubayd Khán, through his agent Báshdán Qará, had incited Sám Mirzá against his ('Ubayd's) Mughal enemies. It will be recalled that in concluding our account of Mughal-Uzbek relations in this period (see above p.175), reference was made to the wars in the Badakhshén and Balkh areas and to the fresh hostilities recorded for the later period of Humáyún's refuge in "Afghanistan". This Uzbek-Mughal hostility was an important diplomatic feature of the period and it is on this basis that the suggestion may be made of 'Ubayd Khán's indirect involvement in this Qandahár campaign.

II. The Afshár, the Action at Qandahár and the End of the Revolt

On the way to Qandahár the rebels first stopped at Faráh which was then held by the Afshár úymaq. The royally appointed governor,

1. "B-dán dá'iyeh keh dar atráf ú sughúr-i viláyat ráyát-i istiqlál ber afrázand va gít-i khurúj rá az atráf-i áfáq andázand."

Murád Sultán was "forced" (az rú-yi izztirár) to join them (and in AHSAN and AFZAL was then executed by the Shámlú). The local garrison joined the march south and we subsequently find Jalál (or Lál) Sultán Afshár in a prominent position at the battle against the Mughals near Qandahár. AFZAL also adds that a rebel governor had been installed in Faráh, and this might indicate that the area was annexed to a projected new state in the east. The fact that the Afshár had indeed joined the rebel cause would also seem to be indicated by the execution at Court during the "second Ottoman invasion" of Alvand Khán, the Afshár governor of Kúh-i Gílúyeh (in Fárs) for what SHIRAZI /o05b calls "signs of discord" (nifáo).

There is no need here to enter into the details of Sám Mirzá's war with the Mughals. The brief facts are that the Qizilbásh at their siege of Qandahár met with the determined resistance of the Mughal governor, Khwájeh Kalán and were held at bay for eight months. The siege was finally relieved by Kámrán Mirzá, the brother of the emperor Humáyún, who came up from Láhúr (Lahore) and defeated the Qizilbásh in a pitched battle in which Aghzívar Khán was killed. Sám Mirzá was thus forced to retire.

The defeat of the rebels occurred in Sha'bán 942/January 1536, or just about a full calendar year after the departure from Harát (the dating is found in the Mughal sources and RASHIDI only). Although Sám Mirzá had outwardly kept aloof from the main course of events, much had taken place during this period which now determined his position. By this time the Ottoman military threat had been overcome in the west, and although 'Ubayd Khán had launched his new invasion of Khurásán, the Sháh was now free to turn to the secondary eastern front.

There was thus nothing for Sâm Mirzá to do but offer his repentance to Sháh Tahmásb. He disavowed his personal connection with the "Grand Sedition" by executing Báshdán Qará and the other "inciters to revolt" and ostentatiously sent their heads to the Sháh with the explanation that it had all been the doing of Aghzívar Khán and the Shámlú. Since he was still officially in revolt and thus persona non grata in Harát (ILCHI), he took refuge in Tabas while waiting for the royal reply to his proffered submission.

The Sháh was already enroute on the final Khurásán Liberation campaign against 'Ubayd Khán when Sâm Mirzá's apologies arrived at Court. Although the Sháh promptly accepted his brother's submission and sent the traditional khil'at as a token of his acceptance, nonetheless it would seem quite clear that the Mirzá's motives were still not entirely trusted for Muhammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín Takkalú, who was slated to become the new governor of Harát upon its liberation, was sent on ahead to keep Tabas under surveillance and to prevent anyone from either entering or leaving (ILCHI). And after that the leading Rúmlú, Amír Sultán, was sent to fetch Sâm Mirzá who was finally brought into the Sháh's presence during the winter operations against the Marv area. Sâm Mirzá was then forgiven (and sent back to Qazvín according to AFZAL) but a number of his "inciters" was executed.

The implication is clearly that the Mirzá's presence in Tabas had been suspect. In this connection it is of interest to note that REULASER/337b (in the obituary for Sâm Mirzá) names the governor of Tabas during the period of the Mirzá's refuge there as Qará Sultán Shámlú. He is presumably the Muhammad Bek Qará íshík Shámlú who, as was seen in the first chapter (p.54 n.1), had been rewarded with Tabas

for his bravery against the Ūzbeks in the administration of DŪrmish Khán and Sám Mirzá (AFZAL/7b,8a). The governor's name suggests that he was of the same (Yúzí) Qará Shámlú who were the leading inciters of Sám Mirzá.

This would suggest the reason for the refuge in Tabas and the Sháh's distrust of his younger brother's intentions there. It might also suggest that the Sháh feared possible collusion between the Mirzá in Tabas and 'Ubayd Khán who was by then in occupation of Herát. This suspicion of the Sháh is in fact still another indication that 'Ubayd Khán had possibly been involved in the "Grand Sedition" all along.

With Sám Mirzá's return to Court the "Grand Sedition" was over. The implications were momentous, for with Sháh Tahmásb's victory the dynastic-úymáq balance created by Sháh Ismá'íl was restored. The period of the regency and the rule by úymáq was over and this meant that a united and genuinely "national" (i.e. Safavid-Qizilbásh) policy could now be pursued. This fact was to play a decisive role in the definitive liberation of khurásán after 'Ubayd Khán's Fifth and Final Invasion to which we now turn.

Chapter 6. The Period of the Fifth and Final Uzbek Invasion

(Güy-Pichī-Takḥāqūy/ 941-944/ 1535-1538)

Part 1. The Uzbek Invasion and Occupation of Khurāsān

A. The Raids Preceding the Main Invasion

1. Khabūshān and Kalāt ¹

Although 'Ubayd Khān did not launch his full-scale invasion until the final phase of Sulaymān's "Campaign of the Two 'Irāqs", there were nonetheless a series of local actions in the years Yūnt and Gūy (941/1534-1535) which showed the instability of the eastern situation and portended the more ambitious Uzbek attempts which were soon to follow.

The first in the series of local actions began with an Uzbek raid on the Khabūshān area northwest of Mashhad. Although an important officer of 'Ubayd Khān, Darvīsh 'Alī Mughal, led the Uzbek party, its rather modest scope can perhaps be gauged by the number of Uzbek troops cited in the Safavid chronicles: about 2000 horse. Sūfyan Khalīfeh Rūmlū, who, as has been seen, had been appointed to this area by the Shāh during the previous liberation campaign, stopped the Uzbek raiders in a battle at Khabūshān in which 150 Uzbeks were killed.

This Qizilbāsh victory encouraged Sūfyan to undertake an offensive (manifestly a Qizilbāsh raid in retaliation) against the Uzbeks at

1. AHSAN/252-3 and KHULASEH/143b-144a are near identical; AFZAL/79a-b is more useful since in addition to the same details (with some variation) it adds the receipt of the news at the Court and thus makes it possible to date the events.

The fact that AFZAL so frequently adds the Court reaction to the news from Khurāsān suggests that its source had access to archival material not available to the other chroniclers. This is also borne out by the fact that AFZAL is more detailed than the other sources on the matter of Court appointments to the provinces.

Kalát who were under Sayyidam Mírzá, another of 'Ubayd Khán's prominent officers. Although Súfyán was apparently successful in his raid and had killed many Úzbeks at Kalát, 200 of his own men were killed in a mountain accident during the return march and he was left with but 500 horse and 200 "foot soldiers" (piyádeh). Darvish 'Alí Mughal, who, as has just been seen, had been stopped at Khabúshán, now suddenly reappeared with 1800 horse (1500 in AFZAL) to take advantage of Súfyán's weakened position. Another battle was fought in which it is stated that the Qizilbásh were again successful and in which 400 more Úzbeks were killed.

The fact that the Úzbeks were in Kalát (i.e. presumably the modern Kalát-i Nádirí on the Iran-Turkmenistan frontier) and were raiding to Khabúshán, would indicate that the Qizilbásh capture of Marv just a few months before (during the planned offensive against the Úzbek homelands) could not have been very effective, for Marv should have served to keep the area policed. It is quite possible that Marv had already been retaken by the Úzbeks; at any rate Súnjik Muhammad Sultán, the son of Shíbání Khán, was in occupation of Marv somewhat over a year later at the time of Sháh Tahmásb's final liberation campaign.

These local events can be approximately dated by the fact given in AFZAL that the news reached the Sháh while he was at the siege of Ván and before the open revolt of Sám Mírzá and the Shámlú in Harát. They mark the only recorded Qizilbásh-Úzbek exchanges in the first year of crisis for Sháh Tahmásb on the western front.

II. Kúhistán ¹

Whatever his reasons, 'Ubayd Khán still delayed his invasion until late in the second year of Sháh Tahmásb's crises (i.e. toward the winter of Qúy/942/1535). How poor his timing was can be judged by the fact that Harát had by then long since been left unguarded, and that the Ottomans were already being harried through eastern Anatolia on their retreat; furthermore it was already late in the "military year" before he finally crossed the Ámú and appeared before Mashhad.

However he had not been completely idle in Khurásán during the first part of that "year". Three of his major officers, Shaykh Abú Sa'id Afrásyáb, Qarájeh Bahádur and Sayyidam Mírzá had been sent on an ambitious raiding mission, probably in early spring, with perhaps 5-6000 troops and had reached deep into Khurásán as far as Jám, Závéh and Kháf (or Khwáf) in the desert province west of Harát and south of Mashhad and Nishápúr known as Kúhistán.

These raiders, according to TAAA, had split into two groups, the larger party of perhaps 4000 heading for the Jám area where they were soon engaged by Súfyán Khalífeh. This Rúmlú "hero" who had fought off the Úzbek raiders of the previous year, was now acting in the role of governor of Mashhad to which he had been appointed at Sám Mírzá's open revolt and desertion of Harát (AFZAL/85b). From Mashhad he now led the only remaining organized Qizilbásh force in Khurásán to oppose the Úzbek raiders. They met the enemy in a battle

1. AFZAL/85b-80a, TAAA/46, AHSAN/263.

The three accounts would seem to be at least partially independent of one another; or at any rate the presentation in all three is markedly different and there are differences in detail as well. For AFZAL's additions from the Court, which are particularly marked in this account and in direct contrast with both AHSAN and TAAA, see the preceding note.

near Zāveh (Turbat-i Haydariyeh) in which the Ūzbeks were defeated and 250 (AHSAN) or 900 (AFZAL) of their number killed.

There is an interesting anecdote connected with this battle which may be cited as an example of possible Ūzbek and Qizilbāsh contacts on the more personal level. It is stated that Shaykh Abū Sa'īd had been left behind after the Ūzbek withdrawal but had hid and was then given shelter and a horse by the local kadkhudā or "headmen" (thus in AHSAN; by the arbāb or "locally influential landowners" in AFZAL) and was thus enabled to escape back to Bukhārā.

This action may be interpreted in the light of "futūwa" or the "chivalric code of honor", for another example of which see AFZAL's/44b long marginal addition to the Battle of Jām. However it is also possible that sectarian loyalties were at play here, for Turbat-i Haydariyeh is known today as a major Sunni center in Khurāsān.

After Sufyān had defeated the larger party of Ūzbek raiders (TAAA), he returned to Mashhad and sent his victory report and head trophies to the Court (AFZAL). He then turned against the second wing of perhaps 1000 raiders who were by then operating in the Khāf area of Rūhistān. He caught them completely by surprise and too heavily laden with booty to offer much resistance (AFZAL). He is said to have killed 200 Ūzbeks here (AHSAN) and again sent his trophies to the Court (AFZAL).

B. The Balkh Uzbek Raid and the Beginnings of the "Harát Revolution" ¹

1. Bayram Úghlan and the Situation in Gharjistán

The two series of raids just described are quite clearly linked to the Úzbeks under 'Ubayd Khán's personal control, for they plundered and probed at the Mashhad area which was shortly to become the Khán's first target in the main invasion of Khurásán. There was however another Úzbek raiding expedition against the Harát area which is difficult to tie in directly with 'Ubayd Khán's plans. This was the raid led by Bayram Úglan (Oğlan), the Úzbek governor of Gharjistán and subordinate of Kístan Qará Sultán, the Jáníbegid "peer" of 'Ubayd Khán who held Balkh.

The sources at our disposal do not permit us to connect this raid with the major attempt at Khurásán which followed soon after. The Harátis themselves could not tell at the time whether this was an independent plundering expedition or the beginning of a full-scale invasion by the sultáns of Túrán (AFZAL). The likelihood is that the raid was carried out without any direct relationship to 'Ubayd Khán's activities, for there is no mention of any further action by any of the rival "neo-eponymous clans" in support of the Sháh-Budáqid "Grand Khán" of Bukhárá. Furthermore, 'Ubayd Khán did not proceed directly against Harát, but rather directed his first attempts against Mashhad; this too would indicate the Bayram Úghlan's raid was under-

1. The basic source here is JANG/155a-157a the author of which was resident in Harát at the time. The other sources repeat this account (with frequent identity in language) although there are a few additions notably in AFZAL), variations and deletions. The account presented here is from JANG unless specifically stated otherwise.

The other references are: AFZAL/85b-87a, ROUZAT/103a-b, KHULASEH/143a-b, 146a-b, AHSAN/264-5, TAAA/46.

taken independently and was meant simply to take immediate advantage of the deteriorating situation in Harát after the dramatic departure of Sám Mirzá and the Shámlú.

The situation in Gharjistan itself is obscure. It has been seen that just prior to Sháh Tahmásb's sudden recall to the western front he had been contemplating an offensive against Balkh, and in line with this had sent a Qizilbásh army to take Gharjistán. The Qizilbásh had^{not} been entirely successful, for although they did set up a governor of their own, the local ruler of the province, Amír Sháh Muḥammad Sayf al-Mulúk, had eluded them. Since nothing further is heard of this Amír Sháh, it is difficult to judge his relationship to Bayram Úghlan who a year later is noted as the Úzbek governor of the area. Perhaps this mountainous province of the Hindú-kush was divided into various sectors, some of which were controlled locally while others were under the jurisdiction of the Qizilbásh, the Úzbeks and the Mughals.

At any rate, less than three months after Sám Mirzá had abandoned Harát, Bayram Úghlan, the Úzbek governor of Gharjistán, led an Úzbek raiding party against the Harát area with an army gathered from Gharjistán and the adjacent Ghúr. He advanced on the area of the Harírúd valley where he reached a point some 15 farsakh (some 60 miles) east of Harát and took a great deal of the livestock of the province. He then advanced to the village of Túnyán, only 5 farsakh (some 20 miles) from Harát, and this became his base of operations for raiding the area of Harát proper.

ii. The Deteriorating Situation in Khurásán after Sâm Mirzá's
Departure

Harát was indeed an inviting target for any raiding group at this time. The departing Shámlú had left only a token Shámlú garrison in the city under their appointee to the governorship, the aged Khalífeh Sultán Shámlú Mír Akhúr (or Akhúr Báshí) whose lack of firmness (za'f) is said in AHSAN to have been matched by the villainy (zabúní) of his fellow Qizilbásh leaders left with him in Harát, Mahmúd Bek (cited specifically as Shámlú in AFZAL/85b) and Ummat Bek (also presumably Shámlú).

As a matter of fact all of Khurásán was naturally enough in a state of flux at this time of the Ottoman invasion and the "Grand Sedition". The Court was too engrossed in these matters to pay any particular attention to eastern affairs, but new farmáns of investiture (cited in AFZAL only) were sent out after the news of Sâm Mirzá's desertion was received. These farmáns (royal decrees) did little more than recognize the status quo: Sâm Mirzá's appointee to Harát, Khalífeh Sultán Shámlú, was recognized as the royal governor despite the open rebellion of the Shámlú; and a realistic appointment was made to Mashhad where the incumbent governor, Sháh Qulí Sultán Ustájlú was recalled to the west (and appointed to Chukhúr Sa'd in the Eriván area) and replaced by Súfyán Khalífeh Rúmlú who commanded the only capable loyalist Qizilbásh forces remaining in Khurásán. To add to the confusion of the times, the vazír of all Khurásán, Áqá Kamálí Kirmání, who held his post in Mashhad, died at this time and a replacement (also in Mashhad) was named to this post; this was Khwájeh Amír Bek, who had previously served as vazír to the Ghází Khán Takkalú-Bahrám Mirzá administration which had been guilty

of the terrible excesses during the "long siege" of Harát. These new appointments however could scarcely have been expected to provide much stability in the deteriorating situation in Khurásán, which had been temporarily left to shift on its own.

In Harát the signs of "revolution" and jacquerie were becoming evident. The ra'yat (non-Qizilbásh population) of the city (shahr) and "suburbs" (bulúkát), faced with still another régime of extortion, now openly defied the Qizilbásh administration and the small token garrison left by Sâm Mirzá. They refused to pay the excessive "taxes" (takálif-i divání); and the new leaders were compelled to accept this situation and become more moderate in their demands out of their "military weakness" (qillat-i sipáh) and their "moral turpitude" (dinâat-i nafs). Thus it came about that the ra'yat of the Harát area began to live in some independence (bar vafq-i doulat-khéhán) of their nominal Qizilbásh masters.¹

With the decline of the Qizilbásh power in Harát, the local Tájik "great families" (a'ýán and akábir) tried to fill the breach and assume control. This becomes evident from the assembly of a'ýán and Qizilbásh which now jointly met to discuss the means to avert the threat of the Gharjistán Úzbeks who were then raiding from their encampment some 5 farsakh (20 miles) from Harát. The Qizilbásh who still remained, notably Mahmúd Bek, were of course the more experienced in military matters and urged that the city be made the center of the defence until the arrival of royal aid, or at least that no attempt be made to engage the Úzbek raiders until they were returning

1. "Ra'abah az touq-i ba'zi takálif-i divání dúr dáshteh bar vafq-i doulatkhéhán bá ishán sulúk mikardand; va ishán benábar-i qillat-i sipáh va dinâat-i nafs in 'amal rá 'atiyeh dánisteh talab-i ziyâdeh namikardand" (JANG/155a).

to their own territory and were laden down with spoil. This mature military advice offered by the Qizilbásh was however vetoed by the ayán (notably by Amír Sultán Ibráhím Amíní a well known poet and munshí or official scribe). They boldly rejected "the craven way out" and ordered all able-bodied Harátís and bulúkátís (i.e. the residents of the agricultural suburbs surrounding the city) possessing a horse and arms to join under the banners of the nominal governor, Khalifeh Sultán and his Qizilbásh troops and to drive the Úzbeks from the area and recover the plunder.

The ayán and the ra'yat (i.e. the upper and lower "classes" of the non-Qizilbásh population) had asserted a measure of independence and were obviously making an attempt to demonstrate the fact that Harát could be defended without recourse to its Qizilbásh "protectors" whose service charges in the form of extortion were now to be circumvented. An added inducement to encourage the ra'yat to join in the adventure was the prospect of recovering the Úzbek loot.

A "popular army" was thus raised, which the contemporary sources contemptuously describe as atráfi ("rabble") and lavand ("freebooters"). It was led not so much by the Qizilbásh as by such local ayán as Amír Sultán Ibráhím Amíní, Sháh Muhammad Jámezbáf and Shádí Muhammad Áses. Mahmúd Bek Shámlú, who figures in the events which follow as an able Qizilbásh military man, was left behind with a small group to defend Harát.

iii. The "Popular Army" Versus the Úzbeks

This motley army, for the most part completely inexperienced in the arts of war (az ádá-b-i muhárabeh bí-khabar búdand: ROUZAT) bravely left Harát on 19 Zú'l-Qa'deh 941/22 May 1535 (just three

months after Sâm Mirzá's departure) to engage Bayram Úghlan's seasoned Uzbek troops. At this same time in the west, Sulaymán had left Baghdad for his second attempt on Āzarbāyjān and 'Irāq-i 'Ajam.

The results were utterly disastrous for the Harátis. When the Úzbeks attacked at a point some 10 farsakh (40 miles) east of Harát in the Harírúd River valley, the inexperienced local troops began to regret their decision to face the enemy in open battle and most of them refused to join their leaders (sardār, i.e. presumably the Qizilbāsh) and promptly deserted. By the time the Úzbeks were through, 900 men of the Harát force had been killed including the aged governor Khalifeh Sultán and the over-enthused poet-a'yán Sultán Ibráhím Amíní. Only a few (JANG says three or four but this presumably refers only to the leaders of the expedition), and notably the Qizilbāsh leader Ummat Bek, managed to escape the rout and fall back on Harát.

What remained of the Harát forces hastily began to organize the defences of the city for the expected attack by Bayram Úghlan. This however proved unnecessary for the time being since the Úzbeks contented themselves with the booty and heads won in battle and did not deem the slim pickings left in Harát worth any further effort.¹ Bayram Úghlan thus returned to Gharjistán where he was congratulated by his suzerain, Kístan Qará Sultán of Balkh (AFZAL).

1. "Dánist keh dar baldeh-yi Harát az amvāl ú asbáb chízí b-dast dar namiyáyad" (JANG/157a).

C. The Interlude of Súfyan Khalifeh Rúmlú in Harát ¹

1. The Joint Qizilbásh-A'yán Invitation to Súfyan Khalifeh

The "Harát Revolution" was temporarily checked by the defeat in Harírúd, for although there was no longer even a nominal Qizilbásh left, the fact had been demonstrated that Qizilbásh aid was after all necessary to guard against the Úzbek threat.

Further Úzbek raids now seemed imminent and the population of Khurásán had recourse to the old method of hiding its wealth in time of danger. However there was now a new possibility, for since the Sháh and his Qizilbásh could not provide security there were suggestions to be heard of submitting to the Úzbeks instead (AFZAL).

The main Qizilbásh armies were fully engaged in the western struggle and not much attention was paid at Court when the Qizilbásh and a'yán of Harát sent in a petition requesting a new governor capable of administering to the needs of justice and defence (AFZAL). While waiting for a reply from the Sháh, the Qizilbásh and the a'yán of Harát acted on their own to find themselves such a governor in much the same fashion as they had done at the death of Dúrmish Khán when the Court had been too preoccupied with the Ustájlú Wars to pay serious attention to the affairs of Khurásán. The obvious candidate was Súfyan Khalifeh Rúmlú who had already stopped previous

1. The basic account here, as for most of the events in Harát during this period, is in JANG/157b-158b. The other sources with some new details or variations are: AFZAL/87a-b, ROUZAT/164a, KHULASEH/147a, AHSAN/205-6, TAAA/47.

ILCHI/200a, 54a is completely unreliable here, for Súfyan Khalifeh Rúmlú has been confused with Khalifeh Sultán Shámlú, and the Gharjístání raid of Bayram Úghlan has been confused with 'Ubayd Khán's siege of Mashhad. The source of ILCHI's errors here would seem to be the same suspect maṣnavi referred to above (p.219 ff.) in discussing ILCHI's riváyat of Sám Mirzá's dealings with the Úzbeks.

Ūzbek raids and had been appointed by the Court as the legal governor of Mashhad.

The Qizilbāsh (under Mahmūd Bek and Ummat Bek) and the a'yān therefore sent a joint delegation to Mashhad which consisted of 2/3 Qizilbāsh and 2/3 kadkhudā ("locally appointed district headmen" to represent the a'yān and ra'yat of the city and suburbs) (JANG). There they pointed out that the defence of Harāt, the capital, was more important than the defence of any other part of Khurāsān (ROUZAT) and begged Sūfyān to come to their city to restore internal order and to protect them from the Ūzbeks. Sūfyān needed no great urging to have the defence of the Holy City in charge of his wife and son and to proceed to Harāt.

On 14 Muharram 942/15 August 1535, (at the same time that Sulaymān had taken Tabriz for the second time and was once more threatening 'Irāq-i 'Ajam) Sūfyān Khalīfeh arrived in Harāt and was officially welcomed by both the Qizilbāsh and a'yān elements of the city.

ii. The New Qizilbash Atrocities

Sufyān Khalīfeh was what would today be called in Persian a ward-i 'ajīb ū gharīb, i.e. a "wondrously strange fellow". The sources apply the word dīvāneh ("mad") to him--in both the figurative sense of being "mad" in battle, and in quite the literal sense of the term. He has already been seen successfully leading the sole organized Qizilbāsh resistance to the Ūzbek inroads in the Mashhad area, and he is personally credited in AHSAN with having killed 4800 Ūzbeks (TAAA although avowedly following AHSAN here says: 4700) during his career in Khurāsān.

The Harátís had wanted a brave new governor who would combine such military prowess with justice; but to their horror they soon discovered that they had achieved only their first purpose, for after a week of welcoming celebrations Súfyán began a new wave of extortion and expropriation which was on a par with the worst of the previous Qizilbásh or Úzbek atrocities. The most rapacious officials and clerks of the city were promptly appointed to office and before long both a'yan and ra'yat in Harát and in the bulúkát were subject to severe economic oppression applied by physical means.

Súfyán is credited with introducing a bizarre novelty in the methods of extortion based upon the direct intervention of the 12 Holy Imáms of the Shí'eh. He was well known for providing the public with sweets and alms in honor of these Imáms (AHSAN/275) and evidently felt in close communion with them for they constantly appeared to him in his dreams. Unfortunately for the wealthy Harátís however, the Imám who thus appeared to him insistently demanded large sums of money in the interests of the defence of the True Faith; these sums were to be divided among the Qizilbásh gházís ("soldiers of the faith").

Súfyán had many such dreams in Harát in which a specific man of means was named by an Imám as being worthy of making a contribution. When the Harátí thus honored was summoned before Súfyán, the Imám's message was relayed to him with great tears of commiseration. Thus the wealthy Harátí, despite Súfyán's personal feelings and attempts at intercession, was perforce led out to the torture chambers in order to extract the sums so unyieldingly demanded by the Imám.

(Na'úzu b'illáh: "God forbid that it be so".)

Harát had to endure this new terror for almost six months before it was finally delivered from its savior by 'Ubayd Khán's invasion of Khurásán and siege of Mashhad. When this news was received in Harát, Súfyan "madly" left the city with a Qizilbásh (mostly Rúmlú) army variously given as from 2000 to 6000 in order to engage 'Ubayd Khán's full army cited as from 20,000 to 30,000.

D. The Launching of 'Ubayd Khán's Fifth Invasion ¹

1. The Beginnings of the Invasion and the Siege of Mashhad

'Ubayd Khán has a famous and pertinent quatrain quoted in both the Safavid sources (e.g. TAAA/38) and the 'Úzbek sources (e.g. SILSILAT/121a) which is generally prefixed to any one of the five invasions of Khurásán. A most prosaic translation would read:

"Once again does my soul yearn for Khurásán; any my existence, derived of all life, craves for it; for Khurásán's zephyrs give the spark of life, like the breath of God; and it would seem that the zephyrs themselves must crave for Harát's Bridge of Málán".

The very elegant and sophisticated Persian reads:

"Báz jánam havas-i mulk-i Khurásán dārad
tan-i bī-ján shudeh-yi man havas-i ján dārad
ruhbakhsh ast shimálash chú dam-i ruh-i Allāh
magar ú níz havá-yi Pul-i Málán dārad?"

And as a matter of fact 'Ubayd Khán was briefly to enjoy the zephyrs of the Bridge of Málán once again, for his Fifth and Final Invasion did result in a new occupation of Harát. However, the invasion was, as has been pointed out, "too late" and "too little": for by the time the Ámú River was crossed into Khurásán, Sulaymán had already abandoned his Iranian campaign and was heading home for Istanbul. The 'Úzbek invasion was also "too late" in the military season to prove effective, for the siege of Mashhad began at the beginning of winter (Qúy/942/1535-6). It was also "too little",

1. While the basic account is approximately the same in the following sources, there are a number of discrepancies and variations which are indicated in our text: AFZAL/87b-89a, KHULASEH/147b, 149a-b, AHSAN/206-9, TAAA/47, JANG/101a-103a (near identical with KHULASEH), ROUZAT/104b-105b, ILCHI/207a, 54a-b, SHIRAZI/606a (brief). The presence of the Khwarizmian allies is indicated in AFZAL/88b, AHSAN/207-8 and TAAA/47.

for despite the presence of his Khwárizmian-Úzbek allies in the campaign, there was no "all-Úzbek army" raised from the Abú'l-Khayrid clans. As it was Mashhad was never taken (ROUZAT's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding) and Harát only fell by dint of internal treachery and the aid of the "revolutionary" bulúkátí who already held the city under siege by the time the Úzbeks appeared.

After crossing the Ámú, 'Ubayd Khán went directly against Mashhad (ILCHI's claim that he first went against Harát is in error) where the governor, Súfyán Khalífeh had, as has just been seen, gone to defend Harát. The fact that Mashhad now withstood a determined Úzbek siege and the reference to the gates and defences of the city would indicate that by this time the walls had finally been completed and that the Holy City had definitively replaced Tús as the defence point in the area and was no longer the easy target it had been in the past (see above pp. 90, 146). It is an interesting coincidence that just as in the first siege of Mashhad (or more accurately of Tús) in 932-3/1520-7 the Qizilbásh and local defenders were led by the wife of an absentee governor. Súfyán Khalífeh's wife and son were able to organize a successful resistance and they repelled all of the Úzbek attempts to storm the city.

ii. The Battle of 'Abdulábád and the Execution of Súfyán Khalífeh

When Súfyán Khalífeh in Harát heard of the siege of Mashhad, he sent word to his wife to hold out for he was coming to the rescue (TAAA). He promptly left Harát with anywhere from 2000 (KHULASEH) to 6000 (ILCHI) men with the "mad" intention of engaging the entire Úzbek army (20,000 in ROUZAT) and driving them out of Khurásán. In keeping with his reputation for "madness", while enroute to battle

the Úzbeks at Mashhad, he stopped long enough to gather some straw in a sack and confidently explained that this was to be used for stuffing the body of 'Ubayd Khán.

At the news of the rapidly approaching small Qizilbásh army, 'Ubayd Khán summoned a war council (jánqí) to decide counter-measures. The unflattering accounts in the Safavid sources of the Khán's position in this council would indicate that his personal prestige, even among his own officers was still at a low ebb despite his elevation as "grand khán"; for he was insulted and overruled by his own men.

There is no way of establishing the source of the Safavid accounts of the inner deliberations of the enemy; spies and renegades are of course a possibility, but it is at least equally possible that such accounts are either apocryphal or simply literary embellishments. Since there are no Úzbek accounts of these events, they are presented here as, at the very least, presenting the contemporary Safavid idea of what had actually occurred in this Úzbek jánqí.

The enemy sources quote 'Ubayd Khán as fearing to engage Súfýán in battle, for his reputation for "madness" outweighed the inferiority in numbers of his troops. The lame excuse was offered that it was unseemly for a ruling monarch to engage a mere officer of the enemy. His own officers however are said to have shamed him by asking: "If you (tú) will not fight an emír of the Sháh and you fear his bravery, then why did you come in the first place to take his territory?" (cited with many variations in each of the main sources). Úzbek "public opinion" is thus said to have forced the reluctant 'Ubayd Khán to leave the siege of Mashhad in order to engage Súfýán Khalífeh in battle.

Súfyán Khalífah had by then advanced through Kúhistán, had gained a minor victory over an Úzbek detachment and had finally camped at 'Abdulábád in the Nishápúr area. It was here that the battle was fought on 20 Rajab 942/14 January 1536 in the Turkí year of Qúy. The battle was begun by the Úzbek van led by: 'Ubayd Khán's son, 'Abd al-'Azíz; Súnjik Muhammad Sultán, the son of Shíbání Khán; and thus a Sháh-Budáqid; and by the Khwárizmian Úzbeks, 'Alí Sultán and Acish Sultán (they would be the sons of Súfyán Khán ibn Aminak ibn Yádgár: see Appendix I p.vii). The determined resistance of the Qizilbásh soon forced 'Ubayd Khán to join in the battle personally with the main Úzbek forces. The hopelessly outnumbered Qizilbásh (put at from 4 to 1, to 10 to 1 for the relative numbers involved) were soon defeated and began to flee the battlefield. Súfyán himself made a last "mad" stand in a ruined fortress nearby from which he held the Úzbeks at bay for "a few days" (KHULASEH), "three or four days" (ILCHI) or "35 days" (AFZAL and AHSAN) before the fort was finally stormed and Súfyán taken alive.

The accounts of the death of this mard-i 'ajib ú gharib are quite in keeping with his reputation. While being brought before 'Ubayd Khán he succeeded in biting his Úzbek guard to death (ROUZAT)! Then despite 'Ubayd Khán's offers of amnesty, he persisted in cursing the Sunní calíphs (sabb-i shaykhayn) and in insulting the Grand Khán. The most famous anecdote, which is repeated in each of the major accounts, relates that Súfyán adamantly kept his head averted and his eyes tightly shut and could in no way be forced to look directly at the Khán. The explanation for this action is cited in a direct quotation from Súfyán which the sources assert had been heard by an eyewitness: "How can my eyes which once beheld the august perfection

of Sháh Tahmásb now look upon his enemy?" (the exact wording is somewhat different in each of the sources). The game was ended when 'Ubayd Khán finally handed him over for execution to his officer, Tinish Bí, for the blood revenge (khún) of a son killed in battle against the "mad" Súfýán (AFZAL, AHSAN).

The Úzbek victory at 'Abdulábád was not of great consequence for 'Ubayd Khán's cause. He returned to the siege of Mashhad but met with the same determined resistance there as before. It was however of great significance for the events at Harát and thus indirectly led to the Khán's occupation of the capital of Khurásán.

E. The "Harát Revolution"

1. The Lynching of the Vazir of Harát 1

By now Harát had gone through three Qizilbásh governors in less than a year's time: Sám Mirzá-Aghzívar Khán Shámlú; Khalifeh Sultán Shámlú; and Súfyán Khalifeh Rúmlú. The first signs of revolution had become evident when the local a'ýán had formed a "popular army" to resist the Úzbeks of Bayram Úghlan. After the débâcle in Harírúd the a'ýán and Qizilbásh had both joined together to invite Súfyán Khalifeh to restore Qizilbásh rule to Harát. The excesses of the Súfyán administration and the governor's departure from Harát to engage the Úzbeks at Mashhad now revived the "Harát Revolution".

Súfyán's reign of terror did not automatically cease with his departure. He had left his chief officer, Khizr Chalabí (Çelebi) Rúmlú in charge of the Qizilbásh garrison and had appointed Khwájeh Núr al-Dín Ahmad Isfahání as vazir to head the administrative functions. They are both described as being the equal of Súfyán in

1. The basic source here is JANG/159a-161a where the author specifically notes the fact that he was an eyewitness to these events. Most of the other sources are apparently based on JANG, particularly KHULASEH/147b-149a which has many passages duplicating JANG word for word. ROUZAT/164b, 160a, which is avowedly based on JANG for the eastern events, is not as close here as is KHULASEH. The similarity of KHULASEH and JANG continues for most of the events in Harát during the final phases of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with the Úzbeks. AFZAL/88a, 89a, while close to JANG, shows its usual independence and makes a few minor additions to the account. AHSAN/269 and TAAA/47 refer to the event very briefly.

The text established here is for the most part from JANG-KHULASEH. It should however be noted that ROUZAT and AFZAL contradict JANG here by placing the lynching after the news of Súfyán's defeat reached Harát and imply it as a consequence. We follow JANG-KHULASEH here which gives the specific date of the occurrence.

rapaciousness and cruelty; indeed they are said to have been chosen precisely for these characteristics. The Khwájeh had previously served as kátib-i daftar (chief clerk) in both the Takkalú administration of Bahrám-Ghází Khán (JANG-KHULASEH) and in the Shámlú administration of Sám Mirzá-Aghzívár Khán (ROUZAT) and it will be recalled that Harát had been thoroughly sacked by the Qizilbásh garrisons of both these administrations.

The Khwájeh's past record evidently made him precisely the man to carry out Súfyán's parting instructions that the sum of 3/4000 Tabrízí túmáns be extorted from the Harátis before his return--or else to suffer the consequences personally. The quotation attributed to the vazír to the effect that he feared the wrath of Súfyán more than the wrath of God, is used to explain the great zeal shown in carrying out these orders. Harátí and bulúkátí, a'yán and ra'yat were all assessed, and vicious officials were put in charge of making the collections. There is also a reference (AFZAL) to the "violation of the family honor" (hatk-i 'izzat) of the local a'yán and kadkhudá at the hands of this new régime. Torture was freely applied and Harát was bled still again by its own Qizilbásh and their administrative Tájik aides. In addition to the usual victims, the Khwájeh is said to have discovered a new source of revenue when he drunkenly ordered that poor, defenseless widows be included in the lists of the assessees; the pointed remark is added in JANG that there were many such widows at the time in the area of Harát.

These excesses were however impolitic at a time when the Qizilbásh garrison was small, the acting governor was away, and the first signs of revolution had already appeared. A mob thus formed in Harát on 2 Rajab 942/27 December 1535, i.e. some 10 days before

Súfyán's defeat at 'Abdulábád, and took matters into its own hands by lynching Khwájeh Núr al-Dín while he was at the baths. He was given no Qizilbásh protection and no attempt was made to control the mob. We also learn that this was not an isolated instance of a shulúc ("mob demonstration"); for when the Khwájeh first heard of the mob forming outside the hammám (bathhouse) he ignored it quite nonchalantly and assumed it was "like the other times" (mánand-i ayyám-i sábiq). It was only when one of his attendants reported from the roof that "the mob of ra'yat and the like today is not like the other times", that the Khwájeh sat up and took notice and by then it was too late (JANG-KHULASEH).

Although the mob is generally described as "rabble" (ajláf), e.g. in AFZAL, the sources, particularly the author of JANG who states that he was a personal witness of these events (*lola*), do show a certain sympathy for the "innocent" (bi-gunáh) ra'yat of Harát and refer to the terrible but righteous wrath of the people who were supported by divine aid. The Harátís, and the author of JANG himself, marveled at the thorough destruction of the hammám and considered such havoc only possible through the miraculous personal intervention of the Imáms. Several anecdotes are cited which attest to the presence of "mysterious strangers" (rijál al-ghayb) in Harát at the very time of the shulúc.

This shulúc and the events which rapidly followed cannot quite be considered in the same light as the shulúc of 932/1526 in which the vazír of Khurásán, Khwájeh Habibulláh, was lynched at the hands of a Qizilbásh mob. These new events in Harát are "revolution" in both the political and class sense of the term.

ii. The Anti-Qizilbāsh Plot of the A'yān and the Bulúkātī ¹

The news of Súfyān's débâcle at 'Abdulábād followed soon after the lynching of Khwájeh Núr al-Dín. The Úzbek menace now seemed acute and Khizir Chalabí and the Rúmlú garrison left by Súfyān together with the Qāzī of Harát, Amír Hasan Astarábádī, began to organize the defences of Harát. The Qizilbāsh garrison was however weak and it became necessary to enlist the aid of the local a'yān and ra'yat.

The policy of extortion was therefore abandoned in an effort to win the sympathy of the local population and an appeal was sent summoning the bulúkātī into Harát to join in the defence. The sudden moderation (mudárá) of the Qizilbāsh was however distrusted and most of the bulúkātī rejected the summons and began instead active resistance against the régime in Harát proper.

This resistance was led by the "arbáb and a'yān" (ROUZAT) of the bulúk of Ziyáratgāh under Khwájeh Ahmad Ziyáratgāhí and Khwájeh Qásim. Khwájeh Ahmad and his family had suffered greatly from the excesses of the Súfyān administration and after their wealth had been expropriated, a gallows had already been erected for them in Harát; only Súfyān's abrupt departure to counter the Úzbeks at Mashhad had saved them. The Ziyáratgāhí thus had no confidence in the new Qizilbāsh policy of moderation and feared that the summons to join in the defence of Harát was a ruse to lure them into the city and subject them to further exactions or even execution.

1. The basic account is again JANG/1b7a-1b8b and the other sources are near identical in both presentation and language: KHULASEH/153a-154a, ROUZAT/1b0a-b, AFZAL/89a-b, AHSAN/209, TAAA/47 (brief).

The Ziyáratgáhi khwájehs therefore took command of the disaffected bulúkátí and expelled the Qizilbásh and their administrators from the bulúk or agricultural suburbs outside of Harát proper. AFZAL is alone in adding that they began their military operations at once and advanced to the walls of Harát which they subjected to bombardment by musket-fire (túfank) and cannon (túp).

One of the Ziyáratgáhi, khwájeh Mubárah, the elder brother of khwájeh Ahmad, did however go to Harát where he outwardly professed his loyalty to the Qizilbásh régime and disclaimed any connections with his brother and the bulúkátí rebels. In truth however he was secretly organizing a plot in Harát itself to overturn the Qizilbásh and bring in 'Ubayd Khán and the Úzbeks. In on the plot was Muhibb Mankál (variant readings: Mikál, Matkál, Makyál), the royally appointed kalántar ("chief of police") of both Harát and its bulúkát.

The kalántar now sent a secret message to Khwájeh Ahmad in Ziyáratgáh urging him to bring his men to the section of the walls under his personal command and promising to admit the bulúkátí if they would join in the uprising planned by the Harátí a'yán against the Qizilbásh garrison. The Khwájeh was also instructed to send a message to 'Ubayd Khán inviting him to come to Harát and promising him the city.

The plot must have been on a rather large scale for the secret soon became widely known and was ultimately betrayed to Abizir Chalebí by Amír Abú Táhir of the Harátí a'yán. (He was the son of the poet-munshí Amír Sultán Ibráhim Amíní who had helped organize the first "popular army" in Harát and had been killed at Harírúd; this same Amír Abú Táhir was eventually to betray the Qizilbásh and let 'Ubayd Khán into Harát.) The Qizilbásh acted promptly on this

information and squelched the attempted revolutionary action in Harát proper. Khwájeh Mubáarak had been forewarned in time and managed to escape back to Ziyáratgáh; the kalántar, Muhibb Ankál, was however seized and tortured to death.

JANG and the derived accounts add that after the plot was suppressed all of the a'ýán of Harát, including those who had not openly participated in the planned overthrow of the Qizilbásh régime, were imprisoned in the city's inner fortress of Ikhtiyár al-Dín. This would make it quite evident that the a'ýán as a group were no longer to be trusted and that they were clearly associated in the minds of the Qizilbásh with the revolutionary movement of Ziyáratgáh.

In terms of a "classical" description of "revolution" it might be stated that the "bourgeois" phase had been liquidated and that the setting was now prepared for the final "proletariat" phase.

iii. The Bulúkátí Siege of Harát and the Background for the Uzbek Alliance¹

Upon the suppression of the plot in Harát, the Ziyáratgáhi leaders united the bulúkátí for direct military operations in an attempt to wrest the city from the Qizilbásh by force. Another messenger was sent to 'Ubayd Khán, who was then in qishlác at the dragging siege of Mashhad, urging him to hurry on to Harát and promising him the aid of the bulúkátí forces.

The bulúkátí did not however await the arrival of their Uzbek allies before going into action. They advanced directly against the

1. The accounts of the bulúkátí action at Harát are a continuation of the previous events: JANG/168b-169a, KHULASEH/154a-b, ROUZAT/160b, AFZAL/89b-90a, AHSAN/270.

Firúzábád Gate of the city walls and ignoring the cajolery of the Qizilbásh leader, Khizr Chalabí, they made several unsuccessful attempts at Harát. Although each attack was repulsed and Qizilbásh sorties often drove them back, they did eventually succeed in surrounding the city and cutting off all outside contacts. By the time Ubeyd Khán arrived, at about the Nou Rúz or New Year's Day of Píchi (18 Ramazán 942/11 March 1536), Harát was already fully invested.

On the sectarian level, the alliance of the local Harátí with the Sunní Úzbeks might at first appear rather strange in view of the "propagandistic" statements made in the sources. However, as has been stressed before and merits repetition here, the formula, "Qizilbásh equals Shí'eh; Úzbek equals Sunní", is an oversimplification which does little to explain the course of political events in Khurásán at this period.

In the first place, the bulk of the population of Khurásán was not "Qizilbásh", i.e. whether Shí'eh or not, it remained outside of the dominant úymáq or ruling "tribes" which were theoretically united to rule Iran under the leadership of the Safavid House. The Qizilbásh in Khurásán (at this time there were Ustájlú and Rúmlú in Mashhad, Shámlú and Rúmlú in Harát, and Afshár in Faráh) consisted for the most part of the official garrisons brought in by each of the newly appointed governors. Their relationship to the local population (i.e. the non-Qizilbásh aiyán and arbáb of the "great local families" and the ra'yat, or all the remaining non-Qizilbásh) has been seen in the repeated atrocities and plundering of those they were theoretically protecting and administering to.

In the second place, while it would be difficult to estimate, even relatively, the sectarian affiliations of the population, it is

quite clear that the Harát area of Khurásán, and particularly the bulúkát, was not homogeneously Shi'eh, for both Sunní and Shi'eh both emerge in Harát depending on whether the Qizilbásh or Úzbeks were in control. The fact may be noted that a Ziyáratgáhi, Háfiẓ Zayn al-Dín, had been executed in the Harát main mosque at the very first Qizilbásh entry in 916/1510: for refusing to curse (la'nat) the orthodox Sunní caliphs (HABIB/515); yet we note the fact that the Ziyáratgáhi khwájehs were nonetheless arbáb at the time of the "Harát Revolution" and had been able to coexist and to prosper during the succeeding officially Shi'eh period to the point where their wealth was a target for expropriation.

Thirdly, as has been seen and is now to be seen again, sectarian animosities did not necessarily provide the leading motivating factors. To this the corollary might be added that secular motivations might however be cloaked in terms of sectarian animosity.

There is thus no need to conclude that the bulúkátí were necessarily crypto-Sunnís who had allied themselves with their co-sectarians, the Úzbeks; or that upon the successful conquest of the city they used their new prestige to promote their faith by exposing the Shi'eh to Úzbek religious justice. Although the bulúkátí were to bring their wealthy enemies to sectarian trial and the expropriation of their property and ultimately their execution, there is no reason to doubt that these charges were falsified in the manner of the previous Úzbek occupation (see above p.155 ff.).

The conclusion would therefore be that the alliance of the bulúkátí "revolutionaries" with 'Ubayd Khán was simply a matter of political and military expediency.

There is further evidence for this on the economic and social

levels, which have been necessarily ignored for the most part in this study. From the unsavory epithets applied in the sources to the bulúkátí movement--they are referred to, for example, as "rabble" (aíláf), "unknowns" (majhúl), "irresponsible freebooters" (lavand), "mischief makers" (fuzúl), "ignoramuses" (juhhál)--it is evident that the reference is to what we have been taught to label today as the "depressed classes" or "the proletariat". The nameless miller who advanced with sword in hand against the walls of Harát, the looting of the homes in Harát at its entry, the references to the dahátí and the rústáyí (the "villagers" or "peasants") in the movement, would indicate that an element of "class warfare" and jacquerie were involved.

The "depressed classes" (the ra'iyat) had suffered considerably from Qizilbásh extra-legal exactions, Úzbek raids and the passage of rival armies. A stable Úzbek government at Harát might have been expected to alleviate some of these pressures. Furthermore, in view of the Sháh's neglect of eastern affairs and the ensuing chaos (the Court was then in qishláq at Tabriz and had as yet given no sign of the coming liberation campaign) an Úzbek solution to the Khurásán problem might well have seemed preferable. In more short-sighted terms, however, the Úzbek alliance provided the bulúkátí with the opportunity to sack Harát and to revenge themselves upon the Qizilbásh.

The a'yán (in "classical" terms they would presumably be stereotyped as the "bourgeoisie") would also have profited at this point from a dynastic change. Far from providing security, the Qizilbásh garrisons had time and time again expropriated their property

and exposed them to looting, torture and execution. The lack of support and interest from the Central authority of the Safavid Court (there was still no legal governor or administrative apparatus in Harát) put them completely at the mercy of an armed garrison without any legal sanctions. Since there was no security under the Qizilbásh sháh there was little to lose in changing their allegiance over to the Úzbek khán. Furthermore, previous experience with 'Ubayd Khán's administration in Harát gave them no serious cause to fear an Úzbek alliance and ultimately an Úzbek solution to the Khurásán problem.

F. The Uzbek Conquest of Harát

I. The Siege of Harát ¹

While Sháh Tahmásb had made his cishláq in Tabriz after the Ottoman threat had been parried, 'Ubayd Khán was at the unsuccessful siege of Mashhad. With the coming of spring and the invitation of the bulúkátí and the khwájehs of Ziyáratgáh, 'Ubayd Khán decided that taking Harát might be easier than countering the determined resistance at Mashhad of Súfyán Khalífeh's widow. He therefore switched sieges and was established at the Bágh-i Murád outside of Harát by Nou Rúz. Harát was now invested by both the Úzbeks and the bulúkátí.

Khizr Chalabí Rúmlú, the ranking Qizilbásh officer had by then organized the defences of Harát. The Qizilbásh were deployed as follows: The Khúsh Gate sector was put under Ummat Bek (Shámlú ?); the Fírúzábád Gate sector was put under Dávúd (? variant readings: Dudácim, Darcam) Khalífeh (Rúmlú ?) ; and the Malik and Qipcháq Gate sectors were put under other trustworthy Qizilbásh. The 'Iráq Gate sector was however held by such non-Qizilbásh administrators and officials as Amír Hasan Astarábádí (the Qází of Harát), Amír Zayn al-'Ábidín (the khatíb or official preacher of Harát) and the latter's sons, Amír Hasan, Amír Husayn and Amír Qásim (variant: Qábúd). Khizr

1. The basic account continues to be JANG/169a-171a with KHULASEH/154b-155b and ROUZAT/167a-b near identical. AFZAL/90a-b and AHSAN/270-1 are also very similar but there are some minor variations. Brief mention is found in TAAA/48, SHIRAZI/600a and NUSAKH/220a.

The sole Úzbek mention is RAQIM/124a where it is stated that 'Ubayd(ulláh) Khán took Harát for the second time toward the end of JumádíI in 942. The date (even if we consider "942" as the Turkí year really standing for "943") is still a month later than the date recorded in the Safavid accounts. RAQIM's chronology appears suspect here as in other cases but in view of the general lack of Úzbek accounts it is worth noting.

Chalabí kept himself in reserve, prepared to assist in any threatened sector.

In addition to the military arrangements a moral attempt was made by the Qizilbásh to recapture the loyalty of the disaffected Harátis. This is one siege where expropriation, extortions and torture were expressly banned and exemptions to regular taxation were even granted. Justice is said to have prevailed; and even the efforts of the Chief Qází of Harát, Amír Hasan, to lead Khizr Chalabí astray by tempting him with the lure of economic oppression went unheeded. (The Qází's reputation becomes evident from the fact that he was soon to be lynched by the victorious bulúkátí.)

These military and moral measures were evidently effective and for five months all Úzbek storms were successfully parried by the Qizilbásh leaders, Khizr Chalabí and Ummat Bek and their loyal non-Qizilbásh aides. Whether Harát could have held out until the arrival of the royal relief army can never be known for sure, for the city was taken by internal treachery. The betrayer was none other than the local a'ýán, Abú Táhir whose previous treachery to the a'ýán plot in Harát has already been recorded.

It would be difficult to judge whether Abú Táhir's betrayal of Harát to the Úzbeks was part of some a'ýán plot to overthrow the Qizilbásh (it will be recalled that most of them had been imprisoned by the Qizilbásh after their first plot had failed), or whether the betrayal was merely the act of an individual willing to use the Úzbeks in his own personal interests. The sources present the latter view and relate how Abú Táhir had quarreled with the Qází, Amír Hasan; had been publicly insulted by the Qází; and that his pique had been

raised by Khizr Chalabí's support of the Qázi in this personal feud.

Abú Táhír was in a position where he could use the Úzbeks in his plan for revenge, for two of the towers of the Khúsh sector of the defences were under his personal command. He therefore secretly sent a messenger to the enemy camp and in return for his own safety and the promise of a high post in the Úzbek service he offered to admit a party of enemy troops through his sector of the walls. The terms were accepted by 'Ubayd Khán and a written compact ('ahdnámeh) was signed to this effect.

Thus on the agreed upon night of 27 Safar 943/14 August 1536 a party of 300 Úzbeks was admitted over the walls. They rapidly fought their way to the Khúsh Gate which they opened to the army of Úzbeks and bulúkátí lying in wait outside.

ii. The Úzbek-Bulúkátí Entry and the Short Sack of Harát ¹

Both the Úzbeks and the bulúkátí came charging through the Khúsh Gate and began the looting and atrocities usual under such circumstances. A fire soon broke out in the bazaar and many shops and shopkeepers perished in the flames. The bulúkátí used their knowledge of Harát advantageously and helpfully pointed out the wealthy homes of the city to their Úzbek allies. Both groups joined in the general plunder: torture was freely applied to discover secret caches; the women were raped.

That this sack of Harát was however not premeditated is made quite clear even in the Safavid sources. 'Ubayd Khán, who had still not entered the city, sent in his officer, Tinish Bí, with a pro-

1. The sources continue their accounts as follows: JANG/171a-172b, KHULASEH/155b-157a, ROUZAT/168a-b, AFZAL/90b-91a, AHSAN/271-2, TAAA/48. The variations are indicated in our text.

clamation forbidding any further excesses, and three or four Uzbek looters were de-nosed and de-eared on the spot to serve as an example. Order was gradually restored but not until the bulúkátí had seized one of their major targets, the Chief Qází of Harát, Amír Hasan: he was burned alive in the market square.¹

The Qizilbásh leaders, Khizr Chalabí, Ummat Bek and Mahmúd Bek, had in the meantime taken refuge in Harát's inner fortress of Ikhti-yár al-Dín. A written peace agreement was now negotiated with 'Ubayd Khán in which life and property were granted in return for the Qizilbásh surrender of the fortress and of the considerable wealth of Súfyan Khalífeh and Sâm Mirzá which had been stolen from the Harátís and stored there. From the mention of the Ziyáratgáhi khwájehs in this connection(TAAA) it would seem that they were to be compensated, but the bulk of the recovered loot went directly into 'Ubayd Khán's treasury. AFZAL assures us that the Khán contented himself with this and took no more.

Despite the writtten agreement however, 'Ubayd Khán's son, Muhammad Rahím and a group of Úzbeks had attempted to secure part of the loot for themselves and had forced their way into the fortress just as the Qizilbásh were surrendering. They had already begun stripping the evacuees of their women and possessions when 'Ubayd Khán heard of this breach in discipline and honor and personally rushed to the scene with bow in hand. Only Muhammad Rahím's hasty

1. TUHFEH/33 cites him as Sayyid Husayn Qází (of the Astarábád sayyids) and calls him a poet with the takhallus (literary pseudonym) of Hazíni. It is stated that he had been qází of Harát for a certain time (muddatí). Sâm Mirzá (the author of TUHFEH) is however incorrect in the year of his death (given as 939) and in his statement that he had been killed "on a certain pretext" (b-bahánehi) by 'Ubayd Khán.

anology and disavowment of his "inciters" saved his life.

The Qizilbásh prisoners were given asylum and then sent in honor with their families to Bukhárá. TAAA says they were killed enroute but the other sources state that they reached Bukhárá and remained alive there until 'Ubayd Khán returned from his final evacuation of Khurásán at which time he ordered their execution.

To this can be added the statement found in JANG/172a and repeated in most of the other sources that upon the Úzbek entry into Harát, 'Ubayd Khán ordered the killing of all Qizilbásh and tabarrá'-iyán (i.e. Shí'eh) on sight. This statement needs qualification, for it might sound as if a general massacre of the Shí'eh population was ordered. The facts would seem to be that this was a military order against the Qizilbásh soldiery still defending Harát, and that the term "Shí'eh" (i.e. here: tabarrá'í) is used here, as in other cases noted above, in the more restricted sense of the local collaborators with the Qizilbásh régime. None of the sources give the slightest hint of a general massacre of the Shí'eh population per se.

In contrast with this severe treatment of the Qizilbásh, KHULASEH cites the case of the expatriation to Bukhárá of the wife and son of the Qázi Amír Hasan lynched by the bulúkátí. It is quite clear that this was an a'yán family, for it is stated that the wife was the daughter of Amír Muhammad Yúsuf who had played a prominent role in Khurásán in the period of Sháh Ismá'il (HABIB/575-9, NUSAKH/209a, TUHFER/23).

This a'yán family was sent to Bukhárá, but their fate there was far different from that of the Qizilbásh executed upon the Khán's return. KHULASEH/346a states that the Qázi's son, Mír Sayyid Muhammad ibn Yúsuf eventually returned to Iran from Mávará'al-nahr and rose to the position of sadr ("minister of religious affairs") at Sháh Tah-másb's Court before his death in 977/1569-70.

G. The Second Uzbek Occupation of Harát

i. 'Ubayd Khán's Deteriorating Position (A Postulation)

The second occupation of Harát lasted for six months in the year of Píchí/943/1536-7 from 27 Safar/14 August to 17 Sha'bán/29 January. This was four months less than the first occupation of Ód-Bárs/936/1529-30. AHSAN/275 and TAAA/48 both state that the occupation lasted for 14 months but this is doubtlessly an error which has arisen through the "chronological tangle", for as has already been noted, AHSAN has inadvertently slipped in an extra qishlág season for the Court at Tabriz.

The sources once again make brief allusions to the Khán's "sitting on the throne of the Tímúrids" (AFZAL/90b), his plans for permanent annexation (ibid./91a) and his establishment of order in Khurásán (TAAA/48). (For the discussion of 'Ubayd Khán's permanent plans in Khurásán, see above p.161 ff under the events of the first Uzbek occupation of Harát.) Although AFZAL/91a asserts that Uzbek governors were appointed throughout Khurásán, this is surely an exaggeration, for this occupation of Khurásán did not extend much beyond the Harát area. Mashhad was never taken; the inference is that the Jurján-Astarábád provinces of northwestern Khurásán remained under Qizilbásh jurisdiction; and there is no mention of any Uzbek activity to the south of Harát.

There are only two minor references to 'Ubayd Khán's second occupation of Harát found in the Uzbek sources consulted (RAQIM and QIPCHAQ): both are brief and inaccurate.¹ This perhaps implies that

1. RAQIM/124a simply gives the date (somewhat inaccurate) of the second fall of Harát. See above p.231 for QIPCHAQ's/592a brief notice of the Khán's withdrawal from the "long siege" and the apparent confusion between the Fourth and Fifth Invasions.

the Grand Khán's activities in Khurásán at this time were not considered particularly significant among the Úzbeks. In fact, the general impression gained from reading the sources at our disposal is that this second taking of Harát was not in the grand manner of the previous Úzbek invasions of Khurásán. Indeed when the Sháh did finally get around to his fourth and final eastern campaign, he seemed as much concerned with the Khwárizmian-Úzbeks in Turkmenistan and with the Mughals in Qandahár as with 'Ubayd Khán in Harát.

The lack of any detailed Úzbek accounts for this entire period of the "Duel over Khurásán" is most acutely felt in attempting to follow the final phases of our discussion. From the Safavid sources, it can only be concluded that 'Ubayd Khán, despite the fact that he was then officially "grand khán", was no longer the great threat he had been in the past. As has been seen, there is no mention of any of the other "neo-eponymous clans" participating with the Khán or even lending their support. This would indicate that he had not been able to unite his Úzbek "peers" into sharing his plans for the conquest of Khurásán. He had instead to rely upon a most unstable Khwárizmian alliance which was soon to be broken when the Khwárizmians changed sides and formed an "entente" with the Qizilbásh, aimed against 'Ubayd Khán himself (see Appendix I p. XVIII ff.).

Furthermore the Khán's own men mutinied at the news of Sháh Tahmásb's arrival in Khurásán and refused to fight the Qizilbásh army. They even threatened to carry the Grand Khán back to Kávará'al-nahr by force if he persisted in his idea of remaining in Khurásán and engaging the Sháh's main army.

This theory being postulated here of the declining power of

'Ubayd Khán at this time is also borne out by the fiasco he suffered in his attempt to seize Khwárizm in the period following the final evacuation of Khurásán. However, it must be admitted that a certain caution is necessary in making this interpretation, particularly in the description of the Khwárizmian disaster, for the sources are those of the enemy--both Safavid and Khwárizmian (GHAZI)--and it must be noted that 'Ubayd Khán did have the support of his "peers" (Baráq Sultán, the Suyúnjíd of Táshkand and 'Abd al-Latíf, the Kúchkúnjíd of Samarcand) in the Khwárizmian campaign.

In view of the almost total lack of knowledge at present of the internal Úzbek situation in the latter part of 'Ubayd Khán's "reign", it would be quite meaningless to speculate any further on the reasons behind the declining power of the Grand Khán which has been postulated here from the enemy sources as a basic cause for 'Ubayd Khán's final failure in Khurásán.

II. The Alleged Sectarian Atrocities ¹

The Safavid sources, i.e. essentially the eyewitness account of JANG, confine their accounts of the second Úzbek occupation of Harát to reports of sectarian atrocities. They read very much like the reports in the first Úzbek occupation except that here the bulúkátí allies of the Úzbeks are cited as the chief culprits. Although the

1. The basic and by far the most detailed account is the eyewitness report of JANG/172b-173b. AHSAN/272 is clearly derivatory but less detailed as is ROUZAT/168b. AFZAL, which has been seen all along to be rather mild in referring to Úzbek atrocities, largely ignores them in its account of the second occupation; surprisingly enough so does KHULASEH, which despite the fact that it has followed JANG (frequently verbatim) for the account of 'Ubayd's final invasion, makes no mention of these new atrocities.

sources state that the Ūzbek Khán issued the necessary farmáns for the daily execution of five or six innocent Harátís accused of heresy (ráfizgarí), they nonetheless immediately qualify the statement and make it quite clear that the charges of "cursing" the Sunní caliphs were fabricated and were brought up by individual covetousness for wealth (mál ú asbáb) or because of a personal grudge (bá kasí sú³-mazájí búđ). The bulúkátí in particular are said to have freely applied the charge of heresy (rafz) to their numerous enemies of the previous Qizilbásh administrations.

The most famous victim (cited in JANG) was Mír Múnshí of the sayyids of Sabzivár. He is said to have had an imposing career under the Tímúrid Sultán Husayn Báýqará (d.911/1500 in Harát) and was then living in retirement in Harát. Despite his renown for philanthropy to the poor, he nonetheless had his enemies who accused him of sabb-i shaykhayn ("cursing" Abú Bakr and Umar) and was executed in the market square "like a thief or traitor" (JANG).

Although the sources speak of 'Ubayd Khán in this connection as a "terrible bloodthirsty tyrant" (saffák-i bíbák:TAAA/48), this can be matched by some of the references to the Qizilbásh tyrants: thus to the name of Súfyán Khálífeh Rúmlú, KHULASEH/148a adds the imprecation, "The curses of God upon him" (la'natu 'lláhi 'alayhi). Atrocities were committed by both Qizilbásh and Ūzbek and although at times of Ūzbek occupation it was possible to cloak them in a sectarian garb, there could be no such attempted justification when the Qizilbásh were torturing and expropriating the wealth of the at least outwardly Shí'eh Harátís. The generalization may perhaps be made that on the levels of "la grande politique" and theory, the Sunní-Shí'eh issue in the "Duel over Khurásán" was largely propagandistic; on the operational level however, it was often opportunistic.

H. The Uzbek Abandonment of Khurāsān ¹

I. The Uzbek Advance on Mashhad and the News of the Royal Liberation Campaign

It has been seen that Mashhad had resisted all of the Ūzbek attempts at storming and the siege there had finally been abandoned in favor of taking Harāt instead. However after three or four months in Harāt when the Ūzbek position there had been consolidated, 'Ubayd Khān marched forth to attempt Mashhad once again; his picture at the Mashhadī resistance is indicated by the fact that the campaign was undertaken in winter--about December. He thus left his trusted officer, Shaykh Darvīsh Bī in charge of the city and the bulūkāt and set out to expand the frontiers of what he evidently hoped was to become a new Ūzbek appenage.

The Court of Shāh Tāhmāsb had however by then finally left Tabrīz and in the preceding summer of Pīchī/943/1536, i.e. at about the same time that 'Ubayd Khān was still engaged in his siege of Harāt, had slowly set out for its campaign to liberate Khurāsān. By the time the 'Ubayd Khān reached Bākharz in Kūhistān and was about half way to Mashhad, rumors began to be heard of the presence of the royal Qizilbāsh army at the Bistām staging area on the very borders of

1. JANG/173b-175b, KHULASEH/158a-159a, ROUZAT/168b-170a and AHSAN / 275-b are all near identical (TAAAH/48 is similar but briefer) and probably all based on the account of Amīr Mahmūd ibn Khwāndamīr (Amīr-khwānd) the author of JANG and eyewitness of the events in Harāt at this time.

There is however another source here, i.e. the Shāhnāme of Mirzā Ḥosīm and both AFZAL/93b and AHSAN/276 quote the same verse beginning: nadārīm mā tāc-i jang-i shāh. This verse refers to the mutinous sentiments of 'Ubayd Khān's umārā and is in keeping with JANG's account. This is a possible indication of a relationship between JANG and the Shāhnāme.

AFZAL/93a-94a, while using the JANG rivāyat, also makes its usual additions from the point of view of the Court as cited in our text.

Khurásán proper.

These rumors were soon confirmed by the capture of a messenger carrying a private letter from an a'yán in Mashhad to a friend in Harát. The letter stated that the Sháh was rapidly approaching Khurásán and would shortly be in Harát; the letter had been sent as an advance warning to the friend to act "prudently" in the face of the new turn of events.

From AFZAL it is learned that the Sháh had also heard of the Uzbek advance toward Mashhad and had accordingly sent an advance army along the Khurásán Highway to occupy the Holy City before the arrival of the enemy. This however proved unnecessary, for upon hearing the news of the royal army's presence near Khurásán, 'Ubayd Khán had abandoned his planned offensive and had returned to Harát.

In Harát 'Ubayd Khán remained unsure of the veracity of the reports (he suspected that the captured letter might have been a plant) until on 16 Sha'bán/28 January the news was fully confirmed by the arrival of a courier from Suyúnj (or Súnjik) Muhammad Sultán, the Sháh-Budáqid son of Shibání Khán, who was then in occupation of Marv. The report, given added credence by a captured Qizilbásh soldier who had been sent along from Marv, stated that not only was the Sháh in Khurásán, but that the Qizilbásh army was already engaged in a northern campaign aimed at the Khwárizmian held areas of Nisá and Abívard in southern Turkmenistan and at Marv itself.

ii. The Mutiny against 'Ubayd Khán and the Departure from Khurásán

As soon as the news was received 'Ubayd Khán assembled a jánqí or war council to discuss what was to be done. Immediate action of some sort was imperative, for although the sources do not point it out,

the Qizilbāsh advance toward Marv threatened to cut off the Ūzbeks at Harāt from their home territory.

'Ubayd Khān began the deliberations by presenting his point of view: he wanted to remain in Khurāsān and engage the Shāh's army directly: he insisted that this time victory would surely fall to them, for the Qizilbāsh had come to the east after a difficult campaign against the Ottomans and had by then become thoroughly exhausted by the rigors of their winter campaign in the Turkmenistan area.

The Ūzbek officers however rejected this and pointed out that the Qizilbāsh were actually stronger than they had been in the past, for they had come fresh from a victory against the mighty Ottoman forces and captured considerable modernized equipment (asbāb-i Rūmī) which they were now prepared to use against the Ūzbeks. To this they added the fact that the Ūzbeks had always lost to the Qizilbāsh when fighting on the Khurāsān side of the Āmū River, and insisted that they now evacuate to Māvarā'al-nahr where they would be willing to fight a defensive war if the Shāh attempted an invasion there. (The unexpressed fear seems to have been that the Shāh, from his advanced position in the Marv area, might have been contemplating an offensive across the Āmū into Māvarā'al-nahr.)

The Grand Khān did not accept this advice and remained adamant in his decision to engage the enemy in Khurāsān; his umarā however proved equally stubborn in their point of view. The result was a mutiny in which the umarā won out: they threatened to use force to carry 'Ubayd Khān back to Māvarā'al-nahr if he persisted any further in his ideas. The Khān was thus forced to yield.

The sources here, i.e. essentially JANG, profess to give a verbatim account of these deliberations. While it is hardly likely that the exact wording is recorded, it would nonetheless seem to represent the actual status of 'Ubayd Khán's personal prestige at the time. At any rate the author of JANG was then in Harát and while his account may be tendentious, it does fit in with the deteriorating personal position of 'Ubayd Khán postulated here as one of the causes for the final Úzbek withdrawal from Khurásán.

Thus it was that the Grand Khán deferred to the views of his own officers and the day after the news from Marv had been received, on 17 Sha'bán 943/29 January 1537, i.e. in midwinter, 'Ubayd Khán evacuated Harát "bemoaning and bemoaning" (giryán ú nálán) as he passed the Bridge of Málán for the last time. And since the Qizilbásh army was operating in the Marv area, i.e. along the main highway from Harát to Bukhárá, the Úzbeks were forced to skulk along to Bukhárá on a back road via Balkh.

Part 2. The Final Campaign for the Liberation of Khurāsān

A. The Beginning of the Campaign: From Tabriz to Bistām ¹

I. The Delayed Beginning of the Campaign

As has been seen the Ottomans had already been harried out of Iran when, toward the winter of Qūy/942/1535, 'Ubayd Khān crossed the Āmū River and began his winter siege of Mashhad. The same ishlāq season had been spent by the Qizilbāsh Court at Tabriz, and although the sources do not state so, it would be apparent that it was a time of recuperation and consolidation after the domestic and foreign threats had both been simultaneously overcome.

The Shāh had emerged victorious at Court and it is significant for the subsequent internal history of the reign of Shāh Tahmāsb that the new vakīl chosen was 'Abdullāh Khān Ustājlu (AFZAL/80b), who had been very much the junior partner in the period of the joint Shāmlū-Ustājlu hegemony and who plays a very minor role in the following period. The vakīl can no longer be called a "regent"; he reverted to his original function as the leading representative of the ūymāq umarā at Court.

1. It is difficult to collate all of the sources here for the presentation is independent in each of the accounts and unique data found in a single source cannot be integrated. AFZAL presents the best rounded view but is confusing as to the sequence of events. KHULASEH is better on this score but is much briefer and not all of its data jibes with the other sources. ROUZAT has a detailed account with an itinerary; however its presentation is confusing since there are actually two reports of the same events and they do not always agree (e.g. on 160b it is stated that Sām Mirzā's letter reached the Court at Qazvin; but on 170a it places this event at Ray. ILCHI has a number of points not found in the other sources and while this is an important asset, the uniqueness of the data makes it possibly suspect particularly when collation with the other sources is difficult. AHSAN's account is brief and its presentation highly confusing. JANG is too local in its orientation on Harāt and has no information of the liberation campaign until the entry into Harāt itself. The other accounts (NUSAKH, SHARAF and SHIRAZI) are too brief to be of any consequence.

The specific references in approximate order of importance are: AFZAL/87b, 92b-93b, ROUZAT/160b, 168b-170b, KHULASEH/157a-158b, ILCHI/54b-55a, AHSAN/274-5, 278, NUSAKH/219b-220a, SHARAF/571, SHIRAZI/606a.

Although of secondary concern to the Court, events in Khurásán were not being completely ignored and it is stated that the news of 'Ubayd Khán's victory at 'Abdulábád (against Súfýán Khalífeh on 20 Rajab/14 January) had in particular stirred the Court into planning a general mobilization for another "definitive" campaign against the Úzbeks.

However, with the coming of spring of Píchí/942/1536 there was no immediate march to liberate Khurásán even though it would seem that preparations were being made and, from the later references, it would appear that this was the time that the captured Ottoman hardware was being assembled. The explanation for the delay is probably the fact that there were still certain internal matters to clear up. But finally, in the summer, after the execution of Muẓaffer Khán, the renegade ruler of Gílán, and of one of the two joint "grand vazírs" (Amír 'Ináyatulláh Khúzání, a relative of the author of AFZAL, c.v./81a), the Court moved from Tabríz on the first stage of the eastern campaign.

That no great urgency was felt is further demonstrated by the fact that a pilgrimage was first undertaken to Ardábíl, the Safavid shrine city where the founder of the dynasty, Shaykh Safí al-Dín and his descendants, including Sháh Ismá'il, were buried. Toward the end of summer (KHULASEH) the Sháh was still at the yayláq of Úján, some forty miles outside of Tabríz on the road eastward to Qazvín--but a long way from Mashhad or Harát.

II. The March to Bistám and the Emergence of Tahmasb as De Facto Sháh

It is most difficult to establish the itinerary of the Qizilbásh Court between Tabríz and Bistám for the sources are extremely contra-

dictory here as to the sequence of events enroute. The passage of time can however be gauged by noting the date of 10 Rabi'II/26 September as marking the presence of the Court at either Qazvin or Ray (in favor of Ray--KHULASEH and SHIRAZI; in favor of Qazvin--NUSAKH; ambivalent--ROUZAT). At any rate the Court was still in 'Irāq-i 'Ajam by the beginning of fall and was evidently planning on a winter campaign. There still seems to have been no feeling of urgency despite the fact that 'Ubayd Khān was already established "on the throne of the Tímúrids in Harāt by this time (date of entry: 27 Safar/14 August).

Despite the slowness of the campaign there were however important preliminary actions undertaken by the Court which testify to its seriousness of purpose. The most important was the order for a general massing at the Bistām staging grounds (on the 'Irāq-i 'Ajam side of the main Khurāsān Highway) of all the Qizilbāsh umarā and their levees, in preparation for which the yakīl, 'Abdullāh Khān was sent on ahead (AFZAL). The fact that most of the leading umarā now joined the Shāh is evidence of the fact that the "Grand Sedition" was over and that a new period had begun in Shāh Tahmāsb's career. Among the important umarā to join the Shāh were: Amīr Sultān Rūmlū (governor of Qazvin), Shāh Qulī Khān Afshār (governor of Kirmān), Husayn Jān Sultān Rūmlū (governor of Hamadān), Budāq Khān Qājār (soon to be named as governor of Marv and then of Qandahār), and the muhrdār ("Keeper of the Seal") Shāh Qulī Khalīfeh Zū'l-Qadar. It is noteworthy that the Shāmlū are not mentioned and in fact, as pointed out above, their subsequent role remained minor until the period toward the close of Shāh Tahmāsb's reign.

Two advance parties were also sent out: one, under Amír Sultán Rúmlú, Sadr al-Dín Khán Ustájlú and 'Alí Sultán Tátí-úghlí Zú'l-Qadar was sent toward Mashhad to counter 'Ubayd Khán's threatening offensive in that area; the secon party (mentioned only in ILCHI) was sent to Astarábád and was under the royal brother Alqás Mírzá, his laleh Badr Khán Ustájlú together with Sháh Qulí Sultán Ustájlú and Khalíl Sultán Varsáq.

It has already been seen that the group sent toward Mashhad had reported the withdrawal of 'Ubayd Khán from Bákhaz and presumably the umará in this party rejoined the Court shortly thereafter, for Amír Sultán Rúmlú figures in some of the events which immediately followed.

As for the Astarábád mission, there is nothing further to go on beyond ILCHI's brief statement. Nothing else is heard of this Astarábád campaign and there is nothing to indicate the presence of the Úzbeks in that area. It is conceivably an error based on a confusion with the events of the Third Liberation campaign when Alqás Mírzá and Badr Khán took Astarábád from the Úzbeks in the "Battle of the Bathhouse" and were appointed as the governors in the province. Furthermore, AFZAL/75a-b has recorded the fact that during the Sháh's rapid return from Khurásán to face Sulaymán's invasion (i.e. some two years previously) Alqás Mírzá had rejoined the Court but that Badr Khán had been named as sole governor of the province. However there is no information as to what had occurred in Astarábád during the following two years. Against considering ILCHI in error here is the fact that the rest of its account of this final liberation campaign does for the most part tally with the data given in the other sources.

Another item of business attended to enroute to Khurásán was the disorder in the Caspian province of Gilán. The royal brother, Bahrám Mírzá, was appointed governor there and given an army to restore order in that province. The lateness of the military season is made further evident by the fact that Bahrám Mírzá and his army first made their qishlác in Qazvin before going on to Gilán in the spring.

A problem still hanging over from the "Grand Sedition" in Khurésán was also attended to at this time, for the heads of the Shámlú "inciters" and the letter asking for forgiveness which had been sent by Sám Mírzá from his refuge in Tabas reached the Court while it was enroute. A return letter granting pardon was sent by the Sháh and (according to ILCHI only) the prospective new Qizilbásh governors of Harát, the Sháh's eldest son, Muhammad Mírzá (the future Sháh Khudábandeh), and his Takkalú laleh, Muhammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí, were ordered to proceed (from Isfahán ?) to Tabas where they could keep Sám Mírzá under surveillance. This measure was apparently not regarded as sufficient, for from the other sources it is learned that before too long Amír Sultán Rúmlú (evidently after his return from the abortive march toward Mashhad) was sent with the muhrdár, Sháh Qulí Khalífeh, to Tebas with instructions to bring Sám Mírzá back to Court. The unexpressed purpose of this, as may be suspected, was to keep Sám Mírzá from any open collusion with 'Ubayd Khán at Harát.

It is therefore clear that the Sháh was fully occupied during the march eastward with the problems he now faced as an independent ruler. The úymáq were being united once again under the Safavid House as in the times of Sháh Ismá'il and this meant that for the

first time since Shéh Tahmásb's accession concerted action could be planned against the Úzbeks in the interests of the Court, and not in the more specialized interests of the feuding and rival úymáq.

The march eastward may have been leisurely, but it must be admitted that the final liberation campaign, and in the longer run, Shéh Tahmásb's personal position, were being given a firm basis. It may perhaps be said that Tahmásb first acted as de facto as well as de jure sháh of Iran during this final campaign for the liberation of Khurásán.

B. The Winter Campaign to Turkmenistan ¹

I. The Northern Campaign

There was no Qizilbāsh qishlāq made during this Final Liberation campaign; nor did the royal army move directly along the main Khurāsān Highway leading from Bistām to Mashhad. Instead we find a winter campaign in Turkmenistan directed against first, the Khwārizmian-Ūzbek (Yādgārid) held oasis towns of Nisā and Abīvard, and second, against Shāh-Budāqid held Marv.

The motivations for this campaign will be dealt with in greater detail in Appendix I (p. xvi), devoted to the Yādgārid Ūzbeks, for the events will be better understood in their proper context. It is sufficient here to recall that as early as the First Liberation campaign in 934/1528, i.e. just prior to the Battle of Jām, the Qizilbāsh had already found it expedient to secure the Khwārizmian frontier at Khabūshān, presumably against Yādgārid and Turkmán raiding. It has also been noted that there seems to be evidence of an anti-Qizilbāsh alliance formed between the Yādgārids and 'Ubayd Khān in the Final Invasion of Khurāsān which Shāh Tahmāsb was then countering.

The campaign against the Khwārizmian Ūzbeks would then seem to have intended as a blow against the newly united Yādgārid and Abū'l-Khayrid Ūzbeks, and also as a defensive measure to secure Qizilbāsh held Khurāsān from the threat of Khwārizmian and Turkmán raiding.

1. The sources are brief and sometimes contradictory. By combining ILCHI/55a, ROUZAT/171a-b and KHULASEH/158b-159b, we do get a somewhat coherent account of the northern campaign.

AFZAL/94a notices the campaign very briefly, but on folios 95b-96a it gives the most important account we have of the re-ceding of Nisā and Abīvard to the Khwārizmians. JANG/198b has no mention of the northern campaign but does have an important reference to Qizilbāsh-Khwārizmian relations at this time.

Brief notices are also found in: AHSAN/275, 278, SHARAF/571, TAAA/80, SHIRAZI/600b.

There was a third factor in this northern campaign which was more immediate in its scope, for it was also aimed at cutting off 'Ubayd Khán at Harát from his main supply route passing north to south from Bukhárá through Marv, Sarakhs and Mashhad. ILCHI alludes to this fact and states that the Court had hoped to block the Khán's escape route and had accordingly pushed ahead in winter over the difficult roads leading directly to Nisá and Abívard and had then advanced directly to Sarakhs. The same source goes on to note however that this purpose was not achieved for by the time the north-south highway had been cut at Sarakhs, it was already too late: 'Ubayd Khán had by then crossed the Ámú into Mávará'al-nahr. (As has been noted above, the Khán had left Harát over a little used road via Balkh.)

The notices for this northern campaign are both brief and confusing. AFZAL points out that there are actually two riváyats (reported versions): one states that Nisá and Abívard had been taken while the Sháh was enroute to Harát; the other states that the area was taken on the return march after Khurásán had been liberated. This second possibility (not found in any of the sources available to us) can probably be discarded, for we do have an account of the royal return itinerary through Kúhistán and Mashhad which fits in with the other data at our command. It is only cited here to show the difficulties in attempting to follow the northern campaign.

However, certain facts are known, for as already noted in the narration of the final flight of 'Ubayd Khán, on 16 Sha'bán/28 January, a courier had arrived in Harát from Súnjik Muḥammad Sultán (the cousin and ally of 'Ubayd Khán who then held Marv) with the news that the Sháh was already operating in the Nisá and Abívard area and was

threatening Marv. It can thus be assumed that at about this date the two oases were occupied by the Qizilbásh, for the next heard (KHULASEH, ROUZAT, NUSAKH) is of the Sháh's follow-up action in taking Marv itself which (in ROUZAT alone) had been taken without a battle when Súnjik Muhammad Sultán fled.

Outside of the fact that the Qizilbásh suffered greatly from the snow and the cold, very little else is related about the campaign and the itinerary cannot be established with any certitude. NUSAKH states that the route of march northward began directly from Bistám. ROUZAT however contradicts this by asserting that the Sháh had first made a pilgrimage to Mashhad before proceeding northward. ILCHI manages to avoid both these riváyats, and ignoring Marv altogether, states that the Sháh paused for a brief qishlác at Sarakhs after the fall of Nisá and Abívard.

The period of this northern campaign was also marked by the appearance at Court (ILCHI says at Sarakhs which is quite possible; TAAA/48 puts this in Harát and is most likely in error) of Sám Mirzá who had been fetched from Tabas by a special Qizilbásh mission sent out specifically for this purpose. Although Sám Mirzá was at least outwardly forgiven for his role in the "Grand Sedition", he was nonetheless sent back to Qazvín (AFZAL/93a). (His future status at the Court of Sháh Tahmásb was insecure, and after living in semi-retirement in Ardabíl he ultimately died in prison in 975/1567-8; see KHULASEH/337b-342a for a detailed obituary.) The last signs of the "Grand Sedition" were thus erased during this northern campaign.

ii. The Khwārizmian-Qizilbāsh Entente

It is difficult to say what Shāh Tahmāsb's first intentions in Turkmenistan were. He appointed Budāq Khān Qājār as governor of the newly conquered areas (in KHULASEH; ROUZAT simply says "a great amir" and the fact is not mentioned elsewhere); however, before too long (probably after the Shāh's arrival at Harāt) the area was officially ceded back to the Khwārizmian Ūzbeks. We shall return to this in Appendix I (p.XVIII); it is enough to note here that the price paid was a loose sort of vassalage to the Qizilbāsh Court.

But something much more important had occurred when Nisā and Abīvard were receded to the Yādgārids, for it meant a definitive break in the 'Ubayd Khān alliance, and the substitution instead, of a new Khwārizmian-Qizilbāsh alignment aimed at 'Ubayd Khān and his immediate successors in Māvarā'al-nahr. The remaining relations of Shāh Tahmāsb and 'Ubayd Khān were to be dominated by this new alliance.

This was a great diplomatic achievement for Shāh Tahmāsb, and it endured long enough (until 950/1543-4) for it to have become a major factor in resolving the Khurāsān problem in favor of the Qizilbāsh.

C. The Sháh in Harát

1. The Appointment of the New Governors to Khurásán ¹

The tradition begun by Sháh Ismá'il of appointing a child member of the ruling Safavid House as the titular governor of Khurásán in residence at the capital city of Harát was maintained by Sháh Tahmásb; as a matter of fact, the infant Tahmásb had been the first to hold this position. To replace his rebel brother, Sám Mírzá, the Sháh now appointed as governor of Khurásán his eldest son, Muhammad Mírzá (the future Sháh Khudábandeh) who was then five years old (AFZAL/94a). The tradition of a laleh, literally meaning "tutor" or "guardian" but in actual practice meaning the de facto governor, chosen from among the leading Qizilbásh umará, was also maintained, and the Takkalú, Muhammad Khán Sharaf al-Dín-úghlí was named to this post.

It will be recalled that this Muhammad Khán had been governor of Baghdád and had remained loyal to the Safavid House during the "Tekkalú Disaster" and upon Sulaymán's conquest of 'Irác-i 'Arab. According to ILCHI/53b he had been appointed briefly to Isfahán before his new assignment to Harát, which was made evidently as a reward for his loyal services. He had one further qualification which fit in with the traditions of being the laleh in Khurásán, i.e. a marriage alliance with the Safavid House, for according to AFZAL/loc. cit. his wife was the sister of Sháh Tahmásb--which made him maternal uncle to his new charge.

1. As pointed out in our text there are two main riváyats. The first is found in JANG/170a-179b, KHULASEH/159b-160b and ROUZAT/170b-172a (with some variation). The second independent riváyat is in ILCHI/53b-54a, 55a. The brief notices in AFZAL/94a and ARSAN/276 are of no great consequence except as how they reflect upon the two riváyats.

There is some confusion in the sources as to when this appointment was made. JANG and its shadow for the events at Harát, KHULASEH, date the appointment as early as the period of Sâm Mirzá's revolt; AHSAN claims that the appointment was made to end Súfyán khalífeh's oppressive de facto rule in Harát; ROUZAT and especially ILCHI (which is particularly insistent upon this point) assert that the nominations were made at the very beginnings of the Final Liberation campaign, i.e. when Harát was under Úzbek siege but had not as yet fallen. The vague statements in the briefer notices (e.g. AFZAL) that the appointments were made at the Sháh's arrival in Harát may in all likelihood be rejected.

There are in addition two distinct riváyats concerning the arrival of the new governors at Harát which can be collated only with great difficulty. The first is in the accounts of JANG, KHULASEH and ROUZAT which despite some discrepancies are very clearly related; the other is the independent account in ILCHI.

According to the first riváyat (the first fact appearing however in ROUZAT only) the new appointees were sent off to Harát when the Sháh had reached Ray enroute to the east (date for the arrival at Ray in KHULASEH: 7 Rabí'II 942/23 September 1536). The new governors started off but first sent Ja'far Sultán, a relation of the Takkalú Khán, on ahead toward Harát. While enroute however their emissary heard of 'Ubayd Khán's entry into Harát (date in JANG and KHULASEH: 27 Safar 943/14 August 1536), and therefore halted his march and reported the news back to the governors. It is stated in JANG that Ja'far had to wait a year before he could finally complete his commission and enter Harát after 'Ubayd Khán's evacuation (date in JANG

and KHULASEH: 17 Sha'bán/29 January). All three sources agree that Je'far Sultán was the first Qizilbásh to enter liberated Harát, that the new governors themselves arrived afterwards at the beginning of spring in the new year of Takháqúy (Nou Rúz date: 28 Ramazán/11 March), and that they were shortly followed by the Sháh. JANG and KHULASEH are specific here and state that the Sháh arrived two or three days after the governors and entered Harát formally on 8 Shavvál 943/20 March 1537. This would be about a month and a half after 'Ubayd Khán's flight.

It will be seen at once that there are certain chronological difficulties in this riváyat, and more important, we are not told what the new appointees were doing in all this time of waiting.

These difficulties and gaps can perhaps be filled in when we turn to the independent riváyat of ILCHI. In this account it would seem that the nominee governors were not with the Court at all when they were ordered to go east by the Sháh, for it is stated that the fermán was sent before the Khurásán campaign was actually begun i.e. presumably while the Court was still at the Tabriz qishlác, and that the governors were instructed to proceed via Yazd (this is subsequently repeated ambiguously as "from Kirmán") to Tabas where they were to keep Sám Mírzá under surveillance. (It is possible that they started from Isfahán to which Muhammad Khán had just been appointed.) The account is concluded by the assertion that Muhammad Khán subsequently reappeared during the northern campaign when the Court was camped at Sarakhs with Sám Mírzá in tow. The account ends abruptly.

Although it is tempting to combine the two riváyats without further ado and simply state that the new appointees had bided their

time at Tabas and had then rejoined the Court before proceeding on their own in advance of the Sháh into Harát, it must be noted that unfortunately ILCHI gives no details on the arrival of the governors or of the Sháh into Harát. There is thus no common factor upon which the two riváyats may be hinged, either at the beginning or end of these independent reports. Furthermore, ILCHI's account of the fetching of Sám Mirzá is contradicted by every other ~~source~~ source used, including those outside the immediate orbit of JANG-KHULASEH-ROUZAT, e.g. AFZAL, AHSAN, TAAA and NUSAKH--all of which agree that a special Qizilbásh mission under Amír Sultán Rúmlú (the grandfather of AHSAN's author) had been detailed for the mission to fetch Sám Mirzá from Tabas. None of these accounts make any mention of the involvement of the new Harát governors.

While these details are obviously of minor importance, it is significant for understanding the nature of our sources that we are left with two independent and coherent accounts of a single event which, while not mutually contradictory, cannot be made to dovetail to our complete satisfaction. It is important for our research on Safavid and Uzbek affairs that such problems be brought out into the open and not glossed over.

It might be noted here as a concluding remark that the new joint administration of Muhammad Mirzá and Muhammad Khán Takkalú was destined to last until the laleh's death in 964/1556 with only occasional Court intrigue and comparatively minor Uzbek raids to interfere with the new security of Khurásán. This is of course in marked contrast with the events described in this dissertation and is an indication of how different the situation in Khurásán was to become after Sháh Tahmásb's Final Liberation. In fact so stable had the admini-

stration become that Muhammed Khán was succeeded in the post of laleh by his own son, Qazán Khán (he however managed to spoil the record and had to be forcibly removed from office in 972/1564-5), and Muhammed Mirzá held on as royal governor until 978/1570-1, close to the end of the Sháh Tahmásb period. It was at Harát that the Mirzá's son was born--the future Sháh 'Abbás the Great, and it was from Harát that Sháh 'Abbás began his career of reunifying Iran.

ii. The General Amnesty in Harát ¹

Once in Harát, many of the doubts vanish regarding the nature and sequence of the events of the Final Liberation, for it is possible to rely upon the eyewitness account in JANG. This source is alone in describing the interim period in the city between the departure of 'Ubayd Khán and the arrival of Ja'far Sultán, the advance emissary of the new governors.

It would seem from the brief description given here that the motivations behind the "Harát Revolution" and the resultant emergence of the bulúkátí to preeminence under the Úzbek régime had petered out in view of the impending Qizilbásh reentry. It is stated that one of the Ziyáratgáhi khwájehs (it will be recalled that this family had led the bulúkátí in the anti-Qizilbásh rising), Abú'l-Hasan by name, had taken over the interim control of the city with the active support of the Qizilbásh who still remained in Harát. This group was however challenged by Khwájeh Muhammad Amín, described as marja'-i jamí'-i navísandegán-i sharír i.e. "the epitomy of all evil petty

1. JANG/175b-176a has the account of the interim situation in Harát. Near identical accounts of the general amnesty and the execution of Khwájeh Kalán are in: JANG/180a-182b, KHULASEH/161a-162a and ROUZAT/172a-b. AFZAL/94a, 96b is brief, as is AHSAN/279 which is limited to the execution of the Khwájeh.

bureaucrats" (literally: "clerks"), who had gathered together a band of rapacious officials bent upon squeezing all they could out of the Harátis before the arrival of the new administration.

In an open contest for power marked by mutual taunts and threats, the Ziyératgáhi khwájeh accused his rival of drunkenness and triumphantly pointed out that since the toubeh of the Sháh, the drinking of wine entailed the death penalty. He therefore won over his hesitant Qizilbásh who were ordered to execute the grasping bureaucrat on the spot.

It is not stated exactly how soon after this event it was that Ja'far Sultán entered Harát. It is merely noted that he was officially welcomed into the city (isticbál) and that upon his entry a general amnesty was issued. By the beginning of spring the new governors arrived to be shortly followed by the official entry of Sháh Tahmásb.

It is related that soon after the Sháh's arrival he personally turned to the problem of meting out justice. There was no problem at all in rewarding those who had managed to emerge untainted through both the anti-Qizilbásh rising and the Úzbek occupation such as Mir 'Abd al-Hayy Rázi and Shaykh Zayn al-'Ábidín Khatíb (the official "preacher" of Harát) and his three sons.

The fact that the khatíb of Harát (he would presumably have been a bona fide Shí'eh) and his three sons (all of whom, as has been seen above, had moreover actively participated in the Qizilbásh defence of the city during the Úzbek-bulúkátí siege) were still around to receive their khil'ats of reward from the Sháh, is a good indication that the Safavid description of a bloodthirsty and violently anti-Shí'eh Úzbek régime at Harát are exaggerated. It is certainly worthy

of note that a single khatib had been able to hold his post in Herát, despite the intervening Uzbek occupations and Qizilbásh re-entries for the entire period beginning with Sháh Ismá'il's first conquest in 916/1510 to the time of his peaceful death some 30 years later in 945/1538-9 and could be succeeded in this post by his own son, Amír Hasan (JANG/191a).

There was a problem however as to what was to be done about the bulúkátí and those Harátí who had helped overthrow the Qizilbásh, had collaborated with the Úzbeks and were guilty of extortion and defamation, for although it is not so stated directly in the sources, it would appear that an important proportion of the population had been tainted.

It was finally decided to solve the problem by proclaiming a general amnesty; not however before the important personages among the guilty parties had been publicly reprimanded by being forced to confess to their sins, to enumerate aloud the specific crimes for which they were held responsible and to recant. A fermán (royal decree) was then issued instructing all the Qizilbásh and their administrative Tájik associates that they refrain from molesting in any way any Harátí or bulúkátí, however grievous his past offenses, for as JANG/181a puts it: "The drops from the royal balsam had cleansed the wound of their crimes free from the infection of their past sins".¹

There was however one exception made to this general amnesty in the case of the "extremist" Sunní (az ghul'át-i ahl-i Sunní), Khwájeh

1. "Rashahát-i maráhim-i khusraváneh sahífeh-yi jaráyim-i íshán rá az louš-i gunáhán-i mázī pák gardánídeh."

Kelán Ghúryání, who was accused of taking advantage of the Úzbek occupation to persecute the Shí'eh. What irked the Sháh in this case was the fact that the Khwájeh had openly welcomed 'Ubeyd Khán when the latter had passed through Ghúryán and had written a madh (verse of praise) in his honor. (Sample, quoted from AFZAL/96b and AHSAN/279: "If you, like a thorn, rake over the dust that is me [so much the better] for I shall then have become the dust of your doorstep".¹)

The Sháh was particularly annoyed at the reports he heard that the Khwájeh had gone even further and had spoken insultingly and unabashedly (JANG: bí-adabáneh ; KHULASEH: gustákháneh) against the royal person. It would seem that the "royal balsam" could not cleanse the sin of lèse-majesté and the Khwájeh was accordingly dragged through the streets and flayed alive in the market square of Harát.

1. "Agar chún khár bar khákam kashí, khák-i derat gardam"

D. The Royal Conquest of Qandahār ¹

A month after the arrival in Harāt, on 10 Zú'l-Qa'deh 943/ 20 April 1537, the Sháh personally set out with an army of 7-8000 horse for the conquest of Mughal held Qandahār and Zamíndávar (the area on the Hírmend River west of Qandahār also referred to as the Garmsírat or the "Hot Lands"). It has been seen that Sám Mirzá and the Shámlú had been active in this area for a full year after the abandonment of Harāt; his defeat in battle by Kámrán Mirzá's (or Mirzá Kámrán's) Mughal army had occurred as recently as a bit over a year before this new Qizilbásh venture.

It is perhaps curious from our point of view that almost all the Safavid sources consulted (the lone exception: AHSAN) as well as the meager accounts in the Mughal authorities and in RASHIDI insist that Sháh Tahmésb undertook this campaign to seek revenge for the defeat inflicted upon Sám Mirzá (ILCHI says for the killing of his laleh, Aghzívár Khán Shámlú) the year before. From what we know of the "Grand Sedition" and Sám Mirzá's status as an open rebel at the time, this motivation appears strange. It is perhaps a different concept of political morality when RASHIDI prefixes its brief account of

1. JANG/183a-180b, KHULASEH/162a-163b and ROUZAT/173a-174b are near identical. AFZAL/94b-95b has much the same data but has supplementary details as well. AHSAN/277, ILCHI/55b and TAAA/48-9,09 are considerably briefer.

Of the Mughal sources consulted only AKBAR/i/308-9, TABAQAT/ii/61 and MUNTAKHAB/ii/455-6 have any reference to the events in Qandahār, and they are most disappointing for the references are exceedingly terse and there are obvious inaccuracies. That these peripheral actions were of no great concern to the chroniclers is indicated by AKBAR's statement concluding the brief notice: "Whither have my words strayed? It is certainly better that I withdraw my hand from these affairs and attach myself to the thread of my design". "The thread of the author's design" is a resumption of the description of Humáyún's war in Gujrát.

RASHIDI/467-9 may be considered a Mughal source for this event, for the author was in close association with Kámrán in Láhúr at this very time. The account is however as brief as the other Mughal notices and is in fact quite conceivably one of their primary sources.

this campaign, which the author asserts was undertaken for revenge, by stating that Sám Mírzá had been fleeing from his royal brother when he came up against Qandahár!

It would seem more likely however that Sháh Tahmásb was using the Sám Mírzá incident to assert the political claims to the area which the Safavids maintained from the time of Sháh Ismá'il onwards (see Section I, p.49). Another motivation was clearly one of plunder and the Safavid sources freely corroborate this view. But perhaps the chief motivation was one of gaining prestige for the newly independent Sháh and for the Qizilbásh régime which had been so severely shaken both in the west and in Khurásán.

The details of the campaign may be summarized as follows (except where otherwise indicated the source is AFZAL which contains unique data supplementing the other accounts):

Upon reaching the Hírmánd (or Helmand) River the Sháh sent Amír Sultán Rúmlú on ahead toward Qandahár. At this news the Mughal governor, Khwájeh Kalán (he was the same governor who had resisted Sám Mírzá's siege for eight months), simply evacuated the city and fled toward Láhúr (Lahore). (RASHIDI offers the explanation that his military supplies had been exhausted during the previous campaign of Sám Mírzá.) 'Abdulláh Khán Ustájlú, the vakíl, was then sent on in advance to receive the surrender of the city which thus fell without a battle.

The Sháh fully incorporated the area into the Qizilbásh state (dákhil-i mamálik-i mahrúseh sákht). Shí'ism was made the official sect preached from the minbars (pulpits) (see especially ROUZAT); and the population pledged itself "to pay tribute and to wear the [Qizilbásh] headgear" (dádán-i báj va púshidan-i táj: JANG-KHULASEH). Further-

more a Qizilbásh governor, Budáq Khán Qájár (ILCHI is incorrect in citing Ya'qúb Sultán) was appointed to the area "from Zamindávar to the frontiers of India".

The element of plunder is quite apparent for it is stated in JANG-KHULASEH-ROUZAT that the considerable sum of 3000 Tabríz túmáns was received in "gifts" by the Sháh at his departure and that the population had been engaged to pay "tribute and taxes" (báj ú kharáj). Furthermore the royal return toward Harát was marked by the subjugation of the nomadic tribes in the area (úymáq va ahshám): those who refused allegiance to the new régime were promptly despoiled. By the time Harát was reached the Sháh was loaded down with his loot.¹

The victorious Qizilbásh army returned to Harát on 23 Muharram 944/2 July 1537, i.e. some two and a half months after its departure. The ensuing triumphal entry and the victory celebrations in the capital city of Khurásán are described in great detail in JANG.

As will shortly be seen, this victory was however most ephemeral for by the following year Kámrán Mirzá had marched back into Qandahár and all of the Sháh's grand plans had come to nought. However, in view of the plunder taken, the temporary prestige gained by the newly independent Sháh and his Qizilbásh troops (fathnámehs or "official victory pronouncements" had been promptly despatched to each of the provinces of Iran), and above all, in view of the clear assertion of the Safavid stake in the area, the royal Qandahár campaign cannot be considered a total failure.

1. "Az yúrish-i Qandahár bá ghanáyim-i bisyár b-Harát ámad" (AHSAN).

E. The Uzbek Embassies to Harát: The Effect of the Qizilbásh
Resurgence on the Internal Uzbek Situation ¹

Uzbek ambassadors were received by the Court sometime after Sháh Tahmásb's return to Harát from Qandahár. The references to this are unfortunately brief and are not entirely complementary.

It would seem that there were separate ambassadors sent by both the Jáníbegid Kistán Qará Sultán of Balkh and by 'Ubayd Khán himself, representing the Sháh-Budáqids of Bukhárá; however AFZAL makes no mention of the emissary from Bukhárá, and TAAA adds one from Samarcand (i.e. from the Kúchkúnjids). It is perfectly consistent with what has been seen in Section I (p.26) that the "appanage-states" should have sent their own separate ambassadors, for the conduct of foreign affairs was one of the prerogatives of each of the "neo-eponymous clans".

One can only conjecture as to precisely what the Uzbek missions were concerned with, but there are fortunately two very specific clues. The first is from TAAA which states that the Uzbek sultáns had heard of the Sháh's great victory at Qandahár and were "in great fear" (váhimeh-yi 'azím) ,i.e. presumably, lest the Qizilbásh next turn against them. Accordingly congratulations for the Qandahár victory were sent accompanied by suitable gifts in order to placate the Qizilbásh Court.

The second clue is from AFZAL which while more specific, restricts the embassies to a single mission from Balkh. It is stated here that the Sháh had originally been planning to attempt Balkh during this Final Liberation campaign and thus secure Khurásán from the Uzbek

1. The references to the Uzbek embassies are in: AFZAL/95b, TAAA/49, KHULASEH/163b and AHSAN/277.

threat (or more accurately, from one of the Ūzbek threats). Kīstān Qarā Sultān had heard of this and had therefore sent an ambassador to forestall this impending attack by offering his vassalage (literally: "expression of obedience": izhār-i itāʿat) to the Qizilbāsh Court. The Shāh is said to have accepted this and to have canceled his planned direct military action. He was satisfied to send the traditional khilʿat and a farmān to Kīstān Qarā confirming his rule in Balkh in a vassalage relationship to the Qizilbāsh Court (dārā-yi ʿān vilāyat rā bar ū musallam dāshtand).

What AFZAL refers to as "vassalage" is obviously seen from the Safavid point of view; it is probably simply meant to express the fact that a peace had been established with the Ūzbeks of Balkh. This is actually borne out by subsequent events, for the Balkh Ūzbeks (the Jānibegids) did not join the other "neo-eponymous clans" in ʿUbayd Khān's Khwārizmian invasion of the following year. Then too, there is another record in 948/1542 (i.e. some four years later) of an embassy from Balkh and a Qizilbāsh mission sent in return. Even more important as an indication that peace had been established is the fact that there are no recorded disturbances on the Balkh frontier until 955/1548 by which time Pīr Muḥammad Khān, the brother of Kīstān Qarā Sultān had succeeded there.

It must be stated however that the mention of a planned offensive against the Ūzbeks during the Shāh's Final Liberation campaign does not seem to have much substance, for as will be shortly seen, there was no intention of spending another season in Khurāsān and going into qishlāc at Harāt.

This does not however overrule the fact that the Ūzbeks may well have feared the intentions of the resurgent Qizilbāsh at this point,

for it must be realized that the Qizilbásh power and prestige was then at the highest it had been since the accession of Sháh Tahmásb. After passing through the crises of the Ottoman invasion and the "Grand Sedition", the Sháh had emerged as ruler of the united Qizilbásh úymáq and had been able to organize an eastern campaign which had done considerably more than simply forcing 'Ubayd Khán to evacuate Khurásán: the Qizilbásh had advanced into Turkmenistan and taken Kerv; they had established an entente with the Khwárizmians aimed against Mávará'al-nahr; a firm Qizilbásh administration had been reestablished at Harát; and Qandahár had been taken from the Mughals. When it is noted that within a period of two years the Sháh had resolved his immediate domestic problems and had defeated each of his foreign enemies (the Ottomans, the Mávará'al-nahr Úzbeks, the Khwárizmian Úzbeks and the Mughals), it can well be imagined that the disunited Úzbek "appanage-states" may have felt fear and had accordingly sent their placating embassies.

The point had been reached where it was no longer a question of the rival Úzbek clans' uniting with 'Ubayd Khán or not, in his attempts to secure Khurásán, for the Grand Khán had been forced to flee most ignominiously before this newly resurgent Qizilbásh power. They may well have had reason to regret the past luxury of disunity at this point and had perforce to send their individual embassies to ward off the Qizilbásh threat.

It would seem however that something positive (i.e. from 'Ubayd Khán's point of view) had emerged from this Úzbek crisis, for the "neo-anonymous clans" seem to have finally been forced by these events into

accepting 'Ubayd Khán's domination. This would seem to^{be} indicated by the facts we have of the Khán's last campaign, against Khwárizm in the following year, in which we do see the Kúchkúnjids and the Suyúnjids (but not the Jánibegids) joined in a common venture under their Grand Khán.

F. The Royal Withdrawal from Khurásán ¹

1. Economic Chaos in Khurásán

It may be recalled that after the Second Liberation campaign of Bárs/930-7/1530 the Court had decided that it could not maintain the full Qizilbásh army in the field for a cishlác at Harát and had instead returned late in the season to winter in Isfahán (another reason had been the suspicious presence of Husayn Khán Shámlú and Sám Mirzá in Shíráz). This same reason is now given for the Sháh's withdrawal from Harát after the Final Liberation campaign. However, it must be admitted that the economic situation in Khurásán must have been much worse at this time, for in addition to the normal ruin to be expected from the period of Uzbek raid, siege and occupation, the Harát area in particular had been plundered several times by its own Qizilbásh and their administrative associates and had in addition undergone a revolution in which the bulúkátí of the agricultural suburbs of the city had been closely involved and in which there are hints at jacquerie.

We are told that there was already a scarcity of food in the province and that prices were already sky-high and rising daily. The Sháh is said to have feared that a Qizilbásh qishlác there would have brought about "utter economic ruin" (nuqsán-i tamám:JANG) to the province.

The withdrawal of the Qizilbásh army and the Court administrators

1. PHULASEH/163b-165b, ROUZAT/175a-176b, and JANG/187b-188a are near identical for the royal departure and itinerary until Bákhharz is reached. JANG in typical indifference to the events outside of Harát does not continue the description of the itinerary beyond this point; it is however the only account for the economic situation. AFZAL/90b-97a is alone in including Mashhad in the itinerary. AHSAN/279 is inconsequential for our interest in Khurásán affairs.

could not of course immediately solve all the economic difficulties of Khurásán; however it did make it possible for the new Khurásán administration to turn to certain reforms after their departure.

JANG/189b states that as soon as the Sháh had departed the new governor, Muhammad Khán "immediately busied himself with fixing prices and controls on foodstuff and grain, much to the sorrow of the speculators and hoarders, but to the general well-being of the local population and the a'yán and to the prosperity of the bazaar and the [respectable] merchants".

Another measure undertaken at this same time was in regard to the agricultural areas surrounding Harát which JANG states had been utterly ruined by the "turn of events" (inciláb-i dourán) since the death of the Tímúrid Sultán Husayn Báýqará (d.911/1506) and the ensuing Qizilbásh and Úzbek wars. These lands were now redistributed among the governor's ágá (i.e. his Qizilbásh leaders) and muqarrabán (his "courtiers" or intimates) with orders to rehabilitate (ábádí) the land.

ii. The Return to Tabriz

In addition to the economic factor, there was a perennial problem on any extended campaign to account for the royal withdrawal: the umará are said to have been desirous of returning to their homes and lands in the west.

Thus toward the beginning of fall (9 Rabi'II 944/15 September 1537), six months after the royal entry into Harát, the Sháh led

1. "Nukhust b-ta'yín-i qaymat-i ajnás va hubúbát va qarár saman-i ghulát mashghúli namúd va tas'ir-i makúlát b-nou'í qarár dád keh erbáb-i ihtikér az kár-i khúð pashimán va aháli va a'yán b-sán-i bázár va bázariyán ma'múr va ábádán shudand".

the victorious Qizilbâsh army back to the west. The governors, his son Muhammad Mirzá, and the laleh Muhammad Khân, accompanied the Shâh part of the way in the traditional manner of mushâya'eh ("seeing off") and JANG-KHULASEH-ROUZAT have preserved the paternal advice said to have been offered by the Shâh at this time to his young son on the duties and responsibilities of rulership.

Enroute at Bâkharz in Kúhistân cognizance was taken of the rebellious state of affairs in that area and counter action was begun against the fortress of Ustâ. Since this action was not terminated until the following "year" it will best be discussed in the next chapter.

AFZAL, while not mentioning the pause in Bâkharz, is alone in stating that the royal route from Harât was through Mashhad. This is most likely to be accepted for it specifically mentions vaqf (pious endowments) lists shown to the Shâh at this time by the vazîr of Mashhad, Masihâ Rûhullâh Khûzânî, the author's grandfather.¹ It is also noted here that Ya'qûb Bek Châvushlû Ustâjlû (possibly the same Ya'qûb Sultân whom ILCHI/55b has erroneously named as the appointee to Gandehâr, although there is another Ya'qûb Sultân--a Qâjâr--who might have been intended) was appointed as governor to Mashhad at this time. This is the only reference to Ya'qûb Bek Ustâjlû as being governor of Mashhad; at the next reference to Mashhad in 950/1543-4 another Ustâjlû, Shâh Qulî Khân is cited as the governor.

There are several other instances of AFZAL's unique record of

1. He was not yet the vazîr of Khurâsân; someone correcting the manuscript--very possibly the author himself--has very carefully crossed out "vazîr of Khurâsân" and substituted "vazîr of Mashhad" in several instances relating to this period, with the indication "sahîb" i.e. "corrected". This is one of the indications we have that the unique manuscript of AFZAL in the British Museum is the author's original copy.

events at Mashhad which appear to be fully authentic and we can thus most likely accept data given here as supplementary to the royal itinerary from Harát preserved in the other sources.

Tihrán (Tehran) was reached toward the beginning of JumádíIII/ beginning of November, Qazvín a month later, and finally Tabríz in mid-Sha'bán/mid-January of 937/1538. The remainder of the winter season was spent in Tabríz.

A year and a half had passed since the beginning of the campaign, and, as has been seen, a great deal had been accomplished in the east during that time of a more enduring nature than had been the case in the previous liberation campaigns. It was not the specific military events of this campaign which had finally ended the "Duel over Khurásán" in Sháh Tahmásb's favor ('Ubayd Khán had not even been directly engaged). It was rather--on the Safavid side--what lay behind the organization of this final campaign, i.e. a newly reunified Qizilbásh state; and on the Úzbek side, it was the eclipse of 'Ubayd Khán's vision of a unified and expansionist Úzbek state.

Chapter 7. Concluding Events(It-Tūnuz-Sichqān/ 944-946/ 1538-1540)A. The Revolt in Khaf ¹i. General Narration of the Events

It has already been noted that when the Shāh was enroute from Herāt to Tabrīz, homeward bound from the Final Liberation campaign, he had passed through Bākharz on the way to Mashhad. He had there taken cognizance of a rebellious state of affairs led by Khwājeh Kalān, the son of Khwājeh Malik Khāfī, who was in possession of the fortress of Ustā which was considered impregnable.

Most of the sources (and there are many references to this event) content themselves with vague statements of a revolt and AHSAN gives the impression that we are dealing here with little more than highway-men ("he was wont to molest the passers-by"²).

ROUZAT however very specifically links this revolt with 'Ubayd Khān's occupation of Khurāsān, for according to this source, Khwājeh Kalān was of the "extremist" Sunnis (az ghul'āt-i ahl-i Sunnī) and had cooperated with 'Ubayd Khān to the extent that he had been given Khāf (or Khwāf) in the Bākharz area of Kūhistān as a "fief" (iqṭā) and had become the Ūzbek governor there. This, according to ROUZAT,

1. JANG/189a-190a and 191a-193b, KHULASEH/164a-b and 165b-167a, and ROUZAT/175b-176b and 177a-178b are similar in many details and also in their two-sequence presentation of the data; ROUZAT however has by far the most detailed account.

AFZAL/98a-99a has a less detailed account but is important for its independent presentation and some new details. Its reference to Ustā as being in Māzandarān is based on an obvious confusion with the fortress of Ustā in that province which was taken by Shāh Ismā'īl in 909.

Of the other and briefer sources (AHSAN/281-2, ILCHI/57a, NUSAKH/220b-221a), the most important is the brief but independent account in SHARAF/570. TUHFEH/79-80 has the brief biography of Khwājeh Kalān (cited there as Malik Khāfī).

2. "B-āyandeh va ravandeh muta'arriz migardid".

is the reason the Khwájeh had fled in fear at the approach of the Sháh and had taken refuge in his impregnable fortress of Ustá (evidently in Kháf).

This account is briefly confirmed in ILCHI which states that Khwájeh Kháfí (the text reads "Khání") had acted oppressively in Khurásán from his fortress at Kháf during the period of the Úzbeks occupation.

The events of the suppression of this rebellion may be summarized as follows: When the Sháh appeared in the Bákharz area, Khwájeh Kalán sent an emissary (a cousin in ROUZAT; a maternal uncle in KHULASEH) to placate the royal anger. The emissary was however grossly insulted and ultimately executed. Instead of forgiving the rebel, the Sháh ordered the governors of Shíráz and Kirmán (Ghází Khán Zú'l-Qadar and Sháh Qulí Sultán Afshár respectively, to whom AFZAL and AHSAN add 'Alí Sultán Táti-úghlí Zú'l-Qadar) to proceed against the fortress of Ustá and not to return until it had been razed. As was seen in the last chapter, the Sháh then continued on his way to Tabriz.

There is a chronological problem which we shall return to under "ii" which will somewhat modify this presentation of the events; but it would seem that there was a stalemate in the operations and that the fortress held out into the following year of Ít/944-5/1538-9. Among the events at the siege is the unique account found in ROUZAT of the manner in which Ustád Shaykhí Túpchí ("the chief canoneer") was killed. He had drawn out Khwájeh Kalán under the false pretence of offering a royal pardon; his deceit was however matched by that of the Khwájeh who "beat him to the draw" with an arrow.

The fortress was finally taken by internal treachery. One of

the Khwájeh's officers deserted over to the Qizilbásh umará and led a small party into the fortress through a secret route. Ustá was thus taken and razed (our Court source, AFZAL, however, notes that 'Alí Bek Bayát was left to guard it) and Khwájeh Kalán was brought to Tabríz in chains. He was hung upside down (TUHFÉH says, "by one foot") from the minaret of the Nasriyeh Mosque in Tabríz and according to ROUZAT was shot at from below as a living target.

TUHFÉH, Sâm Mirzá's biography of contemporary poets, has a brief notice of the Khwájeh, whom he calls Malik Khání. The form "Khání" (found in several of the other sources as well) should most likely be amended to "Kháfí", i.e. an "n/f" substitution which is easily explainable from the Arabic script. It would seem quite clear that there is an error here in TUHFÉH (or at any rate in the printed text) for immediately after citing the name "Malik Khání" the words are added: "He was of the princes (malikzâdehá) OF THERE", i.e. presumably OF KHÁF and therefore the nisbeh KHÁFÍ ("the one from Kháf"); "Malik Khání" would in this context give no sense.

TUHFÉH describes him as a "terrible, bloodthirsty, inveterate tyrant" (bí-bák va źulm-písheh va saffák) and says that in the end he revolted, was seized from his fortress and while still in his youth was executed upon the royal command in Tabríz. To this is added the fact that he was something of a poet (with the takhallus or literary pseudonym of Mashrabí, and had been "a seeker after knowledge" (ťelab-i ʿilmí kardeh búđ)).

ii. Further Details Mainly of a Chronological Nature

There is something of a chronological problem here arising from two facts: 1) The vagaries produced by the use of the mixed Turkí-

Hijri calendar system in the sources. This will be more advantageously discussed in the next sub-chapter ("B") on the revolt in Astarábad, where there much the same problem but where it is more important.

2) Many of the sources (JANG, KHULASEH, AFZAL, AHSAN) state that the siege lasted three months. This however does not seem to jibe at all with the the actual description of the events nor with SHARAF's statement that it lasted 10 months. We should like to accept the longer view of the time duration involved.

It would be advantageous to know as precisely as possible the date of Khwájeh Kalán's execution in Tabríz. This is in itself unimportant; however if ROUZAT's specific statement (vaguely confirmed in JANG) is accepted that the Khwájeh's execution occurred at the same time as that of the Astarábad rebel, Muhammad Sálíh, then this date does become important. It would be a great aid (however indirect or roundabout) for establishing the sequence of certain other far more important events (notably in Khwárizm) where there are very few dating clues of any sort.

It would seem that the chronological discrepancies here can be satisfactorily explained by accepting the fact that there were actually two phases of the siege of Ustá. This is actually indicated by the method of presentation in JANG, KHULASEH and ROUZAT where the narrative is given in two separated sequences: 1) the period of the royal passage through the area, and 2) the description of the successful siege operations.

This would mean that the great umará cited above (i.e. the governors of Shíráz and Kirmán) were sent to take the fortress after (and not simultaneously with) the first group which had been left by the Sháh but had proven itself unable to accomplish its mission. The

three months mentioned in the sources as the duration of the hotly fought battles and the siege would therefore refer only to the second phase of the siege. i.e. only after the great umará had arrived and joined forces with the original group.

This view is somewhat confirmed in AFZAL where the interpretation seems to be that the umará were ordered to the fort by the Sháh in Tabriz after the Nou Rúz of "11/944". This would be about six months after the Sháh had passed through Bákhaz. Adding to this the three months AFZAL ascribes as the duration of the siege and allowing a month for travel to Kháf, we actually do arrive at SHARAF's figure of 10 months.

As a matter of fact, SHARAF's brief account of the events at Ustá (in essence: the Sháh first sent Ustád Shaykhí Túpchí who was however killed in action; the "umará of Khurásán" were then sent by the Sháh; the siege lasted 10 months) fits in very tidily with our chronological requirements established without SHARAF's aid. The reason for the diffidence at using SHARAF directly, is the fact that for purposes of this dissertation SHARAF is a minor source, is not wholly reliable, and is not sufficient by itself. This case is exceptional however, and the reason would not seem difficult to guess if it is remembered that the author of SHARAF is a Kurd, and that an important hero cited by the other sources at the siege of Ustá was 'Alí Sultán Bayát. It is most likely to this 'Alí Sultán to whom SHARAF is proudly referring, when it describes the brave feats of valor performed at the siege by "a Kurd of the Chakaní tribe". While there are certain obvious inaccuracies in SHARAF's brief account, it is nonetheless possible to accept the broad outline of its version.

The conclusion would then be that the operations against Khwájeh Kalán began about Rabí'II 944/September 1537 in "Takhâqúy/943", received a new impetus after the arrival of the Qizilbásh umará some six months later, and ended with the execution of the Khwájeh in Tabriz sometime toward the summer of "Ít/944"--probably at about the very end of Hijrî 944 and possibly at the very beginning of Hijrî 945. (The reason for the slight confusion in the Hijrî year is due to the fact that the year passed at about this time from 944 to 945 on 1 Muharrem/30 May 1538.)

B. The Revolt in Astarábad ¹

1. Establishing the Chronology: A Brief Statement on the "Chronological Tangle" of the Mixed Turki-Hijri Calendar System

At about the same time that the Sháh was leaving Harát homeward bound from the Final Liberation campaign and was taking cognizance of the waywardness of Khwájeh Kalán in Kháf, another rebellion was in progress in Astarábád led by Muhammad Sálíh. It is important for our concerns here to note the fact that just as the revolt in Kháf is to be linked with the Ūzbeks of Bukhárá, the revolt in Astarábád is to be linked with the Ūzbeks of Khwárizm.

Due to the vagaries produced in the sources by attempting to combine the Turki and the Hijri calendar systems (thus a specific Hijri year is arbitrarily assigned to each Turki year regardless of the fact that the solar Turki year beginning in spring is from 10 to 12 days longer than the lunar Hijri year beginning independently of any seasonal considerations in Muharram), these two events are separated in the chronologically arranged sources: the events at Kháf are given under the rubric of "Ít/944"; the events at Astarábád under "Túngúz/945". ROUZAT, which has a freer method of presentation, does however link the two rebellions chronologically by stating that the executions of both Khwájeh Kalán and Muhammad Sálíh in Tabriz occurred

1. JANG/193b-197a, KHULASEH/169b-171b and ROUZAT/178b-180a are again clearly linked in the description of the event; however ROUZAT has certain interpolations.

AFZAL/99b-100b and AHSAN/283-5 are similarly interrelated and both give the details on the Khwarizmian intervention. AFZAL/100a specifically quotes AHSAN as a source for a passage, and it is interesting to note how much leeway an author allowed himself when claiming to be quoting directly. While the passage in question in AFZAL/100a-b can be seen to correspond to a similar passage in AHSAN/284, it is a far cry indeed from what we would consider a direct quotation: additions have been made and the wording changed considerably.

Briefer notices of the event are also found in TAAA/81-2, ILCHI/57a, NUSAKH/221a, SHIRAZI/607a-b, SHARAF/572-3.

b-yek rúz, which may be translated as either "on the same day" or "within a day [of one another]".

It must be admitted right off that this unique reference in ROUZAT is suspect, for it would appear strange indeed that none of the other numerous sources there are for these events would have failed to notice such a dramatic climax to two separate rebellions. Thus JANG (which ROUZAT claims as its main source for the entire period under consideration) is more modest in linking the two events chronologically and simply states that the Astarábád revolt also (níz) occurred "at about that time" (dar én oucât), i.e. in reference to the revolt in Kháf.

Like many of the other additions and asides in ROUZAT, this would appear to be one of the personal interpolations indulged in by the author in the interests of clarity and linkage of details. While this ordinarily makes ROUZAT a particularly valuable source, it must be noted that even though bound to cited sources contemporary with Sháh Tahmásp, ROUZAT itself was not actually written until about 1028/1019 (with additions extending to as late as 1042/1032) and its interpolations, however valuable, must be treated with certain circumspection.

There is however internal evidence in the accounts of the Astarábád rebellion which does actually indicate that the executions of the two rebels occurred, if not actually "on the same day", at least at approximately the same time. The basic premise there is to go on is that much ado is made in the sources over the fact that Muḥammad Sálīb was so evil that he was drinking wine during the especially sacred month of Ramazán when he was finally taken prisoner.

This Ramazán can refer only to Hijrî 944/February 1538 (corresponding to Turkî "Takhâqûy/943"), for the other possibility of Hijrî 945/January 1539 (corresponding to "Ît/944") would place the event too late to fit in with the important events in Khwârizm which are an important part of the background of the Astarâbâd rebellion.

There is one further aid here in determining the absolute chronology: the fact that Muhammad Sâlih, like Khwâjeh Kalân, was executed in Tabrîz. It is known that after the qishlâq in Tabrîz, in the new "year" of "Ît/944", the Shâh had sent an army to conquer Shîrvân (in what is today Soviet Âzarbâyjân) and then personally followed from Marand (in the Tabrîz area) on 19 Rabî'II 945/14 September 1538 (the date is given in SHIRAZI/607a). That is to say, the Shâh, in all likelihood, was in Tabrîz or at least in the Tabrîz area from the time of his return from Khurâsân (Takhâqûy/Shahbân 944/January 1538) until that date. We can therefore put the latest terminal date capping the Astarâbâd revolt at Tabrîz as the summer of Ît, corresponding to early 945 Hijrî/1538.

As a matter of fact, from what has already been seen of the "chronological tangle" we should not be overly concerned with the fact that TAAA places the event in 944, ILCHI in Ramazán 945 and SHIRAZI in "the aforementioned year" (last date cited: 945); nor that, of the chronologically (in theory only) arranged sources, AFZAL says "Qûy/944" (really corresponding to "Ît/944" however and most of which falls in Hijrî 945), while KHULASEH and NUSAKH say "Tûngûz/945" (most of which falls in Hijrî 946). Our own opinion is that the date should correspond to the Hijrî 944 portion of "Takhâqûy/943":

There would seem to be two reasons for this confusion:¹ the first, as remarked throughout this dissertation, is the fact that the dates given in the chronicles do not necessarily mean to describe the exact Hijrī year. The Safavid and Ūzbek sources consulted are most generally referring to the mixed Turkī-Hijrī calendar system in which the Turkī solar year (beginning with the Nou Rūz or first day of spring, which was then counted as March 11) is named according to the nearest corresponding Hijrī or lunar year. Thus a date simply cited as "944" may actually be referring to Hijrī 943, 944 or 945; this may be true even when the author has not specifically stated that he is following this mixed calendar system (e.g. AHSAN, RAQIM).

1. Iskandar Bek, the author of TAAA, has summarized the "chronological tangle" very neatly in giving his reasons for adopting the Turkī system for the main part of his history dealing with Shāh 'Abbās. The reference is on p.251 as marked in the lithographed edition. (There is a pagination error at this point in the edition; the correct page reading should be 278.):

"And I reflected to myself that if I adopt the Hijrī year, which according to Arab usage begins on the first of Muharram, most of the people of Iran will not understand; for among Turks and Persians the beginning of the year is the Nou Ruz which is the first day of (world-adornning) spring and the year is completed at the end of the four seasons when it has become Nou Rūz again. Therefore the month of Muharram falls during the course of the Turkī year and the date (so elegantly) used by 'those of ability' to record the events of the passage of time differs from the Turkī year. Some [of the 'year'] corresponds to the preceding Hijrī year and some to the succeeding year. That is to say, [the 'year'] may be one less or it may be one more [than the actual Hijrī year]."

"Va bē khūd andīshīd keh agar b-ravish-i ahl-i tāríkh saneh-yi Hijrī rá keh mabda'-i án b-'urf-i 'Arab avval-i máh-i Muharram ast manzúr dērad ekšar-i ahl-i 'Ajam namifahmand zūrā keh dar miyāneh-yi Atrák va ahl-i 'Ajam mabda'-i sál Nou Rūz-i Sultānī-st keh avval-i bahār-i 'álam-ará ast va tá inqizá-yi chahār fasl keh Nou Rūz-i dígar mīshavad yek sál ast va máh-i Muharram dar 'arz-i sál-i Turkī váci' mīshavad va tāríkh keh arbáb-i isti'dád b-jihat-i vacáyi'-i 'azímeh-yi ruzgār dar rishteh-yi balághat intiẓám mīdahānd bē sál-i Turkī mukhtelif ast ba'zī muváfīq-i saneh-yi sábiq-i Hijrī va ba'zī mutábīq-i saneh-yi láhīq ast ya'nī yekí kam ast yá ziyád."

There would seem to be two reasons for this confusion:¹ the first, as remarked throughout this dissertation, is the fact that the dates given in the chronicles do not necessarily mean to describe the exact Hijrī year. The Safavid and Ūzbek sources consulted are most generally referring to the mixed Turkī-Hijrī calendar system in which the Turkī solar year (beginning with the Nou Rūz or first day of spring, which was then counted as March 11) is named according to the nearest corresponding Hijrī or lunar year. Thus a date simply cited as "944" may actually be referring to Hijrī 943, 944 or 945: this may be true even when the author has not specifically stated that he is following this mixed calendar system (e.g. AHSAN, RAQIM).

1. Iskandar Bek, the author of TAAA, has summarized the "chronological tangle" very neatly in giving his reasons for adopting the Turkī system for the main part of his history dealing with Shāh 'Abbās. The reference is on p.251 as marked in the lithographed edition. (There is a pagination error at this point in the edition; the correct page reading should be 278.):

"And I reflected to myself that if I adopt the Hijrī year, which according to Arab usage begins on the first of Muharram, most of the people of Iran will not understand; for among Turks and Persians the beginning of the year is the Nou Rūz which is the first day of (world-adornning) spring and the year is completed at the end of the four seasons when it has become Nou Rūz again. Therefore the month of Muharram falls during the course of the Turkī year and the date (so elegantly) used by 'those of ability' to record the events of the passage of time differs from the Turkī year. Some [of the 'year'] corresponds to the preceding Hijrī year and some to the succeeding year. That is to say, [the 'year'] may be one less or it may be one more [than the actual Hijrī year]."

"Va bē khūd andīshīd keh agar b-ravish-i ahl-i tāríkh saneh-yi Hijrī rá keh mabda'-i án b-'urf-i 'Arab avval-i máh-i Muharram ast manzúr dērad ekšar-i ahl-i 'Ajam namifahmand zāra keh dar miyāneh-yi Atrák va ahl-i 'Ajam mabda'-i sál Nou Rūz-i Sultānī-st keh avval-i bahār-i 'alam-ará ast va tā inqizá-yi chahār fasl keh Nou Rūz-i dígar mīshavad yek sál ast va máh-i Muharram dar 'arz-i sál-i Turkī váqi' mīshavad va tāríkh keh arbáb-i isti'dād b-jihat-i vacáyi'-i 'azímeh-yi rúzgār dar rishteh-yi balághat intiẓám midahānd bē sál-i Turkī mukhtelif ast ba'zī muváfīq-i saneh-yi sábiq-i Hijrī va ba'zī mutábīq-i saneh-yi láhīq ast ya'nī yekí kam ast yā ziyád."

The second reason for the confusion relates specifically to the very years being discussed here, for at this particular time the correspondence between the Turkí and Hijrí years becomes extremely tenuous. The year cited as "Ít/944" began on a Nou Rúz corresponding to Hijrí 9 Shavvâl; that is to say, it contained only two and a half months of Hijrí 944 and by far the greater portion of the "year" actually corresponds to Hijrí 945 --despite its being referred to as "944".

It might be pointed out here that the overlapping of Hijrí and Turkí years during this approximate period doubtlessly accounts for the facts that: the year "949" in AHSAN's chronological arrangement (in which the Turkí year is not cited as such) has completely disappeared; "Yúnt/952" in KHULASEH is merely listed without any attached events; NUSAKH has rather furtively sprung two Yíláns upon us, one for "951" and the other for "952"; AFZAL, which attempts to ignore the whole problem, has simply noted a random qishláq for its year "Sichqán/949".

The reason for all this is doubtlessly due to the fact that Turkí "Yílán/951" began on 27 Zú'l-Hijjeh 951 Hijrí, and actually contained 3 days of Hijrí 951, all of Hijrí 952 and seven days of Hijrí 953! It is thus obvious that Turkí "Yílán/951" should be followed by "Yúnt/953" with Hijrí 952 simply disappearing. As the swallowing up of a Hijrí year would however disturb the symmetry of a chronology, it is only attempted in AHSAN--but without any explanation, to be sure--and so the year "949" simply vanishes. The other way out, that of giving the same Turkí name to two consecutive Hijrí years, has been attempted in NUSAKH (and also in KHULASEH/223b where "Bárs/961" follows "Bárs/960").

It is thus apparent that a certain caution must be used in

accepting the dates given in the chronologies, particularly for the period from about Turkí "Takhaqúy/943" when the Nou Rúz fell on 28 Ramazán, to about "Yúnt/953" when the Nou Rúz fell on 8 Muharram Hijrí 953, and thus the Turkí and Hijrí systems began to correspond once again.

To this artificially made difficulty is combined the more natural one of presentation, in which an author attempts to follow events through, despite the limitations of the self-imposed rubric-dates. There is also the related problem in presentation of dealing with simultaneously occurring events on the eastern and western fronts.

With all this in mind there should be no serious qualms about accepting the beginnings of the revolt at Kháf (described under the rubric of "Ít/944") and of the revolt at Astarábád (described under the rubric of "Túngúz/945") as actually having been contemporary and as having occurred in the Hijrí 944 portion of "Takhaqúy/943"! The final suppression of both revolts in Tabríz would then, by the independent chronology established here, have occurred in the spring or summer of "Ít/944" toward the end of Hijrí 944 or the beginning of Hijrí 945: (1 Muharram 945 corresponds to 30 May 1538).

We are not merely quibbling here in attempting to establish the absolute chronology for the Astarábád rebellion, for there is a tie-in here with Khwárizm. The events in Astarábád provide one of the few clues there are in attempting to follow the sequence of the far more important events of the Khwárizmian Civil War, 'Ubayd Khán's intervention and invasion there, and finally the death of the Grand Ahán in Bukhárá. It will be readily seen from the Appendix on Khwárizm that the slightest scrap of information, indirect as it may be, is a most welcome addition.

ii. The Background of the Revolt

Muhammad Sálík was the profligate son (AFZAL,AHSAN), or grandson (JANG,KHULASEH,ROUZAT,ILCHI), or nephew (TAAA,NUSAKH,SHIRAZI) of Khwájeh Muẓaffar Tabakchí. The Khwájeh, of an a'yan family of the Jurján-Mázandarán area (asl az akábírzádegán-i Jurján:ast: AFZAL), had joined the Qizilbásh administrative service in the days of Sháh Ismá'il and he has already been noticed in the Harát administrations of Dúrmaish Khán and Husayn Khán Shámlú. He had evidently retired to Astarábád after this, for he is named in two of RABINO's/27-28,46-52 Astarábád inscriptions: the first (dated 1 JumádíIII 937/21 December 1530) refers to the Khwájeh's efforts to secure a local monetary reform upon the arrival of a new Qizilbásh governor; the second (dated rabí'I 941/September 1534) is a vaqf ("pious endowment") for the public water supply of the city.

The conduct of the son, grandson or nephew of the Khwájeh was in marked contrast. He associated with, and was patron to, the drinking and literary set of Astarábád and steadfastly rejected the Khwájeh's pleas that he make a career for himself in the government service. At the death of the Khwájeh, instead of going to Court as was expected of him, he began to defy the legal authority in the province and to turn his thoughts toward a more independent type of political career than was possible through the Qizilbásh Court.

Qizilbásh authority in Astarábád could not have been particularly stable at this time. As has been seen, during the course of the Third Liberation, the royal brother, Alqás Mírzá and his laleh, Badr Khán Ustájlú had liberated the city from the Úzbeks at the "Battle of the Bathhouse" and had been briefly appointed as the governors. However, shortly afterwards, Alqás Mírzá had rejoined the Court when it was

returning to the west to deal with Sulaymán's invasion. It is not at all clear what the situation in Astarábád was during the period of the Ottoman and the Final Úzbek invasions. As has been noted above, AFZAL asserts that Badr Khán had remained in Astarábád; this is however contradicted by ILCHI which claims that Alqás Mirzá and Badr Khán had again been sent to Astarábád at the very beginning of the Sháh's Final Liberation campaign and that Alqás Mirzá had subsequently rejoined the Court at the Sarakhs camp. It can however be noted that another Ustájlú, Sadr al-Dín Khán, the son of Sárú Píreh, must have been appointed as governor of Astarábád sometime during this Final Liberation campaign, for he is found in this role immediately afterwards at the time of Muhammad Sálíh's revolt.

In addition to his private band of libertines (runúd), Muhammad Sálíh could rely on three parties in his bid for power: the first was known as the Siyáhoúsh ("The Wearers of the Black") described in TAAA as a segment of the local Astarábád population "ever ready to cause trouble" (irádeh-yi baghy va tughyán); the second was the Yaqqeh or Sáyin Turkmán of the area between the Gurgán and Atrak Rivers, who were constant raiders of the Astarábád province; and the third was the Khwárizmian Úzbeks, the nominal suzerains of these Turkmán and in occupation of the oasis towns of Durún, Nisá, and Abívard which fronted on the Qizilbásh held areas of northwestern Khurásán.

iii. The Revolt and the Khwárizmian Intervention

The revolt began when Muhammad Sálíh gathered a group of his runúd, Siyáhoúsh and Turkmán and gradually began encroaching upon the territories belonging to the Qizilbásh governor or to his officers. These successes naturally increased his numbers to the point where

the governor, Sadr al-Dīn Khān had to commit himself.

We now come to the Khwārizmian intervention in favor of the rebel. It must first be stated that as has often been the case in the narration, there are again two rivāyats: the first is the JANG-KHULASEH-ROUZAT cycle which makes no mention of Khwārizm whatsoever; the second is AFZAL joined here by AHSAN which give very specific details on the Khwārizmian intervention. (Of the minor accounts, ILCHI states that Muhammad Sālih revolted with the aid of the "Turk-mānān-i-Atrak" i.e. with the Turkman of the Atrak River.) In view of the detailed account in AFZAL and AHSAN there would seem to be no reason to doubt their authenticity here, for in addition to this mention of Khwārizm they both give approximately the same details of the event as found in the other sources. There is nothing basically contradictory between the two groups of sources; it appears to be simply a matter of supplementary data found in one and not in the other.

According to the first group of sources: Muhammad Sālih's power had grown so that he forced the Qizilbāsh governor to flee from Astarābād (despite the 3000 horse cited in ROUZAT) and to seek refuge in the Bistām-Dāmghān area where he informed the Court of what had occurred and asked for aid.

AFZAL and AHSAN make the following additions: After gathering his supporters and taking a few villages, he sent an emissary to the Khwārizmian Uzbek, 'Umar Ghāzī Sultān, with gifts and with a request for aid in his plans to rebel against the Qizilbāsh and to seize Jurjān province. Upon this, 'Umar Ghāzī crossed the Gurgān River (the Khwārizmian-Qizilbāsh frontier) with a large army (bā khayl ū bashm-i bisyār) and was greeted by Muhammad Sālih and his rebels who submitted (līzhār-i itā'at) to the Khwārizmian Sultān. The allied army then

marched upon Astarábád. The Qizilbásh governor could not hope to resist this formidable group and therefore evacuated the city and fled to the Bistám area.

Umar Ghází Sultán remained in Astarábád for a short while after the conquest during which time he and his Úzbeks were fêted and given "gifts" (doubtlessly as payment for services rendered). When the Sultán felt his position in Astarábád secure against the Qizilbásh, he appointed Muḥammad Sálîḥ as his governor there, left some troops with him and returned to Khwárizm.

The place of Umar Ghází Sultán in Khwárizmian affairs will become clearer in Appendix I (p.XXVIII). It is enough to note here that the Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente referred to above (p.347) as having been negotiated shortly before the revolt in Astarábád, would not necessarily have been binding upon Umar Ghází. The same independence in foreign affairs that has been noted for the Abú'l-Khayrids prevailed among the Yádgárid Úzbeks as well. Umar Ghází was of the Barkid (or Búráid) "neo-eponymous clan" which was very shortly to be eliminated in the Khwárizmian Civil War when the rival clans banded together against this one clan.

Both groups of sources agree that Muḥammad Sálîḥ proceeded to make merry in Astarábád and several anecdotes are cited to illustrate this which are purportedly from reliable eyewitnesses (KHULASEH: az saḥîḥ al-ḡoufî; AHSAN: az Šicât). It should be noted in this connection that the sources also admit that he was a great patron of the arts and sciences and thus it would seem apparent that the "drunken revels" referred to in the sources might equally well be viewed as "literary soirées". The poet Mouláná Hayratî is cited in particular as having

been a recipient of Muhammad Sálîh's largesse, and the profligate rebel's obituary notices in the sources generally conclude with a quote from a casideh written by this poet in his praise.

iv. The Suppression of the Revolt and Concluding Remarks on Astarábád and the Khwárizmian Úzbeks

In the meantime the Court had already despatched a rather imposing array of umará (including the Rúmlú governors of Qazvín and Hamadán, Amír Sultán and Husayn Ján Sultán, respectively) to deal with the situation, and this would seem to confirm the fact that the revolt in Astarábád was more than local in scope. However, before the umará arrived, Astarábád had already been reoccupied by the local Qizilbásh governor and Muhammad Sálîh had been taken prisoner.

This had come about when the evicted governor, Sadr al-Dín Khán Ustájlú, had taken advantage of the new régime's indifference to matters of defence and had been able to take the city by surprise during the revels of the rebels in the month of Ramszán. Legitimacy was then once more restored to the area.

It is of interest to note that the famous Astarábádí sayyids ("descendants of the Prophet") had been involved in the Qizilbásh restoration, for it is stated that they had despatched a delegation to the refugee governor at Bistám and had informed him of their disgust at the new régime. This might explain the otherwise curious statement added in KHULASEH and JANG that the Holy Sect of the 12 Imáms (i.e. orthodox Shí'ism) was then restored in Astarábád. The statement might however also be interpreted to apply to Muhammad Sálîh's alliance with heterodox groups and with the Sunní Khwárizmians.

It will become clearer from Appendix I why 'Umar Ghází Sultán and the Khwárizmians made no attempt to come to their client's aid: a vicious Civil War had broken out in Khwárizm aimed against 'Umar Ghází's own Barkid clan.

Muhammad Sálíh was then sent to Tabríz in chains and, as has been noted, was executed at about the same time as the other rebel, Khwájeh Kalán of Kháf. Like the Khwájeh he was hung from the minaret of Nasriyeh mosque.

The affairs of Astarábád may be concluded by citing ILCHI's/57a notice for 946/1539-40 (i.e. within a year of Muhammad Sálíh's execution) of the appointment of Ismá'il Mirzá, the infant son of the Sháh and the future Sháh Ismá'il II, to the post of governor there. Sadr al-Dín Khán, the suppressor of the revolt was named as his laleh. This system, whereby Astarábád seems to have received the same prestige as Harát itself, was not maintained very long, for in 954/1547-8 Ismá'il Mirzá is seen at Court where he is being named as governor of Shírván. Sadr al-Dín Khán, however, was still governor of Astarábád in 950/1543-4; by 955/1548-9 another Ustájlú, Sháh 'Alí Sultán is cited as being governor there.

It may be noted here that 950/1543-4 marks the date of the first raid on Astarábád by the dominant Khwárizmian Úzbek of the time, Dín Muhammad Sultán (or Khán), and the definitive break in the Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente. These raids and attempts on the Astarábád-Jurján area (also led by 'Alí Sultán, Dín Muhammad's brother) were to last until 973/1565-6 when Hájjim Khán became Grand Khán of a united Khwárizmian state and established a new entente with Sháh Tahmásb.

C. The Loss of Qandahār and Concluding Remarks on the Mughals ¹

As noted in the preceding chapter, one of the side events of Sháh Tahmásb's Final Liberation of Khurásán had been the conquest of Mughal held Qandahār in Takhāqúy/944/1537. The province had been fully incorporated into the Qizilbásh state and Budáq Khán Qájár had been appointed governor. (Another Qájár, Sháh Vardí Ziyád-úghlí, had been appointed as a subsidiary governor at Zamíndávar:AFZAL.)

This was however a most ephemeral victory for Qandahār was promptly retaken (probably within the same Hijrī year of 944/1538) after the Sháh's departure from Khurásán back to the west. Kámrán Mirzá, the brother of the ruling emperor Humáyún, had simply marched back into Qandahār from his seat in Láhúr and forced Budáq Khán into a negotiated surrender after some minor military operations. Nonetheless it is important for subsequent Safavid-Mughal relations that Sháh Tahmásb had personally conquered Qandahār and had staked the Qizilbásh claim to the area.

There was however no attempt made to retake the area at this time. AFZAL and TAAA give as the reason the fact that the Sháh was soon engaged with the revolt of his brother Alcás and Sulaymán's ensuing second (or third, according to the count in the Safavid sources) invasion of Iran. This statement is however quite misleading since Alcás did not begin his revolt until 953/1546-7, i.e. almost ten years later and Sulaymán the Magnificent did not invade Ázarbáyján until two years after that.

A better explanation for the Court's lack of serious concern over

1. The Safavid accounts of the retaking of Qandahār are in: KHULASEH/167a-b, AFZAL/99b, AHSAN/283, TAAA/69, RASHIDI/409 and the Mughal sources AKBAR/308-9, TABAKAT/ol, and INTAHAB/450 are considerably briefer.

the fall of Qandahár would rather appear to be that with the end of the major Úzbek threat to Khurásán the east was considered pacified; reising another full-scale eastern expedition aimed at Qandahár alone was probably not considered worth the effort and the risk.

And yet Qandahár could probably have been retaken very easily, for by early 946/1539 Humáyún had already suffered his first major defeat in Bengal at the hands of the rebel, Shír Khán Afghán, and his own brothers (including Kámrán Mírzá) were in open revolt. By 951/1544 Humáyún had lost India to the rebel, was in refuge in Iran, and was seeking aid from the Qizilbásh Court. From then until 962/1555 Humáyún's bases of operation were at Qandahár and Kábul and he was acting as an ally of the Sháh.

The price extracted for the Court's aid was Qandahár itself. It was reoccupied by the Qizilbásh in 965/1556 when they took advantage of the troubled accession of Akbar the Great (963-1014/1556-1605) to force the Mughals into complying with Humáyún's agreement that Qandahár would be ceded upon the Mughal reconquest of India.

The period of Humáyún's refuge in what is today Afghanistan is a most important feature of the post-'Ubayd Khán situation in Khurásán, for it was marked by considerable friction and open warfare between the Mughals and the Úzbeks in the Balkh and Badakhshán areas. This containment of the Úzbeks by the Mughal allies of the Qizilbásh is an important factor in capping the final defeat of 'Ubayd Khán and in thereby contributing to the resolution of the Khurásán problem in favor of Sháh Tahmásb.

D. The Death of 'Ubayd Khán and Concluding Remarks on the Úzbeks ¹

I. The Political Status of 'Ubayd Khán at the Time of his Death

'Ubayd Khán died on 10 Zú'l-Qa'deh 946/18 March 1540 at the very beginning of the Turkí year Sichqán, i.e. about two and a half years after the Sháh had left Harát upon the conclusion of the victorious Final Liberation of Khurásán. Khurásán had been free of the Úzbeks during this final period, for as has been noted this was the time of the Khwárizmian Civil War and of 'Ubayd Khán's intervention there.

The invasion of Khwárizm seems to indicate that toward the very end of his career, 'Ubayd Khán's prestige among the Úzbeks had risen; for we note the presence of Kúchkúnjids and Suyúnjids (although not the Balkh Jánibegids) who had joined under the banners of the Grand Khán. This brief reflaring of his power and influence at the very end is possibly due to the resurgence of the Qizilbásh power and the new Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente which were both direct threats to the Úzbeks of Mávará'al-nahr. These factors may well have forced a measure of unity among the rival clans at this late period.

'Ubayd Khán's fiasco in Khwárizm however ended all hopes for Úzbek unity, and it is quite clear that the Grand Khán had died without achieving any of his probable aims: Externally, he had failed to take Khurásán and been defeated in his attempt at Khwárizm; internally, the Úzbek "appanage-states" were to drift even further apart after his death.

1. The Úzbek sources contain the most detailed obituary notices: ABD/20a, ANONYM/10b-18a, AUQIM/20a-21a are near identical accounts and the main source for QIPCHAQ/591b-592a, SUBHAN/51b-53b, SILSILAT/117b-119b, 121a, and RAQIM/127a. To this should be added RASHIDI/283.

The Safavid accounts are in: JANG/199a-200a, KHULASEH/175a-170a, ROUZAT/181a (there is a missing folio at this point, but what remains indicates that ROUZAT is closely following JANG), and AHSAN/294-5 -- all of which are very similar. AFZAL/107b-108a has some variation. ILCHI/200a, TAAA/49, SHIRAZI/257b, HAYDARI/55b, NUSAKH/159a, MIFTAH/542a contain brief notices.

The Safavid accounts (JANG, KHULASEH, AFZAL and AHSAN) would however insist that 'Ubayd Khán was planning another attempt on Khurásán just prior to his death, and graphic details are even given (JANG and KHULASEH) of the preparations being made upon his very death-bed. This would imply that the new deterrent Qizilbásh power and the fiasco in Khwárizm had had no effect and that the Khán, to the very end, was planning another stab at Khurásán in his usual manner.

This account however is clearly suspect on internal evidence alone. For these same sources continue their accounts (apparently JANG is the basis) by claiming that 'Abd al-Latíf Khán succeeded as Grand Khán upon the death of 'Ubayd Khán. As proof of this fact these sources note the arrival in Harát of a courier from Mávará'al-nahr reporting the new developments there and proving the reliability of the news by convincingly flashing a new coin minted in the name of 'Abd al-Latíf Khán.

The quarrel here is not with the courier or the new coin, it is rather with the chronology, for 'Abd al-Latíf Khán did indeed succeed as Grand Khán--but only after the interlude of a six month reign by his brother, 'Abdulláh Khán I. (This is overwhelmingly the view of the Úzbek and other Safavid sources.) That is to say, the news which reached Harát of 'Ubayd Khán's death was already at least six months old and this would cast serious doubt as to the reliability of the report from Harát at the same time, that 'Ubayd Khán had been planning another Khurásán invasion on his very death-bed.

This death-bed notice of 'Ubayd Khán in some of the Safavid sources is probably to be taken as nothing more than a literary embellishment, or at best, as having been based upon nothing more conclusive than rumor.

ii. The Cultural Attainments of 'Ubayd Khān

The obituary notices of 'Ubayd Khān, both Safavid, and Ūzbek (plus the Chaghatāy RASHIDI) speak highly of his cultural attainments and thus reflect upon an aspect of Ūzbek internal history which has largely been ignored in this politically oriented dissertation. To see the Ūzbeks in this other aspect, it is of interest to note that 'Ubayd Khān had had an excellent education and had studied religious law and theology with the most eminent scholars of his time. He wrote in both Persian and Turkī (SILSILAT/118a refers to his translations into Turkī) and his verse is frequently quoted in our sources. His name and some snatches of this verse appear in such early Safavid taẓkireh ("Biographies of the Poets") as Sām Mīrzā's TUHFEH/20 and the Majma' al-Khavāss/15-16.¹ He is also praised for his skill in calligraphy and particularly for his musical compositions. His attention to public works and his reign of justice conforming to the religious law of the sharī'at are also attested to.

This description, taken for the most part from the Ūzbek sources, is derived from the highly stylized form of an obituary notice and contains obvious exaggeration; nonetheless some of the praise does seem to rise above the usual clichés. This is particularly apparent in the Safavid accounts which, while much briefer and while most vehement in their damning of the "Sunni terror to Khurāsān" (ILCHI is surprisingly enough particularly vituperative here despite the

1. The reference is to Ṣadiq Kitābdār's taẓkireh written in Turkī in the early period of Shāh 'Abbās. The work has been admirably edited (Tabriz, 1327/1948-9) with both the Turkī original and a Persian translation by Dr. 'Abd al-Rusūl Khayyāmpūr of Tabriz University. The edition is based mostly on an Istanbul University manuscript dated 1010/1607-8. The author, an Afshār, was born in 940/1533-4 and eventually became librarian to Shāh 'Abbās. Like TUHFEH, however, this taẓkireh has very little information relating specifically to the political orientation of this dissertation.

generally mild approach to the other Ūzbek khāns and to the question of atrocities) do, in the end, grudgingly pay their respects to his cultural attainments.

The Chaghatāy author of RASHIDI, a literary-minded soldier himself, pays particularly glowing tribute to 'Ubayd Khān and while it is undoubtedly exaggerated it does reflect upon the impression made by the Khān upon foreign contemporary observers. RASHIDI describes the Bukhārā of 'Ubayd Khān's time as an intellectual center recalling the days of the so-called "Timūrid Renaissance" in Herāt which had culminated in the time of Sultān Husayn Bāyqarā.




III. The Ūzbeks after 'Ubayd Khān and their Relations with Shāh Tahmāsb

The extent of 'Ubayd Khān's failure in the political field is seen in the fact that there were none among his ūzbek successors who could push his vision of a united and expansionist Ūzbek state. At his death the "appanage-states" drifted even further apart and ceased to be a serious threat to Shāh Tahmāsb's control of Khurāsān.

'Abdullah Khān II (ruled in Bukhārā: 904-1000/1557-1598) set about changing this situation and to a large measure was able to succeed where 'Ubayd Khān had failed. One of the explanations of this is perhaps to be sought in the fact that a continued Ūzbek contact with the "Irano-Islamic" traditions of government in Māvarā'al-nahr had prepared the way for the concept of a united state. Another explanation (or perhaps merely a corollary of the first) are the methods used by 'Abdullāh Khān to achieve this end. Unlike 'Ubayd Khān (at any rate as far as can be judged from our limited sources) he first attempted to eliminate the rival "neo-eponymous clans" and

while this was a very slow and difficult process lasting from 904 to 980 (1557-1578), it ultimately provided a solid basis for his expansionist career which was to include a twelve year occupation of Khurásán and the temporary conquest of Khwárizm.

As far as relations with the Qizilbásh state are concerned, this period of 'Abdulláh Khán's internal concerns dovetailed precisely with the retirement from all major activity of Sháh Tahmásb after peace had been established with the Ottomans. Thus, on the one hand, the Úzbeks were left free to build their new unified state without any concern of Qizilbásh interference; and on the other hand, Sháh Tahmásb's control of Khurásán remained for the most part unchallenged after 'Ubayd Khán's defeat in the "Duel over Khurásán".

Genealogical TablesThe Yādgārids: From Neo-Eponymous Clan to Dynasty ¹I. Period of the Yādgārid Neo-Eponymous Clans (916-946/1510-1540)II. Period of the Aminakid Neo-Eponymous Clans (947-973/1541-1566)III. Period of the Aghatáyid Dynasty (974--/1567--)

Abbreviations: M--Muhammed; S--Sultán; Um--'Umar; H--Hasan
 Arabic Numerals (1 to 8)--Yādgārid Grand Khán Succession; Capital
 Letters (A to E)--Aminakid Grand Khán Succession; Roman Numerals (I
 to V)--Dynastic Succession

Chapter 1. The Political Situation in Khwárizm in 930/1524

A. The Founding of the Yádgárid Uzbek State in Khwárizm¹

As has been seen in Section I of this dissertation, the Yádgárids were establishing their separate Uzbek state in Khwárizm at about the same time that the Abú'l-Khayrids were reestablishing their Mávará'al-nahr state under 'Ubeyd Khán. Both of these events occurred in the period of flux following Sháh Ismá'il's victory over Shíbání Khán at Marv in 916/1510.

Corresponding to the Sháh-Budáqid clan of the Abú'l-Khayrids who under Shíbání Khán had led the Úzbeks into Mávará'al-nahr by first taking Samarqand, were the Barkids². Under Ílbárs Khán, the son of Yádgár, this clan paved the way for the complete conquest of Khwárizm by first taking Vazír and Úrganch. The other Yádgárid clans, the Abúlekids and the Aminakids followed shortly afterwards and joined in the conquest of the other khwárizmian towns of Khíva(q), Hazárasb and Kát on the Ámú River delta of the Aral Sea, i.e. Khwárizm proper. A process of expansion then began from the delta through Turkmán held territory, westward toward the Caspian Sea and southward toward Sháh Ismá'il's Khurásán.

As in the case of Mávará'al-nahr, "appanage-states" were promptly

1. For the Yádgárids before the conquest of Khwárizm, see GHAZI/194-207; for the conquest, see ibid./207-217,

For the conquest see also the near identical NUSAKH/159b, HAYDARI/50b, SHIRAZI/260a-b and AHSAN/123.

2. The name of this eponym is garbled in the sources: GHAZI has B-rká; NUSAKH has Búráqeh; SHIRAZI has B-várqeh; HAYDARI has Núr-éf-rín. The name is possibly a corruption of Barkerh (Berke), the son of Jújī Khán the son of Changiz(Jengiz)Khán. The "neo-eponymous" name has therefore been coined here as the "Barkids".

There is a similar problem in many of the names of the Khwárizmian Úzbeks; e.g. Avánish, Anúsh, Anúshqeh, Alúsh and Uvays --are all variants of a single name.

formed on "neo-eponymous" lines and Ílbárs became the first Grand Khán at the dynastic seat in the delta town of Vazír. (The "capital" was to shift to Úrganch shortly after his death.)

B. The Use of GHAZI as a Historical Document

According to GHAZI it would seem that Ílbárs Khán, the founding father of the Khwárizmian-Úzbek state and its first Grand Khán, was still alive in 930/1524 at the time of Sháh Ismá'íl's death (p.215). This is expressed however only by implication for the context is most vague. GHAZI states that: 1) at the death of Sháh Ismá'íl, the Yád-gárids expanded southwards into Khurásán (i.e. to the oasis towns of the Köpet Dagh mountain range area separating Khurásán from modern Turkmenistan); and 2) that expansion continued for several years after which Ílbárs Khán died.

In view of GHAZI's general chronological vagueness there is no real reason to connect these two statements as forming a sequence despite the fact that this would seem to be GHAZI's intention. We would prefer to interpret the statements as follows: In the time of Ílbárs Khán there was a Yád-gárid expansion toward Khurásán; this movement was given a fresh impetus by the death of Sháh Ismá'íl (and the resultant decline of the Safavid deterrent power at the accession of Sháh Tahmásb).

The main difference between this interpretation and the original statement in GHAZI is the fact that the reference to Ílbárs Khán's death which is implied to have occurred after Sháh Tahmásb's accession has been deleted.

The reason for this deletion is the fact that there is precise dating data in the Safavid NUSAKH-source which flatly contradicts GHAZI.

IV.

It must first be stressed that GHAZI's entire account of Khwárizm during the period of concern to this dissertation is presented in a time vacuum; even the occasional stray references which might make a relative chronology possible are at best too vague to be of genuine use, and at worst are contradictory. There are many important details given in GHAZI which would seem to lose their reliability precisely because of the vagueness or contradictions in the chronological sequence.

The important point to be made here however is that these textual difficulties in GHAZI do not necessarily invalidate all of the details given. It should simply be realized that the author of GHAZI, a direct descendant of Yádgár and a Grand Khán himself, has based his "history" of this period on the "folk-memory" of the Úzbeks. This naturally enough had become somewhat garbled in the passage of time before Abú'l-Gházi, the author, wrote down this orally preserved account over one hundred years later. (The work was completed at his death in 1003-4 by his son.)

The Safavid sources (particularly the "Nusakh-source" and the "AFZAL-source") are a great aid in this matter; for while their references are comparatively brief (except for the AFZAL-source's detailed account of 'Ubayd Khán's invasion of Khwárizm) they are nonetheless seen in some sort of historical perspective.

(By "NUSAKH-source" is meant the near identical listings in NUSAKH/159b, HAYDARI/56b and SHIRAZI/260a-b relating to the Khwárizmian Úzbeks. To this, the less detailed but clearly derivatory MUNECCİM-BASI/11/711 may be added. By "AFZAL-source" is meant the scattered references to the Khwárizmian Úzbeks in AFZAL, KHULASEH and AHSAN-- and to some extent TAAA--which while parallel are nonetheless not

necessarily identical. AFZAL is in general much more detailed than AHSAN and KHULASEH.)

The NUSAKH-source is particularly valuable in this connection, for while exceedingly brief (it is essentially a bare list of the names of the Grand Kháns, their dates of death or accession, and a few scraps of added data) it is "legitimist" in orientation, i.e. it is consciously concerned with establishing the successions. This is most important for understanding political theory as opposed to practice, for both GHAZI and the AFZAL-source are more concerned with political realities and thus sometimes ignore the presence of a grand khán whose role may have become overshadowed by a more dominant Úzbek leader.

By a collation with the Safavid sources many of GHAZI's details become meaningful and are partially rescued from the contradictions and obvious errors. GHAZI's account is not thereby completely rehabilitated, but its use as a historical document (rather than as a purely literary document) becomes much more significant.

C. The Succession of Ílbárs Khán

The NUSAKH-source has only to state that Ílbárs Khán, the son of Súráceh (i.e. Barkeh) died in Bárs/923 (1518) and that his successor, Fesen Gulí Khán, the son of Abalak (or Amalak or Ílak, i.e. Abúlak) died in Píchí/930 (1524) to bring GHAZI out of its nebulousness and into full historical light.

For it is possible to collate this bare mention in the NUSAKH-source with the detailed account in GHAZI of the succession. We have only to discard GHAZI's implied assertion that Ílbárs Khán died after Sháh Ismá'il (i.e. after 930/1524). There is no reason however to

discard GHAZI's complementary statement examined above to the effect that after Sháh Ismá'íl's death the Khwárizmians occupied the territories of the Köpet Dagħ. As will be seen in Chapter 2 this fact is verified in the Safavíd notices.

It is therefore possible to accept the dating of the NUSAKH-source (Bárs/923/1518) for the death of Ílbárs Khán, but to follow GHAZI in recording the details of the ensuing events. The NUSAKH-source is much too terse to be a source for any details here, and the AFEAL-source has no mention of these early events. There is however an additional source of information that can be of great service in understanding the political developments in Khwárizm after the death of Ílbárs Khán, i.e. our small store of knowledge of the similar system and its practice in the sister Úzbek state of Lávará'al-nahr.

GHAZI/217 relates that there was another Grand Khán, Sultán Hájí Khán, who occupied this prestigious position for a year before his death and the accession of the Hasan Qulí Khán noted in the NUSAKH-source as the second grand khán. This Sultán Hájí Khán (his reigning date would be about 923-924/1518-1519) was the son of Bálbárs Sultán, the very active brother of Ílbárs Khán who had been closely associated with the first Grand Khán for the very beginning of the occupation of Khwárizm.

The second grand khán was therefore the nephew of Ílbárs Khán and the representative of the Barkid "neo-eponymous clan". The basis of his election according to GHAZI was his seniority in years: he was the eldest of the Yádgárid Dynastic House. In accordance with the Úzbek system, upon election, the new Grand Khán moved from his previous appanage at Yangí-Shahr to the dynastic seat which was then at Vazír.

This was little more than a prestigious promotion for the new Grand Khán, for GHAZI/217 states that he had few troops and few subjects even after his removal to Vazír. The de facto ruler among the Yádgárids after Ílbárs Khán's death was Sultán Ghází Sultán (it is noteworthy that he is not called "khán"). He was the eldest son of Ílbárs Khán himself and had inherited Vazír as his appanage.

The fact that Vazír was appanaged to Sultán Ghází Sultán but served as the dynastic seat occupied by the Grand Khán as well, has its parallel in Mávará'al-nahr where it will be recalled that Shíbání khén had appanaged Samarqand to his son but it was simultaneously the dynastic seat for the Grand Khán, Kúchkúnjí Khán: ABD/21a speaks of their joint (sharík) rule of Samarqand.

Although there are few details on Sultán Ghází Sultán until his assassination in about 944/1538 and the ensuing Second Civil War, it would seem from the references in the AFZAL-source and in GHAZI as well, that he had remained very influential among the Yádgárids through all the intervening period. It is quite possible that he occupied the same sort of dominating position in Khwárizm as did 'Ubayd Khán among the Abú'l-Khayrids before his election as Grand Khán.

At the death of the second grand khán, Sultán Hájí Khán, in about 924/1519, another qurultáy was held and a new grand khán was chosen on the basis of seniority in age. The eldest was Hasan Qulí khán of the Abúlakid "neo-eponymous clan". The dynastic seat was changed at this time from Vazír to Úrganch (presumably because the Barkids under Sultán Ghází Sultán were too well entrenched at Vazír).

D. The First Civil War

The NUSAKH-source states that in Píchí/930 (1524), i.e. the same year as Sháh Tahmásb's accession, Hasan Qulí Khán died and was succeeded by Bújgéh (or Bújghá) Khán the son of Muhammad Amín the son of Yádgár (i.e. of the Amínakid "neo-eponymous clan"). GHAZI/217-220 has the very important details behind this death which turns out not to have been a natural death at all, for he had been defeated and executed in the culmination of the First Civil War.

GHAZI relates that there had been an inter-clan war in which the Amínakids and the Barkids had united and had unseated the Grand Khán, Hasan Qulí, after a determined four month siege of Úrganch. Hasan Qulí Khán and his son were executed and the rest of their clan exiled to Mávará'al-nahr. This eliminated the Abúlakids from among the three original "neo-eponymous clans" of the Yádgárids.

The motivation, according to GHAZI,¹ was jealousy at the large revenues available to the Abúlakids by virtue of the fact that they held the dynastic seat of Úrganch--evidently the most economically important Khwárizmian city at the time.

It is thus seen that as early as 930/1524 an important part of the theoretical political system of the Úzbeks had been invalidated. Two "neo-eponymous clans" had united and eliminated the third from a rightful place as peers in the Yádgárid Dynastic House. This process was to culminate in the Second Civil War in 944-945/1538 when the two remaining clans fought it out: And then there was one, the Amínakids.

This situation has not been seen in our study of the Abú'l-Khayrid

1. "Hasanqulí Khánní yálghúz Úrganj níng hásilíní kúb bildílár."

Ūzbeks which was carried down to the year 946/1540. But this identical process was to occur in Mávará'al-nahr in the succeeding period when a series of inter-clan coalitions and wars resulted in the elimination of the Sháh-Budáqids by 964/1557, the Kúchkúnjids by 986/1578 and the Suyúnjids shortly thereafter. In the end only the Jánibegids were left, i.e. the great unifier, 'Abdulláh Khán.

Chapter 2. The Khwārizmīen-Ūzbek Expansion to the Frontiers of Khurāsān

With the elimination of the Abūlakids in 930/1524 the position of the grand khān began to circulate among the Amīnakids, presumably on the basis of seniority since the next three grand khāns were all brothers.

The succession and dating of the grand khāns as given in the NUSAKH-source are as follows: Būjgeh Khān, who ruled for five years and died in "Ūd/935" (corresponding to 935-6/1529-30); Sūfyān Khān, who ruled until "Qūy/941" (corresponding to 941-2/1535-6) when he was forcibly removed from office by his successor; and Anūsh Khān (or Avānish, Uvays, etc.) who ruled through the Second Civil War and the beginnings of 'Ubayd Khān's invasion of Khwārizm in "īt/944" (945/1538).

All three of these grand khāns are named in GHAZI. There is one difference however: GHAZI's sequence of succession is Sūfyān-Būjgeh-Anūsh, i.e. the relative position of Sūfyān and Būjgeh have been interchanged. The precision of the NUSAKH-source and the fact that its dating scheme fits in perfectly with subsequent events which can be correlated by outside developments would give its version priority over GHAZI with its frequent chronological errors. (E.g. GHAZI has placed an intermarriage between the Khwārizmīan and Qizilbāsh Courts during the period of Būjgeh Khān (pp.225-228), whereas we know from the eyewitness account in ILCHI/62a that this event did not take place until 953/1546.) The sequence of the NUSAKH-source is therefore to be opted, without however thereby automatically ignoring the many details found in GHAZI relating to the period of Būjgeh Khān and Sūfyān Khān.

Many of these details in GHAZI relate to the subjugation of the

Turkmán tribes, particularly during the period of Súfyán Khán (pp. 220-225). This pacification of the Turkmán tribes brought the Khwárizmian Úzbeks to the frontiers of Qizilbásh held Khurásán, to the Köpet Dag mountain range and the valleys of the Gurgán and Atrak Rivers which to this day form the boundary between Iran and Turkmenistan. This is the area known in GHAZI as Tágh Búyí (the "mountain-side") which was so named in contradistinction to the area of Khwárizm proper on the Ámú River delta, which was called Sú Búyí ("the river-side").

On the "mountain-side" were a line of oasis towns stretching from Durún on the west to Mihneh on the east and including the more famous towns of Nisá, Abíverd and Bághbád. This line lay approximately along the Atrak and Kashf (or Mashhad) Rivers north of and parallel to the Qizilbásh line extending from and including the strategic points of Isfaráin, Khabúshán (north of the Atrak River) and Sarakhs (northeast of Mashhad).

When the oasis towns of the "mountain-side" were taken they were fully incorporated into the Yádgárid appanage system. Thus GHAZI states that in addition to Vazír and Yangi Shahr on the "river-side", the Barkids held Durún on the "mountain-side"; similarly the Amínakids held Úrganh and Khíva(q) on the "river-side" and Nisá and Abíverd on the "mountain-side". It is these "mountain-side" appanages that concern us here, for they became the bases from which the Khwárizmian Úzbeks began raiding Qizilbásh held Khurásán.

Outside of the references in GHAZI to the subjugation of the Turkmán (in addition to the "mountain-side", the Turkmán [Türkmen] occupied the areas stretching westward from the Ámú River to the

Caspian Sea) there are no precise details on how or when the Khwárizmian Úzbeks first occupied the "mountain-side" oasis towns. The process had doubtlessly begun from the very beginning of the occupation of the Ámú delta and GHAZI, in a vague context to be sure, mentions the wars of Ílbárs Khán and his brother Bálbárs against the Turkmán of the Caspian area; however the statement is added that the Turkmán subjugation was not fully regularized until the time of Súfyán Khán.

But it is quite clear that the Khwárizmian Úzbeks had also been raiding toward the Khurásán area in the earlier period, for GHAZI states that Hájim Khán's mother (she would be the great-grandmother of the author) was a Turkmán who had been captured in a raid against the Gúklan (Göklen) Turkmán; this would be in the area of the Gurgán and Atrak Rivers, i.e. already within the territory of Khurásán (or more specifically--of Jurján).

This raid must have taken place in the period of Sháh Ismá'il since GHAZI states that Hájim Khán was born in 930/ca.1524. Although this date does not quite tally with GHAZI's further statement that Hájim Khán was 18 years of age at the time of 'Ubayd Khán's invasion of Khwárizm (his birth date would accordingly have had to be in 927 to fit in with the chronology established from the Safavid sources) it is a close enough indication for our purposes here to establish the fact that the Gúklan Turkmán had been raided even before the Safavid deterrent force was severely weakened at the accession of Sháh Tahmásb.

It can thus be said that even in the period of Sháh Ismá'il the Yádgárid expansion southward against the Turkmán had already reached

close to the frontiers of Khurásán, if not in the form of permanent occupation, at least in the form of raiding.

GHAZI then asserts that upon the death of Sháh Ismá'il, the Qizilbásh governors who were in the oasis belt north of the Köpet Dagh Mountains, i.e. in the "mountain-side" of Khwárizm, evacuated their posts upon Yádgárid pressure and fled.¹ The area was then occupied by the Khwárizmians. This was presumably the time that the key towns of Nisá and Abívard were taken.

It has already been noted that there is a difficulty in GHAZI's account here, for Ílbárs Khán, who we know from the NUSAKH-source had died in 923/1518, is cited in this source as having participated in this southward movement. This difficulty, however, has been shown to be adjustable and it is quite possible to accept GHAZI's statement of a Qizilbásh forced withdrawal at this time from the "mountain-side" and delete the reference to Ílbárs Khán as having been active in this particular event.

The Safavid sources make no specific mention of a withdrawal to south of the Köpet Dagh at this time. The area was little noticed and there is no mention of any Qizilbásh governor specifically appointed there. It is probable that the "mountain-side", albeit properly a part of Khurásán, was considered little more than an advance line of defence.

However this lack of direct confirmation in the Safavid sources does not necessarily invalidate GHAZI here. It has been seen that the internal situation in Iran after Sháh Tahmésb's accession was chaotic and that the Ustájlú wars had prevented any direct Qizilbásh

1. "Úl yacda Sháh Ismá'il úlúb túrúr Úzbak qúrqúnehindín Khurásán ...hákimlári táshláb qáchib túrúr." (GHAZI/text/215)

action against 'Ubayd Khán's threat to Khurásán. The fact that the first campaign to liberate Khurásán could not be organized by the Sháh until 934/1523 would make it quite likely that the "mountain-side" was taken between 930 and 934 (1524-28). This would confirm GHAZI.

The little that is known of the situation in Marv at the beginning of Sháh Tahmásb's reign would also bear out GHAZI's statement of a general Qizilbásh withdrawal from the northern marches. Although Marv is not specifically mentioned in the accounts of 'Ubayd Khán's First Invasion of Khurásán in 930-931/1524-5, it can nonetheless most likely be assumed that the Abú'l-Khayrids passed through the oasis on their way to the first siege of Harát.

Marv is however distinctly mentioned in the sources ¹ during 'Ubayd Khán's Second Invasion of 933-934/1526-7. It is seen here that although Marv was still under theoretical Safavid control, it had been largely deserted (BABUR says there were but 15 ra'yat in the fortress of the town) and the waterworks were in ruins. 'Ubayd Khán had simply walked in without any opposition whatsoever while he was on the way to the siege of Mashhad-Tús.

At any rate by the year 934/1528 Nisá and Abivard were already under Khwárizmian control and the Yádgárid Úzbeks were established there as a threat to Qizilbásh security in Khurásán. This fact is learned from AFZAL/37a-b, 38b where it is stated that one of the side events of the First Liberation campaign of Sháh Tahmásb was the re-occupation of the advance fortress of Khabúshán (north of the Atrak

1. Safavid: JANG/130b, ROUZAT/130b, AHSAN/196, TAAA/38, HAYDARI/55a.
 Úzbek: RAQIM/115b, QIPCHAQ/590b.
 Most important of all is BABUR/301b. For the action at Marv and also at Sarakhs, see above pp. 88-9.

River). While this operation had been aimed against the Abú'l-Khayrids who were then in temporary possession of this fortress, its purpose is stated to have been to secure the area on the Khwárizmian frontier (sarhadd-i Úrganchiyeh) from the army (lashgar) of Abívard, Nisá and Bághbád. When the fortress was taken, its defences were strengthened and a garrison of Chakan Kurds was left there to maintain the security of the area. Khabúshán (Qúchán) was so strategically located as to serve as a base against the encroachments of both the Abú'l-Khayrid Úzbeks operating from Mávará'al-nahr (via Marv) and of the Yádgárid Úzbeks operating out of Nisá and Abívard.

By advancing to the frontiers of Khurásán and occupying the strategic oases of Nisá and Abívard, the Khárizmian Úzbeks had become a potential fourth force (the third would be the Mughals) in the "Duel for Khurásán". However, they never became the threat to the Qizilbásh that 'Ubayd Khán represented for they lacked the economic basis of Mávará'al-nahr and had to rely on the subjugated Turkmán who did not share any of the possible Úzbek expansionist goals. The result was that the Khwárizmians concentrated on raiding. There was apparently no serious attempt to advance into Khurásán proper beyond the "mountain-side" and to seek new appanages, in the manner of 'Ubayd Khán, to be incorporated into their state.

Chapter 3. Khwārizmian Foreign RelationsA. The Inter-Úzbek Anti-Qizilbāsh Axis

Another important statement in GHAZI corroborated by the Safavid sources is the reference given under the rubric of Bújgeh Khān to the cooperation or perhaps even to an entente between the Yādgārid Úzbeks of Khwārizm and the Abú'l-Khayrid Úzbeks of Mávará'al-nahr. According to GHAZI/text/211 'Ubayd Khān had undertaken several invasions of Khurāsān and had occupied several towns--and the Khwārizmian Úzbeks had seconded these efforts by making continual raids (hamisheh yúrtúb) from their bases at Nisá, Abivard and Durún upon those areas of Khurāsān not occupied (literally: "the remaining areas", oālgānīnī) by the Abú'l-Khayrids.

This reference to a Yādgārid-Abú'l-Khayrid axis aimed against the Qizilbāsh is borne out by the notice made here in Chapter 2 to the Shāh's First Liberation campaign. While this had been conducted principally to counter 'Ubayd Khān's occupation of Khurāsān it did include a side campaign against Khabúshān. The extent of the inter-Úzbek cooperation is indicated by the fact that although 'Ubayd Khān's newly appointed governor of Isfarāin and Khabúshān, Qanbar 'Alī, was the immediate target of the Qizilbāsh mission, the more general purpose was to secure the area against the Khwārizmians operating from the "mountain-side".

There is another reference, in ILCHI/36b, to the cooperation between the two Úzbek Dynastic Houses. It is stated there that during the Second Invasion (933-934/1526-1527) 'Ubayd Khān had marched from Mashhad toward Astarábād through Khwārizmian territory and the steppe (sahrá) of the Turkmán (the text reads Turkán, probably an error for "Turkmán" or "Turkmánán") of the Atrak River. 'Ubayd Khān is thus

said to have been enabled to catch the Qizilbāsh at Astarābād by surprise.

Although ILCHI's statement is a unique notice and does not fully harmonize with the accounts given in the other sources (see above p 106), there is no reason to reject it entirely. When read in conjunction with GHAZI it does at very least indicate a measure of Yād-gérid-Abú'l-Khayrid cooperation at the time.

A more important Safavid piece of evidence for the existence of an anti-Qizilbāsh axis between the two Ūzbek powers is unfortunately not alluded to in GHAZI. This is the active and direct military aid given to 'Ubayd Khān in his Fifth and Final Invasion of Khurāsān in 942-943/1535-1537. This is specifically noted in three of the Safavid accounts (AFZAL/88b, AHSAN/267-8, TAAA/47) of the Battle of 'Abdulābād fought by the Ūzbeks near Nishāpūr in Rajāb 942/January 1536 against Sūfiyān Khalīfeh Rūmlū, the Qizilbāsh governor of Mashhad and acting governor of Harāt. On the Ūzbek side, in addition to the Shāh-Budāqids ('Abd al-'Azīz Sultān, the son of 'Ubayd Khān; Suyūnj Muhammad Sultān, the son of Shībānī Khān) notice is made of the leading role played in the battle by the Khwārizmians, 'Alī Sultān and Aqish Sultān (presumably the sons of Sūfiyān Khān of the Amīnakids).

As noted in the main narrative (above, p.330) where the deteriorating personal position of 'Ubayd Khān has been postulated, it is quite possible that the Shāh-Budāqids could not gain support for their Khurāsān projects from their own Abú'l-Khayrid "peers" and had perforce turned to an active military alliance with the Khwārizmians. The presence of the two Sūfiyānid brothers at the Battle of 'Abdulābād is an important factor in making this conjecture.

Even more important as an indication of the scope of 'Ubayd Khán's entente with the Khwárizmians is the winter campaign into southern Turkmenistan undertaken by the Sháh as a major part of the Final Liberation campaign. The numerous Safavid accounts of the Qizilbásh military operations here are somewhat contradictory ¹; nonetheless the fact emerges that despite the difficulties of the season and the terrain, Nisá and Abívard were taken from the Khwárizmians and Marv was taken from the Sháh-Budáqids. The implication is clearly that the two Úzbek Houses had been acting in concert against the Qizilbásh.

This Turkmenistan campaign accomplished more than the defeat of the two Úzbek enemies, for by diplomatic manoeuvring Sháh Tahmásb was able to break the inter-Úzbek alliance and to substitute a new political feature in Khurásán: a Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente aimed against 'Ubayd Khán and the Abú'l-Khayrids.

B. Dín Muhammed Sultán and the Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian Accord

Although the details in the Safavid accounts of how this diplomatic success of Sháh Tahmásb was achieved are sometimes contradictory and cannot be collated with GHAZI, nonetheless the basic facts emerge quite clearly. After the conquest of southern Turkmenistan (i.e. Nisá, Abívard and Marv) the Sháh had first appointed Budáq Khán Qájár as governor (thus in KHULASEH/159b; ROUZAT/171b simply says "a great erír "). That is to say, the intention was to incorporate the area into the Qizilbásh state. However, shortly thereafter (it is not clear whether the Sháh was still in northern Khurásán at the time or

1. ROUZAT/169a-b, 171b, KHULASEH/158b-159b, AFZAL/93a-94a, AHSAN/275-6, JANG/174a-175a, ILCHI/54b-55a, NUSAKH/220a-b, TARA/48, SHARAF/571, SHIRAZI/606a.

whether he had by then gone on to Harát), the brothers, Dīn Muḥammad Sultān and 'Alī Sultān, the Amīnakid sons of Anūsh Khān who was then the Yādgārid grand khān at Ūrganch, appeared at Court and the newly conquered areas were ceded back to the Khwārizmians. Nisá and Abivard were granted to Dīn Muḥammad Sultān in a loose sort of nominal vassalage to the Qizilbāsh Court. But in addition something much more important had been accomplished: The inter-Ūzbek axis had been broken and a new Qizilbāsh-Khwārizmian accord took its place.

The particularities of Dīn Muḥammad Sultān's visit to the Court are given in a unique passage in AFZAL/95b-90a in such intimate detail as to preclude any doubt as to its occurrence and as to its results. (It has been noted in the main narrative that AFZAL frequently has references to Court activity not found in the other sources.) It is worth recording here not only for the details on Dīn Muḥammad, but also as a rare example in the local sources in which a description of a royal audience is found.

It is stated in this source that Dīn Muḥammad Khān and his brother 'Alī Bek, the Changīzid sons of Anūsh Khān who were the heirs (vārīšān) of the territory (mulk) of Nisá and Abivard, came to the Court of Shāh Tahmāsb after this territory had been taken "by the swords of the Ghāzīs", to express their "obedience and sincerity" (itā'at va ikhlās). That is to say, they were seeking the restitution of these territories.

After making the necessary "gifts" (pīshkash) to the vakīl ('Abdullāh Khān Ustājilú) and to the "grand vazīr" (Qāzī Jahān) they were granted a private audience with the Shāh in which they requested "enrollment among the royal servitors" (silik-i bandegān-i vālā). Their past sins (ta'sīrāt) (presumably the raiding into Khurāsān and possibly

the association with 'Ubayd Khán) were magnaminously forgiven and the newly conquered area was restored to the brothers.

A farmán granting these territories to the brothers (farmán-i dárá'i-yi mamálik-i maẓkúreh) was written out by the munshí al-mamálik ("chief secretary"), Mirzá Akéfi Túsi, and was royally sealed. The vakil then clothed the brothers in a royal khil'at and they made their final obeisance (pábúsi). They were then granted the full complement of regalia signifying the royal favor, i.e. the qizilbásh "crown" or headgear (táj), the turban (dastúr), the horse, the saddle, in addition to the actual khil'at or "robe of honor". They were then graciously dismissed from Court and allowed to proceed to Nisá and Abívard.

This visit is also referred to, but very briefly, in the other accounts of the AFZAL-source (KHULASEH/159b, AHSAN/278 and TAAA/80).

Despite all the fine details in AFZAL itself there is a possible contradiction in the same source, which may however be explained as an emendation. For in describing the events of the Second Civil War and 'Ubayd Khán's invasion of Khwárizm in the very next year after Dín Muhammad's visit to the Court, it is the Súfyánid, Yúsuf Sultán (or Khán) who is noted as being in occupation of Nisá and Abívard; while his cousin, the Anúshid Dín Muhammad Sultán (or Khán)'s appanage is placed instead at Bághbád and Khabúshán.

The change in the appanages in AFZAL is not fully certain however, for the distinction is made by a marginal note and an emendation within the text (folio 104b). Since the textual emendations in AFZAL are very possibly in the author's hand and other emendations made are fully reliable, the new data is certainly worth considering.

A possible explanation for the emendation is the fact that AFZAL

is referring to some changes in the "mountain-side" appanaging produced by the Civil War which took place in the very next year, for the Yûsuf Khân who is placed in Nisá and Abivard is considered in both the AFZAL-source and the NUSAKH-source as having emerged as grand Khân at the time of the Abû'l-Khayrid invasion which immediately followed the Civil War. Furthermore, AFZAL is very explicit about Yûsuf Khân's amicable relations with the Court of Sháh Tahmasb, for it is stated (uniquely in this source) that he had received a contingent of Qizilbâsh troops.

The other versions of the AFZAL-source do not accept this emendation; however they are very explicit about the more important point of Dîn Muhammad's close relationship to the Qizilbâsh Court. Thus it is stated (KHULASEH/172a and AHSAN/291) that "he was acting in the capacity of Sháh Tahmâsb's governor of Nisá and Abivard".¹ Furthermore, although these two versions do not make AFZAL's specific references to direct military aid received from the Sháh in the war against 'Ubayd Khân, they nonetheless do describe Dîn Muhammad's efforts against the Abû'l-Khayrids as being within the interests of the Safavid state. Thus, AHSAN/292 makes the claim that Dîn Muhammad's victory against the Abû'l-Khayrids was made possible through his having "the good fortune of the Sháh" (doulat-i Pádsháh).

The scope of the Qizilbâsh accord with the Khwârizmians will become clearer in the narration of the events leading to 'Ubayd Khân's final expulsion. It is sufficient to note here that Dîn Muhammad's visit to the Court, the recession of Nisá and Abivard and the establishment of an accord with Khwârizm was a notable diplomatic achievement

1. "Dîn Muhammad ibn Alûsh Khân dar Nisá va Abivard az qibal-i Sháh-i Dîn-Panáh hákim búd."

of Sháh Tahmásb and so changed the power situation in Khurásán that it enabled the Qizilbásh to consolidate the victory won in the Final Liberation.

C. Dín Muhammad's Relations with Sháh Tahmásb according to

JANG and GHAZI

JANG/198a-b has an altogether different account of Dín Muhammad's relations with Sháh Tahmásb's Court which merits being noted for its very uniqueness, despite the fact that there is a garble in the manuscript here (something has very clearly been omitted by the copyist) which makes the interpretation difficult.

JANG, in giving the background for its rather vague account of 'Ubsyd Khán's invasion of Khwárizm and with the clear intention of demonstrating the harmonious relations in the past between the Qizilbásh Court and Khwárizm, makes the following observations: As early as 940/1534 when the Sháh had come to the aid of Bahrám Mirzá and was in Harát (the reference would be to the Third Liberation which relieved the "long siege") Badr al-Dín Muhammad Sultán of the Lakziyeh dynasty (sic: for Khwárizmiyeh ?) had come to the Court bearing great gifts and was enrolled in the ranks of "the obedient" (muti'án). JANG then continues that in 943/1536-7 (i.e. at the Final Liberation) the aforementioned Badr al-Dín Muhammad Sultán sent messages to the Court renewing his obedience (itá'at) and was greatly honored in return by the royal favor (latá'at).

JANG is thus seen to differ from the AFZAL-source on two main points: 1) Dín Muhammad had made his visit to the Court in 940 rather than in 943; and 2) he did not personally appear in 943 but was content to send word of his "obedience".

In view of AFZAL's detailed description of Dīn Muhammad's visit to the Court in 943, JANG's second point can probably be discarded. There still remains JANG's notice that Dīn Muhammad had visited the Court in Harát in 940 at the time of the Third Liberation (i.e. at the time that the Sháh was planning the offensive against Kávará'al-nahr which was to be cancelled at the news of the Ottoman invasion).

The reason for citing JANG's rather vague account here is the very faint possibility it offers in attempting to salvage something from GHAZI's account of Dīn Muhammad's relations with Sháh Tahmásb. It must be stated at once that GHAZI's account cannot really be correlated with the Safavid sources for two reasons: 1) Dīn Muhammad is not given an appanage on the "mountain-side" in GHAZI until after the Second Civil War, and even then the appanage named is at Durún and not Nisá-Abívard; and 2) Dīn Muhammad's acquisition of Nisá-Abívard is noted as having occurred only after the expulsion of 'Ubayd Khán from Khwárizm, i.e. after 946/1538.

Nonetheless, on the chance that some of the details may contain a germ of truth and that there is only an error in the sequence of events here, it is worth noting briefly what GHAZI/254-5 has to say about Dīn Muhammad's relations with Sháh Tahmásb and the visit to the Qizilbásh Court.

It is stated that as a result of Dīn Muhammad's continual raiding into Khurásán (this is an anachronism: his series of raids did not begin until 950/1543-4) Sháh Tahmásb sent an army which succeeded in taking Abívard and a Qizilbásh governor was left there. Dīn Muhammad then went to the Sháh's Court in Qazvín (this is another anachronism: Qazvín did not become the Sháh's capital until 964/1557) where he was ignored for six months. He then forged a royal farmán naming

himself as governor of Abivard, escaped from Qazvin, entered Abivard with his forged papers, and massacred the Qizilbāsh garrison there. Thereupon the Shāh, in great anger, personally led a large army against Dīn Muhammad. The latter however brazenly presented himself before the Shāh and this intrepidity was so admired that Abivard was promptly restored to him and the Shāh returned to Qazvin.

It can be seen that there are very possibly some stray hints in in GHAZI's account which can tenuously be collated with some of the items in the Safavid accounts. However, the major error in GHAZI can probably be identified: the events of Dīn Muhammad's relations with Shāh Tahmāsb have been partially confused with the events of 973/1565-6 when a major Qizilbāsh army laid siege to Abivard--which was then under Abū'l-Khān, Dīn Muhammad's son. (Dīn Muhammad himself had died in 960/1553, which date is given in both GHAZI/212 and KHULASEH/220b.)

It would be best to consider GHAZI's description of Dīn Muhammad's relations with the Qizilbāsh Court as more of a legend than as a purely historical document. Like many legends however, it does contain a substratum of truth which can be isolated from the references in the Safavid sources.

Chapter 4. The Second Khwārizmian Civil War (944-945/1538) ¹

A. The Origins of the Civil War

The Second Khwārizmian Civil War was the final phase in the wars of elimination among the original "neo-eponymous clans" of the Yédgárids. Of the three clans, the Abúlakids had already been eliminated in the First Civil War which had occurred at about the time of Sháh Tahmásb's accession in 930/1524. Since that time the position of grand khān had circulated among the Amínakid brothers, Bújqeh, Súfyan and Anúsh, each of whom had held Úrganch, the seat of the Dynastic House.

According to GHAZI, the other Amínakids were appanaged in Khíva(q), Kát and Hazárasb on the Ámú delta or the "river-side" of Khwārizm proper, and in Bághbád, Nisá and Abívard on the "mountain-side" fronting of Khurásán. The other surviving "neo-eponymous clan", the Barkids or descendants of Ílbárs Khān and Bálbárs Sultán, held Vazír and Yangí Shahr on the "river-side" and Durún, the westernmost oasis town on the "mountain-side".

Fortunately there are a few brief references to this Civil War in the Safevid accounts (in both the AFZAL-source and the NUSAKH-source) which make it possible to authenticate GHAZI's more detailed account. These sources make it possible to overcome GHAZI's time vacuum, for the NUSAKH-source precisely dates the beginning of 'Ubayd Khān's invasion (which followed directly upon the Civil War) in "Ít/944" and the conclusion of the campaign in "Túngúz/945"; similarly, the AFZAL-source gives a connected account of both the Civil War and the invasion in "Túngúz/945" (or simply "945" as in AHSAN). From what has been seen

1. The sources are: a) GHAZI/229-238; b) NUSAKH-source/loc.cit.; c) AFZAL-source: AFZAL/104a-b, AHSAN/290-1, KHULASEH/172a.

of the "chronological tangle" at this particular time, the minor discrepancy can safely be ignored (see above pp.373-8).

This dating fits in with one other fact we have, i.e. the intervention of 'Umar Gházi Sultán (the Barkid grandson of Ílbárs Khán) in Muhammad Sálíh's revolt in Astarábád sometime before Ramazán 944/February 1538 (see AFZAL/99b-101a and AHSAN/283-4). From the fact that 'Umar Gházi Sultán, who plays an important role in the Civil War, did not sustain his client in Astarábád after that date, it can probably be inferred that the Second Civil war had already begun by then.

GHAZI has a detailed account of the immediate causes of the Civil War which cannot however be fully accepted, for it involves the fact of Dín Muhammad's raiding the Qizilbásh frontiers at this date. As is very clear from the AFZAL-source this is most unlikely for Dín Muhammad had made peace with Sháh Tahmásb only the year before the outbreak of the Civil War and there is no reason to believe that this peace had been disturbed in the course of that year. On the contrary, for as has already been indicated the Qizilbásh were clearly involved as allies of Dín Muhammad in the immediately ensuing period of 'Ubayd Khán's invasion of Khwárizm.

Despite the fact that GHAZI's account is rendered partially invalid by the chronology established here, it is nonetheless very much worth citing, for as in other reports of GHAZI there may well be an allusion to certain other events which have been remembered and recorded in an improper sequence but which may still contain a certain element of truth.

GHAZI states that Dín Muhammad, like the other Khwárizmian Úzbeks of the time, used to leave the "river-side" periodically to raid Qizil-

básh Khurásán and then return with much booty. On one of these occasions, Dín Muhammad paused enroute to plunder one of his "peers" instead. The victim was the Barkid, Muhammad Gházi Sultán, who was then annexed in Durún on the "mountain-side". This robbery was the cause of the Civil War for Muhammad Gházi plundered Dín Muhammad in turn after the latter's return from his successful raiding operation in Khurásán. This led to Dín Muhammad's counter-revenge and the assassination of Muhammad Gházi. These acts soon involved the members of their respective clans and the result was the Second Civil war fought between the Aminakids and the Barkids.

It is only necessary to delete GHAZI's interpolated account of Dín Muhammad's raiding of Khurásán at this particular time and to collate what remains with the AFZAL-source to arrive at what was most likely the real immediate cause of the Civil War: the rivalry in the "mountain-side" between Muhammad Gházi at Durún and Dín Muhammad at Nisá-Abivard which developed into a full scale civil war between their respective clans, the Barkids and the Aminakids, in the much more important "river-side" of the Amú delta.

B. The First Results and the Attempted Súfyánid Usurpation

The actual course of the Civil War need not be traced here; this is given with many details in GHAZI. The net result was that the Aminakids (i.e. the Grand Khán Anúsh; his brothers Qáikhán [Abú Yúsuf] and Aghatáy; their nephews, the Súfyánids--or sons of the late Súfyán Khán, and the Bújqids--or sons of the late Bújqeh Khán) all gathered together at Úrganoh and marched against Vazír where all the Barkids had assembled under Sultán Gházi Sultán. A battle was fought in which the Barkids were defeated: Sultán Gházi Sultán was killed and most

of the clan was massacred. The survivors, including Umar Gházi, who was noticed with Muhammad Sálíh at Astarábád, were forced to flee to Mávará'al-nahr.

The Amínakids thus came to have complete hegemony over the Yádgérid Dynastic House and the new territories taken from the Barkids on both the "river-side" and the "mountain-side" were redistributed as appanages among the victors. Thus, according to GHAZI, Dín Muhammad was given Durún, the appanage of his rival, as a reward for his services in the Civil War and took up residence in the "mountain-side" for the first time. This statement should however be treated circumspectly in view of the specific Safavid statements that he had already been established in Nisá and Abívard before the outbreak of the Civil War.

The Safavid notice of the Civil War in the AFZAL-source is brief, but the all-important statement occurs among the events of "945" that the Khwárizmian sultáns had put Sultán Gházi to death and that a period of political anarchy ensued. This one brief statement is enough to place GHAZI's detailed account of the Civil War in its proper perspective and to remove much of this section of this basic source from the realm of legend and into full historical light.

The Safavid sources also add a further detail to the events of the Civil War which is not found in GHAZI. It is stated that as a result of the political anarchy which ensued upon Sultán Gházi Sultán's murder the Súfyánid brothers, led by Yúsuf Sultán (or Khán) assumed control of all Khwárizm. This is accepted in the NUSAKH-source which enters Yúsuf Khán, the son of Súfyán khán, on the list of the grand kháns as succeeding Anúsh Khán in 944/1538. The only difference between the two independent Safavid sources is a minor one:

the NUSAKH-source places Yúsuf Khán's accession as following 'Ubayd Khán's invasion and the ensuing flight of Anúsh Khán from Úrganch. The AFZAI-source places the assumption of power as a direct consequence of the Civil War and as antedating the Abú'l-Khayrid invasion.

The fact thus emerges from the Safavid accounts that in addition to the elimination of the Barkids, the Civil War had also entailed a usurpation among the Amínakids themselves. Yúsuf Khán can in no way be considered as a "legal" candidate for the post of grand khán. When "legitimacy" was restored after the end of the Abú'l-Khayrid invasion, Yúsuf Khán "abdicated" or at any rate he recognized his uncle Qálkhán (Abú Yúsuf) as grand khán.

From the "legalist" or theoretical point of view, what had been happening is most significant. The Amínakids, the sole surviving "neo-eponymous clan" of the original Yádgárid Dynastic House were in turn beginning to split up into a new series of rival "neo-eponymous clans".

The brief reference in the NUSAKH-source to the fact that Súfyán Khán had been forcibly removed as grand khán by his brother Anúsh Khán in "Súy/941" (941-2/1535-6), i.e. about three years before the outbreak of the Second Civil War, is indicative of this new development. It might in fact be possible to interpret the Súfyánid, Yúsuf Khán's usurpation in the light of a Súfyánid revanche against the house of Anúsh Khán. It might also explain why Dín Muhammad, the son of Anúsh Khán does not seem to have cooperated at first with the Súfyánid army in the struggle against 'Ubayd Khán; at any rate separate armies were maintained until the final battle against the enemy.

The attempted Súfyánid usurpation failed however and by the

end of 'Ubayd Khán's invasion, legitimacy was once more restored when the eldest of the Aminakids, Qálkhán (Abú Yúsuf), was elected as grand khán.

The discussion of the political consequences of the Civil War will then best be resumed at that point, for without first following the events of the Abú'l-Khayrid invasion, the subsequent internal situation in Khwárizm cannot be properly understood.

MAR 19 1971

Chapter 5. 'Ubayd Khān's Invasion of KhwārizmA. The Sources

Khwārizm was still reeling from the effects of the Second Civil War when in the same year of "1t/944" corresponding to 945/1538, it suddenly had to face a new crisis: A full-scale invasion of the Abū'l-Khayrīd Ūzbeks of Māvarā'al-nahr led by 'Ubayd Khān.

The most detailed narration of the events is first, the AFZAL-source (AFZAL/104b-100a, KHULASEH/172a-173a, ARSAN/291-2, TAAA/80), and second, GHAZI/238-245. While it is not always possible to correlate the two satisfactorily, they are sufficiently parallel to demonstrate the authenticity of the two wholly independent sources.

From the viewpoint of textual criticism the great importance of the AFZAL-source here is that it confirms most of the details in this section of GHAZI. More than any other part of GHAZI examined here, the description of 'Ubayd Khān's invasion is seen to be much more than a garbled folk-memory; it emerges here as an important and accurate historical document.

A third independent account is found in a few terse statements of the NUSAKH-source (loc.cit.) which do not entirely agree with the AFZAL-source. The event is also briefly and independently referred to in JANG/198b and ILCHI/267a.

It should be noted that outside of a brief statement in QIPCHAQ/592a there are no details given in the Abū'l-Khayrīd Ūzbek sources. From 'Ubayd Khān's point of view we are then relying solely on enemy accounts of the Khwārizmian invasion.

B. The Background

As noted in the discussion on the Second Civil War, the internal situation in Khwárizm was chaotic at the time of the invasion. Anúsh Khán was probably still the official grand khán and in occupation of the dynastic seat of Úrganh; however his position had been rendered precarious by the growing influence of the Súfyánids.

In the AFZAL-source, the Súfyánid leader, Yúsuf Khán had already usurped full power in Khwárizm and AFZAL itself places his base of operations at Nisá and Abivard in the "mountain-side". As against this, in the NUSAKH-source, Yúsuf Khán's base of operations (and presumably his appanage) is given at Khíva(q) and he did not become the grand khán until after the invasion at which time he led the first Khwárizmian resistance following the flight of Anúsh Khán from Úrganh.

However, whatever the inter-clan rivalries may have been they were eventually put aside and the final army raised against the invader was a double one, led by both Dín Muhammad the son of Anúsh Khán, and Yúsuf Khán the son of Súfyán Khán. Their differences had been resolved during the course of the invasion, and at the end of the invasion period the entire Amínakid clan was to be reunited under the eldest of the surviving Yádgárids.

Both the AFZAL-source and GHAZI agree that the instigator of the invasion was 'Umar Ghází Sultán, the last of the important Barkids, who had taken refuge in Mávará'al-nahr after the elimination of his clan during the Second Civil War. And even the terse NUSAKH-source finds room to record a unique reference to the fact that 'Umar Ghází was killed in battle (i.e. presumably on the Abú'l-Khayrid side).

There is however a difference worth noting here between the AFZAL-

source and GHAZI regarding this 'Umar Ghází. The AFZAL-source states that he had first sought refuge and aid, not from 'Ubayd Khán in Bukhára, but from the Suyúnjid Baráq Khán in Táshkand. The reason for this is given that Baráq Khán was the maternal uncle of the Barkid refugee. This, if true, would be an interesting notice of inter-marriage between the two Úzbek Dynastic Houses. This assertion in the AFZAL-source can however in no way be reconciled with GHAZI's claim, given in another context, that the mother of 'Umar Ghází was a Turkmán of local origin. According to GHAZI, the refugee had gone directly to Bukhára where he had entered 'Ubayd Khán's service and succeeded in interesting his new patron in Khwárizm by offering him half of the Amínakid territories.

When the Abú'l-Khayrids advanced into Khwárizm it was in the form of a "Grande Armée" representing most of the "neo-ephymous clans". It was the first such near total army raised since the disaster suffered against Sháh Tahmásb at the Battle of Jám some ten years before (935/1528).

In the main narration the hypothesis has been offered that during those ten years the personal position and prestige of 'Ubayd Khán had seriously declined and that his "peers" among the "neo-eponymous clans" had refused to participate in his designs on Khurásán. It was then suggested that the Abú'l-Khayrids had been forced to unite under 'Ubayd Khán at this time in view of the threat posed by Sháh Tahmásb's newly resurgent Qizilbásh state and by the new Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian accord which had been negotiated.

Thus toward the very close of his career, 'Ubayd Khán was given another opportunity to recoup the disasters suffered both on the home

front and in Khurásán. The fiasco in Khwárizm ended his career and he died shortly after his return to Bukhárá (HAYDARI/55b says a month and a half later).

With 'Ubayd Khán were the Suyúnjids of Táshkand under Baráq Khán and the Kúchkúnjids of Samarqand under 'Abd al-Latíf Khán. GHAZI's statement that the Samarqand forces were led by Javánmard Khán is another obvious example of the anachronisms and the fallibility of the chronology in this source: Javánmard Khán was the son (or nephew) of 'Abd al-Latíf Khán and did not succeed to the appanage of Samarqand until 980/1572 (see ABD/90a).

There is no mention of the presence of the Jánibegids of Balkh in this campaign. The reason is very possibly due to the new peace agreement referred to in the main discussion which had been negotiated between Sháh Tahmásb and Kístan Qará Sultán of Balkh at about the same time that the accord was made with Dín Muhammad and the Khwárizmians (see above pp.359-362).

C. The First Phase: The Abú'l-Khayrid Occupation of Úrganch

GHAZI states that at the approach of the Abú'l-Khayrids, the Grand Khán, Anúsh, evacuated Úrganch and fled to the steppe; he was however captured and given over to 'Umar Ghází Sultán, the Barkid, for execution in accordance with the tradition of khún ("kinship blood-revenge).

The NUSAKH-source confirms the fact that Anúsh Khán had fled, but does not record his subsequent fate. This fact is necessarily not found in the AFZAL-source, since no notice at all is taken there of Anúsh Khán. (It will be recalled that the AFZAL-source does not

have the "legitimist" approach and in describing the Second Civil War has simply recorded the murder of Sultán Ghází Sultán and the emergence of Yúsuf Khán and the Súfyánids to de facto control over Khwárizm.)

GHAZI has an ellipsis at this point in its narrative which is perhaps purposeful, for it omits all reference to the unsuccessful Khwárizmian opposition to 'Ubayd Khán's occupation of the "river-side". The statement is merely made that the Súfyánids under Yúsuf Khán escaped from the "river-side" and joined Dín Muḥammad on the "mountain-side" at Durún.

The NUSAKH-source however asserts that Yúsuf Khán remained in his appanage at Khíva(q) until he finally joined with Dín Muḥammad in the next Turkí year of "Túngúz/945" to drive the Abú'l-Khayrids out of Khwárizm. While this statement is too brief to be of much value it does however provide a hint that Yúsuf Khán had led an organized resistance against the enemy after fall of Úrganah, but that he had finally been defeated and was forced to join the army which Dín Muḥammad was gathering on the "mountain-side".

This hint in the NUSAKH-source is confirmed and given in full detail in the AFZAL-source. The detail here is worth investigating since at this point AFZAL/104b has one of the important references to direct Qizilbásh aid offered to the Khwárizmians against the common enemy, 'Ubayd Khán.

(Although AHSAN and KHULASEH are both clearly parallel with AFZAL, the key reference to direct Qizilbásh aid is omitted; AFZAL's more detailed account is followed here.)

According to AFZAL, Yúsuf Khán fled toward Khurásán (b. araf-1

Khurásán) at the approach of the invader and thus 'Ubayd Khán easily overran Úrganch and the "river-side". In "Khurásán" (i.e. either in the Gurgán-Atrak area of Jurján province or in the "mountain-side" appanages) "he massed an army consisting of 'victory-proceeding' troops of the 'justice-conceding' Sháh who had been assigned to his aid"¹. Whether these troops were actually Qizilbásh or merely Turkmán subjects of the Court is not stated; but the fact remains that Qizilbásh aid had been solicited and given in the Khwárizmian war against 'Ubayd Khán.

AFZAL continues that Yúsuf Khán then advanced against the Abú'l-Khayrids but was defeated (i.e. for a second time) and had to retire. Since he is next noticed as acting in cooperation with Dín Muhammad it can probably be assumed that he had retired back to the "mountain-side" after his failure and that he here joined the second resistance army which was being organized by Dín Muhammad.

This would bring the narrative back once again to the point in GHAZI and the NUSAKH-source where we find Yúsuf Khán escaping from the Abú'l-Khayrids and joining Dín Muhammad for a common defence against the invader. The three independent sources are thus seen to be parallel although only AFZAL has the supplementary data relating to Yúsuf Khán's unsuccessful resistance and to the notice of Qizilbásh aid.

By this time 'Ubayd Khán felt sure enough of his position in Khwárizm to appoint his son, 'Abd al-'Azíz Sultán, as governor at Úrganch and to retire back to Mávará'al-nahr.

1. "Jamí'at az lashgar-i 'askar-i zafar-ráhbar-i pádsháh-i 'adélat-gustar keh b-'imdad-i ú ma'múr búdand namúdeh."

D. The Second Phase: The Khwārizmian Liberation

Although not so stated in the sources there was probably a qishlāc season intervening between 'Ubayd Khān's return to Bukhārā and the beginning of the liberation campaign led jointly by Dīn Muhammad Sultān and Yūsuf Khān. This would correspond to the time mentioned in GHAZI when the Khwārizmians who had escaped the invader were gathering und^r Dīn Muhammad on the "mountain-side" and making their preparations for the campaign which was to follow.

It was thus probably in the spring of "Tūngúz/945", corresponding to Shavvāl 945/March 1539, that the allied Khwārizmian forces left the "mountain-side" bound for the liberation of Abū'l-Khayrīd occupied Ūrganč and the "river-side".

GHAZI asserts that the allies then changed their line of march in order to avoid the main enemy forces under 'Abd al-'Azīz Sultān, the enemy governor of the capital. Instead they turned to Khīva(q) which they occupied after overcoming some minor opposition.

GHAZI's reference to avoiding the enemy at Ūrganč is fully amplified in the AFZAL-source. It is seen here that the allies had actually attempted to siege both Vazīr and Ūrganč but had been forced to retire when 'Ubayd Khān returned from Māvarā'al-nahr to relieve the siege of his son, 'Abd al-'Azīz, at Ūrganč. It was only after their failure and the arrival of 'Ubayd Khān that the allies turned instead to Khīva(q) which they soon liberated. It would seem that GHAZI's ellipsis here is possibly purposeful, for it avoids any mention of a Khwārizmian defeat.

There are two important points connected with the supplementary data found in the AFZAL-source. The first point is that GHAZI's description of the events is demonstrated to be quite accurate, for

despite the lacuna in the mention of the Khwárizmian defeat suffered in the attempt on Úrganch, its main line of narration is seen to be wholly corroborated by the completely independent and more nearly contemporary AFZAL-source. The AFZAL-source is more detailed than GHAZI's account; but there are no contradictions involved.

The second point is derived from a most interesting detail related in this supplementary data in the AFZAL-source. It is stated here that at the siege of Úrganch (and/or Vazír), Dín Muḥammad Sultán dressed his Úzbek (i.e. Khwárizmian-Úzbek) troops in the Qizilbásh fashion (specifically, they put on the Qizilbásh special red turban, the táj) and spread the rumor (shuhrat dáánd) that this represented the advance of a full-scale Qizilbásh army which was rapidly advancing under the personal leadership of Sháh Tahmásb himself who had come to engage the common Abú'l-Khayrid enemy. The ruse however did not work, for as has been related 'Ubayd Khán arrived on the scene--and not Sháh Tahmásb

The AFZAL-source thus provides very significant evidence for the fact that the Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente was so established a diplomatic feature of the time that it was possible to attempt to deceive the Abú'l-Khayrids into believing that the Sháh had personally intervened in the Khwárizmian behalf and had come to their aid.

This could not have been considered a far-fetched possibility at the time, for as already noted some Qizilbásh aid had already been given to Yúsuf Khán. AFZAL/105a has an even more specific reference to such aid, for it is noted there that after the Khwárizmian defeat at the attempted siege of Úrganch-Vazír, Dín Muḥammad Sultán, presumably from newly retaken Khíva(q), had sent to Khurásán for aid and that Muḥammad Khán Takkalú, the Qizilbásh governor at Harát, had

sent a detachment of troops (jam'i) to aid the Khwárizmian sultáns. The actual presence of Qizilbásh units in Khwárizm is only hinted at indirectly in AHSAN and KHULASEH; however the direct participation of a Qizilbásh contingent (tabaqeh-yi Qizilbásh) in the great battle which was now to ensue against the Abú'l-Khayrids is specifically noted in AFZAL.

GHAZI has no mention whatsoever of any Qizilbásh aid solicited or received.

A major battle was then fought near the "river-side" town of Hazárasb between 'Ubayd Khán's Abú'l-Khayrid army and the Khwárizmian allies under the joint leadership of Dín Muḥammad and Yúsuf Khán. The result was an overwhelming victory for the allies which caused 'Ubayd Khán to evacuate Khwárizm definitively.

The AFZAL-source has many graphic details of the events in this critical battle; GHAZI is less specific here. The details in the AFZAL-source perhaps owe their origin to accounts supplied to the Court by actual Qizilbásh participants in the battle, for AFZAL has recorded the prominent role of the "Qizilbásh contingent" in the order of battle at Hazárasb.

There is however no disagreement among the sources that have been consulted as to the extent of the Abú'l-Khayrid rout. Many of the leading Abú'l-Khayrid officers (including Qarájeh Bahádur, Shaykh Naẓar Bī and Háfiz Qunqurat whose names have appeared in the main narrative as leaders in 'Ubayd Khán's attempts at Khurásán) were taken prisoner. Both the AFZAL-source and the NUSAKH-source give the same list of names of the prominent enemy officers captured (this is the only evidence there is of some link between the AFZAL- and NUSAKH-sources). ILCHI/267a asserts that 50 "Úzbek" (i.e. Abú'l-

Khayrid Ūzbek) umará were taken at the battle and that many "eminent heroes" (rijál-i battál) were killed.

GHAZI and the NUSAKH-source then state that these prisoners were exchanged for the Khwárizmians who had been captured at 'Ubayd Khán's first victories and had then been carried off to Mávará'al-nahr. GHAZI has the full details on the mission of Hájim Khán (the author's grandfather) to Mávará'al-nahr to arrange for the exchange of prisoners.

The disaster suffered by 'Ubáyd Khán was complete; khwárizm was evacuated and he died shortly after the return to Bukhárá. From the point of view of Sháh Tahmásb, the Khwárizmian victory was an extension of the Final Liberation campaign and served to cap the Qizilbásh victory in the "Duel for Khurásán".

Chapter 6. The Aftermath

1. The Succession and Uzbek Political Theory

The most important of the khwárizmians to be returned from Láverá'al-nahr in the exchange of prisoners following 'Ubayd Khán's defeat was Qáلكhán or Abú Yúsuf. As the eldest of the surviving Yád-gárids (who by the process of elimination had now become the Amínakids) he was formally elected as grand khán and was installed at the dynastic seat of Úrganch. Yúsuf Khán who had usurped the position of grand khán in the period of the Civil War and the Invasion is stated in the NUSAKH-source to have now sworn allegiance to the new Grand khán. "Legitimacy" as interpreted by the theoretical Úzbek concept of the state was thus restored in Khwárizm.

The new Grand Khán is called Qáلكhán in GHAZI and Abú Yúsuf in the NUSAKH-source. The reference is undoubtedly to one and the same person for they are both described as the son of Amínak (in GHAZI) and the son of Muhammad (i.e. very clearly, the son of Muhammad Amín) in the NUSAKH-source; and from previous references the identification of Amínak and Muhammad Amín is fully established. The identification of Qáلكhán and Abú Yúsuf becomes further evident from the notice in the NUSAKH-source that Abú Yúsuf was known (Mashúr b-) by another name. Unfortunately the other name has been garbled by the copyists of the manuscripts; thus NUSAKH/160a has "Qahál", HAYDARI/56b has "Qatál" and SHIRAZI/261a has "Qatán". It would seem likely that the reference is to GHAZI's "Qáلكhán".

GHAZI's "Qáلكhán" itself is possibly a corruption of the term very much abused by the manuscript copyists which Prof. Zeki Velidi Togan cites among other variants as qaphilgháy and which sometimes

appears as ca'lkhán. It is not a proper name in itself but simply refers to the "heir -apparent" to the post of grand khán by virtue of seniority in age. (See above p.30.)

The period of the Civil Wars, the expansion into Turkmenistan and the Abú'l-Khayrid invasion covers the same time span of Sháh Tahmásb's relations with 'Ubayd Khán. In this period two of the original "neo-eponymous clans" had been eliminated so that by 946/1540 it is actually no longer proper to speak of the "Yádgárid Dynastic House"; the more accurate title would be the "Amínakid Dynastic House".

And precisely as the original Yádgárids had been split into three "neo-eponymous clans", the Amínakids now proceeded in turn to split into five new "neo-eponymous clans" descended from the sons of Amínak (or Muhammad Amín). In fact the awkward term "neo-eponymous" was chosen with this process in mind, for if allowed to continue unhampered, there would undoubtedly have arisen a new eponymous head, Hájim Khán, after his assumption to full control of the Khwárizmian state in 973/1565-6. We would then in theory have had to deal with the "Hájim-Khánids" who would in turn have split into new "neo-eponymous clans".

The internal political history of Khwárizm from 946 to 973 is essentially the stories of the rivalries between these second degree "neo-eponymous clans" and their "appanage-states". In the end Hájim Khán, representing the Aghatáyids won out, much as 'Abdulláh Khán of the Jánibegids of Mávará'al-nahr in 980/1578. And in the end, both eliminated the "neo-eponymous" "appanage-state" system by founding conventional type dynasties which largely broke through the clan orientation of the Úzbek political system.

From the viewpoint of theory, these similar processes in Khwárizm and Mávará'al-nahr differed by the fact that the Abú'l-khayrids had not undergone the secondary change which had occurred in Khwárizm as a result of the two Civil Wars when the Aminakids replaced the Yádgárids as the representatives of the Dynastic House. It is perhaps a minor point of difference but is worth noting if the Úzbek and other related governing systems of the Turks and Mongols is to be fully understood.

B. Khwárizmian Relations with the Qizilbásh

As far as subsequent Khwárizmian relations with Sháh Tahmásb are concerned, it should first be stated that although the Khwárizmians had received some direct Qizilbásh aid (probably little more than a token force) in the struggle against 'Ubayd Khán's invasion, it was the moral support received that was doubtlessly the more important.

Thus the AFZAL-source describes the Battle of Hazárasb almost in terms of a Qizilbásh engagement (e.g. AFZAL/105a: "They [the Khwárizmians] relied upon the good grace of the peerless Sháh and the miracle-making of the 'Family' [i.e. the Safavid House] of all creation"¹. This should however merely be interpreted as literary exuberance on the part of a partisan author whose possibly unconscious use of clichés has carried him beyond historical fact. This philological criticism must surely apply to the otherwise startling statement in ibid./106a that upon the (Sunni-) Khwárizmian victory, "the khutbeh was read in the high name and to the lofty fame of the Imáms of salvation and the Sháh of victorious banners [marginal addition:

¹. "Takiyeh b-iqbál-i pādsháh-i bí-mihál va i'jáz-i dúdmán-i hast ú jehán namúdeh."

Sháh Tahmásb, the raser of enemies] and [the sect of] the 'White Community' [i.e. the Shí'eh] was propagated"¹.

There is however a more mundane reference to the scope of the Khwárizmian-Qizilbásh entente in the AFZAL-source where it is asserted that after the victory Dín Muhammad sent the glad tidings to the court and was rewarded by being granted an annual stipend of 300 Tabrízí túmáns to be drawn on Sabzivár.

The period of the Qizilbásh-Khwárizmian entente was to last but four more years, for with the defeat of 'Ubayd Ahán and the temporary end to the Abú'l-Khayrid expansionist movement it had outserved its purpose.

Dín Muhammad Sultán had emerged from the preceding period as the most powerful of the Khwárizmian Úzbeks and when he drove against Astarábád in 950/1543-4 he ended the Qizilbásh entente. From then on until the death of 'Alí Sultán, Dín Muhammad's younger brother, in 973/1565-6, the Khwárizmians replaced the Abú'l-Khayrids as the major Úzbek threat to the security of Sháh Tahmásb's Khurásán. However, it is important to note that despite the seriousness of the raiding over an area extending from Mashhad to Astarábád, the Khwárizmians never achieved the intensity of purpose of 'Ubayd Khán's sustained drive against Khurásán. There were no Úzbek occupations during this period and no liberation campaigns.

1. "Khutbeh b-nám-i námí va ism-i sámí-yi a'imme-yi hudá va pád-shéh-i muzaffar-livá (marginal addition: Sháh Tahmásb-i 'adú-farsá) khwāndeh raváj-i millat-i bayza dādand".

APPENDIX II: SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHYA. Primary Sources and Key to Abbreviations

1. ABD (An Ūzbek history to ca.1590-1)

Title: 'Abdullāhnāmeḥ (or Sharafnāmeḥ-yi Shāhī)

Author: Ḥāfiz Tinīsh ibn Mīr Muḥammad al-Bukḥārā'ī

Reference: Storey pp.374,1301

Manuscript: British Museum OR#3497

Other MSS in India Office, Cambridge, Lahore, Tashkent, Leningrad

Scope: A history of 'Abdullāh Khān Ūzbek from his birth (940/1533-4) to ca. 999/1590-1

General: This work is the basic contemporary source for the period of 'Abdullāh Khān; however there is very little notice of the preceding period of Ūzbek history. Thus only 5 folios (out of 261) cover the entire period from Abū'l-Khayr Khān to 'Ubayd Khān (f.18a-22b). This reference, however, brief as it is, is the probable source for the accounts in the later Ūzbek histories.

2. AFZAL (A Safavid history of Shāh Tahmāsb:1524-1576)

Title: Afzal al-Tavārīkh

Author: Fazlī Isfahānī

Reference: Storey pp.308,1278,1280

Manuscript: British Museum OR#4678

Unicum

The manuscript (dated 1049) is very possibly in the author's own hand (cf. colophon and also the emendations in the text in what appears to be in the same hand as the copyist). After f.243b there is a missing section extending from the year 969 to 973; some of the folios between 44 and 64 have been misarranged and at least one folio there is missing.

Scope: The entire volume of 275 folios is devoted to the period of Shāh Tahmāsb; ff.2a-9b,14b-108a cover the period of 930-946 (ff.10a-14b gives a very detailed table of contents). The arrangement of the events is chronological and the mixed Turkī-Hijrī dating system is followed; however the Turkī sequence here is not identical with the other sources consulted. Thus Hijrī 930 is called Yīlān here, i.e. it is three behind the Pīchī of the other series.

This volume is called Daftar 1 of Jild II and we are told that Daftar 2 is to deal with the following reign of Sháh Ismá'il II (f.274a). Presumably Daftar 3 would be devoted to the reign of Muhammad Khudábandeh and Jild III to the reign of Sháh 'Abbás for f.2a states that the "introductions" (muqaddamát) were being written in preparation for describing the reign of Sháh 'Abbás. This is confirmed by f.212b which gives the date of writing as 1026/1617 in the reign of Sháh 'Abbás. Jild I has been shown by Prof. Minorsky (see Storey reference above) to be part of a manuscript at Eton (#172a); it is devoted to the period of Sháh Ismá'il I and there are frequent references to it (e.g. ff.31a,70b, 260a) in the Jild II consulted here.

Sources: A.Known Sources: (a) Mirzá Qásim Janábadí's Sháhnámeh of Sháh Tahmásb (see esp. ff.3b-4a,227b and 271b); (b) AHSAN (ff.23b,31a,32a,42b,50a,95a,100a,144a,157b); (c) HABIB (ff.5a,23a,24a); (d) AKBAR (ff.117a,120b) (e) LUBB (f.167a).

B.Unknown Sources: On f.2a it is stated that the sources used have been described in the preface (dibácheh) of Jild I. These "unknown sources" may perhaps be identified by reference to Eton #172a which has not been consulted here. (a) Mouláná Nujúmi Haraví's Táríkh-i Harát va Khurásán (title probably approximate): the author's father, Mouláná Muhammad Munajjim, is called (ff.122b and 245a) the astronomer, teacher and librarian of Muhammad Mirzá (i.e. the future Sháh, Muhammad Khudábandeh, who was the governor of Khurásán). The súrat of the farmán appointing the author's father as teacher of Muhammad Mirzá's son in Harát is given in ff.245a-246a and is dated Ramazán 974/1567. The independent nature of this missing source is evident from the fact that it is opposed to AHSAN (f.42b) as presenting a different version of the Battle of Jám and again of f.50a for the execution of Mouláná Hilálí in Harát. Three other sources are noted on f.42b as supporting Nujúmi Haraví's version of the battle of Jám as opposed to the AHSAN version: Khuldará, Bahjat al-Tavaríkh and Miftáh al-Gulúb (possibly the same as the missing Safavid section of MIFTAH, q.v.).

C.Personal Sources: The author belonged to an important family of top-ranking administrators stemming from Khúzán in Isfahán. Among his grandfather's cousins were Najm al-Sáni (Sháh Ismá'il's "grand vazír") and Amir 'Ináyatulláh (the shortlived "grand vazír" of Sháh Tahmásb) (ff.81a,219b). The author's grandfather, Ahwájeh Rúhullah Isfaháni, was appointed vazír of Mashhad in 939 (f.73b) and vazír of Khurásán (with residence in Mashhad) in 958 (f.154b) and vazír of both Gílán and Khurásán in 975 (f.254a). (This last date conflicts with KHULASEH's statement that it's author's father was reappointed as vazír of Khurásán at that time.)

The author himself served in an official capacity in the reign of Sháh 'Abbás in Shakí (f.137b), Tiflis (f. 257a and was appointed as vazír of Kirman in 1025 (?) (f.221a).

General: AFZAL is probably the most important of the chronicles consulted for the period of Sháh Tahmásb, despite the fact that it was written in the next generation (1020). Its value lies in the fact that in addition to the JANG, KHULASEH and AHSAN riváyats of the events, there are also unique and supplementary references. This is particularly true of the Court reaction to the events which is generally not found in the other sources. This probably arises from the author's special access to official sources (there are many important súrats preserved here, for example) and to the use of the "unknown sources" not cited in the other Safavid chronicles consulted.

3. AHSAN (A Safavid history: 1494-1578)

Title: Ahsan al-Tavárikh

Author: Hasan Bek Rúmlú

Reference: Storey pp.306,1279
V.Minorsky, (Reviews of the Seddon edition and translation) Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, 7, parts 2 and 4, 1934,1935, pp.449-55,990-3.

Edition: C.N. Seddon, vol.I (text) (Baroda 1931); vol.II (translation) (Baroda 1934).

Note: The references to AHSAN in this dissertation are to the Persian text. The English version is far too compressed and there are a few translation errors which render it unsafe for the specialized reader. The valuable notes in the English version have however been freely consulted.

Scope: This is volume 12 (or 9) of what is presumably a General History and covers the period of Sháh Ismá'il to the accession of Muhammad Khudábadeh (900-985/1495-1578). The final date of writing is given as 985 (p.503). Of the 505 pages, pp.184-475 deal with Sháh Tahmásb and pp. 184-295 cover the years 930-940. It is chronologically arranged by rubrics labeled with the Hijrí year; however it generally follows the mixed Turkí-Hijrí system, albeit not as rigorously as the other sources.

Sources: Seddon lists (Preface, vol.I) HABIB, NUSAKH ("probably"), Ross' Anonymous History of Sháh Ismá'il (Storey p.304)¹, and the Ottoman history Hasht Bihisht (Storey p.412). To this LUBB should be added and very likely JANG. The

1. Dr. Bayání of the Milli Library in Tehran has informed me that another copy of the Ross Anonymous is found in the Milli Library.

author was a curchi in Sháh Tahmésb's service and personally participated in several of the campaigns beginning in 953/1546-7 .

General: The value of AHSAN is its availability thanks to C.N. Seddon. It is a major contemporary source for the period of Sháh Tahmésb; however it is not as detailed as AFZAL or KHULASEH particularly for the events in Khurásán. The exact relationship of these sources (and JANG as well) is yet to be worked out.

4. /AKBAR/ (A Mughal history from Bábur to 1602)

Title: Akbarnámeh

Author: Abú'l-Fazl ibn Mubárah ('Allámi)

Reference: Storey p.541

Edition: English translation by H.Beveridge, 3 vols. (Calcutta 1897-1921)

Note: References in this dissertation are to vol.I of the English translation.

5. /ANONYM/

An anonymous fragment in Royal Asian Society (#161; Case 2A) of 27 folios from Changíz Khán to 'Abdulláh Khán Úzbek. It is possibly one of the "rough drafts" of ABD referred to in Storey p.374. It is approximately the same (there are however some variations) as the corresponding portion of ABD and the derivatory Úzbek histories devoted to the origins of the Úzbeks (from Changíz Khán) and the madh ("praise") of the Jánibegids to the birth of 'Abdulláh Khán.

6. /BÁBUR/ (Bábur's Memoirs:d.1530)

Title: Báburnámeh

Author: Bábur

Reference: Islâm Ansiklopedisi ("Babur" by M.Fuad Köprülü)

Edition: Facsimile by A.S. Beveridge, JJW Gibb Memorial Series, vol.I (Leyden-London 1905). For other editions and translations see reference to Islâm Ansiklopedisi, to which the translation into Istanbul Turkish by Reşit Rahmeti Arat (Vekayi: Babur'un Hatirati, 2 vols., Ankara 1943-6) should be added.

7. FERIDUN (Ottoman diplomatic correspondence)

Title: Mecmu'e-i Münşeat al-Salatin

Author: Feridun Bey

Reference: Babinger p.106

Edition: 2 vols. Istanbul 1274-5

8. GHAZI (Khwárizmian Úzbek history to 1663)

Title: Shajareh-yi Turk

Author: Abú'l-Gházi Bahádur Khán 16.12.22

Reference: Islâm Ansiklopedisi ("Ebül Gâzi Bahadîr Han" by A. Zeki Velidi Togan)

Edition: by Baron Desmaisons : Histoire des Mogols et des Tatares
(Text: St.Petersburg 1871; Translation: St.Petersburg 1874)

General: The basic source for the Khwárizmian Úzbeks. See above pp. III-V for "the use of GHAZI as a Historical Document"

9. GIESE (Ottoman anonymous histories to 1555)

Title: Tevarih-i Al-i Osman

Author: Anonymous

Reference: Babinger p.40

Edition: by F.Giese; in two parts (Breslau 1922, Leipzig 1925)

10. HABIB (A Safavid General History to 1524)

Title: Habîb al-Siyar

Author: Ghiyâs al-Dîn Khwândamîr

Reference: Storey pp. 101, 1237-8

Edition: 4 vols., (Tehran 1333)

Scope: A General History ending with Shâh Ismâ'îl (to 930/1524)

Note: References in this dissertation are to the section on Shâh Ismâ'îl in vol.4 of the Tehran edition.

11. /HAYDARI/ (A Safavid General History to ca.1577)

Title: Tārīkh-i Haydarī (or Muġma' al-Tavārīkh

Author: Haydar 'Alī Husaynī Rāzī

Reference: Storey pp.124,1241

Manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris) #542

The only complete manuscript is in Berlin; the British Museum and Paris MSS are fragments.

Scope: A General History written in 1028/1618-9. The section on the Safavids extends to Shéh Ismā'il II (984-5); the section on the Ūzbeks only goes to 975 although the accession of 'Arab Muḥammad (the son of the Khwārizmian Grand Khān, Hājim) in 1011/1602 is noted (f.57a).

General: The section on the Safavids in the British Museum MS is of no great consequence; the section on the Turks and Mongols (in the Paris MS) is however important--particularly for the Chaghatāy (ff.57b-74) and Ugedeyids (ff.74-89b). The brief section on the Ūzbeks (ff.51b-57a) is probably taken from NUSAKH.

12. /ILCHI/ (An Indian-Safavid General History to 1563-4)

Title: Tārīkh-i Ilchī-yi Nizām Shāh

Author: Khūrshāh ibn Qubād al-Husayni (of 'Irāq)

Reference: Storey p.113; C.Schéfer, Chrestomatie persane, tome ii (Paris 1885) pp.65-68

Manuscript: British Museum OR#153 (for the section on the Safavids) and Add#23,513 (for the section on the Turks, Mongols and Ūzbeks)

Scope: A General History to 971/1563-4, the final date of completion (f.73a). The relevant sections are: Maqāleh IV (ff.239a-243b;263b-267b) concerning the Turks and Mongols, and Maqāleh VI concerning the Qarā and Āq-quyūnlū and the Safavids. Maqāleh VI contains Guftār 3 dealing with Shāh Ismā'il and Shāh Tahmāsb (ff.32b-78b:Tahmāsb). (Guftār 4 is the section on Māzandarān edited by C.Schéfer, op.cit.)

Sources: A. Written: The author specifically cites his use made of TEZ (the Shāh's Diary) on f.45a-b and this made fully evident by his narration. In addition HABIB is cited of f.264a. A third written source is a mašnavī which is possibly Mīrzā Qāsim's Shāhnámeh. There are several obvious errors which stem from this mašnavī and also certain fresh information which is sometimes quite

dramatic in its implications (see above p.219). These unique details however cannot generally be verified by references to the other sources consulted.

B. Personal Sources: Much more important than these written sources are the personal observations made by the author who was official ambassador (ilchí) of Nizám Sháh of Ahmadnagar (in the Bombay area) to the Court of Sháh Tahmasb. he arrived in 952/1545 and remained for a year and a half during which time he was in close personal attendance upon the Sháh (f.60a-b). C. Schéfer, op.cit. p.66 states that the ilchí remained at the Court until 971/1563. I am however unable to locate this reference. The passage in question is possibly f.45a-b which states that Sháh Tahmasb's envoy to Qutb Sháh in the Deccan arrived in 971 and brought a copy of TEZ along as a gift to the Qutb Sháh which was put at the author's disposal; i.e. the author was in the Deccan at the time and not at Sháh Tahmasb's Court.

The sources for the period of 952 to the end are thus quite clearly 1) TEZ and 2) personal observation. The sources for the period of 930 to 951 are (except for TEZ) not so clear. From the astute observations made of factional politics at the Court during this period, it would seem that the ilchí must have been in close contact with prominent courtiers who had participated in these events. Neither the mašnaví, nor TEZ nor any of the other Safavid sources consulted could have been ILCHI's source for these independent notices. It should be noted that the period between 946 and 951 is glossed over.

General: ILCHI is extremely valuable as an independent contemporary account of the events at Court as interpreted by a keen foreign observer. Some of the unique references however are erroneous and others cannot be verified. The short section on the Úzbeks of Mávará'al-nahr is not as valuable.

JANG

(A history of Harát: ca.1494-1550)

Title: Jangnámeh-yi Sháh Ismá'il va Sháh Tahmasb (so styled in the Malik Library Handlist; it does not seem to have a more precise title)

Author: Amír Mahmúd ibn Amír Khwándamír (the son of the author of HABIB)

Reference: Storey pp.304,1279

Manuscript: British Museum OR#2939

There is a second British Museum MS which is incomplete, and an additional MS at Cambridge (probably the Ellis MS cited in Storey). To the list in Storey should be added another in the Malik Library in Tehran (#3882).

Scope: A history of Khurásán (mostly Harát): 900-957/1494-1550

Sources: While the period of Sháh Ismá'il is probably taken from HABIB, the period of Sháh Tahmásb is a first hand account written by a contemporary eyewitness. Thus on f.154b the author states that he was living in Harát at the time (941) of Sâm Mirzá's revolt; again on f.101a he describes the lynching of Núr al-Dín (942) and on f.172b the Úzbek atrocities (943) as an eyewitness. There are also frequent references to "reliable verbal sources" (ṣaḥāb, mardum-i ṣaḥīḥ al-qawl, etc.)

General: This is the most important source used; however since AFZAL, KHULASEH, ROUZAT and AHSAN have freely borrowed from it, to the extent of verbatim copying at times, it loses its value as a unique source. Its value is also somewhat marred by its indifference to events at Court, at the Western front and even at Mashhad. Without the other sources serving as a control, JANG would lose much of its value.

14. /JOUHAR/ (A history of Humáyún:d.1557)

Title: Taẓkirat al-Váqi'át

Author: Mihtar Jouhar

Reference: Storey p.536

Edition: English translation by Major C.Stewart (London 1832)

Scope: A history of Humáyún

15. /KHULASEH/ (A Safavid history to 1590-1)

Title: Khuláseh al-Tavárikh

Author: Qāzī Ahmad Ibráhīmī Husaynī Qumī ibn Mir Munshī Sharaf al-Dīn

Reference: Storey pp.1074,1279; W.Hinz, "Eine neuentdeckte Quelle zur Geschichte Irans im 10.Jahrhundert" (Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 89/3-4, 1935, pp.315-328.

Manuscript: In addition to the Berlin MS cited by Hinz (op.cit.) there are two private copies in the possession of Drs. Nafisī and Bayání in Tehran and a third in the Malik Library of Tehran (#4007). The MS used here was microfilmed from Dr.Bayání's copy (dated 1050) which he very graciously put at my disposal.

Scope: A chronologically arranged history (following the mixed Turkî-Hijrî system) of the Safavids to 999/1590-1. Of the 504 folio-pages, ff.91a-373a deal with the reign of Shâh Tahmâsb (ff.91a-176a cover the years 930-946).

Sources: Hinz (op.cit.) cites LUBB, JANG, NUSAKH, AHSAN plus two unknown sources: 1) Moulâna Hayyâtî Tabrizî and 2) Mîr Sultân Ibrâhîm Aminî Harâtî. The latter is possibly the same person who was active at the beginning of the "Harât Revolution" and was killed in the battle against Bayram Ūghlan in 941 and who is described in JANG as a poet and a munshî (see above p.304).

To this may be added: TUHFEH cited as Taẓkireh-yî Sâmi (ff.190a, 278a, 338a); the works of Mîrẓâ ʿĀsim Janābadî (see Storey p. 305) including a Vaqāyi'-i Hâlat-i Sultân Mahmūd Khân (the Mughal governor of Bâkar in Sind) (ff. 273a-275b, 359b); Târîkh-i Āl-i 'Uṣmân by Musliḥ al-Dîn Larî who is cited on f.354b as having been engaged in writing his history when the author met him in Baghdād in 904/1550-7 (see Babinger, op.cit., p. 94).

Personal Sources: The author's father was vazîr of Khurāsân (in Mashhad) from 902-909 and was then re-appointed in 975 (ff.234b, 239a, 243b, 250a, 268a, 269a, 341a). (See above p. XLVI for conflict with AFZAL.) Storey also notes that the author himself went to Mashhad in 904 and studied there for eight years. These connections with Mashhad undoubtedly account for the many unique details in this source relating to local events in Mashhad and to the administrative personnel there. Both the author and his father served as munshîs at the royal Court (ff.278b, 290a, 335a). This probably accounts for the important and unique sûrats included in the text.

General: The great importance of KHULASEH as an independent source (particularly for the events at Mashhad and for the sûrats begins at about 900/1553. For the 930-940 period it presents little data not found in JANG, AFZAL or AHSAN to which it is closely linked (to the extent of occasional verbatim identification). It is however one of the basic detailed sources for the period of this dissertation.

16. LUBB (A Safavid General History to 1542)

Title: Lubb al-Tavârikh

Author: Yahyâ ibn 'Abd al-Latîf al-Husaynî al-Qazvinî

Reference: Storey pp.111, 1239

Edition: Tehran (Khâvar) 1314

Scope: A short General History (264 pp.) written in 948/1542 (p. 263) and dedicated to Bahram Mirza (Shah Tahmasb's brother) (p.260). The section on the Safavids (pp.235-264) has 20 pages on Shah Isma'il (pp.240-260) and the last five pages on Shah Tahmasb. There is also a brief section on the Uzbeks of Mavera'al-nahr (pp.232-4).

General: The section of Shah Isma'il is important and along with HABIB was used by the later Safavid chroniclers. The brief section on Shah Tahmasb is devoted to a madh (praise) and has little factual information. The brief section on the Uzbeks is however worth noting, for a contemporary and dated succession of the grand khans is presented as well as an allusion to the Uzbek political system (p.233).

17. LUTFI (An Ottoman history to 1553)

Edition: Lutfi Paşa Tarihi (Istanbul 1341)

Reference: Babinger p.80

18. Majma' al-Khavass (A Safavid taẓkireh to ca.1600)

Author: Sādiq Kitābdār (Afshār)

Edition: (including Persian translation) by 'Abd al-Rusūl Khayyāmpūr (Tabriz 1327)

Reference: See above p.389 n.1

Scope: A taẓkireh of poets (written in Turkī) of the early period of Shah 'Abbās (MS dated 1016).

19. MIFTAH (A Safavid General History to ca.1610)

Title: Miftāh al-Qulūb

Author: Ahmad ibn Shams al-Dīn al-Asīl

Reference: Storey p.155

Manuscript: (unicum) Cambridge, Christ's College #Dd.4.6.

Scope: This is Jild III (with 504 folios) of what appears to be a large scale General History. It is a Safavid work for Shah Isma'il is referred to (f.541b) as nou bāreh-yi būstān-i hidāyat va vilāyat ("the first fruits of the garden of salvation and sanctity") while the reference to the Uzbeks (f.540a) is to ta'addī-yi Ūzbekān va ẓulm-i

Muhammad Shībānī ("the oppression of the Ūzbeks and the tyranny of Muhammad Shībānī"). This Jild III includes many of the contemporary petty dynasties as well as the Čarā and Āq-quyūnlū. The section of the Ūzbeks (ff. 537b-504) extends to Nadir Muhammad Khān (accession: 1017/1608). For Jild II see Storey loc.cit.

General: The section on the Ūzbeks is brief (except for the more detailed notice of 'Abdullāh Khān) and very little new information is added for the period of 'Ubayd Khān. The missing Jild I (presumably dealing with the Safavids) is possibly one of the "unknown sources" of AFZAL similarly entitled "Miftāh al-qulūb" (see above p.XLVI).

20. MUNECCIMBAŞI (An Ottoman General History to 1672)

Edition: Muneccimbaşı Tarihi (Sahaif-ül-Ahbar) in 3 vols. (Istanbul 1285)

Reference: Babinger p.234

21. MUNTAKHAB (A history of India from 997 to 1595)

Title: Muntakhab al-Tavārikh

Author: 'Abd al-Qādir Badā'ūnī

Reference: Storey p.435

Edition: English translation in 3 vols. by W.H.Lowe (Calcutta 1884-1925)

Note: References in dissertation are to vol.2 of the translation

22. MUQIM (An Ūzbek history to 1704-5)

Title: Taẓkireh-yi Muqīm Khānī

Author: Muhammad Yūsuf al-Munshī ibn Khwājeh Baqā Balkhī

Reference: Storey pp.380,1301

Manuscript: Royal Asian Society (#160, Case 2B)
Other MSS in Rome and Tashkent

Scope: A history of the Ūzbeks of Mávará'al-nahr to 1110/1704-5. Of the 105 folio-pages, only five (18a-22b) deal with the period from Shíbání Khán to the death of 'Ubayd Khán. This brief section is almost identical with ANONYM and ABD.

General: MUQIM is essentially a history of the second Ūzbek dynasty of Mávará'al-nahr (the Astrakhánids) (ff.33b to end). There is accordingly very little of concern to the period of this dissertation.

23. NIŞANCI (An Ottoman history to 1561)

Edition: Tarih-i Nişancı (Mehmet Paşa) (Istanbul 1279)

Reference: Babinger p.103

24. NUSAKH (A Şafavid General History to 1565-6)

Title: Nusakh-i Jahán-ará

Author: Qāzī Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-Ghaffārī al-Qazvīnī

Reference: Storey pp.116,1240

Manuscript: British Museum OR#141
To the 12 MSS listed in Storey (many incomplete)
add Malik Library #3889

Scope: A General History to 973/1565-6 (date given on f.203b) dedicated to Sháh Tahmasb and particularly valuable for its references to minor dynasties. The relevant sections here are in Nusakh II (ff.153b-159b) on the Júchids and including the lists of the grand kháns on Mávará'al-nahr and Khwárizm, and Nusakh III (ff.200a-211b on Sháh Ismá'il and ff.211b-237b on Sháh Tahmasb). The account is however very brief and consists of the major events arranged chronologically on the mixed Turkí-Hijrī system. There are a number of marginal additions which include fresh data not found elsewhere; however for the most part this is of very trifling detail.

General: NUSAKH, despite the fact that it is a fully contemporary source, is too sketchy to be of any great value; nonetheless, like the other minor sources it is useful as a control. The listing of the Ūzbek grand kháns, particularly of Khwárizm, is however of great importance, for despite its terseness it is most welcome in view of the absence of other sources. It is probably the source for the references to the Ūzbeks in the later General Histories. (See Appendix I p.IV for the "Nusakh-source".)

25. PEÇEVI (An Ottoman history from 1520-1639)
Edition: Tarih-i Peçevi , 2 vols. (Istanbul 1297)
Reference: Babinger p.192
Note: References in this dissertation are to vol.1.
26. QIPCHAQ (An Uzbek General History to 1725-6)
Title: Tārīkh-i Qipchāq Khānī
Author: Qipchāq Khān (Khwājam Bek Balkhī)
Reference: Storey pp.136,1243
Manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris) #348
Scope: An Uzbek General History to 1138/1725-6. Of the 630 folio pages, ff.578b-595b deal with the Abū'l-Khayrid Ūzbeks (with only ff.590a-591a for the entire period from Rūchim Khān to Ūbayd Khān).
General: Like the other Uzbek histories used, it is of minor value for the purposes of this dissertation.
27. RABINO (Epigraphic material from the Caspian provinces)
Title: Māzandarān and Astarābād
Author: H.L.Rabino
Edition: E.J.W.Gibb Memorial, New Series, vol.vii (London 1928)
Scope: A combined travelogue and history of the Caspian provinces, especially important for the recording of the inscriptions encountered by the author enroute.
28. RAQIM (An Uzbek history and taẓkireh to 1646-7)
Title: Tārīkhnāmeḥ-yi Rāqim
Author: Akhūnd Mullā Sharaf al-Dīn Aḥlam ibn Nūr al-Dīn
Reference: Storey pp.376,1301
Manuscript: Royal Asian Society (#102 Case 2A)
 Other MSS in Edinburgh, Paris, Tashkent

Scope: A taẓkireh of political figures, 'ulamá and poets of Mávará'-al-nahr (and to a lesser extent of India and Iran) with frequent use of chronograms up to 1056/1640-7. (RAQIM was however written in 1113/1701-2.) Of the 227 folio pages, ff.80a-95a concern Shíbání Khán, 95a-113b cover the period from 916-930, ff.114a-120b cover the period from 930-940.

General: Although RAQIM is not contemporary and its references to individuals and to events are brief, it is nonetheless the most useful of the Úzbek sources for the period of this dissertation.

29. RASHIDI (A Chaghatáy history to 1546)

Title: Táríkh-i Rashidí

Author: Mirzá Muhammad Haydar Dughlát

Reference: Storey pp.274, 1273
Introduction to the English translation

Edition: English "Version": The Táríkh-i Rashidí by N.Elias and E.Denison Ross (London 1895).
According to Zeki Velidi Togan, Tarihde Usul p.240, this English edition is "an abbreviated translation of certain parts of the book".

General: The history of the Chaghatáy written by an important figure in the events of his time (up to 1546). Although the period of Shíbání Khán is well covered there is very little concerning the Úzbeks of 930-940.

30. ROUZAT (A Safavid history to ca.1632)

Title: Rouzat al-Safaviyeh

Author: Mirzá Bek ibn Hasan Hasani Junábadi

Reference: Storey p.313

Manuscript: To Storey's British Museum MS (OR#3338) and the Lala Ismail MS (#340, now in Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul) should be added another MS in the Malik Library (#3923) and a fourth in the Majlis Library of Tehran. The British Museum MS is the one referred to here, although the missing end section has been copied out from the Istanbul MS.

Scope: ROUZAT is a detailed history of the Safavids to the year 1035/1025-6 in the reign of Sháh 'Abbás with two appendices (f.385a to end, f.402) which continue the narration beyond the accession of Sháh Safí to the year 1041-2. Of the 402 folio pages, ff.125b-225a are devoted to the period of Sháh Tahmásb and ff.125b-181a cover the years 930-940. The work itself must have been in progress for some time for on f.228a the author places the current year as 1028. The final Zikr ("rubric") relating to the events at Balkh is broken off in the British Museum MS but is given in complete form in the Istanbul MS.

Sources: The author lists his sources at the end of the Istanbul MS (ff.499b-500b) in a special Zikr entitled "Regarding the Reliability of the Riváyat of this Work Entitled 'Rouzát al-Safaviyeh'". These are: 1) HABIB for the period of Sháh Ismá'il up to the Battle of Cháldirán in 920/1514; 2) JANG for the years 921-957; 3) NUSAKH for the years 958-973; 4) rávis (accounts of "reliable eyewitnesses") for 974-996; 5) personal observation for the final period. This is however a rather modest account of the actual sources used, for while for the 930-957 period the narration of the events in Harát are clearly derived from JANG, there is nonetheless a great deal of supplementary information particularly in regard to the events at Court and in western Iran (disregarded in JANG). There is a parallel here (but by no means complete identification) with KHULASEH. This is also true of the period ascribed to NUSAKH; e.g. the important events at Harát and in Turkmenistan in 972-3 (ff.217b-221a) are given in considerable more detail than in the corresponding passages in NUSAKH (ff.235b-237b).

General: ROUZAT is a basic and independent source for the period of Sháh 'Abbás and should be consulted along with the more famous TAAA. It is almost as important for the period of Sháh Tahmásb, for while not of immediate contemporary nature, there are some unique details. But even more striking are the interpolations (sometimes in the form of a brief commentary) which are added to the standard narration in the interests of clarity or linkage with other events. This is particularly true for the use made of JANG, which is, as has been seen, extremely local in its orientation on Harát. Not all of ROUZAT's interpolations may be accepted, but they do have the value of an observation of past events from the vantage-point of a historian of the succeeding generation. Note might also be made here of the excellence and freshness in style of ROUZAT. The language used, while by no means primitive, is generally quite clear and direct, so that details left hazy in other versions by reason of the language employed, are brought into clear focus. A subjective reaction would be that ROUZAT is the most pleasing of the munshiyáneh-style sources that were consulted.

31. /SHARAF/ (A history of the Kurds to 1596)

Title: Sharafnámeh

Author: Sharaf Khán Bitlísí

Reference: Storey p.367

Edition: Text: by V.Velyaminov-Zernov, 2 vols. (St.Petersburg 1860-2); Translation: by F.B. Charmoy, Fastes de la nation kourde, 2 vols. (St.Petersburg 1868-75)

Note: References in this dissertation are to the translation

Scope: Essentially a history of the Kurds to 1005/1596, but also including a history of the contemporary events in Iran. For our purposes SHARAF is a minor source, although it is occasionally useful as a check on the major sources.

32. /SHIRAZI/ (A Mughal General History to ca.1012-3)

Title: Ahsan al-Taváríkh (or Muntakhab al-Taváríkh)

Author: Hasan Bek ibn Muhammad Bek Khákí Shírází

Reference: Storey pp.123,1241

Manuscript: British Museum OR#1049

Scope: A General History of 630 folio pages written by a Shírází in Akbar's service in India, extending to 1021 for India, 998 for Iran, 1014 for Mávárá'al-nahr and 994 for Khwárizm.

General: The section on the Safavids (ff.599b-630) is brief and resembles NUSAKH. It has some value since the dating is by Hijrí years (rather than by the mixed Turkí-Hijrí system) and there are occasional specific dates given for events which are not found in the other sources.

33. /SILSILAT/ (An Úzbek history to 1711-2)

Title: Silsilat al-Saláţín (and/or Taváríkh-i Badí'eh)

Author: Hájí Mír Muhammad Salím

Reference: Storey p.380

Manuscript: Bodleian (Ousley 269): unicum

Scope: The second part of the Bodleian manuscript (ff. 109a-end, 338a) is a history of the Uzbek dynasties of Mávará'al-nahr to 1123/1711-12 (the date of writing is given on f. 135a as 1143/1730-1). Of the section on the Abú'l-Khayrids (ff. 110a-155a) ff. 113a-121a cover the period after Shibáni Khán (d. 916) to 946.

General: Like the other late Uzbek histories consulted (MUQIM, QIPCHAQ, SUBHAN) this is essentially a history of the Astrakhanid dynasty. The references to the period of 'Ubayd Khán are too brief to be of major value.

24. SOLAKZADE (An Ottoman history to 1643-4)

Edition: Solakzade Tarihi (Istanbul 1297)

Reference: Babinger p. 203

35. SUBHAN (An Uzbek history and taẓkireh to 1697-8)

Title: Tárikh-i Subhan Qulí Khán

Author: Mír Muhammad Amin ibn Mírzá Zamán Balkhí

Reference: Storey p. 378

Manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris) #472
Other MSS in Kabul and Bukhara

Scope: A combination chronicle and taẓkireh for Mávará'al-nahr from Timúr to 1109. 1697-8. Of the 180 folio pages, ff. 47b-93a are devoted to the Abú'l-Khayrids (ff. 51a-53b deal with the period of 'Ubayd Khán).

General: Too brief and too late to be of much value for the purposes here; furthermore the section on the Jánibegids is near identical (in some passages--verbatim) with ANONYM and ABD.

36. SÜLEYMANNAME (A history of Sulaymán: 1520-1566)

Edition: Süleymanname (by Kara Çelebizade) (Bulak 1248)

Reference: Babinger p. 205

37. TAAK (A Safavid history to Sháh 'Abbás:d.1629)

Title: Tárikh-i 'Álam-Árá-yi 'Abbási

Author: Iskandar Bek Munshí (Turkmán)

Reference: Storey pp.310,1280

Edition: Tehran 1313-4/1396-7

Scope: The standard history of Sháh 'Abbás. Of the 768 pages (actually 795 pp; there is a pagination error of 27 pp. beginning on p.275), pp.1-274 is an introduction covering the period through Sháh Muhammad Khudábandeh. Of this, pp.33-95 deal with the the period of Sháh Tahmásb and pp. 95-136 contain a valuable taẓkireh for this period.

General: While the section devoted to Sháh Tahmásb is comparatively brief and little new data is to be found (in general, it may be said that AHSAN is the basic source here); nonetheless it is valuable for its method of presentation which links events by subject (e.g. relations with the Úzbeks, Mughals, Ottomans, etc.) rather than by chronology. Interrelationships of events are thus seen more clearly than is possible in the straight chronological presentation of the other sources. In addition, the appended taẓkireh is extremely useful for identifying the personnel active in the Sháh Tahmásb period.

38. TABAQAT (A history of India to 1592-3)

Title: Tabaqát-i Akbari

Author: Khwájeh Nizám al-Dín Ahmad

Reference: Storey p.433

Edition: English translation by B.De, 3 vols. (Calcutta 1913-39)

Note: References in this dissertation are to vol.2 of the translation

39. TEZ (Sháh Tahmásb's Diary to 1561-2)

Title: Taẓkireh-yi Sháh Tahmásb

Author: Sháh Tahmásb

Reference: Storey pp.305,1279

Edition: Berlin (Kaviani) 1343/1923
For other editions see Storey loc.sit.

Scope: The Diary of the Sháh extending from his accession to the execution of the Ottoman Prince Báyzíd in 969/1561-2

General: While brief (79 pp), TEZ is one of the major independent sources for following the internal Safavid history of the period. It is also particularly valuable for the relations with the Ottomans--very much less so, however, for the Úzbeks. It must be noted that without the standard Safavid chronicles to serve as a control, TEZ loses a great deal of its significance, for there are obvious exaggerations and many lacunae.

40. The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Sidi Ali Reïs
(Title of the English translation)

Title: Mir'at ül-memalik

Author: Sayyidí 'Alí Pa'ís

Edition: English translation by A.Vambéry (London 1899)

Reference: See above p.156

Scope: The travels of the Ottoman admiral from India to Istanbul (via Central Asia and Iran) in 1553-1556.

41. TUHFEH (A Safavid taẓkireh to 1550)

Title: Tuhfeh-yi Sámi

Author: Sâm Mirzá (the brother of Sháh Tahmásb)

Reference: Storey no.798,1335

Edition: Tehran 1314 (Shamsí)

Scope: A taẓkireh (191 pp.) of the contemporary poets written in 957/1550 with brief comments of the poets's biographies, their style and a few sample verses.

General: The biographical notices are much too brief to be of any great importance for the political orientation of this dissertation. The value of TUHFEH is essentially sociological as well as literary, and a detailed study would reveal a great deal of interest in social origins, the relationship of "Turk" and "Tájík", as well as the intellectual milieu of the Sháh Tahmásb period.

B. Secondary Sources

- Babinger, F., Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke (Leipzig 1927)
- Barthold, V.V., Histoire des turcs d'Asie centrale (Paris 1945)
Mussulman Culture, translation by S. Suhrawardy
(Calcutta 1934)
- Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entziklopediya, second edition (Moscow 1950-1957)
- Browne, E.G., A History of Persian Literature in Modern Times
(Cambridge 1924)
- Encyclopaedia of Islam, 4 volumes and supplement (London and Leyden
1913-1934)
- Gabain, A. von, Ozbekische Grammatik (Leipzig 1945)
- Howorth, Sir Henry H., History of the Mongols from the 9th to the
19th Century, 4 volumes (London 1875-1927)
- İslâm Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul 1940--)
- Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR (Akademiya Nauk Kazakhskoy SSR, Alma-Ata 1957)
- Istoriya Uzbekskoy SSR (Akademiya Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, Tashkent 1956)
- Keyhân, Mas'ûd, Jughráfiyâ-yi mufasssal-i îrân, 3 volumes (Tehran 1310-11)
- Lestrangé, G., The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate (Cambridge 1930)
- Minorsky, V., Tadhkirat al-mulúk (E.J.W. Gibb New Series xvi, London 1943)
- Radloff, W., Versuch eines Wörterbuches der Türk-Dialecte, 4 volumes
(St. Petersburg 1893-1911)
- Storey, C.A., Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey (London
1927--)
- Togan, A. Zeki Velidi, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve yakîn tarihi
(Istanbul 1942-1947)
Tarihde Usul (Istanbul 1950)
Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş (Istanbul 1946)

APPENDIX III: Table of Turki-Hijri-Miladi Correspondences
and Safavid-Uzbek Qishlaqs

TURKI	NOU RÚZ ca. March 11	A.H. A.D.	Muhar- ram 1	A.H.	Safavid Qishlaq	Uzbek Qishlaq
Píchí	5 JumI	930 1524	29 Oct	931	Tabríz	Harát (siege)
Takháqúy	16 "	931 1525	18 "	932	"	Bukhárá
Ít	27 "	932 1526	8 "	933	Qazvín	Mashhad (siege)
Túngúz	9 JumII	933 1527	27 Sept	934	"	Harát (siege)
Sichcán	19 "	934 1528	15 "	935	Qum	Bukhárá
Ód	29 "	935 1529	5 "	936	Qazvín	Harát
Bárs	11 Raj	936 1530	25 Aug	937	Isfahán	Bukhárá
Rúshcán	22 "	937 1531	15 "	938	Tabríz	Bukhárá or Mashhad
Lúy	3 Sha' b	938 1532	3 "	939	"	Harát (siege)
Yílán	14 "	939 1533	23 July	940	Harát	Bukhárá
Yúnt	25 "	940 1534	13 "	941	Ván (siege)	Bukhárá
Úy	7 Ram	941 1535	2 "	942	Tabríz	Mashhad (siege)
Píchí	18 "	942 1536	20 June	943	Marv (area)	Harát and Bukhárá
Takháqúy	28 "	943 1537	10 "	944	Tabríz	Bukhárá
Ít	9 Shav	944 1538	30 May	945	"	Úrganch and Bukhárá
Túngúz	21 "	945 1539	19 "	946	"	Bukhárá
Sichcán	2 Z. q.	946 1540				

Note: Jum--Jumádi; Raj--Rajab; Sha' b--Sha' bân; Ram--Ramazán;
 Shav--Shavval; Z. q.--Zú'l-qá'deh